View source for Chapter 1: Hybrid Threat Concepts

[[Category:FS]]
A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregu- lar forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Understanding hybrid threats involves several key concepts, most of which are not actually new.

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==Hybrid Threats== 
Hybrid threats are innovative, adaptive, globally connected, networked, and embedded in the clutter of local populations. They can possess a wide range of old, adapted and advanced technologies—including the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They can operate conventionally and unconven- tionally, employing adaptive and asymmetric combinations of traditional, irregular, and criminal tactics and using traditional military capabilities in old and new ways.

Threats can challenge U.S. access—directly and indirectly. They can attack U.S. national and political will with very sophisticated information campaigns as well as seek to conduct physical attacks on the U.S. homeland.

It is important to note that hybrid threats are not new. History is full of examples of how an adver- sary has prepared to use his relative perceived strengths against his opponent’s perceived weaknesses:
*1754 to 1763: regular British and French forces fought each other amidst irregular Colonialists fighting for the British and American Indians fighting for both sides.
*1814: Peninsula War ended after the combination of regular and irregular allied forces from Britain, Portugal, and Spain prevented France from controlling the Iberian Peninsula.
*1954 to 1976: Viet Cong and People’s Army of Vietnam combined irregular and regular forces in fighting the French and U.S. forces. Viet Cong would organize into conventional and uncon- ventional units.
*2006: Hezbollah mixed conventional capabilities (such as anti-armor weapons, rockets, and command and control networks) with irregular tactics (including information warfare, non- uniformed combatants, and civilian shielding). The result was a tactical stalemate and strategic setback for Israel.
 
The U.S. Army will face hybrid threats that simultaneously employ some combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements, to achieve their objectives. Hybrid threats will use an ever-changing variety of conventional and unconventional organizations, equipment, and tactics to create multiple dilemmas.

Hybrid threats seek to saturate the entire operational environment (OE) with effects that support their course of action and force their opponents to react along multiple lines of operation. A simple military at- tack may not present enough complexity to stretch resources, degrade intellectual capacity, and restrict freedom of maneuver. Instead, hybrid threats can simultaneously create economic instability, foster lack of trust in existing governance, attack information networks, provide a captivating message consistent with their goals, cause man-made humanitarian crises, and physically endanger opponents. Synchronized and synergistic hybrid threat actions can take place in the information, social, political, infrastructure, economic and military domains.

Opponents of hybrid threats will have difficulty isolating specific challenges. They will be forced to conduct economy of force measures on one or more of several lines of operation. Meanwhile, hybrid threats will continue to shift effort and emphasis to make all choices seem poor ones.

Hybrid threats are networks of people, capabilities, and devices that merge, split, and coalesce in action across all of the operational variables of the OE. Each separate actor and action of a hybrid threat can be defeated if isolated and the proper countermeasure is applied. By creating severe impacts across the total OE, a hybrid threat prevents its opponents from segregating the conflict into easily assailable parts. Often military action will be the least important of a hybrid threat’s activities, only coming after exploitation of all the other aspects of the OE has paralyzed its opponent.

Hybrid threats can include criminals and criminal groups used in conjunction with both regular and irregular forces. A picture of this future was provided by the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, in which Russia employed the many criminal elements operating in South Ossetia to conduct the cleansing of ethnic Georgians from that region. Additionally, criminal organizations have the potential to provide much- needed funding to operations and facilitate the purchase of equipment. Adversaries will be enabled by WMD and technologies that allow them to be disruptive on a regional and area basis.

Swift tactical success is not essential to victory. The dimension of time favors those fighting the United States. An enemy need not win any engagement or battles; the enemy simply must not lose the war. Wearing down the popular support for U.S. operations by simply causing a political and military stalemate can be all that is required to claim victory or to change U.S. behavior or policy.

The most challenging attribute of our adversaries will be their ability to adapt and transition. Their speed, agility, versatility, and changeability are the keys to success in a fight against a larger, more powerful opponent.

==Hybrid Adaptation==
Adaptation, broadly defined, is the ability to learn and adjust behaviors based on learning. Adaptation is closely linked to one’s OE and its variables. '''Adversaries can approach adaptation from two perspectives: natural and directed.'''

''Natural adaptation'' occurs as an actor (nation-state or non-state) acquires or refines its ability to apply its political, economic, military or informational power. Natural adaptation may be advanced through—
*Acquisition of technology, key capabilities, or resources (financial and material).
*Effective organization.
*Effective use of the information environment or even key regional or global alliances.

''Directed adaptation'' refers to adaptation, based specifically on lessons learned, to counter U.S. pow- er and influence. Counters to U.S. actions will be ever changing and likely conducted by a hybrid force. Hybrid threats will offer a mix of capabilities along the spectrum of conflict to counter U.S. military actions. Adversaries will learn from U.S. operations what works and what needs refinement. They will be Hybrid Threat Concepts whatever the U.S. force is not. Like natural adaptation, directed adaptation will inform issues of force design, military strategy, and operational designs.

Success goes to those who master the skills necessary to act, react, and adapt with speed and creativity. Enemies learn quickly and change, often unconstrained by rules or bureaucracy. While this may cause haphazard and incomplete change, it does allow a rapidity that is difficult to counter. Adversaries will continue to be adaptive in terms of using all available sources of power at their disposal.
 
==Hybrid Transitions==
One of the most dangerous aspects of a hybrid threat is the ability of its components to transition in and out of various forms. Military forces, for example, can remove uniforms and insignia and other indicators of status and blend in with the local population. Insurgent forces might abandon weapons and protest innocence of wrongdoing. Criminals might don the accoutrements of a local police force in order to gain access to a key facility.

Hybrid threats will use the difficulties of positive identification of threat actors as threat actors to their advantage. OEs will be replete with many actors conducting activities counter to U.S. interests but without a clear visual signature as to their status as threats. Indeed, often these actors will be providing sig- natures similar to friendly or neutral actors.

Time-honored concepts of “conventional” and “unconventional” war and “traditional” methods ver- sus “adaptive” methods are weapons to a hybrid threat. These concepts do not have meaning to a hybrid threat beyond their ability to be used against its opponents. Hybrid threats see war holistically and do not try to break it up into convenient pieces.

Hybrid threat forces will need to perform certain functions in order for them to succeed. Some functions at some points will best be performed by uniformed military forces. At other times or for other reasons, some functions will be best performed by irregular forces. At some points, both types of forces will be acting together. At others, they will shift between the status of regular and irregular. They may also use deception to shift between combatant and noncombatant status. Hybrid threats will present themselves in many ways but always maintain the ability to aggregate at the time and place of their choosing.