View source for TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics

[[Category:TC]]

== Introduction ==
This training circular (TC), as part of the TC 7-100 series, describes an opposing force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces for potential combat operations. This OPFOR reflects a composite of the characteristics of military and/or paramilitary forces that may be present in actual operational environments (OEs) in which U.S. forces might become involved in the near- and mid-term. Like those actual threats or enemies, the OPFOR will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The nature of OEs is constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments to keep pace with real-world developments.

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===Operational Environments===
The DOD officially defines an ''operational environment'' as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (JP 3-0). This definition applies to an OE for a specific operation, at any level of command. In planning a training scenario and its road to war, trainers need to take into consideration the entire OE and its impact on the OPFOR’s operations and tactics.

====Contemporary Operational Environment====
'''The ''Contemporary Operational Environment'' (COE) is the collective set of conditions, derived from a composite of actual worldwide conditions, that pose realistic challenges for training, leader development, and capabilities development for Army forces and their joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners.''' COE is a collective term for the related aspects of contemporary OEs that exist or could exist today or in the near- and mid-term future (next 10 years). It is not a totally artificial construct created for training. Rather, it is a representative composite of all the operational variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations in various actual OEs in this contemporary timeframe. This composite can, therefore, provide realistic and relevant conditions necessary for training and leader development.

=====Why It Is Called Contemporary=====
The COE is “contemporary” in the sense that it does not represent conditions that existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather those conditions that exist today and in the near- and mid-term future. This composite COE consists not only of the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the seven other operational variables that help define any OE.

===== Training Applications =====
The COE is particularly valuable in training. Its flexible composite should be capable of addressing the qualities of virtually any OE in which the units or individuals being trained might be called upon to operate. In training environments, an OE is created to approximate the demands of actual OEs that U.S. forces might encounter and to set the conditions for producing desired training outcomes. This involves the appropriate combination of an OPFOR (with military and/or paramilitary capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential adversaries) and other variables of the OE in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner. See TC 7-101 for more detail on the incorporation of the COE into the design of training exercises.

The Army trains as it will fight. It trains and educates its members to develop agile leaders and organizations able to adapt to any situation and operate successfully in any OE. A training objective consists of task, conditions, and standard. The “conditions” for Army training events must include an OE that is realistic, relevant, and challenging to the ability of the training unit to accomplish the same kinds of mission-essential tasks that would be required of it in an actual OE for an actual operation. As much as possible, a combination of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training enablers can help replicate conditions representative of an actual OE. (See FM 7-0.)

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''Conditions. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance''. (JP 1-02)
----In predeployment training, the OE created for a training exercise should represent as closely as possible the conditions of the anticipated OE for the actual mission. Otherwise, the OE for training may represent a composite of the types of conditions that might exist in a number of actual OEs.

====Operational Variables====

All military operations will be significantly affected by a number of variables in the OE beyond simply military forces. Analysis of any OE, including the composite OE created for training purposes, focuses on eight interrelated operational variables:
* '''Political.''' Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance— formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.
* '''Military.''' Explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE.
* '''Economic.''' Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.
* '''Social.''' Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.
* '''Information.'''   Describes   the   nature,   scope,  characteristics,   and  effects   of  individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
* '''Infrastructure.''' Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.
* '''Physical Environment.''' Includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations.
* '''Time.''' Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE.
The memory aid for these variables is PMESII-PT.

An assessment of these eight operational variables and their relationships helps to understand any OE and its impact on a particular operation. The operational variables form the basis for determining the conditions under which a unit will not only operate but also under which it will train. (See TC 7-101 for guidance on use of the operational variables in creating an appropriate OE for a training exercise.) Just as in an actual operation, commanders and staffs must seek to develop an understanding of the particular OE they face in a training event.

The OPFOR represents a major part of the military variable in training exercises. As such, it must fit in with the characteristics of the other seven operational variables that are selected for that exercise.

=== Opposing Force ===
AR 350-2, which establishes policies and procedures for the Army’s Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program, defines an ''opposing force'' as “a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing U.S. forces.” The TC 7-100 series describes the doctrine, organizations, and equipment of such an OPFOR and how to combine it with other operational variables to portray the qualities of a full range of conditions appropriate to Army training environments. As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring partner capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. force.

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''Note''. Although the OPFOR is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For example, some capability development activities that do not require simulation of a specific real- world potential adversary may use an OPFOR to portray the “threat” or “enemy.”
----When U.S. forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account the presence and influence of various types of threats and other actors. In a training environment, an OPFOR can represent a composite of those nation-state or non-state actors that constitute military and/or paramilitary forces that could present a threat to the United States, its friends, or its allies. As in actual OEs, the OE used in training environments will also include various types of other, nonmilitary actors that are not part of the OPFOR, but could be part of the OE. The OPFOR employs tactics that can either mitigate or exploit the OE.

The commander of a U.S. unit plans and conducts training based on the unit’s mission-essential task list and priorities of effort. The commander establishes the conditions in which to conduct training to standards. These conditions should include an OPFOR that realistically challenges the ability of the U.S. unit to accomplish its tasks. Training requirements will determine whether the OPFOR’s capabilities are fundamental, sophisticated, or a combination of these.

==== The Hybrid Threat for Training ====
In exercise design (see TC 7-101), the type(s) of forces making up the OPFOR will depend upon the conditions determined to be appropriate for accomplishing training objectives. In some cases, the OPFOR may only need to reflect the nature and capabilities of a regular military force, an irregular force, or a criminal organization. However, in order to be representative of the types of threats the Army is likely to encounter in actual OEs, the OPFOR will often need to represent the capabilities of a hybrid threat.

'''A ''hybrid threat'' is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.''' See TC 7-100 for more information on the nature of hybrid threats. However, TC 7-100.2 will focus on the representation of the tactics of such hybrid threats in training exercises. In that context, the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called ''the Hybrid Threat'', with the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid Threat. The HT is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat whose military and/or paramilitary forces are represented as an OPFOR in training exercises.

The OPFOR, when representing a hybrid threat, must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must be capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained.

Military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of the Army unit being trained.

The OPFOR tactics described in TC 7-100.2 are appropriate for use by an OPFOR that consists either entirely or partly of regular military forces. Some of these tactics, particularly those carried out by smaller organizations, can also be used by irregular forces or even by criminal elements. Even those tactics carried out primarily by regular military forces may involve other components of the HT acting in some capacity. When either acting alone or in concert with other components of the HT, irregular forces and/or criminal elements can also use other tactics, which are outlined in other parts of the TC 7-100 series.

==== Baseline OPFOR ====
This TC introduces the baseline tactical doctrine of a flexible, thinking, adaptive OPFOR that applies its doctrine with considerable flexibility, adaptability, and initiative. It is applicable to the entire training community, including the OPFORs at all of the combat training centers (CTCs), the TRADOC schools, and units in the field. It provides an OPFOR that believes that, through adaptive use of all available forces and capabilities, it can create opportunities that, properly leveraged, can allow it to fight and win, even against an opponent such as the United States.

As a baseline for developing specific OPFORs for specific training environments, this TC describes an OPFOR that is representative of the forces of contemporary nation-states. This composite of the characteristics of real-world military forces (possibly combined with irregular forces and/or criminal elements) provides a framework for the realistic and relevant portrayal of capabilities and actions that U.S. armed forces might face in actual OEs.

==== The State ====
TC 7-100.2 outlines the tactical-level doctrine of an OPFOR that primarily represents the armed forces of a nation-state. For this composite of real-world nation-state threats, the TC 7-100 series refers to the country to which the regular military forces belong as “the State.” The general characteristics of State’s doctrine and strategy could fit a number of different types of potential adversaries in a number of different scenarios.
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''Note''. In specific U.S. Army training environments, the generic name of the State may give way to other fictitious country names. (See guidance in AR 350-2.)
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The OPFOR exists for the purpose of opposing U.S. forces in training exercises. However, like most countries in the world, the State typically does not design its forces just to fight the United States or its allies. It may design them principally to deal with regional threats and to take advantage of regional opportunities. At the same time, the State is aware that aggressive pursuit of its regional goals might lead to intervention by a major power, such as the United States, from outside the region. To the extent possible, therefore, it might invest in technologies and capabilities that have utility against both regional and extraregional opponents. The basic force structure of the OPFOR is the same for conflict with either type of opponent.

The State must go to war⎯or continue the war after extraregional intervention⎯with whatever forces and capabilities it had going into the war. However, it can adapt how it uses those forces and capabilities to fit the nature of the conflict and its opponent(s). Either on its own or as part of the HT for training, the State can employ adaptive strategy, operations, and tactics.

At the strategic level, the State’s ability to challenge U.S. interests includes not only the military and paramilitary forces of the State, but also the State’s diplomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Rarely would any country engage the United States or a U.S.-led coalition with purely military means. Trainers need to consider the total OE and all instruments of power at the disposal of the State⎯not just the military element. It is also possible that the State could be part of an alliance or coalition, in which case the OPFOR could include multinational forces. These nation-state forces may also operate in conjunction with non-state actors such as irregular forces or criminal elements as part of the HT for training.

==== Flexibility ====
The OPFOR must be flexible enough to fit various training requirements. It must be scalable and tunable. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be   state-of-the-art, relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of those categories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.

In the OPFOR baseline presented in this TC, the authors often say that the State or the OPFOR “may” be able to do something or “might” or “could” do something. They often use the progressive forms of verbs to say that the State “is developing” a capability or “is continually modernizing.” The State participates in the global market, which can allow it to acquire things it cannot produce domestically. Such descriptions give scenario writers considerable flexibility in determining what the State or the OPFOR actually has at a given point in time or a given place on the battlefield⎯in a particular scenario.

==== Thinking ====
This TC describes how the OPFOR thinks, especially how it thinks about fighting its regional neighbors and/or the United States. This thinking determines basic OPFOR tactics—as well as strategy and operations, which are the subject of FM 7-100.1). It drives OPFOR organizational structures and equipment acquisition or adaptation. It also determines how the nation-state OPFOR that represents the armed forces of the State would interact with other, non-state actors that may be present in the COE.

Just because the U.S. force knows something about how the OPFOR has fought in the past does not mean that the OPFOR will always continue to fight that way. A thinking OPFOR will learn from its own successes and failures, as well as those of its potential enemies. It will adapt its thinking, its makeup, and its way of fighting to accommodate these lessons learned. It will continuously look for innovative ways to deal with the United States and its armed forces.

==== Adaptability ====
The OPFOR has developed its doctrine, force structure, and capabilities with an eye toward employing them against both regional and extraregional opponents, if necessary. It has thought about and trained for how to adapt once an extraregional force becomes engaged. It has included this adaptability in its doctrine in the form of general principles, based on its perceptions of the United States and other threats to its goals and aspirations. It will seek to avoid types of operations and environments for which U.S. forces are optimized. During the course of conflict, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.

In general, the OPFOR will be less predictable than OPFORs in the past. It will be difficult to template as it adapts and attempts to create opportunity. Its patterns of operation will change as it achieves success or experiences failure. The OPFOR’s doctrine might not change, but its way of operating will.

==== Initiative ====
Like U.S. Army doctrine, OPFOR doctrine must allow sufficient freedom for bold, creative initiative in any situation. OPFOR doctrine is descriptive, but not prescriptive; authoritative, but not authoritarian; definitive, but not dogmatic. The OPFOR that U.S. units encounter in various training venues will not apply this doctrine blindly or unthinkingly, but will use its experience and assessments to interpolate from this baseline in light of specific situations. Thus, U.S. units can no longer say that the OPFOR has to do certain things and cannot do anything that is not expressly prescribed in established OPFOR doctrine. Doctrine guides OPFOR actions in support of the State’s objectives; OPFOR leaders apply it  with judgment and initiative.

==== Terminology ====
Since OPFOR baseline doctrine is a composite of how various forces worldwide might operate, it uses some terminology that is in common with that of other countries, including the United States. Whenever possible, OPFOR doctrine uses established U.S. military terms⎯with the same meaning as defined in FM 1-02 and/or JP 1-02. However, the TC 7-100 series also includes some concepts for things the OPFOR does differently from how the U.S. military does them. Even if various real-world foreign countries might use the same concept, or something very close to it, different countries might give it different names. In those cases, the OPFOR TCs either use a term commonly accepted by one or more other countries or create a new, “composite” term that makes sense and is clearly understandable. In any case where an operational or tactical term is not further specifically defined in the TC 7-100 series, it is used in the same sense as in the U.S. definition.
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''Note''. After this introduction, the chapters of this TC address their topics from the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the OPFOR and allied or affiliated forces. Likewise, enemy refers to the enemy of the OPFOR, which may be an opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent (normally the United States or a U.S.-led coalition).
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=== The COE and OPFOR Continue to Evolve ===
Taking into consideration adversaries in real-world OEs and desired training outcomes and leader development goals, the authors of TC 7-100 series have developed an OPFOR doctrine and structure that reflect those of forces that could be encountered in actual OEs. While the Army integrates this OPFOR and other operational variables into training scenarios, the authors of the TC 7-100 series are continuing to research real-world OEs and to mature the OPFOR in training in order to provide a richer, appropriately challenging training environment and keep the OPFOR and the COE truly “contemporary.”

The nature of real-world OEs and potential OEs is extremely fluid, with rapidly changing regional and global relationships. New actors⎯both nation-states and non-state actors⎯are constantly appearing and disappearing from the scene. As the United States and its military forces interact with  various OEs worldwide, the OEs change, and so does a composite of those OEs. Therefore, the nature of the COE for training is adaptive and constantly changing. As the Army applies the lessons learned from training, the OPFOR and potential real-world adversaries will also learn and adapt.

The OPFOR tactical doctrine provided in this TC should meet most of the U.S. Army’s training needs for the foreseeable future. In the near- and mid-term, almost anyone who fights the United States would probably have to use the same kinds of adaptive action as outlined in this doctrine.

However, as real-world conditions, forces, or capabilities change over time, OPFOR doctrine and its applications will evolve along with them, to continue to provide the Army an appropriate OPFOR. Thus, the OPFOR will remain capable of presenting a challenge that is appropriate to meet evolving training requirements.

==Chapter 1: Strategic and Operational Framework==
{{Main article|Chapter 1: Strategic and Operational Framework}}
This chapter describes the State’s national security strategy and how the State designs campaigns and operations to achieve strategic goals outlined in that strategy. This provides the general framework within which the OPFOR plans and executes military actions at the tactical level, which are the focus of the remainder of this TC. See FM 7-100.1 for more detail on OPFOR operations.

==Chapter 2: Command and Control==
{{Main article|Chapter 2: Command and Control}}
This chapter focuses on tactical command and control (C2). It explains how the OPFOR expects to direct the forces and actions described in other chapters of this TC. Most important, it shows how OPFOR commanders and staffs think and work. In modern war, the overriding need for speedy decisions to seize fleeting opportunities drastically reduces the time available for decisionmaking and for issuing and implementing orders. Moreover, the tactical situation is subject to sudden and radical changes, and the results of combat are more likely to be decisive than in the past. OPFOR C2 participants, processes, and systems are designed to operate effectively and efficiently in this environment.

==Chapter 3:Offense==
{{Main article|Chapter 3: Offense}}
The offense carries the fight to the enemy. The OPFOR sees this as the decisive form of combat and the ultimate means of imposing its will on the enemy. While conditions at a particular time or place may require the OPFOR to defend, defeating an enemy force ultimately requires shifting to the offense. Even within the context of defense, victory normally requires some sort of offensive action. Therefore, OPFOR commanders at all levels seek to create and exploit opportunities to take offensive action, whenever possible.

==Chapter 4: Defense==
{{Main article|Chapter 4: Defense}}
While the OPFOR sees the offense as the decisive form of military action, it recognizes defense as the stronger form of military action, particularly when faced with a superior foe. Defensive operations can lead to strategic victory if they force a stronger invading enemy to abandon his mission. It may be sufficient for the OPFOR simply not to lose. Even when an operational-level command as a whole is conducting an offensive operation, it is likely that one or more tactical-level subordinate units may be executing defensive missions to preserve offensive combat power in other areas, to protect an important formation or resource, or to deny access to key facilities or geographic areas. The same is true of subordinate units within a tactical-level command.

==Chapter 5: Battle Drills==
{{Main article|Chapter 5: Battle Drills}}
The OPFOR derives great flexibility from battle drills. Unlike the U.S. view that battle drill, especially at higher levels, reduces flexibility, the OPFOR uses minor, simple, and clear modifications to thoroughly understood and practiced battle drills to adapt to ever-shifting conditions. It does not write standard procedures into its combat orders and does not write new orders when a simple shift from current formations and organization will do.

==Chapter 6: Other Combined Arms Actions==
{{Main article|Chapter 6: Other Combined Arms Actions}}
The OPFOR’s basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. Brigades, divisions, and tactical groups conduct or organize combined arms actions other than the basic types of offensive and defensive action outlined in chapters 3 and 4. The tactics described in this chapter are employed in combat actions that could be either offensive or defensive in nature.

==Chapter 7: Information Warfare==
{{Main article|Chapter 7: Information Warfare}}
The OPFOR is constantly increasing the levels of technology used in its communications, automation, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems. In order to ensure the successful use of information technologies and to deny the enemy the advantage afforded by such systems, the OPFOR has continued to refine its doctrine and capabilities for information warfare (INFOWAR). The OPFOR knows it cannot maintain continuous information dominance, particularly against peer or more powerful opponents. Therefore,  it  selects for  disruption only those  targets most critical to ensuring the successful achievement of its objectives. It attempts to gain an information advantage only at critical times and places on the battlefield. This chapter focuses on INFOWAR activities at the tactical level.

==Chapter 8: Reconnaissance==
{{Main article|Chapter 8: Reconnaissance}}
To the OPFOR, the single most important component of military action is reconnaissance. Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with organizing, collecting, and studying information on the operational environment associated with the area of upcoming battles. Aggressive, continuous reconnaissance allows the timely accomplishment of combat missions with minimum losses. Poor reconnaissance can lead directly to failure. The OPFOR commits significant resources to any reconnaissance mission.

==Chapter 9: Indirect Fire Support==
{{Main article|Chapter 9: Indirect Fire Support}}
Modern battle is, above all, a firefight⎯in which indirect fire plays a decisive role in the effective engagement of the enemy. Uninterrupted and very close cooperation with the maneuver of supported combined arms units is the basis of the actions of indirect fire support units.

==Chapter 10: Aviation==
{{Main article|Chapter 10: Aviation}}
The ability of the OPFOR to employ its aviation assets will depend on the level of airspace dominance the OPFOR possesses. When fighting a weaker opponent, the OPFOR expects to establish and maintain air superiority and thus to employ its aviation with relative ease. When faced with a superior enemy, however, the OPFOR will alter aviation missions to ensure the most effective use of its air power without the unnecessary loss of assets. In either situation, the OPFOR makes maximum use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at all levels. This chapter addresses the OPFOR aviation tactics of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs. 

==Chapter 11: Air Defense==
{{Main article|Chapter 11: Air Defense}}
Air defense is an integral component of combined arms combat. The OPFOR system of air defense includes the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This chapter concentrates on tactical-level air defense. It discusses operational-level air defense only when it contributes to an understanding of tactical air defense and the relationship between the two. 

==Chapter 12: Engineer Support==
{{Main article|Chapter 12: Engineer Support}}
The OPFOR realizes that engineer support is vital for the successful execution of combat. Due to the fluid nature of modern combat, effective engineer support is essential for ground forces to employ or preserve combat power, as the conditions dictate. Engineer support can give combat forces the ability to maneuver quickly to exploit windows of opportunity. It can help change the nature of the conflict to something for which the enemy is not prepared.

==Chapter 13: CBRN and Smoke==
{{Main article|Chapter 13: CBRN and Smoke}}
The use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons can have an enormous impact on all combat actions. Because chemical employment is more likely than the other three types, this chapter begins by focusing on OPFOR chemical capabilities. Because the OPFOR may also have some biological, nuclear, and radiological capabilities, these also deserve discussion, despite of the lower probability of their employment. The chapter concludes with discussions of CBRN protection and employment of smoke.

==Chapter 14: Logistics==
{{Main article|Chapter 14: Logistics}}
Logistics is the process of planning and executing the sustainment of forces in support of military actions. At the tactical level, it focuses on the traditional combat service support functions of materiel support (supply), maintenance, transportation, personnel support, and medical support. These tasks present a challenge in modern combat, where there is not always a clearly defined front line or a relatively secure rear area. Combat can spread over a deep and wide area. Within such an area, combat actions and attrition may not occur evenly or predictably. There may be areas of intense battles and local destruction, while other secondary or defensive sectors have much lighter logistics demands. This requires a flexible logistics system designed to sustain forces throughout conflict, adapting as conditions change.

==Chapter 15: Special-Purpose Forces and Commandos==
{{Main article|Chapter 15: Special-Forces and Commandos}}
The OPFOR includes both special-purpose forces (SPF) and commandos, each of which are discussed in their respective sections in this chapter. The chapter also clarifies the relationships between the two types of units in terms of command and control (C2), organization for combat, and tactical capabilities.

==Chapter 16: Marksmen and Snipers==
{{Main article|Chapter 16: Marksmen and Snipers}}
The OPFOR recognizes both marksmen and snipers as significant combat multipliers at the tactical level. It also realizes that their successes (especially those of snipers) may have an impact at the operational and strategic levels as well. Marksmen and snipers each fill a unique niche and are an integral part of virtually all OPFOR tactical actions. This chapter primarily addresses the use of marksmen and snipers subordinate to an OPFOR regular military force, since that is the focus of this TC.