View source for Appendix A: Information Warfare

: ''This page is a section of [[TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces|TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces]].''
The irregular OPFOR (including insurgents, guerrillas, and criminal elements) is trained to use adaptive techniques to defeat a superior opponent. Naturally it uses information warfare (INFOWAR) to obtain asymmetrical effects. These tactics are constantly evolving thanks to the exponential growth of networking and information technology. Increased accessibility to the Internet, commoditization of information, and unprecedented global awareness provide the irregular OPFOR with the ability to focus its INFOWAR activities on one of the enemies greatest weaknesses—his dependence on information communication technology in every aspect of his operations.

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== General Characteristics ==

The irregular OPFOR, along with the regular OPFOR, defines ''information warfare'' as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. Conducted in conjunction with offensive or defensive actions, INFOWAR is designed to exploit the weaknesses of the opponent’s information systems.

=== Goals ===

The primary goals of INFOWAR are to—
* Influence the enemy’s decisionmaking through his collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes.
* Retain the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems.

=== Tactical Tasks ===

The effects of INFOWAR can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint. However, the irregular OPFOR highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of INFOWAR at the tactical level:
* '''Destroy.''' Destruction tasks physically render the enemy’s information systems ineffective. Destruction is most effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a command and control (C2) function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute. Neutralizing or destroying the opponent’s information capability can be brought about by physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
* '''Degrade.''' Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s information infrastructure, information systems, and information collection means.
* '''Disrupt.''' Disruption activities focus on disrupting enemy observation and sensor capabilities at critical times and locations. Disruption impedes the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and obtain or maintain information dominance.
* '''Deny.''' Denial activities attempt to limit the enemy’s ability to collect or disseminate information on the irregular OPFOR or deny his collection efforts.
* '''Deceive.''' Deception activities strive to mislead the enemy’s decisionmakers and manipulate his overall understanding of OPFOR activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes disorientation among decisionmakers within their decision cycle.
* '''Exploit.''' Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemy’s C2 or reconnaissance intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities to the advantage of the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR also uses its various INFOWAR capabilities to exploit any enemy vulnerability.
* '''Influence.''' Influencing information affects an enemy’s beliefs, motives, perspectives, and reasoning capabilities, in order to support irregular OPFOR objectives. This may be done through misinformation or by manipulating or “spinning” information.

=== INFOWAR Elements ===

Across the spectrum of competition, conflict, and war, the following elements are integrated when developing and implementing INFOWAR:
* '''Electronic warfare (EW).''' Activity conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the irregular OPFOR.
* '''Deception.''' Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
* '''Physical destruction.''' Use of all types of weapons and explosives to destroy critical components of the enemy force, focusing on C2 nodes and RISTA sensors.
* '''Protection and security measures.''' A wide range of activities (including the elements of deception and EW) to enhance survivability and preserve combat power.
* '''Perception management.''' Measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits irregular OPFOR objectives.
* '''Information attack (IA).''' Intentional disruption or distortion of ''information'' in a manner that supports accomplishment of the irregular OPFOR mission.
* '''Computer warfare.''' Attacks focused specifically on computer ''systems, networks, and nodes''.
The seven elements of INFOWAR do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets requires that they all be integrated into a single, integrated INFOWAR plan. However, effective execution of INFOWAR does not necessarily involve the use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is required to successfully execute a tactical INFOWAR action. Nevertheless, using one element or subelement, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of INFOWAR.
The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the tactical situation and support to the overall objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to which the irregular OPFOR employs the various elements of INFOWAR. The commander or leader has the freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his tactical needs, within the bounds of guidance from higher authority. The resources and capabilities of the irregular OPFOR, and the appropriateness of the INFOWAR medium to the target, determine the choices and the extent to which the various INFOWAR elements are employed and integrated.

=== Tools ===

Tools for waging INFOWAR can include, but are not limited to—
* Conventional physical and electronic destruction means.
* Malicious software.
* Denial-of-service attacks.
* The Internet.
* The media.
* International public opinion.
* Communication networks.
* Various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.
The irregular OPFOR can employ INFOWAR tools from both civilian and military sources and from assets of third-party actors.
In some cases, the irregular OPFOR will conduct INFOWAR activities that are criminal in nature. For example, it may—
* Use known computer exploitation tactics such as identity theft and industrial espionage.
* Sell its computer warfare capabilities to create additional funding for its operations.

=== Targets ===

The OPFOR sees the targets of INFOWAR as an opponent’s—
* Decisionmakers.
* Weapons and hardware.
* Critical information infrastructure.
* C2 system.
* Information and telecommunications systems.
* C2 centers and nodes.
Information links, such as transmitters, communication devices, and protocols, will be targeted. The irregular OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate, influence, use, or destroy an information link. See table A-1 for typical examples of INFOWAR objectives and targets.

{| class="wikitable"
|+ Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets
!'''''Elements'''''
!'''''Objectives'''''
!'''''Targets'''''
|-
|Electronic Warfare (EW)
|Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
|C2 and RISTA assets and networks.
|-
|Deception
|Mislead enemy decisionmakers.

Cause confusion and delays in the decisionmaking process.

Persuade the local population and/or international community to support irregular OPFOR objectives.
|Key military decisionmakers.

General population and international media sources and Internet sites.
|-
|Physical Destruction
|Destroy the enemy’s information infrastructures.
|C2 nodes and links, RISTA assets, telecommunications, and power sources.
|-
|Protection and Security Measures
|Protect critical assets.
|Enemy RISTA assets.
|-
|Perception Management
|Distort reality or manipulate information to support irregular OPFOR goals.
|Enemy RISTA assets.

Local populace and leaders.

Media sources (international and domestic).
|-
|Information Attack (IA)
|Alter or deny key information.
|Decisionmakers and other users of information.

Systems reliant on accurate information.
|-
|Computer Warfare
|Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s computer networks and information flow.
|C2 and RISTA assets and networks.
|}

=== Windows Of Opportunity ===

To conduct successful action against a more powerful enemy force likely enjoying a technological overmatch, the irregular OPFOR must exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment (OE). Most often, however, the irregular OPFOR will have to create its own opportunities. INFOWAR can help create the necessary windows of opportunity for any type of offensive or defensive action, by executing deception techniques, EW, perception management, and/or physical destruction.
Specific INFOWAR activities that can limit enemy force effectiveness can include—
* Deceiving enemy forces with recurring social and political activities by active supporters of the irregular OPFOR that appear non-threatening in the vicinity of the targeted objective.
* Exploiting enemy information collection with false intelligence provided by active supporters of the irregular OPFOR and/or insider threats.
* Disrupting enemy information collection through coercion and extortion of the relevant population to not cooperate with enemy forces.
* Influencing enemy forces with misinformation and/or manipulated claims against the governing authority to which the enemy forces belong.
* Demonstrating the inability of enemy forces to protect civilians, effectively defend civil and/or military facilities, and/or safeguard key representatives of the governing authority.
* Psychologically isolating the enemy force and governing authority from each other as well as from a relevant civilian population.
* Creating a positive impression of irregular OPFOR actions and objectives among local, regional, and/or global audiences.
* Influencing a local, regional, and/or global audience with near real-time media coverage of successful irregular OPFOR actions against enemy forces and the governing authority.
* Using media releases to indicate the increasing discontent in a relevant population due to the governing authority’s actions and reactions affecting daily civil commerce and lifestyles.
* Using progressive INFOWAR activities to degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing authority to continue counterinsurgent, counter-guerrilla, or anti-crime operations.

== INFOWAR Organizations ==

Various types on non-state actors might be part of the irregular OPFOR, affiliated with it, or support it in some manner. Even those organizations that do not belong to the irregular OPFOR or support it directly or willingly could be exploited or manipulated to support its objectives. Irregular INFOWAR organizations can be semiformal in the case of insurgent organization or ad hoc in informal organizations such as guerrillas or criminal gangs. In most case, the irregular forces are organized to perform a specific mission. Their number and size will increase or decrease based on the tactical situation.
INFOWAR organizations conduct actions either in support of or independent of established irregular OPFOR units. The determining factors are base on those means that achieve their goals expeditiously.
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'''''Note.''''' Special-purpose forces (SPF) can organize, train, and support parts of the irregular OPFOR (insurgents or guerrillas and possibly even criminal organizations) and conduct operations in conjunction with them. SPF missions can also include the use of INFOWAR.
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Criminal elements will engage in INFOWAR activities to protect their operations. However, some criminal organization specialize in INFOWAR and use technology to illegally produce profits either by acquiring sensitive financial information or by selling hacking services and malware toolkits. (See [[Chapter 4: Criminals|chapter 4]] for more information.) INFOWAR organizations will provide a variety of products and technical assistance to aligned irregular forces through direct action cells or through specialized INFOWAR cells.

=== INFOWAR Cells ===

In a local or higher insurgent organization, an INFOWAR cell plans, coordinates, and implements the organization’s INFOWAR plan and provides guidance and assistance to the INFOWAR direct action cells whenever required. The INFOWAR cell may use a variety of lethal and nonlethal methods to influence the enemy and the population. Examples of such activities include but are not limited to—
* Propaganda such as night letters and disinformation campaigns.
* Incentivizing of destabilization activities such as criminal activities.
* Assassinations and sabotage.
IED and other terrorist attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may also be used in a manner to deceive the enemy and confuse the source of the attacks. The ultimate goal of the INFOWAR cell is to create and maintain the perception that the enemy cannot provide security and stability to the population.
Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be capable of several functions. Multiple functions and activities are necessary if the enemy has mounted his own INFOWAR campaign. Some example functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are—
* Information management (internal methods, links, and security).
* Media manipulation, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and public affairs designed to influence the population.
* Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of direct action teams, or printing).
* Rumor control (misinformation and disinformation).
* Sabotage actions.
* Civic actions.
* Indoctrination training.
* Fund-raising (including international).
* Recruiting.
* Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence.
All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.

=== INFOWAR Direct Action Cells ===

An INFOWAR direct action cell supports the insurgent organization’s INFOWAR plan and may or may not receive guidance from the INFOWAR cell. Direct action as the title indicates is the nature of its objective, purpose, and role. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other terror attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. These attacks may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the attack to their enemy.
Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, an INFOWAR direct action cell may be capable of several functions. Some example functions performed by this cell are—
* Selective sabotage actions.
* Information management
* Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation—PSYWAR).
* Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos, broadcast successes of other direct action teams).
* Civic actions.
* Assistance in the cyber-mining for intelligence.
All of these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals.
Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function (PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other experts. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell may be dispersed and are assigned as the mission dictates. When countering the enemy’s INFOWAR campaign, specific knowledge of stabilizing factors and systems is required. For example, if the enemy engages in reconstruction efforts the direct action cell may require specific knowledge to sabotage the operation.
The mission, combat conditions, and many other variables determine the configuration and composition of each direct action cell. Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. Cell composition is not fixed and varies from cell to cell, mission to mission, and OE to OE. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons appropriate to the mission. Other equipment is added as required, such as computers, computer rigged vehicles, specialized antennas, and communications. Several members of the direct action cell may be hired INFOWAR specialists. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the cell. There may be as few as one INFOWAR direct action cell to over 20 INFOWAR direct action cells, depending on the mission and other factors. Portions of the INFOWAR direct action cell are probably dispersed.

=== Support To INFOWAR Cells ===

Irregular OPFOR organizations at times will compete for limited resources either from their higher headquarters or from an external supporting state or non-state actors. This competition appears to the outside observer as disjointed or lacking the discipline needed for unity of effort. However, individual leaders of the irregular OPFOR are allowed to develop lines of operation as it sees fit given the unique set of circumstances of its area of responsibility and the means at its disposal. When a particular tactic is proven to be effective, it will be replicated as necessary in order to exploit success, increase the perception of legitimacy for the irregular OPFOR cause, and to give the impression of progress. This sort of “groping in the dark” for a successful strategy means that the irregular OPFOR is able to experiment to find what works and to capitalize on effective tactics. The key is to open as many inroads as possible and to increase the likelihood for windows of opportunity for the irregular OPFOR to exploit the political, economic or social situation.
The operational variables will determine whether or not a local area will require all of the elements of tradecraft for a complete perception management campaign. Important issues such as regional conflicts, underprivileged and underrepresented populations, and the location of political, commercial or economic power centers, all have the potential to be targets of an INFOWAR campaign plan. Support may come in many forms from the general population. Online chat rooms, radio and television opinion shows and politically motivated groups may all provide support to the INFOWAR mission. As the irregular OPFOR assess the local environment and the enemy’s center of gravity is determined, INFOWAR planners will target select groups, organizations, and individuals for a variety of activities.
Some INFOWAR missions may require cultural insights, organizational intelligence, and specialized expertise for use in an INFOWAR campaign. For example, the media manipulation function (PSYWAR) may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, a tribal, ethnic, or cultural leader; or other experts. Other functions could be used to obtain specific technical expertise such as the configuration of important infrastructure, industrial, economic, and financial systems to develop targets for cyber attack. INFOWAR activities will leverage the knowledge of individuals employed by these sectors of the operational environment.

== INFOWAR Support To Irregular OPFOR ==

INFOWAR activities support all of the categories of irregular OPFOR—insurgents, guerrillas, and criminal elements. INFOWAR Cells provide the ways and means to conduct all elements of INFOWAR activities. INFOWAR actions in the form of perception management or propaganda are designed to garner support of the population for the irregular OPFOR. By establishing seemingly innocuous activities such as web logs (blogs) and news outlets, INFOWAR cells can establish inroads for C2 functions, targeting and other support functions. By targeting an information system’s weakest link, (the user), INFOWAR cells can obtain information that provides inroads for further attacks by the irregular OPFOR or to by components of the Hybrid Threat. If the current governing authority has control over information technology, INFOWAR cells can conduct their operations from the sanctuary of a sympathetic nation.
INFOWAR activities provide support to the irregular OPFOR covertly in both times of peace and times of war. OPFOR INFOWAR organizations can provide a variety of products and technical assistance to aligned irregular organizations. INFOWAR cells also provide information technology resources such as servers and networks to the irregular OPFOR in order to protect INFOWAR activities and disassociate it from INFOWAR operations.
Some examples of INFOWAR support—
* Locations of media outlets and personalities both friendly and enemy.
* Accepted customs and norms and practices used to foster support for the irregular OPFOR.
* Inside access to government, commercial, and financial leaders and institutions that support the enemy.
* Locations of civilian and government communications infrastructure.
* Distracting of enemy forces through instantaneous civil disobedience such as flash mobs.
* Economic data vital to projecting required resources necessary to establish local rapport.
* Established networks for recruiting and mobilization of combatants and noncombatants.
* Enemy forces mission command tactics techniques and procedures, and command and control structure.
INFOWAR cells provide advisors and technological resources to the irregular OPFOR in either a covert or clandestine manner depending on the objective. Examples of such support could include either all or some of the elements of INFOWAR and range from hosting servers and managing networks for an insurgency or criminal element to supplying software and/or EW equipment to guerrillas for INFOWAR operations.
INFOWAR cells may or may not have the necessary resources to conduct research and development of INFOWAR technologies and to develop mature INFOWAR training and doctrine. In some cases, commercial-off-the-shelf technology satisfies the requirement for the irregular OPFOR. The INFOWAR cell may provide funds or equipment such as computers and network equipment, low-power GPS jammers, or software for use by other insurgents or by affiliated guerrillas or criminals. The benefit of using commercial information technology is that it is dual purpose and has less chance of raising suspicion when transporting it.

==== Perception Management Activities ====
Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth or stability that best suits the irregular OPFOR objectives. Perception management integrates a number of widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences range from enemy forces, to the local populace, to world popular opinion. At the tactical level, the irregular OPFOR seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through PSYWAR and other perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and influencing civilian populations.
The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of—
* PSYWAR.
* Direct action.
* Public affairs.
* Media manipulation and censorship.
* Regional or international recruitment and/or fundraising for affiliated irregular forces.
Information communications technology and global dissemination of the 24-hour news cycle has empowered the irregular OPFOR to implement complex perception management activities public affairs to affect change, garner global support, and generally shape the OE to its purposes. INFOWAR activities engage in public affairs to involve interest groups and media outlets to gain influence and to obtain their objectives. The irregular OPFOR can enable political and civic leaders at all levels to engage the population to accept its ideology and support the irregular OPFOR.
Although the irregular OPFOR maintains that perception management activities conducted at the tactical level must be consistent with, and contribute to, the goals of the highest levels of organization, subordinates are allowed much discretion on the ways and means of achieving their perception management objectives. For example, forming a partnership with a charitable organization or a local business leader in order to obtain secure lines of communications, and a recruiting pool would be a natural extension of the strategy necessary to influence the local populace. If there is a religious or other ideological approach available, the irregular OPFOR will leverage this to establish drivers of social mobility such as educational organizations or business alliances. These organizations also provide the irregular OPFOR a conduit for recruiting, indoctrination, and long-term influence within the target group. Additionally, the irregular OPFOR has the freedom to provide immediate assistance and disperse funds without delay during times of crisis or whenever there is an opportunity to meet a particular objective. This gives the irregular OPFOR the opportunity to be the so called “first with the most” in the struggle for hearts and minds.

===== Psychological Warfare =====
PSYWAR is a major contributor to perception management. Targeting the forces of the enemy, PSYWAR attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, aggressiveness, tenacity, and reasoning of enemy personnel. In addition to the enemy’s military forces, PSYWAR specialists also concentrate on manipulating the local population and international media in favor of the irregular OPFOR, turning opinion against the enemy’s objectives. Planners focus special emphasis on highlighting enemy casualties and lack of success. They also highlight enemy mistakes, especially those that cause civilian casualties or damage civil infrastructure.
The irregular OPFOR skillfully employs media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to further influence public and private perceptions. However, if the irregular OPFOR perceives the presence of NGOs to be detrimental to its objectives, it can be extremely effective in hindering their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, thus discrediting them.

===== Public Affairs =====
Local partnerships and projects are regarded as enhancing the strategic and operational goals of the irregular OPFOR but are not necessarily prescribed by the higher command. The objective is to provide a working solution that is culturally acceptable to the target population and does not compromise the core the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to integrate its activities into the target society and does this by providing the essential services for everyday life. Through cultural acceptance and shared goals, INFOWAR operators are able to develop trust and loyalty among the society and create opportunity for future projects and the perception of social mobility. Other examples of grassroots assistance given to a disenfranchised segment of the population by the irregular OPFOR could include—
* Establishment or purchase of a local business or industry in order to buy influence, generate funds for irregular OPFOR activities, and provide access to lines of communications.
* Cash payments to victims of both natural and manmade disasters.
* Support to religious, educational, or charitable institutions for public relations purposes, and recruitment.
* Provision of public services such as welfare, disaster response, or law and order services in order to delegitimize the existing government.
* Monetary support to religious, political, academic, or business leaders who are willing to support the irregular OPFOR cause.
* Establishing a parallel legal process where the population can obtain a just resolution for disputes without unwanted corruption by external values.
If properly employed, the results of perception management activities become ingrained into everyday life and can be viewed as a positive force to the targeted population. The targeted population gets the services denied to them by the current governmental structure, while the irregular OPFOR is able to move freely among the population and establish a support structure for future operations. Perception management activities are regarded by the enemy as propaganda, despite the fact that the irregular OPFOR enjoys more influence over the population than the existing government does. The irregular OPFOR is able to maintain contact with the target population in an overt way that further legitimizes its presence. By providing opportunities for education, work and charity, the irregular OPFOR receives in return loyalty and support for its cause. The irregular OPFOR may adopt a long-term strategy that allows it to fully integrate into all aspects of society. The fact that it administers resources and services that are unavailable to the targeted population increases its influence and makes affiliation with its cause a desirable goal for the target population.

Providing footage of perceived abuses of power by the enemy to the public helps INFOWAR activities make a case for allowing the irregular OPFOR to establish an ideological foothold within the state and provides the moral support needed to increase the resistance to the government.

===== Disaster Response =====
Response to disaster, whether natural or manmade, is viewed by the irregular OPFOR as another opportunity to gain influence and support in a region. Human suffering on a large scale sets the conditions for chaos and an overextension of the state’s resources. In many regions, disaster-relief services may be inadequate, and there is usually an inordinate amount of suffering before any assistance becomes available. Because of its access to resources and support systems that are outside the government’s bureaucratic structure, the irregular OPFOR can enable a more comprehensive response to natural disasters in certain targeted areas. In some cases, it will augment the current regime’s disaster-relief efforts and attempt to integrate and legitimize its role in assisting the population. In other situations, it will supplant the existing structure and outperform the competition. The goal is to be the first with the most in terms of aid and assistance. Disaster response efforts may include—
* Evacuation of personnel from threatened areas.
* Provision of humanitarian relief such as food and temporary shelter.
* Long-term plans to rebuild structures destroyed by the disaster.
* Cash payments to victims to pay for immediate needs or to compensate a loss.
The irregular OPFOR can couple these services—including grassroots activism, social services and disaster response—with a political message and an intimidating presence. These combined methods allow the irregular OPFOR to establish its legitimacy, separate its enemies from its friends, and build support among the population while establishing inroads for future operations.

===== Media Activities =====
Irregular OPFOR will use all available means to exploit the media. These include both traditional forms such as television and newspaper outlets and as “new” media such as social networks and other computerized outlets. Benefits to the irregular OPFOR include the ability to connect with sympathizers for recruiting and resourcing, channeling responses through emotive themes, and promulgating a narrative of events that is more conducive to its objective.
The barriers to obtaining and using the media have diminished significantly with the ubiquitous expansion of the Internet. Media resources are no longer restricted to a limited number of corporations or individuals. Individuals with the technical knowledge can leverage a variety of commercially available technologies and reach a large audience. In some cases video releases or newscasts produced exclusively within the new media are used by traditional media outlets and are given more attention than the official account of events. Unburdened by a multi-step approval process, irregular OPFOR can manipulate the media to their political and military advantage. Oftentimes it is not the most accurate or properly vetted message that attracts attention, but rather the first to hit the media.
Having the ability to appeal or relate to the broadest possible audience within the cultural context of the OE, means that the irregular OPFOR has an intimate understanding of the target audience including social and cultural factors such as race issues, economic status and education levels.
The irregular OPFOR uses its knowledge of technology and culture to craft a message that is both targeted and suggestive. It also uses media operations as a front for reconnaissance and intelligence operations. Some of the techniques available to the irregular OPFOR are—
* Producing pamphlets, signs, and banners to spread their message usually through the use of images for illustration.
* Using radio television and other media in a fashion that exploits freedom of speech laws in order to operate on the fringe of social norms without being illegal.

==== Computer Warfare Information Attack ====
OPFOR information warfare (INFOWAR) units engage in a combination of computer warfare, information attack and perception management to establish and maintain information dominance in cyberspace by using both direct and indirect attacks on their adversary’s computer networks, information systems and online media. Computer warfare and information attack targets both the networks and the information enemy elements of national power need to function daily basis and conduct warfare. INFOWAR brings to bear the information oriented elements of national power to decisively defeat the enemy.
The complex nature of the information environment provides the conditions for both direct and indirect INFOWAR attacks and presents an opportunity for INFOWAR tactics and techniques to augment traditional military operations at all levels of command from tactical to the strategic. Modern militaries rely on information systems and automation as well as worldwide connectivity to project power on a global scale. These information systems are used in command and control; logistics support; surveillance and reconnaissance; and for global positioning and navigation satellites which provide both navigation and precision targeting data.
The direct approach to INFOWAR is a concerted operation designed to attack a specific target whether it is key infrastructure, a civil institution’s databases or critical command and control nodes. While the indirect approach could involve the constant probing of the adversary’s weaknesses and multiple limited engagements designed to wear down electronic defenses, win decisively in the propaganda campaign, or to identify vulnerabilities for future operations.

===== Providing Computer Warfare Tools and Services =====
Hosting services are the key to supporting INFOWAR activities in cyberspace. The INFOWAR unit provides access for a variety of services and is a clearing house for exchanging successful techniques and data on potential targets in chat rooms and on blogs. The irregular OPFOR can use these services to email or embed links to servers outside the area of operations that can be used for recruiting, exchanging intelligence and propaganda, and launching attacks.
Propaganda is still a key component of the INFOWAR campaign. Redirecting Internet users to OPFOR themed websites will have the effect of not only spreading the irregular OPFOR’s message but giving the enemy and his supporters the impression that the irregular OPFOR has compromised every aspect of his society.

===== Developing Paralell Networks =====
Providing to the irregular OPFOR a C2 network is an effective way for the INFOWAR activity to maintain situational awareness and gather intelligence on the state’s infrastructure and elements of power. A dedicated communications network can also be used to recruit and mobilize large groups for specific actions such as rallies, protests, riots, or attacks.
The irregular OPFOR posing as commercial or humanitarian venture, such as an NGO, a legitimate business, or another noncombatant entity, can establish network connectivity in a contested area of interest. This can be accomplished at another level by providing telecommunications infrastructure and switching equipment to the state’s telecommunications company with embedded backdoor access to the input-output systems of the equipment.
This will give the INFOWAR activity free access to important elements of the nation’s telecommunications network. In other cases, after hostilities have begun, telecommunications equipment can be replaced or reconfigured after a key node is physically seized and repurposed for manipulation and use by the irregular OPFOR.
The irregular OPFOR has the ability to seize enemy civil telecommunications infrastructure and use it for their purposes. Existing switching equipment can be integrated with that of their own and used with existing lines and wireless towers to extend the range and services for the irregular OPFOR C2 network. Once implemented the irregular OPFOR can commercialize its services. As more subscribers are added, thenetwork becomes a source of intelligence by logging calls made and received by persons of interest. It can also be a source of revenue to fund future actions.

==== SPF and INFOWAR ====
INFOWAR capabilities provide clear advantages for SPF missions, due to the fact that SPF will always conduct missions in small teams or detachments and will use INFOWAR capabilities and techniques to maximize the effectiveness of their small numbers. INFOWAR capabilities have the potential to increase situational awareness, facilitate deception, and disrupt the enemy’s decision making process.
SPF conducts an array of operations in support of the INFOWAR plan. Examples include—
* Perception Management.
* Diversionary Measures.
* Sniper.
* Indirect Fire.
* Air Defense (denial of airspace and enemy claims of air supremacy and/or superiority).
* Electronic Warfare.
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'''''Note.''''' SPF can recruit, organize, train, advise, and support local insurgents or guerrillas and possibly even criminal organizations and conduct (or lead) operations in conjunction with them. SPF personnel may fight alongside such affiliates or assist them to prepare for offensive actions, diversionary measures, INFOWAR activities or other missions. In some cases, the SPF will not only advise and assist but actually control (command) the irregular forces as a surrogate force. SPF missions (and those of their affiliates or surrogates) can include the use of terror tactics. See [[Chapter 7: Information Warfare|TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics Chapter 7 INFOWAR]], and [[Chapter 15: Special-Forces and Commandos|Chapter 15 Special Purpose Forces]] for more information.
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The nature of the shared goal or interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree of affiliation. For example, the affiliation of an SPF detachment with criminal (or guerrilla) organizations is dependent only on the needs of the criminal (or guerrilla) organization or on the needs of the SPF at a particular time. The relational dynamics of SPF units are very fluid and apt to change from one day to the next. Shifts in affiliations may in turn cause adjustments in the SPF task organization to accommodate these changes.

===== Direct Action Team =====
A Direct Action Team is embedded in most INFOWAR units to provide support to the PSYWAR company. The teams specialize in infantry antiarmor style attacks; antiarmor ambushes; hit-and-run attacks against armored and/or hardened or rear area targets. Usually one Direct Action Teams, each broken into three attack elements of 4 persons each. The teams will probably be supported or augmented by different types of SPF specialty teams such as Sniper Teams or Sapper Teams. The SPF Teams (UAV) may be used to acquire reconnaissance information on targets or facilities.
SPF team members are cross-trained in the use of all equipment, weapons, and vehicles assigned to the company. The equipment and weapons mix is determined by the mission. SPF Soldiers speak several languages and are able to interact with the local populace for perception management and or PSYWAR missions. All SPF teams may be augmented by other SPF personnel, weapons, and/or equipment. The team serves as a standard SPF Team when not required for INFOWAR.
The SPF team leader coordinates all combat activities as well as reconnaissance and jamming activities, operations, employment, monitoring, direction finding, collection, and reporting. This includes GSR, sensor sets, remote sensor monitoring, and observation.

===== Signal Team =====
A single small SPF signal team can provide long-range communications support for guerrilla units up to battalion size. A full SPF signal team can do the same for a brigade-size unit. Teams can also support insurgent operations. This team may also serve in a signals reconnaissance collection role. In the collection role, the signal equipment is exchanged one-for-one with communications intercept and direction finding equipment. Each team then becomes a communications intercept and direction finding unit.

===== Sniper Team =====
The snipers (7.62-mm or .50 cal) in each attack element provide covering fires. The 35-mm AGL-L and the 7.62-mm GP MG engage personnel when they exit the armored vehicles, pin down the supporting infantry allowing the ATGM/ATGL gunner to engage the armored vehicle. and provide covering fires for the ATGM and ATGL gunners. Sniper operations are useful to create hesitancy among enemy forces and to disrupt the enemy decision making process by forcing enemy commanders to account for sniper counter sniper operations.
[[Category:TC]]