View source for Chapter 2: Hybrid Threat Components

[[Category:TC|7-100-2]]
: ''This page is a section of [[TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat|TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat]].''
Through formal structure and informal agreement, military and state paramilitary forces can work in concert to varying degrees with insurgent, guerrilla, and criminal groups towards common ends. Typically, the common goal is the removal of U.S. and coalition forces from their area of operations. The goals of hybrid threat forces may or may not coincide with those of other actors in the same geographic area.

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==Threats and Other Actors== 
There are many types of actors or participants in today’s complex world environment. Some of the actors are countries (also called nation-states) and some are not. Nation-states are still dominant actors. However, some power is shifting to nontraditional actors and transnational concerns. There are many potential challenges to traditional concepts like balance of power, sovereignty, national interest, and roles of nation-state and non-state actors.

Of course, not all actors are threats. To be a threat, a nation or organization must have both the capabilities and the intention to challenge the United States. The capabilities in question are not necessarily purely military, but encompass all the elements of power available to the nation or organization.

Defining the actors in hybrid threat operations requires a dynamic situational awareness of change in a particular operational environment (OE). An order of battle or an appreciation of adversaries may transition abruptly or retain characteristics over an extended period. Similarly, the full band of PMESII-PT variables requires constant estimation and analysis to project or confirm the motivations, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of a hybrid threat. This section addresses significant categories of threats that can combine, associate, or affiliate in order to threaten or apply hybrid capabilities.

The key components of a hybrid threat, therefore, are two or more of the following:
*Military force.
*Nation-state paramilitary force (such as internal security forces, police, or border guards).
*Insurgent groups (movements that primarily rely on subversion and violence to change the status quo).
*Guerrilla units (irregular indigenous forces operating in occupied territory).
*Criminal organizations (such as gangs, drug cartels, or hackers).

===Nation-state Actors===
Nation-states fall into four basic categories according to their roles in the international community. The categories are core states, transition states, rogue states, and failed or failing states. Countries can move from one category to another, as conditions change.

The category of ''core states'' includes more than half of the nearly 200 countries in the world today. These are basically democratic (although to varying degrees) and share common values and interests. Within this larger group, there is an “inner core” of major powers. These are the advanced countries, including the United States, that generally dominate world politics. Most conflict with global consequences will involve the core states in some fashion or another.

''Transition states'' are other larger, industrial-based countries, mostly emerging regional powers, that have the potential to become accepted among the core states, perhaps as major powers. High-end transition states are moving from an industrial-based society to an information-based society. Low-end transition states are seeking to move from an agricultural-based society to an industrial base. As states try to make this transition, there are cycles of political stability and instability, and the outcome of the transition is uncertain. Some transition states may successfully join the ranks of core states and even become major powers within that context. Others may become competitors.

''Rogue states'' are those that are hostile to their neighbors or to core states’ interests. These countries attack or threaten to attack their neighbors. They may sell or give armaments to other countries or non-state actors within or outside their region, thus threatening regional or international stability. They can sponsor international terrorism or even confront U.S. military forces operating in the region.

''Failed or failing states'' are fragmented in such a way that a rule of law is absent. Their instability is a threat to their neighbors and the core states. The government has ceased to meet the needs of all its people, and at least parts of the country may have become virtually ungovernable. Entities other than the legitimate government institutions—such as large criminal organizations—may have filled the power vacuum and taken control. The real threat to U.S. forces may come from elements other than the military. In some cases, the government might be able to control the population and meet the people’s needs, but only with outside support—perhaps from countries or groups opposed to U.S. interests. Failed or failing states often harbor groups antagonistic to the United States and its interests.

===Non-state Actors===
Non-state actors are those that do not represent the forces of a particular nation-state. Such non-state elements include rogue actors as well as third-party actors.

Like rogue states, ''rogue actors'' are hostile to other actors. However, they may be present in one country or extend across several countries. Examples include insurgents, guerrillas, mercenaries, and trans- national or subnational political movements. Particular sources of danger are terrorists and drug-trafficking or criminal organizations, since they may have the best technology, equipment, and weapons available, simply because they have the money to buy them. These non-state rogue actors may use terror tactics and militarily unconventional methods to achieve their goals.

''Third-party actors'' may not be hostile to other actors. However, their presence, activities, and interests can affect the ability of military forces to accomplish their mission. These third-party actors can include—
*Refugees and internally displaced persons.
*International humanitarian relief agencies.
*Transnational corporations.
*News media.

These individuals and groups bring multiple sources of motivation, ideology, interests, beliefs, or political affiliations into consideration. They may be sources of civil unrest. Their presence may require military forces to consider the potential impacts of traffic congestion, demonstrations, sabotage, and information manipulation.

===Regular Military Forces===
Regular military forces are the regulated armed forces of a state or alliance of states with the specified function of military offensive and defensive capabilities in legitimate service to the state or alliance. Traditional capabilities of regular military forces normally are intended to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:
*Defeat an adversary’s armed forces.
*Destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity.
*Seize or retain territory.

These descriptors are consistent with the U.S. DOD definition of traditional warfare per DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.7.

Other legitimate functions of regular military forces can include a wide range of stability and support missions in concert with state policies and programs. These can include national disaster response, or assistance to province or district government to counter lawlessness, riot, or insurrection.

===Irregular Forces=== 
Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). ''Irregular warfare'' is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s) (JP 1).

===Regular Versus Irregular Forces===
''Traditional warfare'' is a form of warfare between the regulated militaries of nation-states, or alliances of states (DODD 3000.7). In contrast, ''unconventional warfare'' encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations which are normally of long duration and usually conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces (JP 3-05). Traditional armed forces characterize standing military units of a nation-state. A nation-state may also have capabilities such as border guard units, constabulary, and law enforcement organizations that may have an assigned paramilitary role. Irregular forces can exhibit a mixed capability of insurgent, guerrilla, and armed criminal elements. Traditional military units may also be involved directly or indirectly in coordination with irregular warfare operations.

Irregular forces favor indirect and asymmetric approaches. These approaches may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an opponent’s power, influence, and will. Irregular warfare typically involves a protracted conflict that involves state and non-state forces in a regional area. However, such a conflict can be readily connected to transnational actions due to globalization on political, economic, and financial fronts.

Different types of irregular forces may use varied levels of violence or nonviolence to exert influence. Access to technology can impact irregular force operations. Some forces may use low-technology approaches to counter the capabilities of a superpower. Yet, a constant search for improved technologies will parallel a constantly changing set of operational conditions.

The actions of irregular forces are not a lesser form of conflict below the threshold of warfare. At the tactical level, they can apply tactics, techniques, and procedures common to regular forces but do so with asymmetric applications and means. However, irregular forces also can use methods such as guerrilla war- fare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, coercion, and criminal activities.

Adversaries faced with the conventional warfighting capacity of the U.S. Army and joint or combined forces partners are likely to choose to fight using a hybrid of traditional, irregular, and/or criminal capabilities as a way to achieve their strategic objectives. A strategy of U.S. adversaries will be to degrade and exhaust U.S. forces rather than cause a direct U.S. military defeat.

The definition of irregular warfare highlights a key issue of a relevant population and the intention to damage an opponent’s influence over that population. The population can be defined in many aspects and may describe itself in terms such as its culture, ethnicity, familial lineage, theology, ideology, or geographic locale. When confronting the United States, regular or irregular forces will seek to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the United States and any strategic partners to exercise political authority over a relevant population.

==Defining Enemy Combatants==
The DOD defines an ''enemy combatant'' as “in general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict” (JP 1-02 from DODD 2311.01E). Other essential terms are ''lawful enemy combatant and unlawful enemy combatant''. Definitions are provided in figure 2-1 on page 2-4.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Figure 2-1. Combatant Definitions
|'''Enemy Combatant'''

In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term enemy combatant includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy combatants.”(DODD 2310.01E)
|-
|'''Lawful Enemy Combatant'''

Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power. (DODD 2310.01E)
|-
|'''Unlawful Enemy Combatant'''

Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combat immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. … [The] term ''unlawful enemy combatant'' is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting … forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. (DODD 2310.01E)
|}
Combatants can be casually and incorrectly categorized without appropriate attention to what a particular term defines as the purpose, intent, or character of an enemy combatant. Several terms that can easily be misused include paramilitary forces, insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, militia, and mercenaries. Figure 2-2 provides DOD definitions of the first four terms.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Figure 2-2. Paramilitary Definitions
|'''Paramilitary Forces'''

[Member of]…forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

(JP 3-24)
|-
|'''Insurgent'''

[Actor in]…organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.

''(Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0)''
|-
|'''Guerrilla'''
A combat participant in guerrilla warfare…[a member of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.] (JP 3.05.1)]
|-
|'''Terrorist'''

An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.                                                                                                                       (JP 3-07.2)
|}

===Paramilitary===
''Paramilitary forces'' are “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission” (JP 3-24). Thus, there are various types of non-state paramilitary forces, such as insurgents, guerrillas, terrorist groups, and mercenaries. However, there are also nation-state paramilitary forces such as internal security forces, border guards, and police, which are specifically not a part of the regular armed forces of the country.
----
''Note.'' The term ''militia'' has acquired many definitions based on the situational context. This context may be the culture; historical traditions such as which group of people have familial, social, theological, or political power; and the external or self-descriptions such forces use in media affairs or propaganda. A generic definition of a militia can parallel the definition of a paramilitary force. However, a nation-state can also have militia that are considered an extension of its armed forces.
----

===Insurgent===
An ''insurgency'' is “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority” (JP 3-24). Insurgent organizations have no regular table of organization and equipment structure. The mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization and its subordinate cells. A higher insurgent organization can include organizations at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational levels. Higher insurgent organizations can contain a mix of local insurgent and guerrilla organizations. Each of these organizations provides differing capabilities.

As an insurgent organization develops and grows, it often forms a political headquarters to communicate with the indigenous population, external supporters, and its enemies. The leaders in this central political headquarters direct the insurgency’s paramilitary forces and ensure that the insurgency remains focused on reaching its long-term political goals.

===Guerrilla===
A ''guerrilla'' is “a combat participant in guerrilla warfare” (JP 1-02). Guerrilla warfare is “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces” (JP 3-05.1). A prime characteristic of guerrilla operations is to attack points of enemy weakness and in conditions developed or selected by the guerrilla force. Deception and mobility are critical to achieving surprise and avoiding engagements unless the tactical opportunity weighs heavily in the favor of the guerrilla. At the tactical level, attacks are planned and conducted as sudden, violent, decentralized actions. Principles of rapid dispersion and rapid concentration facilitate these types of operation.
{| class="wikitable"
|+The Maoist Example
|Mao Tse-tung’s concept of guerrilla war offers a prime example of different types of forces working toward a common purpose, and exemplifies an adaptive concept of waging war. In the China of the 1930s and 1940s, Mao realized that guerrilla warfare was only one of several approaches in mobilizing a population against an enemy. For the means available to the Communist Chinese at the time, they optimized military and political capabilities in localized home guards or militia, as well as guerrilla groups from squad to regiment in size. They also configured regular military units as resources, training, and events allowed such evolution and cooperative forms of combat power.

According to Mao, guerrilla forces evolve gradually from rudimentary paramilitary elements to more traditional military-like forces that plan and operate in conjunction with regular army units of the revolutionary army. Guerrilla warfare cannot be isolated in concept or practice from the offensive and defensive actions of the regular army. Trying to separate guerrilla warfare from traditional warfare denies the contributions that each type of force provides to synergy in operational effectiveness. Mao identi fies three types of cooperation among guerrillas and orthodox military units: strategic, tactical, and battle cooperation.

Such an organization can optimize conceptual aspects of warfare and is “not depen dent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly or ganized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. It can be con ducted in any terrain…. Its basic element is man … endowed with intelligence, emo tions, and will … politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake.” (''Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare'', USMC FMFRP 12-18)
|-
|Capabilities or limitations of a hybrid force emerge as conditions change in an OE. The Mao model lists multiple sources for capability that include—
·  Volunteers from the general population.

·  Regular unit soldiers detailed temporarily to a guerrilla force.

·  Regular unit soldiers detailed permanently to a guerrilla force as a cadre.

·  Combinations of regular unit members and locally recruited civilians.

·  Local militia or self defense home guard members.

·  Deserters from the enemy forces.

·  Even former “bandits and bandit groups.”
|}

===Terrorist===
A ''terrorist'' is “an individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives” (JP 3-07.2). A ''terrorist group'' is “any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives” (JP 3-07.2). Categorizing terrorist groups by their affiliation with governments or supporting organizations can provide insight in terrorist intent and capability. Terrorist groups can align as state-directed, state-sponsored, or non-state supported organizations. In some cases, the state itself can be a terrorist regime.

===Mercenary===
''Mercenaries'' are armed individuals who use conflict as a professional trade and service for private gain. Those who fall within that definition are not considered combatants. However, those who take direct part in hostilities can be considered unlawful enemy combatants. The term ''mercenary'' applies to those acting individually and in formed units. Soldiers serving officially in foreign armed forces are not mercenaries. Loan service personnel sent to help train the soldiers of other countries as part of an official training agreement between sovereign governments are not mercenaries even if they take a direct part in hostilities.

In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, mercenaries are individuals who act individually or act as a member of a formed group, and have all the following characteristics:
*Are recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict.
*Are operating directly in the hostilities.
*Are motivated by the desire for private gain. (They are promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party.)
*Are neither nationals of a party to the conflict nor residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict.
*Are not members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.
*Are not on official military duty representing a country that is not involved in the conflict such as a legitimate loan service or training appointment.

===Criminal Organizations===
There is no part of the world that is criminal-free. Therefore, there will always be criminal elements present in any OE. The only question is whether those criminal organizations will find it in their interests to become part of a hybrid threat and to perform some of the functions required to achieve common goals and objectives.

Criminal organizations are normally independent of nation-state control. However, large-scale criminal organizations often extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide and include a political influence component. Individual criminals or small gangs do not normally have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, large-scale criminal organizations can challenge governmental authority with capabilities and characteristics similar to a paramilitary force.

By mutual agreement or when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated with other actors such as insurgents or individuals. They may provide capabilities similar to a private army for hire. Insurgents or guerrillas controlling or operating in the same area as a criminal organization can provide security and protection to the criminal organization’s activities in exchange for financial assistance, intelligence, arms and materiel, or general logistical support. On behalf of the criminal organization, guerrilla or insurgent organizations can—
*Create diversionary actions.
*Conduct reconnaissance and early warning.
*Conduct money laundering, smuggling, or transportation.
*Conduct civic actions.

Their mutual interests can include preventing U.S. or government forces from interfering in their respective activities.

Some criminals may form loosely affiliated organizations that have no true formal structure. Nevertheless, even low-capability criminals sometimes can impact events through opportunistic actions. Criminal violence degrades a social and political environment. As small criminal organizations expand their activities to compete with or support of long-established criminal organizations, criminals may seek neutralize or control political authority in order to improve their ability to operate successfully and discourage rival criminal enterprises.

At times, criminal organizations might also be affiliated with nation-state military or paramilitary actors. In time of armed conflict or support to a regional insurgency, a state can encourage and materially support criminal organizations to commit actions that contribute to the breakdown of civil control in a neighboring country.

==Use of WMD==
The intent of hybrid threats to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is one of the most serious contemporary threats to regional neighbors or even the U.S. homeland. The means of attack can range from a highly sophisticated weapon system such as a nuclear bomb to a rudimentary improvised radiological device. The specter of chemical contamination or biological infection adds to the array of weapons. Although high-yield explosives have not been traditionally recognized as WMD, high-yield and some low-yield explosives have caused significant devastating effects on people and places. With any type of WMD, the hybrid threat’s desired outcome could involve any or all of the following:
*Producing mass casualties.
*Massive damage of physical infrastructure and/or the economy.
*Extensive disruption of activities and lifestyles.

The threat of WMD use is present across the entire spectrum of conflict. Potential exists for WMD use with individual acts of wanton damage or destruction of property or person, as well as operations con- ducted by organized violent groups or rogue states. Hybrid threats may include organizations with demonstrated global reach capabilities and the intention to acquire and use WMD. For example, an international terrorist network with WMD capability could target extragegional military forces either in their homeland or as they are deploying into the region. It would patiently await the opportunity to achieve maximum operational or strategic impact of its use of WMD.

Ultimately, a significant impact on a large population would be an intimidating psychological effect from physical and emotional stress. Simply stated, the potential for mass injury or death, as well as mass damage or destruction, presents a compelling requirement for protective measures and increased assurance to counter public harm, anxiety, and fear.

Three general trends with impact on hybrid threat use of WMD are micro-actors, sophistication, and overlap with transnational crime. Each of these trends can pose a critical danger by linking intent with WMD capability. Growing numbers of small independent actors can manipulate advanced technologies to gain knowledge and means while masking their operational or tactical plans. Sophistication involves a combination of global information systems, financial resources, and practical exchange of ideas. Transnational criminals demonstrate themselves to be a valuable network to assist other hybrid threat components with enhanced mobility, improved support, and concealed actions.