View source for Chapter 3: Hybrid Threat Strategy

[[Category:TC|7-100-3]]
: ''This page is a section of [[TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat|TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat]].''
Hybrid Threat (HT) strategy is sophisticated, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional. In pursuit of its strategic goals, the HT is prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action (COAs). It calls these strategic operations, regional operations, transition operations, and adaptive operations. Each COA involves the use of all four instruments of power (not just military and/or paramilitary, but also diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means), but to different degrees and in different ways. The strategic operations COA overarches the other three, which also serve as basic operational designs (see chapter 4). 

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==Strategic Operations== 
What the HT calls “strategic operations” is a COA that uses all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve the HT’s goals by attacking the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. It is a universal strategic COA the HT would use to deal with all situations, against all kinds of opponents, potential opponents, or neutral parties.
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''Note.'' The introduction and chapters 1 and 2 use the terms ''enemy'' and ''adversary'' to refer to various nation-state or non-state actors that threaten or oppose U.S. interests. However, the remainder of this TC will use enemy and adversary to refer to an enemy or adversary of the actors who make up the HT. Likewise, ''friendly'' refers to the HT.
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Strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, they continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those opera- tions. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations. See figure 3-1.
[[File:Figure 3-1. Strategic operations and other courses of action.png|center|thumb|500x500px|Figure 3-1. Strategic operations and other courses of action]]

===Strategic Goals and Operational Designs===
The first aim of strategic operations is to preclude an extraregional power (a foreign power, such as the United States, from outside the region) from intervening in the HT’s region. (See the section on Strategic Preclusion later in this chapter.) If preclusion is not possible, the aim becomes that of getting the extraregional force to leave before it can achieve the goals of its intervention. Strategic operations may make use of operational designs unnecessary, or they may continue while the HT operates along one of its operational designs.

HT strategy is designed to achieve one or more specific strategic goals within the HT’s region. Therefore, it typically starts with actions directed at an opponent within the region.
 
If possible, the HT will attempt to achieve its ends without resorting to armed conflict. Accordingly strategic operations are not limited to military and/or paramilitary means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. The HT may be able to achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by other than military or paramilitary instruments of power, perhaps with the mere threat of using that power against the regional opponent. These actions would fall under the general framework of “strategic operations.”

When nonmilitary means are not sufficient or expedient, the HT may resort to armed conflict as a means of creating conditions that lead to the desired end state. However, strategic operations continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the HT to undertake “regional operations” that include military means.

Prior to initiating armed conflict and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the HT continues to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside actors. Such ac- tors could include other regional neighbors or an extraregional power that could overmatch the HT’s forces. However, plans for those regional operations always include branches and sequels for dealing with the possibility of intervention by an extraregional power. When unable to limit the conflict to regional operations, the HT is prepared to engage extraregional forces through “transition and adaptive operations.” Usually, the HT does not shift directly from regional to adaptive operations. The transition is incremental and does not occur at a single, easily identifiable point. If the HT perceives that intervention is likely, transition operations may begin simultaneously with regional and strategic operations.

Transition operations overlap both regional and adaptive operations. Transition operations allow the HT to shift to adaptive operations or back to regional operations. At some point, the HT either seizes an opportunity to return to regional operations, or it reaches a point where it must complete the shift to adaptive operations. Even after shifting to adaptive operations, the HT tries to set conditions for transitioning back to regional operations.

If an extraregional power were to have significant forces already deployed in the region prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the HT would not be able to conduct regional operations using a typical conventional design without first neutralizing those forces. In this case, the HT would first use strategic operations, with all means available, to put pressure on the already present extraregional force to withdraw from the region or at least remain neutral in the regional conflict. Barring that, strategic operations could still aim at keeping the extraregional power from committing additional forces to the region and preventing his forces already there from being able to fully exercise their capabilities. If the extraregional force is still able to intervene, the HT would have to start with adaptive operations.

Eventually, the HT would seek to move back into transition operations. If it could neutralize or eliminate the extraregional force, it could finally complete the transition to regional operations and thus achieve its strategic goals.
 
===Means===
Strategic operations apply all four instruments of power, in varying combinations depending on the conditions. In most cases, the diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means tend to dominate. During strategic operations, military and/or paramilitary means are most often used to complement those other instruments of power to achieve HT goals. For example, the military and/or paramilitary means are likely to be used against key political or economic centers or tangible targets whose destruction affects in- tangible centers of gravity, rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
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''Note.'' One of the four instruments of power available to the HT is called “diplomatic-political” because non-state components of the HT would not have diplomatic means. However, they could exert political pressure or influence.
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Against such targets, the HT will employ all means available, including—
*Diplomatic initiatives.
*Political influence.
*Information warfare (INFOWAR).
*Economic pressure.
*Terrorist attacks.
*HT-sponsored insurgency.
*Direct action by special-purpose forces (SPF).
*Long-range precision fires.
*Even weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against selected targets.
These efforts often place noncombatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-political, economic, and psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary.

The use of diplomatic-political or economic means or pressure is always orchestrated at the highest level, as is strategic INFOWAR. Even with the military instrument of power, actions considered part of strategic operations require a conscious, calculated decision and direction or authorization by the HT leadership, which is not entirely military in its makeup.

===Targets===
Strategic operations target the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. They attack the intangible com- ponents of the enemy’s efforts against the HT. They primarily target those elements that can most affect factors such as—
*Enemy soldiers’ and leaders’ confidence.
*Political and diplomatic decisions.
*Public opinion.
*The interests of private institutions.
National will and the collective will and commitment of alliances and coalitions. National will is not just the will to fight, but also the will to intervene by other than military means.

It may not be readily apparent to outside parties whether specific actions by the HT’s various instruments of power are part of strategic operations or part of another strategic-level COA occurring simultaneously. In fact, one action could conceivably fulfill both purposes. For example, a demoralizing defeat that could affect the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity could also be a defeat from an operational or tactical viewpoint. In other cases, a particular action on the battlefield might not make sense from a tactical or operational viewpoint, but could achieve a strategic purpose. Its purpose may be to inflict mass casualties or destroy high-visibility enemy systems in order to weaken the enemy’s national will to continue the intervention.

Likewise, victims of terror tactics may not be able to tell whether they were attacked by actual terrorists (independent or affiliated) or by insurgents, criminal organizations, or SPF using terror tactics. However, the results are the same. From the HT’s point of view, it can exploit the effects such attacks have on the enemy’s tangible capabilities and/or his intangible centers of gravity. In makes no difference whether the HT planned and carried out the attack or was merely able to capitalize on it and reap the benefits of someone else’s action. Even when the HT is responsible, there is opportunity for plausible deniability.

===Timeframe===
Strategic operations occur continuously, from prior to the outbreak of war to the post-war period. They can precede war, with the aim of deterring other regional actors from actions hostile to the HT’s in- terests or compelling such actors to yield to the HT’s will.

The HT is always applying its diplomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Even in peacetime, the very presence of the HT’s military and/or paramilitary power gives the HT leve- rage and influence in regional affairs. Another tool for expanding the HT’s influence is the use of peace- time programs and training exercises that regular armed forces that are part of the HT conduct to—
*Shape the international environment.
*Open communications and improve mutual understanding with other countries.
*Improve interoperability with allies and potential allies.
The HT can also foster military or economic cooperation based on historical relationships. Thus, it may be possible for the HT to achieve its strategic goals without ever resorting to armed conflict.

In wartime, strategic operations become an important, powerful component of the HT’s strategy for total war. They occur concurrently with regional, transition, and adaptive operations and can change the course of other strategic-level COAs or even bring the war to an end. Strategic operations may continue even after termination of the armed conflict. If the HT succeeds in defeating the extraregional force or at least forces it to withdraw from the region, this victory enhances the HT’s status both regionally and globally. It will take advantage of this status to pursue its strategic goals. Should the HT lose this war as judged from conventional political or military standards, but still survive as a nation or non-state entity, it may be able to claim victory.

==Strategic Information Warfare==
An important component the HT’s strategy for total war is the conduct of information warfare (INFOWAR), which the HT defines as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an in- formation advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy’s decisionmaking through his collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the HT’s ability to employ the same. In the context of total war, INFOWAR encompasses all instruments of power. It is not just a military function and concept. Thus, the HT applies INFOWAR at every level of conflict and in peacetime interactions with other actors.

Despite the fact that the HT refers to it as “warfare,” INFOWAR exists in peacetime as well as dur- ing war. In peacetime, INFOWAR involves struggle and competition, rather than actual “warfare,” as states and non-state actors maneuver and posture to protect their own interests, gain an advantage, or influence others.

During times of crisis and war, INFOWAR activities continue and intensify. Defensive INFOWAR measures are more strictly enforced, while some of the more offensive elements of INFOWAR come to the fore. Even the subtler elements may become more aggressive and assertive.

===The Strategic Dimension===
Because of its significance to the overall achievement of the HT’s strategy, INFOWAR at the strategic level receives special attention. Strategic INFOWAR is the synergistic effort of the HT to control or manipulate information events, be they diplomatic, political, economic, or military in nature. Specifically, the HT defines strategic INFOWAR as any attack (digital, physical, or cognitive) against the information base of an adversary nation’s critical infrastructures.

The ultimate goal of strategic INFOWAR is strategic disruption and damage to the overall strength of an opponent. This disruption also focuses on the shaping of foreign decisionmakers’ actions to support the HT’s strategic objectives and goals. Perception management activities are critical to strategic INFOWAR. The HT attempts to use all forms of persuasion and global media to win the “battle of the story.”

Strategic INFOWAR can undermine an extraregional power’s traditional advantage of geographic sanctuary from strategic attack. Strategic INFOWAR is not confined to a simple zone of territory, but can extend globally to encompass attacks on an opponent’s homeland or the homelands of various military coa- lition members.

In addition to using all its own assets, the HT will seek third-party actors or outside resources to support its overall information strategy. The HT facilitates these shadow networks as necessary and continuously cultivates and maintains them during peacetime.

===Elements of INFOWAR===
Integrated within INFOWAR doctrine are the following elements:
*'''Electronic warfare (EW)'''. Measures conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the HT.
*'''Deception.''' Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information to induce him to act in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
*'''Physical destruction.''' Measures to destroy critical components of the enemy’s information infrastructure.
*'''Protection and security measures.''' Measures to protect the HT’s information infrastructure and to deny protected information to other actors.
*'''Perception management.''' Measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits HT objectives. Perception management uses a combination of true, false, and misleading information targeted at the local populace and/or external actors. This element is crucial to successful strategic INFOWAR. The HT is continuously looking for ways to sway international opinion in its favor or impact critical foreign strategic decisionmakers.
*'''Information attack (IA).''' Measures focused on the intentional disruption of digital information in a manner that supports a comprehensive strategic INFOWAR campaign. IAs focus exclusively on the manipulation or degradation of the information moving throughout the information environment. Unlike computer warfare attacks that target the information systems, IAs target the information itself.
*'''Computer warfare.''' Measures ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence collection purposes to the insertion of destructive viruses and deceptive in- formation into enemy computer systems. Such attacks focus on the denial of service and/or disruption or manipulation of the infrastructure’s integrity. Strategic INFOWAR typically targets critical nodes or hubs, rather than targeting the entire network or infrastructure.

The seven elements of INFOWAR do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets makes it necessary that they all be integrated into a single INFOWAR plan. However, effective execution of strategic INFOWAR does not necessary involve the use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is required to successfully execute a strategic INFOWAR action or a supporting action at the operational or tactical level. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the overall situation and specific strategic goals.

==Strategic Preclusion==
Strategic preclusion seeks to completely deter extraregional involvement or severely limit its scope and intensity. The HT would attempt to achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the extraregional power or to improve its own regional or international standing. It would employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by the extraregional power. Actions can take many forms and often contain several lines of operation working simultaneously.

The primary target of strategic preclusion is the extraregional power’s national will. First, the HT would conduct diplomatic-political and perception management activities aimed at influencing regional, transnational, and world opinion. For example, the HT might use a disinformation campaign to discredit the legitimacy of diplomatic or economic sanctions imposed upon it. The extraregional power’s economy and military would be secondary targets, with both practical and symbolic goals. This might include using global markets and international financial systems to disrupt the economy of the extraregional power, or conducting physical and information attacks against critical economic centers. Similarly, the military could be attacked indirectly by disrupting its power projection, mobilization, and training capacity. Preclusive actions are likely to increase in intensity and scope as the extraregional power moves closer to military action. If strategic preclusion fails, the HT will turn to operational methods that attempt to limit the scope of extraregional involvement or cause it to terminate quickly.