View source for TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat

[[Category:TC|7-100-00]]
:The purpose of this training circular (TC) is to describe hybrid threats and summarize the manner in which such future threats may operationally organize to fight U.S. forces. It also outlines the strategy, operations, tactics, and organization of the Hybrid Threat that represents a composite of actual threat forces as an opposing force (OPFOR) for training exercises.

:''This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.''

:Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this TC. The preparing agency is the Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)–Threats. Send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to CTID at the following address: Director, CTID, TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323. This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at http://www.us.army.mil and the Reimer Digital Library at https://www.adtdl.army.mil.

:Readers should monitor those sites and also the TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14705412 (AKO access required) for the status of this guide and information regarding updates. Periodic updates, subject to the normal approval process, will occur as a result of the normal production cycle. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest update.
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==Introduction==
This TC will address an emerging category of threats and activities that do not fit into the traditional understanding of conventional and unconventional war. It will focus on hybrid threats as simultaneous combinations of various types of activities by enemies and adversaries that will change and adapt over time. This TC summarizes the manner in which future threats operationally organize to fight us. However, it also discusses the strategy, operations, tactics, and organizations of the Hybrid Threat (HT), which portrays such forces in training exercises. For more detailed discussions of HT operations, tactics, and organizations, the reader should consult other TCs in the 7-100 series and supporting products.

===Hybrid Threats and the Hybrid Threat for Training===
A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. This introduction and the first two chapters will focus on the nature of hybrid threats that U.S. forces can expect to face in various operational environments. However, the remainder of this TC will focus on the representation of such hybrid threats in training exercises. In that context, the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called the Hybrid Threat, with the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid Threat, which is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats.
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''Note.'' This introduction and chapters 1 and 2 address threats and use the terms enemy and adversary to refer to various nation-state or non-state actors that threaten or oppose U.S. interests. However, the remainder of this TC will use enemy and adversary to refer to an enemy or adversary of the actors who make up the Hybrid Threat (HT) for training exercises.
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====The Emergence of Hybrid Threats====
The term “hybrid” has recently been used to capture the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of conflict. While the existence of innovative adversaries is not new, today’s hybrid approaches demand that U.S. forces prepare for a range of conflicts. These may involve nation-state adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states.

The emergence of hybrid threats heralds a dangerous development in the capabilities of what was labeled a “guerrilla” or “irregular” force in past conflicts. Hybrid threats can combine state-based, conventional military forces—sophisticated weapons, command and control, and combined arms tactics—with attributes usually associated with insurgent and criminal organizations. Hybrid threats are characterized by the combination of regular and irregular forces. Regular forces are governed by international law, military tradition, and custom. Irregular forces are unregulated and as a result act with no restrictions on violence or targets for violence. The ability to combine and transition between regular and irregular forces and operations to capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities makes hybrid threats particularly effective. To be a hybrid, these forces cooperate in the context of pursuing their own internal objectives. For example, criminal elements may steal parts for a profit while at the same time compromising the readiness of a U.S. force’s combat systems. Militia forces may defend their town or village with exceptional vigor as part of a complex defensive network. Some hybrid threats will be a result of a state (or states) sponsoring a non-state actor.
 
Hybrid threats will seek to use the media, technology, and a position within a state’s political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage. In combat with U.S. forces, their operations can be highly adaptive, combining conventional, unconventional, irregular, and criminal tactics in different combinations that shift over time. They will use insurgent activities to create instability and to alienate legitimate forces from the population. Additionally, they will use global networks to broadcast their influence. Hybrid threats often will not place limits on the use of violence.

The phenomena of irregular forces engaging regular military forces by using conventional tactics and weapons is not new; the American Revolutionary War and the Vietnam War contain examples of pitched battles between regular and irregular forces. To an increasing degree, hostile groups are using advanced weapons, off-the-shelf technology, combined arms tactics, and intensive training to prepare their forces to engage U.S. Army troops when conditions are suitable. They are also perfectly capable of using terrorism and guerrilla tactics when that suits them. Whether these forces fight as an indigenous resistance or as a proxy for a hostile nation-state, some combination of these approaches appears likely in the persistent conflicts of the near future.

====Major Combat Operations====
Major combat operations (MCO) employ all available combat power (directly and indirectly) to destroy an opponent’s military capability, thereby decisively altering the military conditions within the operational environment. MCO usually involve intensive combat between the uniformed armed forces of nation-states. Hybrid threats may have the capacity to engage in MCO. Even then, MCO tend to blur with other operational themes. Within a theater of war, some U.S. or coalition forces may be conducting MCO while others may be conducting counterinsurgency and limited intervention. For example, in Vietnam both the United States and North Vietnam deployed their national armed forces. Although major battles occurred, the United States characterized much of the war as counterinsurgency operations.

====Multiple Threats====
Multiple threats to U.S. interests exist, and rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. The potential for armed conflict between nation-states remains a serious challenge. Additionally, the influence of non-state actors has ever-increasing regional and worldwide implications. Some regional powers aspire to dominate their neighbors and have the conventional force capabilities to do so. Such situations may threaten U.S. vital interests, U.S. allies, or regional stability. Transnational groups conduct a range of activities that threaten U.S. interests and citizens at home and abroad. Such activities include terrorism, illegal drug trading, illicit arms and strategic material trafficking, international organized crime, piracy, and deliberate environmental damage. Extremism, ethnic disputes, and religious rivalries can also further the threat to a region’s stability. Collectively, these transnational threats may adversely affect U.S. interests and possible result in military involvement.

==Part One: Hybrid Threats==
Part one of this TC focuses on simultaneous combinations of various types of activities by  enemies and adversaries  that will change and  adapt  over time. It summarizes the nature of such threats, their component forces, and the manner in which they would operationally organize to fight us.

===Chapter 1: Hybrid Threat Concepts===
{{Main article|Chapter 1: Hybrid Threat Concepts}}
A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. Understanding hybrid threats involves several key concepts, most of which are not actually new.

===Chapter 2: Hybrid Threat Components===
{{Main article|Chapter 2: Hybrid Threat Components}}
Through formal structure and informal agreement, military and state paramilitary forces can work in concert to varying degrees with insurgent, guerrilla, and criminal groups towards common ends. Typically, the common goal is the removal of U.S. and coalition forces from their area of operations. The goals of hybrid threat forces may or may not coincide with those of other actors in the same geographic area.

==Part Two: The Hybrid Threat for Training==
Part two of this TC focuses on the Hybrid Threat (HT) for U.S. Army training. The HT is a realistic and relevant composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat whose military and/or paramilitary forces are represented as an opposing force (OPFOR) in training exercises. The following chapters will discuss the strategy, operations, tactics, and organizations of the HT. For more detail, the reader should consult other TCs in the 7-100 series and supporting products.

The OPFOR, when representing a hybrid threat, must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained. Training for the challenges of contemporary operational environments requires an OPFOR that is “a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces” (Army Regulation 350-2).
The commander of a U.S. unit plans and conducts training based on the unit’s mission essential task list and priorities of effort. The commander establishes the conditions in which to conduct training to standards. These conditions should include an OPFOR that realistically challenges the ability of the U.S. unit to accomplish its tasks. Training requirements will determine whether the OPFOR’s capabilities are fundamental, sophisticated, or a combination of these.

As real-world conditions and capabilities change, elements of OPFOR doctrine, organization, and equipment capabilities will evolve also. The OPFOR will remain capable of presenting realistic and relevant challenges that are appropriate to meet evolving training requirements. Military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of the Army unit being trained.

===Chapter 3: Hybrid Threat Strategy===
{{Main article|Chapter 3: Hybrid Threat Strategy}}
Hybrid Threat (HT) strategy is sophisticated, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional. In pursuit of its strategic goals, the HT is prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action (COAs). It calls these strategic operations, regional operations, transition operations, and adaptive operations. Each COA involves the use of all four instruments of power (not just military and/or paramilitary, but also diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means), but to different degrees and in different ways. The strategic operations COA overarches the other three, which also serve as basic operational designs (see chapter 4).

===Chapter 4: Hybrid Threat Operations===
{{Main article|Chapter 4: Hybrid Threat Operations}}
Of the four types of strategic-level courses of action outlined in chapter 3, regional, transition, and adaptive operations are also operational designs. This chapter explores those designs and outlines the Hybrid Threat’s (HT’s) principles of operation against an extraregional power. For more detail, see [[FM 7-100.1 Opposing Forces Operations|FM 7-100.1]].

===Chapter 5: Hybrid Threat Tactics===
{{Main article|Chapter 5: Hybrid Threat Tactics}}
The Hybrid Threat (HT) possesses a wide range of options for executing tactical actions. This chapter explores the concepts behind those options.

=== Chapter 6: Hybrid Threat Organizations ===
{{Main article|Chapter 6: Hybrid Threat Organizations}}
The Hybrid Threat (HT) tailors its organizations to the required missions and functions. It determines the functions that must be performed in order to successfully accomplish its goals. Then it builds teams and organizations to execute those functions without regard to traditional military hierarchy, the law of war, or rules of engagement.

== Appendix A: Scenario Blueprints ==
{{Main article|Appendix A: Scenario Blueprints }}
A training scenario blueprint is a pictorial and textual representation of the results of task and countertask analysis. A blueprint is presented as a course of action (COA) sketch with accompanying text. The actions and entities depicted establish the necessary full spectrum training conditions that provide the opportunity to accomplish training objectives.

== Glossary: TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat ==
{{Main article|Glossary: TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat }}

== References ==

==== Department of the Army Forms ====
The DA Form is available on the Army Publishing Directorate web site (www.apd.army.mil). DA Form 2028,  ''Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.''

==== Documents Needed ====
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. FM 1-02, ''Operational Terms and Graphics''. 21 September 2004.

JP 1-02, ''Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms''. Available online:  <nowiki>http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/</nowiki>

[[TC 7-101 Exercise Design|TC 7-101, ''Exercise Design'']]. 26 November 2010.

==== Readings Recommended ====
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

[[FM 7-100.1 Opposing Forces Operations|FM 7-100.1, ''Opposing Force Operations'']]. 27 December 2004.

[[TC 7-100.4 Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide|FM 7-100.4, ''Opposing Force Organization Guide'']]. 3 May 2007. Associated online organizational directories, volumes I-IV, available on TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at  <nowiki>https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/19296289</nowiki> (AKO access required). Associated ''Worldwide Equipment Guide'', volumes 1-3, available on TRADOC G2-TRISA Website at  <nowiki>https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14751393</nowiki> (AKO access required).

==== Sources Used ====
These are sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

DODD 2310.01E, ''The Department of Defense Detainee Program''. 5 September 2006. DODD 3000.7, ''Irregular Warfare (IW)''. 1 December 2008.

''Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0''. 17 May 2010. USMC FMFRP 12-18, ''Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare''. 5 April 1989.