Information: Amari

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Amari is one of the most modern information environments on the African continent. It has the second highest mobile phone using population in the world at 76%. This rapid adoption and advancement were driven by the challenges of landline infrastructure, created by distance and environmental conditions. Demands to develop information systems that allowed Amari to continue its economic expansion caused the country to leapfrog forward with mobile networks and other innovative information technologies in lieu of traditional landlines. The rapid growth in mobile technology created a corresponding leap forward in Internet usage, with over 47 percent penetration in the population. This also supported the explosion of social media used by Amarians — specifically by the growing youth bulge. While open to introduction and application of new information technologies, the people and government of Amari continue to use tried and true information harvesting and management techniques until new systems and applications prove their worth and value.

The growth and the freedom of expression exercised by the population increased dialogue critical of Amaris’ neighbors; Kujenga and Nyumba. This growing popular movement and related criticism caused the Amari government to attempt control of message traffic during significant periods of political unrest or in the aftermath of attacks by guerillas, terrorists, or by criminal elements. The intent is to prevent a popular backlash against Kujenga or Nyumba amid calls for open conflict. Amari uses sophisticated information capture and tracking capabilities to monitor both internal and regional communications. A growing segment of the population is aware of the reported claims of oppression committed by Kujenga government forces in the Tanga region. There is also growing anti-Nyumba sentiment caused by the attacks against the Mtangazajiland villages by Nyumban militias. Even though the Amari government attempted to suppress news of the attacks and their brutality, the population is growing increasingly concerned and calling for action to strike Nyumba and stop the attacks. Insurgent groups are using this situation as an opportunity to discredit the government and its attempts to protect Amari citizens.

Satellite Telecommunications

AMARI Satellite Coverage.

Amari’s satellite services are well established and continue to rapidly develop. It uses both internally developed capabilities and commercial contracts to support government, civil, and military operations. In cooperation with a company from Olvana, the Amari government launched a satellite program to improve essential services to the country. Recent satellite platforms include encryption based on quantum key distribution to provide security for network traffic to and from the platforms. The Olvanese Company manufactures Amari’s satellite platforms; these systems have an expected service life of 15 years. The Amari space program maintains six satellites in orbit with an established program to cycle new platforms into operation as old platforms reach the end of service life. The flight path of the satellites reaches across Africa, Europe and Central Asia. The ground control station at Malindi manages individual satellites with a typical package of 28 active transponders and seven antennas. Transponders broadcast in C-, Ku-, Ka-, L-, and S-bands.

• Ku-Band will provide services for Telephony, Video, Data transfer, Telemedicine, Teleconferencing and tele-education;
• Ka-Band will provide services for Telephony, Video, Data transfer;
• C-Band will predominantly be used for television signals and Internet data transmissions;
• L-Band will augment GPS signals to about 3-5m and thus play a major role in security and surveillance.
• S-Band provides ground observation

Malindi launch platform.

Amari’s primary space-based imagery platform is the 220-pound (100-kg) Eagle earth observation spacecraft. The Eagle S-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR) can conduct either continuous 10 km swath surveys or detailed spot surveys. Its ground resolution is 1-2 m in spotlight mode, 1-3 m in strip map mode, and 5-30 m in ScanSAR mode. The Eagle provides imagery of roads, urban areas, open terrain, coastline and ocean conditions. Broadband and wireless service is provided by a series of 21 Intelsat platforms covering the region and most of east Africa. Resulting coverage provides 98% reliability.

The services provided by these satellite systems are seen by Amari as a means to stimulate economic growth in Africa, helping create jobs and saving customers expensive charges for imagery collection, telephone calls and broadband Internet access. The satellite's C-band payload will reach across Africa, while its Ku-band transponders will be aimed at regions of eastern Africa. The Ka-band system is specifically wired into spot beams focused on Amari, Ziwa, Kujenga, and Nyumba. These systems transmit two L-band navigation channels that make for more accurate satellite positioning services in the Eastern region.

The satellite launch and control complex located at Malindi performs reception and processing of satellite collected data and transmission of instructions for programs. Amari operates the facility not only as a ground control station but also as a launch complex for communications and data collection satellites. The complex location and activities are a continuing point of contention with Nyumba. The Nyumban government asserts that the ground control station is used to perform observation and electronic collection against the Nyumban government and commercial businesses in the country. Amari does operate the complex as an element of its cyber defense network that targets those non-state actors launching cyber-attacks against Amari interests.

Navigation

Amari’s military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers, reciprocal with GPS or GLONASS, for navigation. They also use both national imagery assets and commercial imagery services to provide IMINT for planning and conducting unit movement.

Public Communications Media

In the past, Amari largely maintained a hands-off policy concerning public media. Due to recent media reports of the vulnerability of government, business, financial, and technological sectors to cyber-attack, there is growing fear among the population. This growing concern of the population about their physical and financial security resulted in the government increasing its efforts in the area of perception management and cyber defense. In addition to recent cyber-attacks, there is growing public dissatisfaction with the government response to reports of the mistreatment of native Tangans by the Kujenga government, as well as Amarian People’s Union (APU) opposition of the growing influx of refugees from Nyumba. In response to these concerns, Amari launched several programs in an attempt to control public media, with mixed results. Program goals are to shore up Amari’s image and quell a growing vocal protest and media campaign by the Free Tanga Youth Movement (FTYM) over Kujengan atrocities. The increasing intensity of the pro-Tanga separation protests and APU media attacks are causing the government to slowly squeeze opposition media in an effort to quell rising nationalist fervor. This may eventually lead to open confrontations with either Kujenga, Nyumba or both.

Despite Amari Telecommunications Authority (ATA) control of all Amari Internet service backbones (packet-switching and bandwidth), the government still finds it a challenge to control Internet information. The Internet now serves as the main forum for Amari’s growing nationalistic voices because of its decentralized nature and its growing importance in the economic sector of the country. Following the recent reports of atrocities in the Tanga region, Broad anti-Kujenga protests exploded across radical nationalist blogs. Protests and social media messages increasingly call for action against the Kujengan government, along with dissatisfaction with the Amari government for lack of response against Kujenga.

The Amari government response to the proliferation of radical nationalist messages across social media was one of the most sophisticated Internet media manipulation schemes in the world. The official explanation for the Internet filters was to block perceived pornographic or immoral material. The reality was an attempt to block sites with political content in an effort to cool both the anti-Kujenga message, and also limit the backlash against the Amari government. The Amari government is also actively broadcasting a message that it is investigating the situation in Tanga while using all means at its disposal to support the Tangans in their efforts to gain autonomy from the Kujengan government.

Internally, government cyber security elements are attempting to block what they believe are external elements trying to inflame the situation with Kujenga. The Amari government collected evidence that Nyumba instigated a media campaign to influence the Amari people in an effort to divert attention from its own problems with Amari along the border. Nyumba’s perceived objective is to tie down Amari security and border control forces in the Tanga region, thus allowing Nyumban forces greater freedom in Gulu-Kakuma. Amari suspects that Nyumba may be attempting to seize the resource rich region in order to relocate the Nyumban population displaced by drought and poor growing conditions.

Using the capabilities of the DarkNet, operators located in Nyumba, following Nyumban campaign objectives, launched a propaganda campaign to show mistreatment of the Tangans by the Kujenga forces. Amari had limited success in filtering the anti-Kujenga message because proxy services, usually hosted abroad, are difficult to block without totally prohibiting virtual private networks (VPNs). Amari citizens responded to the attempted Internet filters by seeking commercial firms offering VPNs to circumvent the government bans. Thus, a race began between the Amari government and activists, as the activists attempted to create and disseminate usable proxy addresses before the Amari government can detect them and add them to the filter.

The nationalist movement, FTYM, uses the Internet, print media, and radio in an attempt to communicate broad demands for action by the Amari government to support separation from Kujenga. The Internet serves as the principle media to reach both domestic and international audiences, as it lends itself to reaching a more educated and urban population. Since the educated, young, urban population comprises the domestic anti-Kujenga movement’s core, the Internet serves as a practical method for support and communication between themselves, Amarian suppporters, and Western sympathizers. Members of the FTYM craft simple but effective messages, usually in English, to speed dissemination to Western media outlets and non-Tangan supporters abroad.

FTYM also distanced itself from any foreign governments in order to undercut any accusations of external influence. Their domestic effort focused on a perceived lack of adequate responses to the issues with Kujenga. Some analysts suggest the movement does not want to be seen as simply a front organization associated with insurgents in the Tanga region that oppose the Kujenga government.

The Amari People’s Union (APU) movement is in the early stages of developing its message regarding the Amari government’s failure to adequately respond to incursions by Nyumba backed forces. Located in the region hit hardest by Nyumban actions, APU coalesced as a vigilante group for self-protection. The group originally started as a means for the local population to assist in securing the border areas. Lack of adequate support and recognition from the government ultimately resulted in the group viewing the Amari government as not caring about the population. That perception fuels the group’s growing hostility towards the government and fuels its new media campaign to gain public support.

In response, the Amari government launched an internal perception management campaign using government controlled websites, social media accounts, television and radio. These include over 15 different news and discussion sites that, while appearing to deliver a variety of opinions, are ultimately controlled by the Amarian government. To get unfiltered news and information, most Amarians access Western news site using satellite television or the Internet when able. An important additional source is the Amarian blogosphere, which connects Amarians internationally and domestically and is considered by most to be highly trustworthy. Amari also enlisted the aid of Ziwa government and technical media outlets as a means to fill gaps in its information operations as part of this campaign.

Internet

Internet Penetration

Amari has a vibrant, savvy, and growing Internet user population, enabled by a strong and innovative technology sector. Almost 60% of government institutions use Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in their operation. Whether it is a social media presence, a website, some form of e-government, cloud computing, or a combination, Internet and network connectivity are essential components to government operations. ICT integration is also a critical enabler in the private sector, with over 90% of Amari businesses using it as a tool to facilitate enterprise activities and over 50% maintaining a web presence. Over 70% of enterprises use Internet connectivity to conduct financial transactions. The growing youth bubble also recognized the power offered by the Internet and social media to express their dissatisfaction with the government.

Amari fiber-optic backbone and new construction.

The Amari government considers the Internet to be a critical element of the national infrastructure due to the key role it plays in the governance and financial sectors. Recent successful attacks via the Internet prompted the government to transfer all cyber security functions to the military, with the mission to create an integrated national defense program. Amari continues to expand its cyber capability by enlisting students from the higher education system and organizing them in the military’s reserve structure as a cyber militia.

The capital of Amari, Kisumu, is developing its status as a Smart City with maximum connectivity between devices and growing access to cashless transactions. This developing Internet of Things (IoT) gives the city’s managers and government leadership an unprecedented ability to visualize movement and activities within the confines of the city using the advanced network and sensors. The availability of Smart City amenities and ubiquitous technological penetration in nature preserves and national parks continues to support strong growth in financial, technological, scientific, and ecological tourism sectors from around the world.

Rapidly growing mobile phone usage continues to fuel the increase of Amarian network connectivity and Internet use. A highly competitive market and decreasing technology cost helps make phones and data packages much more accessible to the population. Amarian social media has become a dynamic center for discussing politics, culture, and religion. A World Bank economic indicator study finds almost one-half of Amarians use the Internet, the majority via mobile phones.

Recognizing the need to control and protect communication networks, the Amari government lists the critical nodes of the broadband network as critical infrastructure. This designation requires the government to provide both physical security and cyber security forces for their protection. This is especially true in Kisumu: with its Smart City connectivity and key financial and government functions. Military forces provide guards and monitor operation of the network to ensure continuity and security. Unfortunately, corruption found in some elements of the government and military forces creates both internal and external system vulnerabilities.

Compared to the environment for traditional news media, the Internet was relatively free from restrictions, with no blocking or filtering of online content reported until recent developments cause the government to act. Social media is quickly overtaking television as the main means of information messaging to the public.

Television

General television broadcast tower locations.

Both public and private television networks operate in Amari, with both regional and satellite TV available to the public. Satellite TV is also available in remote areas of the country. With increasing high-speed Internet connectivity available to the population there is a corresponding increase in the use of Internet video. Many middle-class Amarians have both televisions and high-speed Internet in the urban areas of the country.

The WAZI network is a government program intended to provide television, Internet, and telephone services to the general public. The WAZI centers are predominantly located in small towns and villages in the rural areas of the country. The network has only rudimentary broadcast and Internet security measures in place. The WAZI media kiosks provide primarily government sponsored TV programming and news.

Television is a highly popular medium. The US government estimates that television reaches almost 60% of Amarian households. Ten government and private broadcast groups provide programming including official government information, as well as international entertainment and news. The growing middle-class continues to expand the demand for access to TV broadcasts as well as expanding the use of Internet social media videos.

The government maintains broadcast control over the television content aired in Amari through control of broadcast towers. All broadcast networks, public and commercial, are controlled by the Amarian government. Amari’s three major government networks broadcast a combination of news, sports, religious, and historical programming. Amarians have become avid consumers of the over 150 satellite broadcasts via Very Small Aperture Television. The Amarian government periodically cracks down on unlicensed satellite reception, but the prevalence of satellite dishes prevents such crackdowns from being widespread or persistent. As part of its information control campaign, the Amari government plans to jam foreign-sourced satellite transmissions if the internal dissent continues to grow and threaten government interests. It is likely the Amari government will continue to aggressively control viewing choices for Amarians.

The Amari government lists the nodes of the television broadcast network as critical infrastructure and provides mostly physical security protections to secure them. The growing number of cyber-attacks has made it apparent that cyber defensive measures are necessary as well.

Based on a law passed by parliament, Amari founded the Media Quality Board to establish a rating system for all movies, videos, and television broadcasts to maintain acceptable content for public consumption. The law includes enforcement provisions if producers release film or videos deemed unsuitable for the public. The law originally did not include reviews and monitoring of print media or Internet social media, but with increasing nationalistic opposition, a revision of the bill adding print and social media is making its way through Parliament. If enacted, the revised bill allows government restriction of print news media to prevent the publication of messages it deems inflammatory and contrary to Amari’s best interests. Likewise, it allows the government to block or shut down social media sources that serve as a medium for inflammatory rhetoric.

Radio

Radio broadcast general locations.

Radio was at one point the dominant media outlet in Amari; it is now losing ground to other media and is not as popular with the urban population as the Internet or television. Both public and private radio networks operate in Amari. These serve the mostly the rural populations. Regional and short-wave radio are available to the public, with more than 81+ AM/FM and 30 LW/MS/SW radio stations broadcasting news, entertainment, and talk-radio. Major Amarian-controlled radio stations include a government network; foreign broadcasting in multiple languages, including Tangan and Nyumban dialects of Swahili; and multiple news, talk, cultural, and youth-oriented networks. Practically all Amarians and most people living within 200 kilometers of the Amarian border have access to this programming. Government regulation of private radio networks allows it to shut down stations broadcasting content deemed inappropriate.

Both the FTYM and APU groups launched pirate radio stations broadcasting an anti-government message. Due to fear of the electronic warfare capabilities of the Amari para-military police and the military, these radio stations were designed to be highly mobile. Stations are generally low power, and as a result only reach a localized audience.

Print Media

The leadership of the Amari government and print media have had a love-hate relationship for many years. The President typically advocates for freedom of the press, while many of the leaders in parliament continue to call for increased regulation of radical print media. In spite of the continuing conflicting views, privately owned Amari print media continues to flourish. There are four main print media components; daily newspapers, magazines, newsletters, and political handbills. The Alliance Party of Amari uses its control of the government to advocate for aggressive government efforts to stifle dissent and censor anti-government media messages.

Even considering its continuing conflict with the government leadership, print media is still a trusted information source for many Amarians. Several English language newspapers and magazines are available in many towns and the cities. Some international papers and magazines are regularly available on newsstands, but may be dated. Most newspapers carry political news, but they also feature sports, entertainment, and advertisements.

Amari also has political handbills, such as Truth Speaks, Justice, Clear, and The Real News. These publications, and others like them, seek to influence the populace on issues, particularly human rights, government corruption, and perceived international involvement in state affairs. Government leaders view them as a detractor to well-intended government programs and voices of discord that complicate unity of purpose within the country. Relations between handbill publishers and the Amari military is also strained, as several handbills are highly critical of the military and other security forces. The concern is that the handbills and flyers distributed by the publishing houses provide aid to insurgents and guerillas, and also are a potential tool for spies from neighboring countries.

Journalists and print media are still a respected part of Amari society. The Amari government continues to attempt to limit criticism of its actions and of the country’s leadership. Attempts to expand the authority of the Media Quality Board, allowing it to monitor and approve all media content, has been repeatedly blocked by the judiciary.

Telephone

Cellular telephone system.

Amari’s modern telecommunications program began with the establishment of the Amari Telecommunications Authority (ATA). A governmental authority, the ATA controls all Amarian telecommunication affairs. The ATA launched ambitious programs to modernize and expand telecommunications capabilities throughout the country. Initially, it started programs to manufacture and install a reliable national long-distance network. Recognizing the significant challenges posed by both the environment and rapidly changing technology, in recent years the ATA chose instead to invest more heavily in developing mobile phone networks. Mobile technology offers far greater flexibility and adaptability than the older landline-based network structure. This approach complemented the government’s vision of the ATA as a source of revenue. It is solely responsible for auctioning access to the spectrum, and manages license permits for operation of mobile networks. To increase spectrum availability throughout the country, the ATC also launched a $450m satellite telecommunications program. The AMARISAT satellite network supports both international and domestic telecommunications network connections.

Currently, the ATA regulates a combination of landlines and mobile networks. Mobile online financial transfers (OFTs) are seen as a means of avoiding corruption in the financial and government sectors; the population readily accepted online billing for both business and personal purchases.

An estimated 12 million landlines and 45 million mobile lines currently operate within the country. Domestic and foreign investors had planned to develop Fourth Generation (4G) mobile services, but capital shortages and government issues with foreign investment shifted the new network’s ownership and construction responsibility to various Amarian government agencies.

The Amari government lists the nodes of the telephone network as critical infrastructure and employs both network security and physical protection for the system. As with many other elements of the government there is a certain amount of corruption that allows unauthorized, and often undetected, access to the telephone networks. Criminal elements focusing more on the phone network due to the population’s increased use of electronic funds transfer and OFTs.

Cell Phone Market Penetration

A recent study by the World Bank estimated 45 million Amarians utilize a mobile device. Service is provided through a mobile phone consortium consisting of private telecom companies from multiple nations with the ATA reviewing and approving or disapproving all access requests. Potential members must agree to Amari’s stringent licensing conditions before being accepted into the mobile phone consortium.

As the government expands the WAZI network, satellite phones are growing in popularity in remote regions of the country. The WAZI network system is a government initiative to make telephone and Internet services available to the public in mostly rural areas. The government subsidizes the cost of the service so that the public has increased access to technology, information, and Internet services.

Amari planned and established a homegrown satellite program to improve its communications network. Initially, the Amari Space Agency (ASA) used a two-stage space vehicle (SV), launched from Malindi, to put a satellite into orbit. The satellite weighed approximately 60 pounds and ostensibly contained a communications system. ASA used this platform and subsequent satellites for communication, and possibly for regional intelligence collection purposes. Today, Amari continues to advance their information programs with micro-satellites, increasing coverage and reliability of the network. Significantly, the space program also advanced Amari imagery and signal intelligence capabilities, laying the groundwork for a possible change in the regional balance of power.

Postal/Courier

Amari Postal Service (APS) has more than 1,660 post offices, but there is no home delivery service. With the increase in Internet use and electronic fund transfers for bill paying, use of the postal service is on a steep decline. Both International and domestic services are unreliable and slow, with letters and packages frequently disappearing or experiencing lengthy delivery delays. Using the APS to send or receive mail is not recommended, especially for business transactions. Corruption seems to be the only means available to improve the odds of letters or parcels actually reaching their delivery address. By paying an additional handling fee, patrons can expect better service, with some expectation that the letter or parcel will actually be delivered. Tips are expected when a parcel is delivered to the recipient. Some of the post offices in larger cities offer telegraph and banking services. APS is attempting to upgrade its postal system to meet international standards.

There are few regulations that control the kind of materials that can be sent using the postal service. As it is a somewhat antiquated system, there are few screening or scanning systems in place, leaving the service open to abuse. In practice, the postal system has been used to send contraband, and in some cases, bombs. Due to the unreliable nature of the service, it is hard to determine if the addressees are the APS are the intended targets.

Word of Mouth

Word of Mouth (WoM) is an important communications medium in Amari. Rural populations, especially within tribes and ethnic groups, retain WoM as a trusted method of sending secure messages. Even some urban populations still hold WoM as an important element of the Amari culture. An example of its power are the protests caused by a rumor of fraudulent voting activities after the recent national referendum. The rumor passed quickly through a well-established network of family and tribal connections to cause a large scale protest against the government in a suburb of the capital.

Because of increased government monitoring of information flow, WoM has become a growing means of sending secure messages without government knowledge. Couriers and messengers, while not the fastest means of message transmission, have proven to be the most adaptive and secure method. Insurgents, guerillas, and criminal elements all use historic smuggling routes to send messengers to contacts in other areas of the country and the region.

A wide variety of tribes and other ethnic groups rely on WoM as a key means of communication. The Maasai and Turkana are well known nomadic tribes that maintain their histories and relations through verbal storytelling. They use historic tribal relationships in conjunction with the newly available mobile technology to rapidly pass news or messages.

The education system also uses WoM to impart wisdom and conduct the government-directed indoctrination of the population. The education system is a reliable means of transmitting trusted messages. The members and faculty of higher-level education institutions are a small but influential group that exchanges political and philosophical views via WoM. Increasingly, technical schools and organizations are following in this vein, as their faculty discusses their views and political positions during classes and other organized meetings.

Information Control

The government effectively controls all major media transmission systems but traditionally refrains from overtly trying to control messages or information exchange. In the past year though, Amari’s government initiated a low-key INFOWAR campaign in an attempt to suppress growing dissident nationalist groups. This campaign uses newly formed cyber militia (CM) groups to collect open source intelligence, primarily from social media and elsewhere on the internet. Thanks to a technology-sharing agreement with the government of Ziwa, Amari gained access to new network systems, artificial intelligence, and cyber operational capabilities (Ziwa entered into this treaty with Amari to gain military assistance and support as needed because of its limited military capability). Amari continues to use all means at its disposal to maintain a balance of national pride and cooperation of the population with government programs and initiatives.

INFOWAR

INFOWAR in the region mixes old and new technology. While Amari, Kujenga, Nyumba, and Ziwa all maintain older equipment as the backbone for much of their INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries continue to modernize to able to conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet and network information operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the region focus their INFOWAR on likely adversaries, but are also suspected of using their capabilities against large international businesses.

In recent years there has been a rise in the use of INFOWAR actions by criminal groups in Kujenga and Nyumba. In Amari, groups like the Pemba Digital Army (PDA), attempt to counter Amari INFOWAR actions undertaken to halt their insurgent activities. The Bonkeri, a group organized by the Amari government but classified as criminal by the international community, conducts government-sanctioned political and financial hacking of networks to further Amari goals. This organization provides freelance hacking of foreign computer systems in support of Amari’s political and strategic agendas.

Electronic Warfare

Amari maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from Western systems, to international arms market purchases, to domestically produced items. While mostly focused on regional competitors, the Amarian electronic warfare (EW) capability can employ niche EW systems that will affect 1st tier opponent networks and systems. Amarian EW systems, doctrine, and training followed a similar path to their telecommunications network development, where mobile devices rapidly displaced landlines. This strategy allowed Amari to rapidly adopt and/or adapt modern systems, as opposed to a more linear internal development of EW systems and capabilities. This made it possible for Amari to conduct both electronic attack and defense against modern fixed and mobile electronic networks and systems.

Computer Attack

Amari maintains the second most robust computer attack capability in the region. Amari is adapting commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) platforms to expand its ability to conduct cyber-attacks of critical network nodes. The country uses its education system to support internal, regional, and international information campaigns. This program is the basis for the organization and establishment of the large CM that uses newly available Ziwa technological capabilities to support operations. Estimates suggest this program is the origin of the Bonkeri group. It has likely hacked both regional governments and private financial networks, but has had less success against military networks and systems due to enhanced levels of cyber security. The nearest peer-competitors are extra-government groups found in Nyumba that work with the Nyumbian government to target foreign governments, commercial, and technical research sectors.

Amarian hackers are believed to have attacked Kujengan government and commercial entities. Five years ago, suspected Amarian hacktivists attacked the Kujengan port located at Tanga. Four years ago, several hacking attacks, thought to originate in Amari, attempted to transfer funds from several Kujengan banks and financial institutions. Amarin government involvement has not been proven but some intelligence analysts believe it was at least complicit in these attacks.

Information Attack

Amari also possesses one of the most developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region (second only to Nyumba), though these capabilities are still rudimentary by global standards. Amari maintains a growing cyber-focused force, and has used IA against its regional opponents. In retaliation for the suspected cyber-attacks on its power grid, Amari directed its cyber force to probe both the Kujenga and Nyumba power systems to identify weaknesses and likely targets of opportunity. As part of this campaign, Amari is quietly attempting to enlist the aid of the Ziwa technology sector to further develop and exploit identified targets. These efforts are in their initial stages, with the goal of developing a fully capable IA force to oppose threats.

Amari also uses spoofing attacks, aided by advanced Ziwa technology, in its deception operations. In these attacks, Amari uses artificial intelligence, advanced signals intercept systems, and cutting-edge computer technology to intercept adversary sensor feeds and replace the collected data. Amari replaces the original data package with data that confuses or misleads adversary tracking and targeting systems. Adversary platforms without a strong encryption system between the collection sensors and the data reception and processing center are particularly susceptible to spoofing. The main capability currently targeted is GPS guidance and targeting. Successful spoofing attacks lead to incorrect targeting information, estimates of strength, or current status of units or equipment.

Deception

Deception remains a hallmark of Amarian military operations; its importance will only increase in the future. The Amari military focuses on deception to mask friendly operations and allow its forces to close the gap with their targets. As a means of defense, the Amari cyber security forces employ deception using alternate, false networks with the appearance of legitimate structure and content, to decoy cyber-attacks. These deception networks have two purposes: enticing attackers to strike at the network with no actual effect, and then using information gained from the attack to identify techniques used. This technique allows the cyber defense force to protect vital information and also develop new protective measures.

Physical Destruction

Amari conducts traditional kinetic weapons attacks to target facilities, personnel, and network equipment. Amari uses both airborne and ground-based manned and unmanned platforms to deliver both lethal and non-lethal attacks. The Amari National Defence Force (ANDF), working with the CM, is developing a capability to exploit social media targeting of key foreign government and business personnel.

Amari planning prefers asymmetric non-lethal attacks against fixed network facilities or supporting utilities, preserving targets for possible future exploitation. These attacks include disruption of the power grid supplying the network, military bases, or critical infrastructure.

Protection and Security Measures

Recently, Amari made international news as it was unable to protect itself from cyber-crime attacks that defrauded the government of over $20M and disrupted the power grid. In response to the growing criticism by the public, Amari launched an initiative placing the military in charge of all cyber defense programs and operations. The Amari military has robust network and system protection in place that surpasses all other sectors of the government. Their procedures and techniques are being used to harden government systems after repeated penetrations by suspected Kujengan and Nyumban elements. The Amarians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Amari uses both internally produced and commercial off-the-shelf network protection software.

As 80 percent of the cyber-attacks are launched using social network mining, Amari also employs its cyber militia to collect information on personnel associated with targets. The militia crafts a profile of identified key personnel to define the most likely means of a successful information attack.

Perception Management

Amari is building a robust perception management capability to complement its deception capabilities. As part of its intelligence reorganization, Amari established a media and information branch, with the mission of crafting the government message. The media and information branch also manages information flow concerning negative government incidents, internal attacks, or government involvement in regional issues.

There are increasing instances of fake news being used to influence the public’s view of volatile issues. The most notable case is a recent news report, purportedly released by an international news channel, which made inflammatory reports of cross-border attacks on the Mtangazajiland villages by Nyumban militias. The story spread across social media and became a national news story. The international news channel eventually disavowed any ownership of the report and called on the government to investigate the source. Other fake news reports surfaced claiming the sitting president was well ahead in the polls prior to the most recent election. It is uncertain whether the fake news was an attempt by the president’s party to influence the outcome of the election or an external attempt to influence the Amari election.

Intelligence

Amari is pursuing a strategic modernization of its command and control (C2) and reconnaissance, intelligence, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems. This modernization effort focuses on linking existing capabilities with development of new technical capabilities. It also builds on the skills and knowledge of the Amari militia (military reserve) to identify and field developing technologies that support both the government and military C2 process. Using the capabilities of its militia personnel, Amari is pulling in the newest COTS software and hardware to support C2 and RISTA mission requirements. The use of COTS increases the risk of unexpected vulnerabilities built into the software or hardware, but the rapid fielding of cutting-edge technology makes the risk acceptable to Amari leaders.

Amari also enjoys sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts also believe Amari to be the most capable space power in the region, as it has at least six government-owned and -operated satellites that support the information collection requirements of the government, military, business, and technology sectors. Amari also uses COTS satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Amaria-produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Amarian neighbor capabilities will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Amari’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and SPACE programs.

Amari operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Amarian government launched a modernization program of its intelligence portfolio responding to the growing internet and social media use in the country. This move is an effort to maintain centralized control of RISTA collection and streamline the development of new capabilities. This action also ensures that the Amari leadership controls access to all levels of intelligence as it defends the country and its interests.

Command and Control Systems

Government/military command and control systems are reliable but somewhat antiquated. They rely on fixed telephone and radio installations to carry messages and data to facilities and headquarters. This arrangement forces the military to rely heavily on radio communications once it deploys from home station or country region. Modernization of the systems currently focuses on the improving C2 and specifically seeks to reach an agreement with Ziwa to add their newly fielded Battle Management System (BMS) for all Amari military forces. The C2 components appear below;

• Government
  • Networks – Fiber-optic/copper/radio
  • Radar – Coastal, capital, and critical infrastructure defense
  • Optical – Satellite and fixed-wind imagery
  • Satellite – Encrypted C2 radio network
• Military
  • Networks – Data and voice integrated network
  • Radar – Independent air defense
  • Radio – VHF, UHF, SW, SSB

Human Intelligence

Amari organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the ANDF, along with its associated intelligence units, operates regionally, using both active and passive HUMINT collection assets. Amarians conduct influence operations throughout the region by recruiting agents within neighboring country government, business, military, education, and technology organizations. Passive agents are found at many levels within the mentioned sectors, while active offensive agents are primarily in the trucking, service, and criminal sectors. Amari is working to expand its sources within the technical sectors of Ziwa and to a more limited degree in Nyumba.

Amari maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Amarian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to improve Amari tactics and techniques probably are a prime HUMINT objective.

Amari intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled guerillas throughout the region. For the past decade, the Amari intelligence service and military recruited and trained Tanga guerilla units to oppose the Kujengan control of the Tanga region. The Tanga guerillas provided a vital proxy for Amarian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Amarian combat tactics, techniques, and capabilities. Many reports indicate Amarian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries; the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Amarians, a number of Kujengans, Nyumbans, and other native regional personnel were trained and operationally attached to the Amarian military, helping to increase the Amarian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military directs the Tanga guerillas as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Amarian operations.

Open Source Intelligence

Amari leverages its large educational and technological campuses into a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program, with government and government-affiliated operators collecting primarily via the Internet. The government, now through the military, continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data and technical information to support Amari interests. Amari continues to use its existing Information Warfare capabilities in concert with COTS services to exert its influence over the Tanga and Nyumba border regions.

Signals Intelligence

Amarian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating opponent communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor operational security (OPSEC). Amari SIGINT uses state-of-the-art COMINT and ELINT sensors on ground, air, and space platforms. Using these systems, the Amari military collects signal data to compile the output into a common operational picture used to support the full range of objectives from strategic to tactical. Regional competitors can expect Amarian SIGINT to provide the Amarian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Amarian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all the mainstream languages of the east African region.

SIGINT SYSTEMS

Imagery Intelligence

Amarian IMINT operations utilize satellite, UAVs, and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Amari has access to a government-owned and -operated medium-resolution imaging satellite (2.5m). This IMINT satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) to achieve the best possible image resolution. Continual monitoring by the ground control station at Malindi ensures that the platform maintains maximum possible stability for image collection. Images collected are stored and dumped to Malindi station located on the Amari coastline at preset intervals. Recent analysis indicates that the newest Amari platforms may have the ability to downlink near real-time imagery to the ground station at Malindi. To further supplement its IMINT requirements, the Amarian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from international service providers. This capability augments the Amari platforms by providing visible imagery, infrared, and water vapor collection.

Malindi Satellite Control Installation

Fixed and rotary wing platforms fly preplanned patrol routes along the borders shared with Kujenga and Nyumba. The imagery collected must be off-loaded and processed, which builds in a delay in the information being available to the command and control system. As the platforms are limited in number and configuration, the mission routes are focused on the most likely avenues used by insurgents and criminal elements. These mission parameters result in gaps in border coverage in the remote areas. Those gaps are patrolled by ground forces specifically assigned border security and observation missions.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

Amari defense forces developed a niche area of MASINT for electro-optical intelligence as an off-shoot of environmental research. The military realized that spectral analysis for rainfall prediction and crop health could also be applied to detection of low-observable systems and tracking of ground or air platforms. Technical advancements in the area of sensors allowed Amari to integrate this MASINT capability into its satellites used to observe the region. By creating a known spectral background of the region the system then uses rapid spectral analysis to detect variations in the plume of the detected system and compare it against the known background to determine vectors and speed of moving systems.

Summary

Amari maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which they are actively working to expand. Amari defends its interests from a wide and dynamic cyber threat by regional opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber defense elements a great deal of real-world experience. Amari will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future. The capabilities of the government of Amari are offset by the public’s growing connectivity and the associated information freedom provided by mobile networks. The increased connectivity of Amari also produces a corresponding vulnerability to cyber-attacks and information manipulation by both internal and external opponents.