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''This page is a section of [[Ziwa]].''
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[[Africa|DATE Africa]] &gt; [[Ziwa]] &gt; '''{{PAGENAME}}''' &larr;You are here
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<div style="float:right;margin-left:15px;">[[File:ZPDF-insignia3.png|120px|thumb|center|ZPDF Insignia]]__TOC__</div>
  
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[[Ariana]] has an extensive history of various types of operations, from sponsorship of proxy terrorism to sustained force-on-force conflict. This history forms the basis for the military leadership mindset. The legacy of changing political boundaries between Ariana and its neighbors over the last century never terminated satisfactorily for the countries’ ethnic groups, familial-clan geographical demographics, or theological divisions.
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The Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) is the state military of the Republic of Ziwa. Its structure and focus has adapted over the last decade alongside the country’s economic development. The ZPDF consists of the Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC), Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC), and the National Guard. Ziwa’s military relations with its neighbors – Amari to the north and Kujenga to the south - is generally stable, despite sporadic low-level incidents along the border.  The scope of border control operations has contributed to the forward deployment of dedicated maneuver elements and leveraging of former rebels to ensure the appearance of security.
  
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== Military Forces ==
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Multiple threats exist to exploit Ziwa’s dependency on natural resources and external power generation and transmission. Brutal militants in the northeast mountain area (“[[Watasi Gang|The Watasi Gang]]”) and pockets of [[Union of Peace for the Ziwa|ethnic rebels]] throughout the country continue to plague stability and keep the military at continually high operational tempo.  Although both Kujenga and Amari have active security agreements with Ziwa, rumors persist of covert support to the rebels by both countries. Another key role of the ZPDF is support to reducing criminal smuggling and trafficking of arms and humans through the country’s borders. The ZGFC and National Guard both have resources dedicated to this task. Defense spending and percentage of GDP included over the last five years averaged 1% of GDP. (Figures from CIA World Fact book.)
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Ariana’s military maintains a robust ground force with a smaller, agile air and sea force capability. The latest intelligence assessments indicate Ariana’s military has largely tier 2 capabilities with four separate Army Divisions with tier 1 capabilities. The tier two military forces consist of modern competitive military systems from two decades ago, fielded in significant numbers across the military’s force structure. Ariana recently upgraded equipment and weapon systems to attain selected tier 1 niche capabilities for certain divisional units including the following: 91st Tank, 92nd Motorized Infantry, 99th Special Purpose Forces (SPF), and 96th Airborne (ABN) Infantry. These tier 1 divisional units reflect a major military force with fielded state-of-the-art technology.
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{| class="wikitable"
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|+Ziwan Views on Neighbor States’ Security Conditions
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! Amari
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! Kujenga
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! Nyumba
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|- valign="top"
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|
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*Partners in combating criminal and countering extremists along shared border and on Lake Victoria.
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*Generally not considered a threat, but viewed as a buffer between Amari and Kujengan instability.
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|
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*Kujenga unwilling/unable to control cross-border and lake criminal activity
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*Militia/gang violence & incursions along southern border and northeastern mountains
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*Poaching and violence spillage a big problem (esp. tourism)
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*Conduit of criminal activity into Ziwan territories
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|
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*Little direct interaction
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*Driver of lawlessness and refugees
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|}
  
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Ariana’s forces field equipment to operate in all terrain with the ability to successfully conduct day and night operations. Ariana’s military also maintains links to regional criminal and terrorist groups that further extend the country’s potential as a global threat. (''For additional information on tier tables, see Section 4: Appendix C and the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG): Vol I, Chapter 1, OPFOR Tier Tables.'')
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==Ziwa National Command Authority==
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[[File:Ziwa Command Authority.png|thumb|300px|right|National Command Authority]]Military branches of the Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) receive their authority via a civilian control and structure. The Ziwan Ministry of Security and Defense (MoSD) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the national security strategy. 
  
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== Military Strategy ==
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==National Strategic Goals==
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Ziwa’s defense policy has evolved from the previous regime’s emphasis on the need to defend itself against any external aggression.  Over the last two decades it has also recognized that the threat to a country’s stability and economic progress can be internal. The mission of a nation’s security and defense forces are to ensure security by effectively implementing the nation’s policies on internal and external security.  Its experience in suppressing rebellion within its borders led to internal defense policies that have been criticized for complying with only the letter of international agreements.  Ziwa believes its economic progress, political power, and regional prestige are imperiled without a modern military power to secure them. The forces are designed and structured with these objectives in mind:
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* Maintain internal stability and prevent internal security issue from destabilizing political and economic gains
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* Support regional cooperation and develop stable international military relations
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* Ensure and support beneficial use of Ziwan land and lake resources
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* Enforce territorial integrity and maintain border security
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* Defeat armed militants that threaten internal security and inhibit free trade and tourism.
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Security and defense policy dictates that the forces should be held in operational readiness and their organization, equipment and procedures for exercising command and control should be tailored towards meeting the role and missions of the forces in peacetime, national emergency or crisis and in war.
  
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=== National Command Authority ===
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Ziwa’s military forces must be used to influence perceived potential threats across the borders or otherwise. Modernizing and updating of the forces to cater for contingencies is essential and an ongoing program across all services.
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[[File:Arianian National Command Authority.png|center|thumb|Arianian National Command Authority]]
 
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All countries share a similar National Command Authority (NCA) construct including Gorgas, who refers to it as a National Council. The Ariana NCA exercises overall control over the application of  all national power instruments to plan and carry out the country’s national security strategy. The NCA includes cabinet ministers responsible for military and civilian instruments of power such as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Information, Finance and Economic Affairs, Interior, and Defense. The Arianian president chairs the NCA and may select additional members.
 
  
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The president appoints the Minister of National Security, who is responsible for the NCA’s Strategic Integration Department (SID). The SID is the overarching agency responsible for integrating all national power instruments under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the plans and actions of all Ariana’s ministries, but particularly those associated with the national  power instruments. (''See TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics: Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.'')
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==Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC)==
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[[File:Arianian Supreme High Command.png|thumb|Arianian Supreme High Command]]
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The Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC) is responsible for all ground combat and security patrol operations. Generally regarded as a competent ground force when conducting operations, military units in garrison have sometimes reflected their government’s level of corruption. There are approximately 33,600 ground forces on active duty, including the National Guard. No formal reserve capability exists. Forces are generally arrayed in rotation along Ziwa’s borders with non-deployed forces remaining in garrison bases.  
  
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=== Strategic Operational Framework ===
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===Doctrine and Tactics===
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The strategic operational framework for all countries in the Caucasus region is similar in construct and application, primarily the result of historic influences. The NCAs and the NC for all five countries exercise command and control (C2) of  the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC), which includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff  drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The  General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components while its functional directorates are responsible for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters.
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Ziwan military doctrine in similar to that of its neighbor, Kujenga, in that forces are deployed to stabilize and respond to security incidents.  Heavier maneuver forces and/or air support may then be deployed to augment in-contact forces and provide decisive engagement as needed.  While Ziwa has a fairly capable array of ground assets, commanders prefer to leverage their robust indirect fire capabilities – particularly in sparsely-populated areas. 
  
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All five countries currently configure their militaries using an administrative force structure (AFS) for managing military forces in peacetime. This administrative force contains the aggregate  of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into corps and armies for administrative purposes. In some cases, the militaries may group their forces administratively under geographical commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the administrative force structure to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the administrative force structure consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. ''(See FM   7-100.4  Opposing Force Organization Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.'')
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Ziwan ground forces have modernized to a point, but their command doctrine retains legacy elements from prior to the force restructuring of the last two decades.
  
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== National Strategic Goals ==
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===Composition===
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The Arianian military has four priorities based upon the country’s history. First, it wants to become the dominant regional military power. Second, the Arianian military must be strong enough to defend its borders, control the Strait of Hormuz, and deny access to hostile powers. Third, Ariana remains focused on maintaining weapons of mass destruction because some Arianians believe such weapons will deter conventional aggression by enemies and are the rightful possession of a great power, as Ariana views itself. This explains Arianian efforts to continue enhancing the country’s nuclear capability. Ariana’s final priority is global deployment of smaller clandestine units (irregular forces) to train and equip other anti-Western factions. This focus has two advantages for the Arianians, as it both disrupts US interests and creates an outlet for weapons sold by the Arianian military complex.
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[[File:Ziwa-ground-fs.png|thumb|450px|right|Ziwa Army Force Structure]]Maneuver battalions are Ziwa’s basic combat unit, with most being able to operate semi-independently.  The ZGFC routinely adjusts its task organization based on mission requirements or perceived changes to threat conditions. The motorized regiments are rotated to designated security missions, with heavy forces and artillery allocated per mission requirements. The remainder of the forces are generally maintained at installations near Usagara and Geita.  
  
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The NCA determines the direction and scope of Ariana’s strategic mission. Ariana’s overall goals are to continually expand its dominance within the region and eventually change its position within the global community. These long-term aims are supported by one or more specific goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity, including:
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'''Primary Formations:'''
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* Defense of Ariana’s sovereignty
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*7<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Brigade
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* Economic expansion
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*1<sup>st</sup> Motorized Regiment
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* Destruction of insurgent groups
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*2<sup>nd</sup> Motorized Regiment
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* Acquisition of natural resources located outside Ariana’s borders
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*26<sup>th</sup> Artillery Regiment
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* Preclusion or elimination of outside intervention
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*27<sup>th</sup> Rocket Regiment
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[[File:Arianian Strategic Operations in Peace and War.png|thumb|Arianian Strategic Operations in Peace and War]]
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*22<sup>nd</sup> Air Defense Regiment
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*1<sup>st</sup> Information Warfare Battalion
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*356<sup>th</sup> Engineer Battalion
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*51<sup>st</sup> Antitank Battalion
  
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=== Implementing National Security Goals ===
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===Paramilitary Forces===
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All five countries share similar strategies to achieve their national goals. Strategic operations for all five countries remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or war preparation. Once war begins, strategic operations  continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.
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[[File:ZPNG-FS.png|thumb|200px|right|ZPNG force structure ]]'''Ziwa People’s National Guard (ZPNG).'''  The National Guard is the state paramilitary security force of Ziwa.  They are responsible for maintaining order and security along the Ziwan border with Kujenga and on Lake Victoria.  They are generally regarded as capable of conducting area security and stability operations.  The motorized units of the National Guard are arrayed across the Ziwa-Kujenga border, while the Marine Battalion has responsibility on the lake.  
  
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In pursuit of their national security strategies, all five countries are prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action:
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A large portion of the National Guard’s approximately 3800 personnel is comprised of former rebel fighters from the border regions.  Intended as a good will gesture, this strategy has been met with mixed results. Their knowledge of the terrain and local dynamics has been a significant benefit, but lingering grudges can create conflict.
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* '''Strategic operations''' use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country’s national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity.
 
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* '''Regional operations''' include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
 
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* '''Transition operations''' bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
 
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* '''Adaptive operations''' preserve the country’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country’s military.
 
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[[File:Ariana's Strategic Goals.png|thumb|Ariana's Strategic Goals]]
 
  
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=== National Security Strategy ===
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[[File:Ziwa NatlGuard Disposition.JPG|thumb|right|ZPNG Disposition]]The National Guard’s equipment is older than that of the primary ground forces – likely Tier 3, even 4.  Differing levels of discipline within the ranks of the National Guard lead to a wide range of readiness.  Where some units have been meticulous and even improved the vehicles to a Tier 2 condition, others have allowed them to fall into disrepair and resigned to mostly pedestrian operations.
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Although Donovia, Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, and Limaria may refer to them as “operations,” each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country’s strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.
 
  
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Each country’s strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power. If possible, each government will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not  begin with  armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of “strategic operations.”
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Many of the command positions and most of the signal unit are staffed by regulars from the ZGFC.  The command and control systems are generally most sophisticated and kept in better repair to enable management across distances.  They are likely Tier 2.
  
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The government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the country to undertake “regional operations” that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power.
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The National Guard’s Marine Battalion (MARBAT) is the only element in the ZPDF with a maritime capability. Its mission is to maintain safety and security on Lake Victoria and support lake port security operations.  It has little offensive capability, but conducts regular patrols and courtesy inspection on the lake.  Like the other National Guard units, it is staffed largely by former rebels, but is generally more professional and has a more positive reputation.  
  
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== Military Forces Overview ==
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See also [[Chapter 15: Special-Forces and Commandos|TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 15, Special Purpose Forces and Commandos]].
  
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=== Military Strategy ===
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===Training and Readiness===
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[[File:Arianian Military Forces Disposition.png|thumb|Arianian Military Forces Disposition]]
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The military fills the ranks of both its regular forces and the National Guard through an all-volunteer recruiting program. Reductions in regular force recruiting and retention levels were expected due to Ziwa’s economic growth, but personnel levels from Ziwa’s ethnic minorities and former rebels remain strong. Recruits receive basic military skills training at the Ziwa National Training Center near Usagara, with advanced skill training delivered either as additional training at the center or as on-the-job training (OJT).  Ziwa relies heavily on peacekeeping rotations to solidify and expand individual and small unit capabilities.  
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Ariana conducts overt and covert operations in order to maintain its position within the region. The country maintains strong relationships with Limaria and has ties with Donovia. Ariana also is focused on keeping Western influence out of the region and maintaining its current status as a regional strongman.
 
  
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=== Army Overview ===
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Overall readiness and unit-level capabilities are generally better in the regular forces than National Guard units. The ranks of former rebels soldiers often receive waivers for training and may subsequently revert to their previous, often aggressive, small unit techniques if not intentionally enculturated into the wider force.  Reporting has placed the regular force readiness at approximately 70-80%. Readiness in the National Guard varies, but is assumed to be slightly less than the regular force.  National Guard units in the outlying areas, and those dominated by former rebels, have a history of modifying or cannibalizing their issued equipment based on their perceived local requirements. 
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The Arianians maintain a robust ground force capability that consists of a conventional military capable of conducting a wide range of operations. Multiple sources indicate the ground forces, which include paramilitary groups that supplement the regular army, boast an estimated 790,600 troops. The ground forces consist of three mechanized armies.
 
  
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The ground forces tend to deploy along the country’s external borders, particularly those with Iraq and Atropia, which are seen as the most likely land avenues for Western forces to approach. The military also tends to protect key infrastructure such as potential nuclear sites, dams, and political buildings.
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===Weapons and Equipment===
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The weapons and equipment of the ZPDF are mostly Tier 2 capabilities, with niche Tier 1 in much of its communications elements.  The National Guard is distinctly less capable, with most of its equipment being Tier 3 and even some Tier 4 systems, although units may modify equipment to make it more capable.  Equipment is generally purchased or acquired through trade agreements from Donovia or Olvana, with only a few categories from other producers.  
  
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Arianian ground forces will play the major role in any foreign invasion scenario. If a country invaded Ariana— most likely through the Persian Gulf or Iraq—the invader would face a wave of ground forces consisting of mechanized infantry. The ground forces would likely exert their main effort to repel the invader in a conventional force-on-force engagement.
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The 61<sup>st</sup> Tank Battalion functions as a special presidential guard and has a significant allocation of Tier 1 equipment acquired through high-visibility military sales with Olvana. Although more capable than the bulk of the ZGDF, these are largely for regional prestige and not likely to be used except for capital defense.
  
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A terrain analysis of Ariana’s physical environment quickly explains the disposition of its military forces. The Zagros Mountains channelize movement from the northwest to the southeast. Overall, Ariana’s size and terrain dictate the country’s defense strategy. When facing an extra-regional force, a possible course of action   would be for the ground forces to fight a retrograde delay that would maximize the advantages of the difficult terrain to draw an invader into Ariana and extend its logistical lines. The Arianians could fight on interior lines of communication, a course of action that would allow them to concentrate on the enemy at choke points such as mountain passes.
 
  
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Originally, the Arianian military developed mainly as a defensive force with the primary objective of maintaining territorial integrity. Some elements, however, received an additional mission to export ideology and policy abroad. While most unit leaders come from Ariana’s more educated classes, fundamentalists and religious zealots lead some units, receiving their positions as a result of their perceived loyalty to the regime rather than their qualifications. Recently, the Arianian military initiated a program to educate and professionalize the force no matter how the leaders obtained their current position.
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===Functional Capabilities===
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====Command and Control====
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[[File:Amari Army Command Graphic.JPG|thumb|250px|right|Army Command Structure]]Ziwa’s history of confronting rebellion within its borders has created a culture in which defense-related policies and even brigade or regiment-level command directives are managed by the Ministry of Defense Headquarters at Mwanza. Despite the sometimes cumbersome information flow, military commanders retain a fair amount of autonomy within their assigned missions. Cynicism and distrust remains high throughout the Ziwa People’s National Guard (ZPNG), but frequent command and staff rotations have reduced simmering resentment.  
  
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==== Army Size and Structure ====
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''(See also [[Chapter 2: Command and Control|TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control]])''
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The maneuver brigade serves as Ariana’s basic combined arms unit. In the AFS, some maneuver brigades are constituent, or organic, to the base structure, such as divisions. The NCA calls them ''divisional brigades''. These armies, however, organize some units as ''separate brigades'', designed to possess greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from   a higher tactical-level headquarters. Separate brigades possess some subordinate units with the  same force structure as a divisional brigade of the same type (for example, the headquarters); some units that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade, marked “(Sep)” in the organizational directories; and some that are the same as units of this type found at division level, marked “(Div).”
 
  
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The Arianian army designs its maneuver brigades to serve as the basis to form a brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division or division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an operational-strategic command (OSC), an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of a field group (FG). (''See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.'')
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====Maneuver====
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The ZPDF maneuver forces maintain a relatively active rotational deployment schedule.  Battalions assume active security, support, and refit roles throughout the year.  They generally rotate within their parent regiments, augmented with additional armor, artillery, and other assets task organized as needed. As security requirements allow, ZPDF maneuver elements will be used as part of Ziwa’s peacekeeping or humanitarian contribution. Maneuver element are most often used to present an overwhelming deterrent to quell nascent crises or to contain problem situations until indirect fire assets can be utilized. (See below: “<nowiki>[[#Fire Support|Fire Support]]</nowiki>”)
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====Air Defense====
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The battalions of Ziwa’s 22<sup>nd</sup> Air Defense Regiment have a similar rotation scheme as the maneuver forces, with a primary mission of key facility protection in the capital and lake districts. Up to a battalion-sized force may be used to protect indirect fire assets – particularly long range MRL and artillery supporting maneuver forces in the active security role.
  
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The Arianian ground forces consist of three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) mechanized infantry armies. Support and special purpose elements include air defense, artillery, engineer, militia, special  purpose  forces (SPF), and missile commands. Recently, Ariana established an Information Warfare (INFOWAR) brigade to develop electronic and computer warfare capabilities. (''See diagram on page 2A-2-4 and the Order of Battle (OB) at the end of this country’s variable'').
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Ziwa has invested significant resources in integrating its air defense systems. This effort ranges from purchase of new systems to retrofitting older ones.  Many maneuver elements have been augmented with physical and electronic air defense deception assets to further enhance survivability of these systems.  
  
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Divisions and brigades are the Arianian army’s two largest tactical-level organizations. In peacetime, the army units are often subordinated to a larger, operational-level administrative command. The Arianian army might also maintain some separate, single-service, tactical-level commands (divisions, brigades, or battalions) directly under the control of their service  headquarters. For example, major tactical-level commands of the air force, navy, strategic forces, and the SPF Command often remain under the direct control of their respective service component headquarters. The army component headquarters may retain centralized control of certain elite ground force elements, including airborne units and army SPF. This permits flexibility in employing these relatively scarce assets in response to national-level requirements. For these tactical-level organizations (division and below), the organizational directories contain standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E) structures. These administrative groupings normally differ from Ariana’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure. (''See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 3, Offense.'')
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All maneuver battalions’ organic air defense capabilities are generally limited to MANPADS.  Units frequently train to receive and send queuing communications to enhance responsiveness and accuracy of non-networked systems.
  
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Ariana fields 15 divisions, Ariana’s largest tactical unit. Divisions can serve as the foundation to form DTGs, though that is not always the case. A division can fight as part of an OSC, an organization in the AFS (such as army or military region), or a separate unit in an FG.
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''(See also [[Chapter 11: Air Defense|TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 11, Air Defense]])''
  
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==== Army Doctrine and Tactics ====
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====INFOWAR====
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The Arianian army derives most of its doctrine and tactics from Donovian military doctrine. The Arianian army gears its doctrine and tactics toward the opposition and the physical environment. Ariana can conduct large-scale operations, fluctuate back and forth from adaptive tactics, or operate in a hybrid configuration. Similar to most armies today, Arianian ground forces currently employ tactical control measures, including assembly areas, forming-up assembly areas just prior to attacks, advance axes, checkpoints, jump-off lines (similar to Western lines of departure), and attack lines. The Arianian military will likely engage, hoping to push back invaders or buy time to mobilize reserves and for adaptive doctrine to begin.
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Ziwa’s military information warfare capabilities are closely linked to government capabilities. Both government and military prefers to control and direct the majority of INFOWAR assets at the national level.  Military officials have stated publicly that they do not perceive a significant threat from their neighbors, but rely on their capabilities to maintain situational awareness.  
  
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==== Army Training and Readiness ====
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Intelligence and INFOWAR-related capabilities supporting ZPDF forces will likely focus on maintaining situational awareness of opposing key military leaders, while retaining the capability to disrupt communications and interfere with threat decision-making capacity. Both tactical and space-based assets will impact threat GPS-reliant navigation and munitions.  Ziwa has spent the last decade developing both an offensive and defensive cyber capability.  The program leverages both domestic technical capabilities, as well as those of foreign actors – particularly North Torbia.
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Ariana fields a well-trained army. Most units maintain a 98% operational readiness rate.
 
  
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==== Army Equipment and Weapons ====
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Ziwa has invested in significant improvements in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  Although much of the public information portrays the UAV advancements as related to the government’s unmanned safety and public health service programs, Ministry of Defense testing of advanced individual and swarm UAVs has been leaked to online sources.
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Ariana’s equipment and weapons largely reflect tier 2 capabilities with certain army divisions with tier 1 capabilities within the military’s force structure. The Arianian army recently upgraded some systems for selected tier 1 niche capabilities. The Arianian army has the equipment to operate in all terrain types and successfully conduct both day and night operations. (''For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the WEG: Vol. 1, Chapter 1, OPFOR Tier Tables.'')
 
  
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=== Naval Forces Overview ===
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''(See also [[Chapter 7: Information Warfare |TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 7, Information Warfare]]) and [[Information: Ziwa|Ziwa: Information]]''
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The Arianian navy patrols the Persian Gulf and maintains a small, agile contingent on the Caspian Sea. The navy has attempted to upgrade its capabilities with the purchase of Donovian ships and equipment, including submarines, missiles, and fast attack craft. Recently, the Arianian navy conducted exercises in the Persian Gulf that demonstrated at least a tier 2 rating for both equipment and training.
 
  
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Ariana maintains the strongest regional naval force after Donovia, and only the US Navy possesses enough ships and firepower to open the Strait of Hormuz if Ariana attempted to close it. If Ariana blocked shipment lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, many Middle Eastern countries would become essentially landlocked.
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====RISTA====
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[[File:Arianian Navy.png|thumb|Arianian Navy]]
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The ZPDF reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) doctrine centers on the ground forces of the National Guard deployed across the border regions. This generally consists of presence patrols, surveillance, and coordination with intelligence personnel for development of human intelligence (HUMINT).  Its ground reconnaissance is supported by advanced intelligence and INFOWAR capabilities allocated and managed by the Ziwan National Intelligence Bureau (NIB).  This arrangement integrated Ziwan RISTA with its INFOWAR capabilities and doctrine.  
  
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==== Navy Size and Structure ====
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The Ziwan Air Corp (ZAC) maintain most of the electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, which consist of integrated radar warning and RF countermeasures. Similarly, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Air Defense Regiment of the ZGFC is allocated systems to support early warning and target detection.  The ZAC maintains a close relationship with the NIB to facilitate integration of the rapidly developing Ziwan space-based imagery capability.  This capability has been criticized for alleged surveillance on Ziwan citizens, rather than on potential threats.
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Like most navies, the Arianian navy’s shore establishment borders its sea frontiers. The Arianian navy divides the country into four naval districts. The First Naval District, also the most important, sits astride the Strait of Hormuz at Bandar-e Abbas. This is Ariana’s most modern and well- developed port facility and where Ariana constructed its main repair facilities. It also serves as the home port for most of its larger ships. The Second Naval District covers the northern Persian Gulf, and Third Naval operates in the general vicinity of the northern Persian Gulf. The Fourth Naval District covers Ariana’s northern border where it shares the Caspian Sea with Donovian and Atropian fleets.
 
  
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Ariana also has an Indian Ocean base in the very southeastern part of the country near the Pakistan border. This base serves as the Arianian navy’s main outlet to the open sea. Some experts believe this port will eventually become the home port for the submarines currently berthed at Bandar-e Abbas. (''See diagram on page 2A-2-10 and the OB at the end of this country’s variable'').
+
Ziwa is rapidly and aggressively adopting open source information research and analysis to improve intelligence capabilities.  This has been a joint development project between the Ministry of Defense and prominent Ziwan universities.
  
−
==== Navy Doctrine and Tactics ====
+
Human intelligence continues to provide the majority of external data collection and a balanced share of internal intelligence.
−
Arianian naval strategy has four main priorities:
 
−
* Control the Strait of Hormuz and thereby access to the Persian Gulf
 
−
* Project naval power into the Persian Gulf and dominate the disputed islands there
 
−
* Disrupt sea lines of communication for nearby countries
 
−
* Intimidate other countries through its naval presence
 
−
Although Ariana maintains the second most capable regional naval force, it will likely operate more or less as a “guerilla navy.” The Arianian navy would employ small boats in hit-and-run type missions, deploy mines, fire anti-ship cruise missiles, and use fixed wing and helicopter forces against stronger naval forces.
 
  
−
Arianian naval missions might include:
+
Ziwa has no established MASINT systems but recent purchase of aerostat-based systems for border and regional surveillance. 
−
* Mine laying, particularly of narrow channels and coastal areas
 
−
* Insertion/extraction of SOF
 
−
* Seizure of disputed islands
 
−
* Raids on coastal areas and isolated oil rig platforms
 
−
* Harassment and closure of the Strait of Hormuz
 
−
* Defensive patrolling of coastal areas
 
−
Ariana created a new and mixed naval dimension with the recent acquisition of three Donovian submarines currently based at Bandar-e Abbas. A foreign navy could bottle up the submarines because of the location of Bandar-e Abbas in the constricted Strait of Hormuz.
 
  
−
There are seven naval bases including one headquarters element in Ariana’s capital. The majority of the bases are in the Persian Gulf. The total service fleet consists of 120 craft and '''''24''''' submarines.
+
''See also [[Chapter 7: Information Warfare|TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 7, Information Warfare]] and [[Information: Ziwa|Ziwa: Information]]''
  
−
==== Navy Training and Readiness ====
+
====Fire Support====
−
Ariana’s naval forces can successfully conduct day and night operations. Ariana’s navy is well- trained and at a high rate of readiness. Most naval units maintain operational readiness rates of approximately 93%.
+
Ziwa views its artillery and rocket forces as key to its ability to maintain order and security within its borders. Rather than directly assigning indirect fire (IDF) assets to its motorized battalions, Ziwa prefers to maintain their IDF inventory at installations closer to the capital.  It may temporarily attach assets to maneuver units as security requirements dictate. When deploying forward in support of maneuver forces, IDF systems will be supported by air defense assets.  
  
−
==== Navy Equipment and Weapons ====
+
Multiple rocket launcher systems are less likely to deploy with maneuver units as their ranges and garrisons allow support across much of the Ziwan territory.  Exceptions in the past include operations to put down rebellion in the northeastern mountainous region.  
−
Ariana’s naval equipment and weapons contain largely tier 2 capabilities throughout the navy’s force structure, which is based on modern competitive military systems fielded over the last 10 to 20  years. Upgrades to some systems, however, provide a number of tier 1 niche naval capabilities.
 
  
−
=== Air Force Overview ===
+
Similar to its air defense upgrades, Ziwa has invested heavily in technical capabilities that increase the accuracy, lethality, and integration of the entire spectrum of fire support systems. Ziwa has not pursued a modern missile program.  Rumors of upgrading and refitting of legacy pre-regime systems have been reported, but are likely unfounded. 
−
Ariana divides its air force into three commands: Western, Southern, and Eastern. The Arianian air force consists of four divisions, with the 10th Fighter Aviation Division as the premier air force unit.
 
  
−
The air force has a reputation for flying skill and the ability to put ordnance on target. Recent exercises provide evidence that, for regional standards, Arianian pilots remain skillful in air strikes against ground targets and using terrain to mask themselves from radar. Arianian pilots maintain a deep strike capability. The air force primarily supports its ground forces and is likely positioned near strategic sites such as nuclear plants, dams, and government buildings in order to intercept enemy air activity.
+
''(See also [[Chapter 9: Indirect Fire Support|TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support]])''
−
[[File:Arianian Air Force.png|thumb|Arianian Air Force]]
 
  
−
==== Air Force Size and Structure ====
+
====Protection====
−
The Arianian air force fields four aviation divisions divided up into one fighter, two bomber and one fighter/bomber units based on their aviation assets. It also possesses several other regiments designed for ground attack, reconnaissance, combat operations, transportation, or Arianian SPF unit support. The Arianian air force also has limited heliborne jamming capabilities. (''See the OB at the end of this country’s variable'').
+
The ZPDF takes substantial effort to protect its critical assets and capabilities. The presumed capabilities of their neighbors, combined with the Ziwan preference for centralizing many of its critical intelligence and military assets has required a full range of physical and electronic protection measures.
  
−
==== Air Force Doctrine and Tactics ====
+
Critical information and intelligence capabilities are protected in hardened facilities near the capital, while military assets rely on physical, electronic, and cyber protection.  ZPDF combat units incorporate camouflage, force concealment, and use of decoys into their training.    Elements of the ZPDF’s engineer battalion may be task organized to support specific requirements.  When not specifically tasked, the engineer capabilities support maneuver units’ mobility and protection requirements.
−
The Arianian air force modified its doctrine and tactics based on observing other countries’ conflicts, including the US. It will use force-on-force engagement with a regional competitor. Additionally, the Arianian air force will likely exhibit a show of force as a warning before actually committing to air combat and use its air force to support ground troops and protect key infrastructure.
 
  
−
==== Air Force Training and Readiness ====
+
Landmines from previous conflicts in the region have been used in improvised devices by rebels within Ziwan borders.  ZPDF and National Guard soldiers train regularly on explosive hazard awareness. At least a quarter of the soldiers have participated in humanitarian demining operations in the region and worldwide.
−
Ariana’s air force operates mostly well-trained units with a 95% equipment operational readiness rate throughout.
 
  
−
==== Air Force Equipment and Weapons ====
+
''(See also [[Chapter 12: Engineer Support|TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support]])''
−
The Arianian air force operates mainly tier 2 equipment and weapons, but now possesses limited modern upgrades and the potential for random tier 1 niche capabilities. Ariana’s air force can successfully conduct day and night operations. (''For further information see the WEG, Vol 2: Airspace and Air Defense Systems.'')
 
  
−
=== Government Paramilitary Forces ===
+
====Logistics====
−
The Arianian government tasks its paramilitary forces (government forces like police that  are distinct from regular armed forces yet similar in organization or training) with the following missions: basic law enforcement, border control, and maintenance of public order. Arianian agencies with these responsibilities include the Ministry of Intelligence and the Law Enforcement Forces under the Interior Ministry. Last year, the US State Department reported Ariana’s security forces and paramilitary forces faced corruption issues and acted with impunity as they conducted serious human rights violations, especially when reacting to demonstrations after recent presidential elections.
+
Ziwa centrally manages military materiel through its Defense Logistics Bureau (DLB), headquartered in Mwanza.  Foreign supplies and equipment arrive for processing via air or rail.  Meticulous record-keeping and modern automated systems allow the DLC to push standard supplies to military units with little interference. Commanders request variance through their staff to the DLC.  Temporary remote depots may be established if commanders request it or secure resupply is at risk of compromise.
  
−
=== Non-State Paramilitary Forces ===
+
====CBRNE====
 +
Ziwa does not have a confirmed offensive chemical warfare capability, nor is it part of their warfighting doctrine. All personnel receive a basic chemical first aid training.  Emergency responders in all cities have more advanced capabilities for mass casualty care.
  
−
==== Insurgent/Guerrilla Forces ====
 
−
Attempting to generalize the irregular conflict motivation of different population segments is problematic. Nonetheless, two major considerations are an ethnocentric or separatist motivation compared to a nationalistic motivation. Such strife has devolved to forms of irregular warfare and a violent struggle among state and non-state actors to gain legitimacy and influence over relevant segments of the population.
 
  
−
Several foreign anti-Ariana insurgent groups operate with sporadic violence and have attacked current government entities and key leaders. The largest group is located in southeast Ariana and has been opposing leaders for two decades through a low-level pseudo-insurgency. The group, God’s Helpers Brigade, promotes violent populace opposition to state taxation policies; unreliable electrical service, sewage treatment, and potable water issues; substandard medical preventive services; lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the executive and legislative branches of the government.
+
==Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC)==
 +
The Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC) is a small but capable force with primary focus supporting ground forces, providing strategic deterrence, and enabling national intelligence efforts.   
  
−
Other groups and affiliates across Ariana are sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political state governance concepts. Whether these groups align with a pro-Western coalition  in future possible operations or continue with separate domestic agendas, the distinction between criminal organizations, private militia, insurgents, or guerrillas will be significant in assessing  which forces support coalition objectives.
+
The main base is near Mwanza and was built by mostly Olvanan contractors in the late 1990s. The base is a multi-stage project that included runways, taxiways, extensive shelter and ordnance storage facilities, a headquarters facility and a large complex of living quarters and support buildings.   Civilian airports and airfields may be used by military forces during times of national emergency, as authorized by the president.  
  
−
At least three forms of armed and unarmed combatants will emerge from these domestic groups if a regional host nation invites US and coalition presence to the area. First, factions may oppose the  host nation government and be unfriendly toward the US-coalition presence. These factions will initiate overt resistance through violent and nonviolent protests against the host nation and US coalition. Next, factions will oppose host nation government policies but be potentially friendly toward the US coalition presence when this regional presence promotes and supports a domestic faction agenda. Third, several extremist factions will quickly resort to expanded terrorism if a US coalition enters the region. The groups will initially target US coalition forces, logistical staging points, host nation law enforcement, and internal security forces. Any of these domestic factions can be influenced by financing, training, and materiel support from foreign entities that are intent on agitating civil unrest or insurgency-like actions in the region.
+
The intelligence platforms of the ZAC are attached, but personnel and special technical assets remain under control of the National Intelligence Bureau.
  
−
Operational reach actions range from subversive and violent confrontations with adversary nation- states or a host nation government in power, to actions by a contracted individual or small cell capable of inflicting strategic consequences. Irregular forces can be unusually flexible and adaptable in ways and means to counter traditional advantages of stronger opponents, disregard sanctions intended to control conflict, and optimize actions with self-announced justification based on populist regional social justice or ideological perspectives. An irregular force will optimize a range of organizational options, from small, loosely affiliated cells to global networks, in order to promote mission success and psychological effect. Such networks can be local, regional, international, or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs programs; and attain covert or overt financial, political, military, economic, or social support. In summary, people conducting irregular warfare will seek to gain capabilities such as co-opting an indigenous population or hiring a domestic criminal organization, encouraging a militia with robust international connections, protecting transnational networking affiliations, or applying a combination of these capabilities to degrade practical or perceived power by a rival criminal organization or militia, or the host nation governmental authority.
+
===Air Corps Size and Structure===
 +
[[File:ZiwaAirCorps roundel.PNG|150px|thumb|right|Ziwa Air Corps roundel]]The ZAC fields an estimated 645 personnel that operate approximately 18 fixed wing aircraft, 22 helicopters, and an estimated 9 unmanned aerial vehicles.  ZAC aircraft operate primarily from Air Station Mwanza, although standing national policy authorizes military use of civil air infrastructure and facilities. Fighters and intelligence-related platforms will operate from secure facilities at Mwanza.
  
−
The NCA commands the militia, another category of reserve military personnel that was formed about 20 years ago. The militia became famous when young boys martyred themselves in suicidal human wave attacks against Iraq during the border wars. The militia can conduct limited traditional military operations; most units can perform civil support missions.
+
ZAC intelligence personnel also have the responsibility to coordinate military application of Ziwa’s developing GPS and space-based intelligence capabilities.
  
−
==== Criminal Organizations ====
+
===Air Corps Doctrine and Tactics===
−
Despite a lack of official reports on criminal enterprises, the country’s drug and weapons trades remain lucrative businesses. Reports indicate certain SPF elements have links to the black market. These domestic elements generally are categorized with criminal organizations.
+
Political and military leaders have reiterated the fundamental principle was that the ZAC would undertake a preemptive attack if the security of the state is endangered.  It is unknown whether this extends to internal strikes.  Due to Ziwan political desires, justification for preemptive attacks would need to be clearly articulated.  The Air Corps regularly trains on ground support and interception missions.  The ZAC prefers to conduct disruption missions against potential threats and lines of communication.  Pilots have received training in conducting sensitive intelligence border operations with the assumption of communications or navigational interference.  
  
−
==== Private Security Organizations ====
+
===Air Corps Weapons and Equipment===
−
In troubled areas of Ariana, small groups of local civilians band together to provide security for their businesses, homes, and families, as these people feel that the police and military cannot arrive in time when trouble does occur. The news media indiscriminately uses the “militia” label when reporting armed  violence  in  the  region by  such  groups. A  militia  is commonly  defined  as a paramilitary force organized and controlled by a sovereign government similar to an internal  security force. Although militias typically are not irregular forces, some groups of armed Arianian individuals band together formally or informally, and either self-declare or are categorized with the “militia” term.
+
One of the fundamental elements of Ziwa’s air capability development is to gain the support of at least the sympathy of one large or middle power – in practice, usually Olvana or Donovia.  They have also purchased or participated in military sales programs of a variety of countries, which gives the ZAC an odd mix of equipment sources.  The ZAC aircraft inventory is generally Tier 2 to Tier 3 - based on technology from 15 to 30 years ago. Aircraft converted for intelligence purposes may have been fitted with niche Tier 2, or in some cases, Tier 1 systems.  Most of the ZAC aircraft are capable of conducting 24-hour operations in all weather. The equipment is generally Donovian in origin, with some Olvanan variants possible.[[File:ZAC-FS.png|300px|thumb|right|Ziwa Air Corps Composition]]
 +
'''Ziwa Air Corp (ZAC)'''
 +
*[[File:OB-Explorer-icon.png|16px|link=http://example.com|Click to open Force Struce viewer]] Attack Aviation SQDN  (FW)
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*[[File:OB-Explorer-icon.png|16px|link=http://example.com|Click to open Force Struce viewer]] Helicopter SQDN   (RW)
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*[[File:OB-Explorer-icon.png|16px|link=http://example.com|Click to open Force Struce viewer]] Intelligence (UAV) SQDN
  
−
==== Nonmilitary Armed Combatants ====
+
===Air Corps Training and Readiness===
−
While nonmilitary armed combatants (insurgent forces, guerrilla forces, criminal organizations, and private security organizations) may not see eye-to-eye with the Arianian government, they are at best neutral in support of US activities in the region and at worst, predominately hostile.
+
Ziwan aircraft inventory is kept at a relatively high state of repair and readiness – as high as 80%.  ZAC emphasis on maintaining existing aircraft while investing in enabling technologies have kept its systems operating at a high level.   Pilots receive training from a variety of sources, particularly Donovia.  Pilots receive sufficient live and simulated air missions to maintain proficiency.
  
−
== Military Functions ==
+
[[Category:DATE]]
−
 
+
[[Category:Africa]]
−
=== Command and Control ===
+
[[Category:Ziwa]]
−
The core of Ariana’s command and control (C2) concept remains the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the military operates from the view that centralized planning helps assure both command (establishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions. Necessarily then, the military relies on the loyalty of its forces and extends far-ranging authority for troops to act while foregoing rigorous control as unproductive in the modern environment. (''See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.'')
 
−
 
 
−
Arianian military battalions have a headquarters composed of a command section including the commander, deputy commander, and a small staff element, as well as a staff section with the chief of staff and the remainder of the battalion staff. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer, assistant operations officer, intelligence officer, and resources officer. The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer, and the reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance, while the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer. (''See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.'')
 
−
 
 
−
C2 at the tactical level of command emphasizes survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security. Command posts and procedures are streamlined at the operational level, relying heavily on common procedures for important recurring tactical tasks.
 
−
 
 
−
=== Maneuver ===
 
−
The Arianian military has a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations; the basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In the administrative force structure, maneuver brigades are typically constituent to divisions—called divisional brigades. However, some are organized as separate brigades, designed to have greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters.
 
−
 
 
−
=== Air Defense ===
 
−
The Arianian Air Defense Command (ADC), subordinate to the Supreme High Command, provides air defense coverage for Arianian units. It also supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing an integrated air defense system (IADS). Air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an IADS. This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of air defense coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.
 
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−
Ariana recognizes that air defense is an ''all-arms'' effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of an organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. The ADC continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.
 
−
 
 
−
Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machine guns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.
 
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Ariana considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. Therefore, Arianian ground forces are acquiring as many MANPADS as possible and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The military can also disseminate them to selected affiliated forces. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Arianian units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (''For more information, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics,  Chapter 11, Air Defense.'')
 
−
 
 
−
=== INFOWAR ===
 
−
Ariana defines information warfare (INFOWAR) as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy’s decision-making cycle through collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems. Ariana has a robust INFOWAR capability with the  brigade headquarters out of Tehran.
 
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−
=== RISTA ===
 
−
Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) is viewed as the single- most important function for the Arianian military. Thus, Arianian forces typically commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations, which are usually aggressive with overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines. The table on the next page summarizes the effective ranges for reconnaissance assets that can support Ariana’s tactical commanders.
 
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=== Fire Support ===
 
−
Arianian military doctrine stresses that fire support combines air assets, surface-to-surface missiles, and artillery into an integrated attack against enemy defenses as well as for offense operations. In past conflicts, Ariana’s military successfully integrated fire support into operations, from close to deep-strike capability. The commanders always seek to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire to destroy enemy formations, weapons systems, or key components of an enemy combat system. (''See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support.'')
 
−
 
 
−
=== Protection ===
 
−
Ariana will attempt to minimize civilian casualties to a large extent. The military has engineering assets to reinforce civilian and military positions. The C2 and fire support systems are  sophisticated enough to minimize the threat of “friendly fire” or other accidents. However, military and civilian populations are closely integrated, making it difficult for invaders to launch attacks without the risk of civilian casualties that would enrage the population and be used as ammunition for INFOWAR. (''See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support and Chapter 7, Information Warfare.'')
 
−
[[File:Effective Ranges of Arianian Reconnaissance Assets.png|center|thumb|Effective Ranges of Arianian Reconnaissance Assets]]
 
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−
=== Logistics ===
 
−
The Arianian military fields a robust logistics capability that can support its maneuver units for any length of time. Ariana’s military continues to improve its logistics systems, including increased emphasis on support zone security and plans to stockpile war materiel throughout the country.
 
−
 
 
−
=== Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear ===
 
−
Ariana possesses a capable and growing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capability. In this region emerging CBRN capability and technology is viewed as a status symbol. Countries possessing these capabilities are firm in their belief that they should be viewed as a powerbroker and that their weapons equate to symbols of national might with the ability to have regional and possibly strategic impact.
 
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Arianian strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it believes its national security is in jeopardy. National policy also supports the use of preemptive CBRN strikes against a neighbor either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack. It may also use, or threaten to use, CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological pressure.
 
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−
Ariana has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying CBRN warheads, most Arianian artillery systems are capable of delivering chemical munitions. Artillery systems that are 152-mm or larger are also capable of firing nuclear rounds. The Arianian air force can also use its aircraft to deliver a CBRN attack. Trained Arianian SPF may also be used as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages. Ariana is also well-prepared to employ civilian and military CBRN protection measures and has chemical defense units organic to all division and brigade maneuver units.
 
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−
Ariana has a substantial industrial base that produces large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC), which are chemical substances possessing acute toxicity. An adjunct to chemical weapons is use of TIC, which can easily be exploited as improvised (or converted into) chemical weapons by military and civilians alike. (''For a listing of possible high- and moderate-risk TIC possibly available to Ariana see the WEG, Vol. I, Chapter 14, Improvised Military Systems.'')
 
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−
For additional information on the capabilities, release authority (NCA), and employment of CBRN see TC 7-100.2'': Opposing Force Tactics,'' Chapter 13, ''CBRN and Smoke''. For specific technical information, delivery means, agents, and effects of CBRN see the ''WEG'', Vol. I, Chapter 11, ''Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN).''
 
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−
== Research and Development Goals ==
 
−
Over the past two decades, Ariana carried out secretive research supporting its uranium enrichment program, which directly violated the policy set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During this time period, Ariana strongly refuted any claims that it sought nuclear weapons while covertly pursuing a dual parallel uranium enrichment program. One program uses a laser process (based on Donovian technology) and the other applies a centrifuge process. The Donovian government terminated cooperation with Ariana on the laser enrichment program after extensive dialogue with the US, and the program still appears inactive. Ariana admitted that it has obtained uranium centrifuge technology through unofficial channels. Recently, Ariana became the tenth country in the world to develop a nuclear weapon. Though less powerful in terms of kilowatts compared with other nuclear powers, Ariana now possesses a small number of tactical nuclear weapons.
 
−
 
 
−
== Summary ==
 
−
Ariana maintains the second-strongest military in the region after Donovia, with primarily tier 1 and 2 equipment. Ariana operates a capable army, navy, and air force that provide it with a considerable edge compared to its neighboring countries. The Ariana military has the capability to inflict severe losses on any military force that attempts to invade its homeland, but also fields the forces to conduct offensive operations against neighboring countries.
 
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[[Category:DATE|020]]
 
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[[Category:Caucasus]]
 
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[[Category:Ariana]]
 
 
[[Category:Military]]
 
[[Category:Military]]

Latest revision as of 17:38, 25 January 2022

DATE Africa > Ziwa > Military: Ziwa ←You are here

ZPDF Insignia

The Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) is the state military of the Republic of Ziwa. Its structure and focus has adapted over the last decade alongside the country’s economic development. The ZPDF consists of the Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC), Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC), and the National Guard. Ziwa’s military relations with its neighbors – Amari to the north and Kujenga to the south - is generally stable, despite sporadic low-level incidents along the border. The scope of border control operations has contributed to the forward deployment of dedicated maneuver elements and leveraging of former rebels to ensure the appearance of security.

Multiple threats exist to exploit Ziwa’s dependency on natural resources and external power generation and transmission. Brutal militants in the northeast mountain area (“The Watasi Gang”) and pockets of ethnic rebels throughout the country continue to plague stability and keep the military at continually high operational tempo. Although both Kujenga and Amari have active security agreements with Ziwa, rumors persist of covert support to the rebels by both countries. Another key role of the ZPDF is support to reducing criminal smuggling and trafficking of arms and humans through the country’s borders. The ZGFC and National Guard both have resources dedicated to this task. Defense spending and percentage of GDP included over the last five years averaged 1% of GDP. (Figures from CIA World Fact book.)

Ziwan Views on Neighbor States’ Security Conditions
Amari Kujenga Nyumba
  • Partners in combating criminal and countering extremists along shared border and on Lake Victoria.
  • Generally not considered a threat, but viewed as a buffer between Amari and Kujengan instability.
  • Kujenga unwilling/unable to control cross-border and lake criminal activity
  • Militia/gang violence & incursions along southern border and northeastern mountains
  • Poaching and violence spillage a big problem (esp. tourism)
  • Conduit of criminal activity into Ziwan territories
  • Little direct interaction
  • Driver of lawlessness and refugees

Ziwa National Command Authority

National Command Authority
Military branches of the Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) receive their authority via a civilian control and structure. The Ziwan Ministry of Security and Defense (MoSD) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the national security strategy. 

National Strategic Goals

Ziwa’s defense policy has evolved from the previous regime’s emphasis on the need to defend itself against any external aggression.  Over the last two decades it has also recognized that the threat to a country’s stability and economic progress can be internal. The mission of a nation’s security and defense forces are to ensure security by effectively implementing the nation’s policies on internal and external security.  Its experience in suppressing rebellion within its borders led to internal defense policies that have been criticized for complying with only the letter of international agreements.  Ziwa believes its economic progress, political power, and regional prestige are imperiled without a modern military power to secure them. The forces are designed and structured with these objectives in mind:

  • Maintain internal stability and prevent internal security issue from destabilizing political and economic gains
  • Support regional cooperation and develop stable international military relations
  • Ensure and support beneficial use of Ziwan land and lake resources
  • Enforce territorial integrity and maintain border security
  • Defeat armed militants that threaten internal security and inhibit free trade and tourism.

Security and defense policy dictates that the forces should be held in operational readiness and their organization, equipment and procedures for exercising command and control should be tailored towards meeting the role and missions of the forces in peacetime, national emergency or crisis and in war.

Ziwa’s military forces must be used to influence perceived potential threats across the borders or otherwise. Modernizing and updating of the forces to cater for contingencies is essential and an ongoing program across all services.

Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC)

The Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC) is responsible for all ground combat and security patrol operations. Generally regarded as a competent ground force when conducting operations, military units in garrison have sometimes reflected their government’s level of corruption. There are approximately 33,600 ground forces on active duty, including the National Guard. No formal reserve capability exists. Forces are generally arrayed in rotation along Ziwa’s borders with non-deployed forces remaining in garrison bases.

Doctrine and Tactics

Ziwan military doctrine in similar to that of its neighbor, Kujenga, in that forces are deployed to stabilize and respond to security incidents.  Heavier maneuver forces and/or air support may then be deployed to augment in-contact forces and provide decisive engagement as needed.  While Ziwa has a fairly capable array of ground assets, commanders prefer to leverage their robust indirect fire capabilities – particularly in sparsely-populated areas. 

Ziwan ground forces have modernized to a point, but their command doctrine retains legacy elements from prior to the force restructuring of the last two decades.

Composition

Ziwa Army Force Structure
Maneuver battalions are Ziwa’s basic combat unit, with most being able to operate semi-independently.  The ZGFC routinely adjusts its task organization based on mission requirements or perceived changes to threat conditions. The motorized regiments are rotated to designated security missions, with heavy forces and artillery allocated per mission requirements. The remainder of the forces are generally maintained at installations near Usagara and Geita.

Primary Formations:

  • 7th Mechanized Brigade
  • 1st Motorized Regiment
  • 2nd Motorized Regiment
  • 26th Artillery Regiment
  • 27th Rocket Regiment
  • 22nd Air Defense Regiment
  • 1st Information Warfare Battalion
  • 356th Engineer Battalion
  • 51st Antitank Battalion

Paramilitary Forces

ZPNG force structure
Ziwa People’s National Guard (ZPNG).  The National Guard is the state paramilitary security force of Ziwa.  They are responsible for maintaining order and security along the Ziwan border with Kujenga and on Lake Victoria.  They are generally regarded as capable of conducting area security and stability operations.  The motorized units of the National Guard are arrayed across the Ziwa-Kujenga border, while the Marine Battalion has responsibility on the lake.

A large portion of the National Guard’s approximately 3800 personnel is comprised of former rebel fighters from the border regions.  Intended as a good will gesture, this strategy has been met with mixed results. Their knowledge of the terrain and local dynamics has been a significant benefit, but lingering grudges can create conflict.

ZPNG Disposition
The National Guard’s equipment is older than that of the primary ground forces – likely Tier 3, even 4.  Differing levels of discipline within the ranks of the National Guard lead to a wide range of readiness.  Where some units have been meticulous and even improved the vehicles to a Tier 2 condition, others have allowed them to fall into disrepair and resigned to mostly pedestrian operations.

Many of the command positions and most of the signal unit are staffed by regulars from the ZGFC.  The command and control systems are generally most sophisticated and kept in better repair to enable management across distances.  They are likely Tier 2.

The National Guard’s Marine Battalion (MARBAT) is the only element in the ZPDF with a maritime capability. Its mission is to maintain safety and security on Lake Victoria and support lake port security operations.  It has little offensive capability, but conducts regular patrols and courtesy inspection on the lake.  Like the other National Guard units, it is staffed largely by former rebels, but is generally more professional and has a more positive reputation.  

See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 15, Special Purpose Forces and Commandos.

Training and Readiness

The military fills the ranks of both its regular forces and the National Guard through an all-volunteer recruiting program. Reductions in regular force recruiting and retention levels were expected due to Ziwa’s economic growth, but personnel levels from Ziwa’s ethnic minorities and former rebels remain strong. Recruits receive basic military skills training at the Ziwa National Training Center near Usagara, with advanced skill training delivered either as additional training at the center or as on-the-job training (OJT).  Ziwa relies heavily on peacekeeping rotations to solidify and expand individual and small unit capabilities. 

Overall readiness and unit-level capabilities are generally better in the regular forces than National Guard units. The ranks of former rebels soldiers often receive waivers for training and may subsequently revert to their previous, often aggressive, small unit techniques if not intentionally enculturated into the wider force.  Reporting has placed the regular force readiness at approximately 70-80%. Readiness in the National Guard varies, but is assumed to be slightly less than the regular force.  National Guard units in the outlying areas, and those dominated by former rebels, have a history of modifying or cannibalizing their issued equipment based on their perceived local requirements. 

Weapons and Equipment

The weapons and equipment of the ZPDF are mostly Tier 2 capabilities, with niche Tier 1 in much of its communications elements.  The National Guard is distinctly less capable, with most of its equipment being Tier 3 and even some Tier 4 systems, although units may modify equipment to make it more capable.  Equipment is generally purchased or acquired through trade agreements from Donovia or Olvana, with only a few categories from other producers.  

The 61st Tank Battalion functions as a special presidential guard and has a significant allocation of Tier 1 equipment acquired through high-visibility military sales with Olvana. Although more capable than the bulk of the ZGDF, these are largely for regional prestige and not likely to be used except for capital defense.


Functional Capabilities

Command and Control

Army Command Structure
Ziwa’s history of confronting rebellion within its borders has created a culture in which defense-related policies and even brigade or regiment-level command directives are managed by the Ministry of Defense Headquarters at Mwanza. Despite the sometimes cumbersome information flow, military commanders retain a fair amount of autonomy within their assigned missions. Cynicism and distrust remains high throughout the Ziwa People’s National Guard (ZPNG), but frequent command and staff rotations have reduced simmering resentment.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control)

Maneuver

The ZPDF maneuver forces maintain a relatively active rotational deployment schedule.  Battalions assume active security, support, and refit roles throughout the year.  They generally rotate within their parent regiments, augmented with additional armor, artillery, and other assets task organized as needed. As security requirements allow, ZPDF maneuver elements will be used as part of Ziwa’s peacekeeping or humanitarian contribution. Maneuver element are most often used to present an overwhelming deterrent to quell nascent crises or to contain problem situations until indirect fire assets can be utilized. (See below: “[[#Fire Support|Fire Support]]”)

Air Defense

The battalions of Ziwa’s 22nd Air Defense Regiment have a similar rotation scheme as the maneuver forces, with a primary mission of key facility protection in the capital and lake districts. Up to a battalion-sized force may be used to protect indirect fire assets – particularly long range MRL and artillery supporting maneuver forces in the active security role.

Ziwa has invested significant resources in integrating its air defense systems. This effort ranges from purchase of new systems to retrofitting older ones.  Many maneuver elements have been augmented with physical and electronic air defense deception assets to further enhance survivability of these systems.

All maneuver battalions’ organic air defense capabilities are generally limited to MANPADS.  Units frequently train to receive and send queuing communications to enhance responsiveness and accuracy of non-networked systems.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 11, Air Defense)

INFOWAR

Ziwa’s military information warfare capabilities are closely linked to government capabilities. Both government and military prefers to control and direct the majority of INFOWAR assets at the national level.  Military officials have stated publicly that they do not perceive a significant threat from their neighbors, but rely on their capabilities to maintain situational awareness. 

Intelligence and INFOWAR-related capabilities supporting ZPDF forces will likely focus on maintaining situational awareness of opposing key military leaders, while retaining the capability to disrupt communications and interfere with threat decision-making capacity. Both tactical and space-based assets will impact threat GPS-reliant navigation and munitions.  Ziwa has spent the last decade developing both an offensive and defensive cyber capability.  The program leverages both domestic technical capabilities, as well as those of foreign actors – particularly North Torbia.

Ziwa has invested in significant improvements in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  Although much of the public information portrays the UAV advancements as related to the government’s unmanned safety and public health service programs, Ministry of Defense testing of advanced individual and swarm UAVs has been leaked to online sources.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 7, Information Warfare) and Ziwa: Information

RISTA

The ZPDF reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) doctrine centers on the ground forces of the National Guard deployed across the border regions. This generally consists of presence patrols, surveillance, and coordination with intelligence personnel for development of human intelligence (HUMINT).  Its ground reconnaissance is supported by advanced intelligence and INFOWAR capabilities allocated and managed by the Ziwan National Intelligence Bureau (NIB).  This arrangement integrated Ziwan RISTA with its INFOWAR capabilities and doctrine.

The Ziwan Air Corp (ZAC) maintain most of the electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, which consist of integrated radar warning and RF countermeasures. Similarly, the 22nd Air Defense Regiment of the ZGFC is allocated systems to support early warning and target detection.  The ZAC maintains a close relationship with the NIB to facilitate integration of the rapidly developing Ziwan space-based imagery capability.  This capability has been criticized for alleged surveillance on Ziwan citizens, rather than on potential threats.

Ziwa is rapidly and aggressively adopting open source information research and analysis to improve intelligence capabilities.  This has been a joint development project between the Ministry of Defense and prominent Ziwan universities.

Human intelligence continues to provide the majority of external data collection and a balanced share of internal intelligence.

Ziwa has no established MASINT systems but recent purchase of aerostat-based systems for border and regional surveillance. 

See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 7, Information Warfare and Ziwa: Information

Fire Support

Ziwa views its artillery and rocket forces as key to its ability to maintain order and security within its borders. Rather than directly assigning indirect fire (IDF) assets to its motorized battalions, Ziwa prefers to maintain their IDF inventory at installations closer to the capital.  It may temporarily attach assets to maneuver units as security requirements dictate. When deploying forward in support of maneuver forces, IDF systems will be supported by air defense assets.

Multiple rocket launcher systems are less likely to deploy with maneuver units as their ranges and garrisons allow support across much of the Ziwan territory.  Exceptions in the past include operations to put down rebellion in the northeastern mountainous region.  

Similar to its air defense upgrades, Ziwa has invested heavily in technical capabilities that increase the accuracy, lethality, and integration of the entire spectrum of fire support systems. Ziwa has not pursued a modern missile program.  Rumors of upgrading and refitting of legacy pre-regime systems have been reported, but are likely unfounded. 

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support)

Protection

The ZPDF takes substantial effort to protect its critical assets and capabilities. The presumed capabilities of their neighbors, combined with the Ziwan preference for centralizing many of its critical intelligence and military assets has required a full range of physical and electronic protection measures.

Critical information and intelligence capabilities are protected in hardened facilities near the capital, while military assets rely on physical, electronic, and cyber protection.  ZPDF combat units incorporate camouflage, force concealment, and use of decoys into their training.    Elements of the ZPDF’s engineer battalion may be task organized to support specific requirements.  When not specifically tasked, the engineer capabilities support maneuver units’ mobility and protection requirements.

Landmines from previous conflicts in the region have been used in improvised devices by rebels within Ziwan borders.  ZPDF and National Guard soldiers train regularly on explosive hazard awareness. At least a quarter of the soldiers have participated in humanitarian demining operations in the region and worldwide.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support)

Logistics

Ziwa centrally manages military materiel through its Defense Logistics Bureau (DLB), headquartered in Mwanza.  Foreign supplies and equipment arrive for processing via air or rail.  Meticulous record-keeping and modern automated systems allow the DLC to push standard supplies to military units with little interference. Commanders request variance through their staff to the DLC.  Temporary remote depots may be established if commanders request it or secure resupply is at risk of compromise.

CBRNE

Ziwa does not have a confirmed offensive chemical warfare capability, nor is it part of their warfighting doctrine. All personnel receive a basic chemical first aid training.  Emergency responders in all cities have more advanced capabilities for mass casualty care.


Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC)

The Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC) is a small but capable force with primary focus supporting ground forces, providing strategic deterrence, and enabling national intelligence efforts.  

The main base is near Mwanza and was built by mostly Olvanan contractors in the late 1990s. The base is a multi-stage project that included runways, taxiways, extensive shelter and ordnance storage facilities, a headquarters facility and a large complex of living quarters and support buildings.   Civilian airports and airfields may be used by military forces during times of national emergency, as authorized by the president.

The intelligence platforms of the ZAC are attached, but personnel and special technical assets remain under control of the National Intelligence Bureau.

Air Corps Size and Structure

Ziwa Air Corps roundel
The ZAC fields an estimated 645 personnel that operate approximately 18 fixed wing aircraft, 22 helicopters, and an estimated 9 unmanned aerial vehicles.  ZAC aircraft operate primarily from Air Station Mwanza, although standing national policy authorizes military use of civil air infrastructure and facilities. Fighters and intelligence-related platforms will operate from secure facilities at Mwanza.

ZAC intelligence personnel also have the responsibility to coordinate military application of Ziwa’s developing GPS and space-based intelligence capabilities.

Air Corps Doctrine and Tactics

Political and military leaders have reiterated the fundamental principle was that the ZAC would undertake a preemptive attack if the security of the state is endangered.  It is unknown whether this extends to internal strikes.  Due to Ziwan political desires, justification for preemptive attacks would need to be clearly articulated.  The Air Corps regularly trains on ground support and interception missions.  The ZAC prefers to conduct disruption missions against potential threats and lines of communication.  Pilots have received training in conducting sensitive intelligence border operations with the assumption of communications or navigational interference.

Air Corps Weapons and Equipment

One of the fundamental elements of Ziwa’s air capability development is to gain the support of at least the sympathy of one large or middle power – in practice, usually Olvana or Donovia.  They have also purchased or participated in military sales programs of a variety of countries, which gives the ZAC an odd mix of equipment sources.  The ZAC aircraft inventory is generally Tier 2 to Tier 3 - based on technology from 15 to 30 years ago. Aircraft converted for intelligence purposes may have been fitted with niche Tier 2, or in some cases, Tier 1 systems.  Most of the ZAC aircraft are capable of conducting 24-hour operations in all weather. The equipment is generally Donovian in origin, with some Olvanan variants possible.
Ziwa Air Corps Composition

Ziwa Air Corp (ZAC)

  • Click to open Force Struce viewer Attack Aviation SQDN  (FW)
  • Click to open Force Struce viewer Helicopter SQDN   (RW)
  • Click to open Force Struce viewer Intelligence (UAV) SQDN

Air Corps Training and Readiness

Ziwan aircraft inventory is kept at a relatively high state of repair and readiness – as high as 80%.  ZAC emphasis on maintaining existing aircraft while investing in enabling technologies have kept its systems operating at a high level.   Pilots receive training from a variety of sources, particularly Donovia.  Pilots receive sufficient live and simulated air missions to maintain proficiency.

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