Information: Amari

This page is a section of Amari.

Amari is one of the most modern information environments on the African continent. It has the second highest mobile phone using population in the world at 76%. This rapid adoption and advancement were driven by the challenges of landline infrastructure, created by distance and environmental conditions. Demands to develop information systems that allowed Amari to continue its economic expansion caused the country to leapfrog forward with mobile networks and other innovative information technologies in lieu of traditional landlines. The rapid growth in mobile technology created a corresponding leap forward in Internet usage, with over 47 percent penetration in the population. This also supported the explosion of social media used by Amarians — specifically by the growing youth bulge. While open to introduction and application of new information technologies, the people and government of Amari continue to use tried and true information harvesting and management techniques until new systems and applications prove their worth and value.

The growth and the freedom of expression exercised by the population increased dialogue critical of Amaris’ neighbors; Kujenga and Nyumba. This growing nationalist movement and related criticism caused the Amari government to attempt control of message traffic during significant periods of political unrest or in the aftermath of attacks by guerillas, terrorists, or by criminal elements. The intent is to prevent a popular backlash against Kujenga or Nyumba amid calls for open conflict. Amari uses sophisticated information capture and tracking capabilities to monitor both internal and regional communications. A growing segment of the population is aware of the reported claims of oppression committed by Kujenga government forces in the Tanga region. There is also growing anti-Nyumba sentiment caused by the attacks against the Mtangazajiland villages by Nyumban militias. Even though the Amari government attempted to suppress news of the attacks and their brutality, the population is growing increasingly concerned and calling for action to strike Nyumba and stop the attacks. Insurgent groups are using this situation as an opportunity to discredit the government and its attempts to protect Amari citizens.

Satellite Telecommunications

Amari’s satellite services are well established and continue to rapidly develop. It uses both internally developed capabilities and commercial contracts to support government, civil, and military operations. In cooperation with a company from Olvana, the Amari government launched a satellite program to improve essential services to the country. Recent satellite platforms include encryption based on quantum key distribution to provide security for network traffic to and from the platforms. The Olvanese company manufactures Amari’s satellite platforms; these systems have an expected service life of 15 years. The Amari space program maintains six satellites in orbit with an established program to cycle new platforms into operation as old platforms reach the end of service life. The flight path of the satellites reaches across Africa, Europe and Central Asia. The ground control station at Malindi manages individual satellites with a typical package of 28 active transponders and seven antennas. Transponders broadcast in C-, Ku-, Ka-, L-, and S-bands.

• Ku-Band will provide services for Telephony, Video, Data transfer, Telemedicine, Teleconferencing and tele-education;
• Ka-Band will provide services for Telephony, Video, Data transfer;
• C-Band will predominantly be used for television signals and Internet data transmissions.; and
• L-Band will augment GPS signals to about 3-5m and thus play a major role in security and surveillance.
• S-Band provides ground observation

AMARI SATELLITE COVERAGE EASTERN REGION

Amari’s primary space-based imagery platform is the 220-pound (100-kg) Eagle earth observation spacecraft. The Eagle S-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR) can conduct either continuous 10 km swath surveys or detailed spot surveys. Its ground resolution is 1-2 m in spotlight mode, 1-3 m in strip map mode, and 5-30 m in ScanSAR mode. The Eagle provides imagery of roads, urban areas, open terrain, coastline and ocean conditions. Broadband and wireless service is provided by a series of 21 Intelsat platforms covering the region and most of east Africa. Resulting coverage provides 98% reliability.

The services provided by these satellite systems are seen by Amari as a means to stimulate economic growth in Africa, helping create jobs and saving customers expensive charges for imagery collection, telephone calls and broadband Internet access. The satellite's C-band payload will reach across Africa, while its Ku-band transponders will be aimed at regions of eastern Africa. The Ka-band system is specifically wired into spot beams focused on Amari, Ziwa, Kujenga, and Nyumba. These systems transmit two L-band navigation channels that make for more accurate satellite positioning services in the Eastern region.

MALINDI LAUNCH PLATFORM

The satellite launch and control complex located at Malindi performs reception and processing of satellite collected data and transmission of instructions for programs. Amari operates the facility not only as a ground control station but also as a launch complex for communications and data collection satellites. The complex location and activities are a continuing point of contention with Nyumba. The Nyumban government asserts that the ground control station is used to perform observation and electronic collection against the Nyumban government and commercial businesses in the country. Amari does operate the complex as an element of its cyber defense network that targets those non-state actors launching cyber-attacks against Amari interests.

Navigation

Amari’s military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers, reciprocal with GPS or GLONASS, for navigation. They also use both national imagery assets and commercial imagery services to provide IMINT for planning and conducting unit movement.

Public Communications Media

In the past, Amari largely maintained a hands-off policy concerning public media. Due to recent media reports of the vulnerability of government, business, financial, and technological sectors to cyber-attack, there is growing fear among the population. This growing concern of the population about their physical and financial security resulted in the government increasing its efforts in the area of perception management and cyber defense. In addition to recent cyber-attacks, there is growing public dissatisfaction with the government response to reports of the mistreatment of native Tangans by the Kujenga government, as well as Amarian People’s Union (APU) opposition of the growing influx of refugees from Nyumba. In response to these concerns, Amari launched several programs in an attempt to control public media, with mixed results. Program goals are to shore up Amari’s image and quell a growing vocal protest and media campaign by the Free Tanga Youth Movement (FTYM) over Kujengan atrocities. The increasing intensity of the pro-Tanga separation protests and APU media attacks are causing the government to slowly squeeze opposition media in an effort to quell rising nationalist fervor. This may eventually lead to open confrontations with either Kujenga, Nyumba or both.

Despite Amari Telecommunications Authority (ATA) control of all Amari Internet service backbones (packet-switching and bandwidth), the government still finds it a challenge to control Internet information. The Internet now serves as the main forum for Amari’s growing nationalistic voices because of its decentralized nature and its growing importance in the economic sector of the country. Following the recent reports of atrocities in the Tanga region, Broad anti-Kujenga protests exploded across radical nationalist blogs. Protests and social media messages increasingly call for action against the Kujengan government, along with dissatisfaction with the Amari government for lack of response against Kujenga.

The Amari government response to the proliferation of radical nationalist messages across social media was one of the most sophisticated Internet media manipulation schemes in the world. The official explanation for the Internet filters was to block perceived pornographic or immoral material. The reality was an attempt to block sites with political content in an effort to cool both the anti-Kujenga message, and also limit the backlash against the Amari government. The Amari government is also actively broadcasting a message that it is investigating the situation in Tanga while using all means at its disposal to support the Tangans in their efforts to gain autonomy from the Kujengan government.

Internally, government cyber security elements are attempting to block what they believe are external elements trying to inflame the situation with Kujenga. The Amari government collected evidence that Nyumba instigated a media campaign to influence the Amari people in an effort to divert attention from its own problems with Amari along the border. Nyumba’s perceived objective is to tie down Amari security and border control forces in the Tanga region, thus allowing Nyumban forces greater freedom in Gulu-Kakuma. Amari suspects that Nyumba may be attempting to seize the resource rich region in order to relocate the Nyumban population displaced by drought and poor growing conditions.

Using the capabilities of the DarkNet, operators located in Nyumba, following Nyumban campaign objectives, launched a propaganda campaign to show mistreatment of the Tangans by the Kujenga forces. Amari had limited success in filtering the anti-Kujenga message because proxy services, usually hosted abroad, are difficult to block without totally prohibiting virtual private networks (VPNs). Amari citizens responded to the attempted Internet filters by seeking commercial firms offering VPNs to circumvent the government bans. Thus, a race began between the Amari government and activists, as the activists attempted to create and disseminate usable proxy addresses before the Amari government can detect them and add them to the filter.

The nationalist movement, FTYM, uses the Internet, print media, and radio in an attempt to communicate broad demands for action by the Amari government to support separation from Kujenga. The Internet serves as the principle media to reach both domestic and international audiences, as it lends itself to reaching a more educated and urban population. Since the educated, young, urban population comprises the domestic anti-Kujenga movement’s core, the Internet serves as a practical method for support and communication between themselves, Amarian suppporters, and Western sympathizers. Members of the FTYM craft simple but effective messages, usually in English, to speed dissemination to Western media outlets and non-Tangan supporters abroad.

FTYM also distanced itself from any foreign governments in order to undercut any accusations of external influence. Their domestic effort focused on a perceived lack of adequate responses to the issues with Kujenga. Some analysts suggest the movement does not want to be seen as simply a front organization associated with insurgents in the Tanga region that oppose the Kujenga government.

The Amari People’s Union (APU) movement is in the early stages of developing its message regarding the Amari government’s failure to adequately respond to incursions by Nyumba backed forces. Located in the region hit hardest by Nyumban actions, APU coalesced as a vigilante group for self-protection. The group originally started as a means for the local population to assist in securing the border areas. Lack of adequate support and recognition from the government ultimately resulted in the group viewing the Amari government as not caring about the population. That perception fuels the group’s growing hostility towards the government and fuels its new media campaign to gain public support.

In response, the Amari government launched an internal perception management campaign using government controlled websites, social media accounts, television and radio. These include over 15 different news and discussion sites that, while appearing to deliver a variety of opinions, are ultimately controlled by the Amarian government. To get unfiltered news and information, most Amarians access Western news site using satellite television or the Internet when able. An important additional source is the Amarian blogosphere, which connects Amarians internationally and domestically and is considered by most to be highly trustworthy. Amari also enlisted the aid of Ziwa government and technical media outlets as a means to fill gaps in its information operations as part of this campaign.

Internet

Amari has a vibrant, savvy, and growing Internet user population, enabled by a strong and innovative technology sector. Almost 60% of government institutions use Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in their operation. Whether it is a social media presence, a website, some form of e-government, cloud computing, or a combination, Internet and network connectivity are essential components to government operations. ICT integration is also a critical enabler in the private sector, with over 90% of Amari businesses using it as a tool to facilitate enterprise activities and over 50% maintaining a web presence. Over 70% of enterprises use Internet connectivity to conduct financial transactions. The growing youth bubble also recognized the power offered by the Internet and social media to express their dissatisfaction with the government.

The Amari government considers the Internet to be a critical element of the national infrastructure due to the key role it plays in the governance and financial sectors. Recent successful attacks via the Internet prompted the government to transfer all cyber security functions to the military, with the mission to create an integrated national defense program. Amari continues to expand its cyber capability by enlisting students from the higher education system and organizing them in the military’s reserve structure as a cyber militia.

The capital of Amari, Kisumu, is developing its status as a Smart City with maximum connectivity between devices and growing access to cashless transactions. This developing Internet of Things (IoT) gives the city’s managers and government leadership an unprecedented ability to visualize movement and activities within the confines of the city using the advanced network and sensors. The availability of Smart City amenities and ubiquitous technological penetration in nature preserves and national parks continues to support strong growth in financial, technological, scientific, and ecological tourism sectors from around the world.

Rapidly growing mobile phone usage continues to fuel the increase of Amarian network connectivity and Internet use. A highly competitive market and decreasing technology cost helps make phones and data packages much more accessible to the population. Amarian social media has become a dynamic center for discussing politics, culture, and religion. A World Bank economic indicator study finds almost one-half of Amarians use the Internet, the majority via mobile phones.

Recognizing the need to control and protect communication networks, the Amari government lists the critical nodes of the broadband network as critical infrastructure. This designation requires the government to provide both physical security and cyber security forces for their protection. This is especially true in Kisumu: with its Smart City connectivity and key financial and government functions. Military forces provide guards and monitor operation of the network to ensure continuity and security. Unfortunately, corruption found in some elements of the government and military forces creates both internal and external system vulnerabilities.

Compared to the environment for traditional news media, the Internet was relatively free from restrictions, with no blocking or filtering of online content reported until recent developments cause the government to act. Social media is quickly overtaking television as the main means of information messaging to the public.

Television

The government maintains broadcast control over all television content aired in Ariana. A highly popular media, the US Government estimates that television reaches almost 80% of Arianian households. The country’s five major networks broadcast a combination of news, sports, religious,  and historical programming. All networks are controlled by the Arianian government. Arianians are avid consumers of foreign satellite broadcasts via Very Small Aperture Television (like DIRECTV®). The Arianian government periodically cracks down on unlicensed satellite reception, but the prevalence of satellite dishes prevents such crackdowns from being widespread or persistent.

The Arianian government has attempted to jam foreign-sourced satellite transmission, especially from the US, UK, and EU. It has also  enlisted foreign allies like Cuba to jam the uplink signal. It is likely the government will continue to aggressively control viewing choices for Arianians.

Radio

The Arianian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. In December 2002, the US- funded Radio Safa began regular broadcasts in Farsi on short-wave, medium-wave, and satellite. Major Arianian-controlled radio stations include a government network; foreign broadcasting in multiple languages, including Atropian  and  Limarian; and multiple news, talk, cultural, and youth-oriented networks. Practically all Arianians and most people living within 200 kilometers of the Arianian border have access to this programming.

Print Media

After the election of mildly reformist politicians in the late 1990s, the privately-owned Arianian print media began to flourish. Since the return of the conservatives to power, the Arianian government  has adopted aggressive state censorship that bans many reformist newspapers and their employees from the field.

Telephone

Ariana’s modern telecommunications began in 1971. The Arianian government, under both the Pasha and Islamic Republic, ran the Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) as the national telecommunications monopoly. As it did with many other former state enterprises, the Arianian government planned to privatize the ATC. Recently, the Arianian military used a government subsidy to purchase control of the ATC through a shell company, Elburz Enterprises.

Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage

Currently, Arianian telecommunications operate with a combination of landlines (increasingly fiber optic since 1984, with digital switching since 1989) and mobile services (text messaging remains popular). Ariana operates an estimated 25 million landlines and 43 million mobile lines. Foreign operators plan to provide Third Generation (3G) mobile services, but capital and foreign control issues shifted the new network’s ownership and construction responsibility to various Arianian government agencies.

Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links (INMARSAT and INTELSAT), high-frequency (HF) radio, and fiber optic cable. The ATC, from its outset in 1971, assumed responsibility for all Arianian telecommunication affairs, and the ATC began the same year to manufacture the network’s required national long- distance equipment. After the first fiber optic cable operational testing at the ATC’s research center in 1984, the government began constructing the Shahid's Voice Communications Company in Esfahan the next year; it became operational in 1989.

By the end of the decade, the US government estimated 8.5 million Arianians enjoyed mobile telephone service operated through one heavily-congested mobile network with a long waiting list. In 2005, the Arianian parliament forced the Kalarian company Kalacell to withdraw from a potential mobile phone consortium. The failed business deal damaged Arianian-Kalarian relations despite Ariana’s need for another network. Later that year, South Africa’s Mobile Telephones Network of South Africa accepted Ariana’s stringent licensing conditions and replaced Kalacell in the mobile phone consortium.

Additionally, Ariana embarked on a homegrown satellite program to improve its communications network. In February 2009, the Arianians used a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), which weighed about 60 pounds, to launch a first-generation communications satellite into orbit. Ariana can use this or future satellites for communication or possibly for intelligence purposes. Significantly, the launch validated Arianian ballistic missile and rocket capabilities, laying the groundwork for a possible change in the Middle East balance of power.

Postal/Courier

Ariana Postal Service (APS) and other private courier services within Ariana transport mail, packages, and other documents. The private couriers’ importance continues to decrease as business activity restrictions  by  the Arianian  military  and international  economic  sanctions  make it progressively more difficult to operate within Ariana. APS offers domestic and international service as it attempts to upgrade its postal system to international standards.

Word of Mouth

Word of mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Ariana. Because of the political situation, political or religious speech not specifically approved by the government is dangerous, so trust relationships are even more important than in most neighboring countries. The Arianian government often disseminates new policy through religious authorities to give government pronouncements the veneer of religious sanction.

Information Control

The government effectively controls all major media outlets and effectively muzzles dissent except on the Internet, where reformers operate with great difficulty. For over 30 years, Ariana’s government has maintained a massive anti-US INFOWAR campaign that is remarkable mostly for its ineffectiveness with both its own population and wider regional and international audiences. On the other hand, Ariana’s Persian ethnic majority warmly receives any perception management-driven messages of Persian “greatness” or “uniqueness.”

INFOWAR

INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.

Electronic Warfare

Ariana maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from 1970s Western equipment to international arms market purchases to domestically produced items. While still capable against regional foes, the Arianian electronic warfare (EW) capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with modern Arianian equipment. Arianian EW doctrine remains in a state of flux as the Arianian military struggles with slow abandonment of Western practices and adoption of more non-Western asymmetric practices.

Computer Attack

Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful they could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, the Arianians possess significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.

Information Attack

Ariana also possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia, even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force, and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Arianian IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies.

Deception

Deception remains a hallmark of Arianian military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. Arianians particularly focus on deception to mask operations and allow Arianian forces to close the gap with the US and other adversarial countries, which Arianians believe maintain an unbridgeable arms overmatch. Arianians will likely use a variety of ruses, such as wearing US-style or other countries’ military uniforms, to mask their involvement in military operations.

Physical Destruction

Ariana knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other high-end opponents is extremely limited. Ariana will probably only attack sensors as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. Ariana highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon.

Protection and Security Measures

Recently, Ariana made international news for being unable to protect its nuclear power SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks from malware. While significant damage occurred from this incident, the Arianians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Ariana uses both internally produced and commercial off-the- shelf network protection software.

Perception Management

Traditionally, Ariana attempts to craft a complete anti-Western, Revolutionary Islam message for both external and internal consumption. The Arianian government uses local proxies to downplay  the “Persian” and Shia origins of its message in non-Shia countries while consistently supporting world-wide communications that “Islam is the Answer” to the Muslim world’s problems. This idea of Revolutionary Islam’s value itself is an Arianian Islamic Republic message. Internally, the government conveys that the Arianian Islamic Republic is the primary Shia Islam defender. The Arianian government consistently references the Martyrdom of Hussein, a prime element of Shia, to rally populous support from the rural, religiously conservative Shia. Additionally, INFOWAR messages merge perceived threats (such as Western cultural imperialism/pollution) with the Islamic Republic as a threat against Ariana itself. This rallying cry to defend the Arianian nation resonates with all levels of Arianian society.

Regionally, Arianians attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against aggressive outside forces. In government and population discussions, Arianians stress their shared religious beliefs and play up the Atropian minority population’s integration within Ariana. Arianians also continue to strengthen their relations with Limaria, stressing common commercial interests. Arianians will likely attempt to portray Gorgans as “puppets” of the West. Despite their historical and political status as the “odd man out” of the Caucasus region, the Arianians will deftly play up elements of political, social, religious, or economic commonality with other nations.

Intelligence

Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe Ariana to be the second most capable space power in the region as it has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, Ariana has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite  imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian- produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.

Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.

Human Intelligence

Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the Arianian military’s World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.

Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the “Persian” and “Shia” origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.

Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers  and Arianian military’s associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.

Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.

The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.

Open Source Intelligence

Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.

Signals Intelligence

Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.

Imagery Intelligence

Arianian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Ariana has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped  to a ground station located somewhere in Ariana. To further supplement its IMINT requirements,  the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open- source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.

Summary

Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future.