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Difference between revisions of "Information: North Torbia"

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''This page is a section of [[North Torbia]].''
 
''This page is a section of [[North Torbia]].''
  
[[Ariana]] is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. Ariana is one of the most sophisticated nations in the world at information control, utilizing advanced capabilities to monitor and direct communications. Despite this, the fragmented Arianian opposition uses the Internet extensively, though its ultimate effect on the political environment is mixed at best. Ariana’s INFOWAR capability is generally good, with pockets of excellence in a variety of disciplines.
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The Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia, also known as North Torbia, is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. The Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia is very adept at information control, utilizing programs that have been in place for years to monitor and direct communications. In addition, the Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia’s INFOWAR capability is extremely capable, with areas of excellence in select disciplines.
  
 
== Satellite Telecommunications ==
 
== Satellite Telecommunications ==
Ariana’s advancements in satellite communication services are rapidly developing. Presently, Ariana operates one government-owned telecommunication satellite which utilizes Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. When necessary, Ariana contracts with foreign allies to lease satellite communication systems that also operate Ku-band transponders.
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The Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia advancements in satellite communication services are slowly developing in manufacturing and launching their own satellites. Presently, North Torbia operates one earth observation satellite that utilizes X-Band transponders to communicate images for download while in a sun-synchronous polar orbit. This satellite is projected to be operational for at least four to eight years and is claimed to be used for agriculture, exploration, mapping, utilities management, and urban planning. North Torbia is also possibly using satellites from other countries, such as Olvana, Donovia, and possibly other Western Nations, both inside and outside of the region, to advance its weapons research programs.
  
 
== Navigation ==
 
== Navigation ==
Ariana’s military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers that are reciprocal with GPS or GLONASS for navigation. This highlights the significance of dual-use technologies, utilizing technologies designed for the commercial sector yet adaptable to support military objectives.
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North Torbia does not have its own Global Positioning System (GPS) system and must rely on other countries that are friendly to its government. The military is believed to use Donovian and People's Republic of Olvana satellite navigation systems; although the possibility exist that it may utilize Western GPS systems as well. Additionally, by utilizing commercial sector technologies that could be adapted to support military objectives is also possibly being utilized by North Torbia.
  
 
== Public Communications Media ==
 
== Public Communications Media ==
Ariana’s heavy-handed control of public communications has allowed the country to weather a sustained protest movement and slowly squeeze opposition voices from the public arena—either to internal silence or external exile. All significant public media is not just government-controlled, but the messages are crafted expertly to portray the Arianian government and the Council of Guardians Revolution in the best possible light and to shift the blame for most issues to an implacably hostile West.
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North Torbia’s use of heavy-handed control of public communications has allowed the country to exert total control over its population. This allows them to deny any internal opposition group from opposing the manner in which the current regime runs the country by utilizing public media forums. All significant public media is not just government-controlled, but messages are crafted to portray North Torbia’s government in the best possible light.
  
 
=== Internet ===
 
=== Internet ===
Internet use in Ariana is blossoming, and the Arianian Internet is a dynamic center for discussing politics, culture, and religion. World Bank economic indicator studies suggest about one-third of Arianians use the Internet.  Arianian Internet usage growth is among if not the fastest in the Caucasus region.
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North Torbia is a relative newcomer to the Internet and has not been fully adopted mainstream Internet technology due to its isolationist ways. The Internet is viewed as a potential threat by allowing access to a variety of views and opinions not consistent with the government’s views and opinions and to protect against this the government has exerted very strong control of the development. The country has some broadband infrastructure, to include fiber optic links between major institutions. Online services for most individuals and institutions are provided through a free domestic-only network known as Net-Torbia, with limited global access to a select group of users.
[[File:Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message.png|thumb|Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message]]
 
Despite Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) control of all Ariana Internet service backbones (packet-switching and bandwidth), the government still finds it a challenge to control Internet information. The Internet now serves as the main forum for Ariana’s dissident voices because of its decentralized nature and the fact that most of the infrastructure is outside Ariana’s borders. Broad anti- government protests following recent Arianian presidential elections increased the importance, content, and quantity of Internet blogs.
 
  
The Arianian government responded to the proliferation of Internet anti-government messages by adopting one of the most sophisticated Internet censorship systems in the world. Officially, the Arianian government introduced Internet filters to block perceived pornographic or immoral material. In practice, it attempts to block sites with political content as it limits access and identifies those who make posts. The Director of the Arianian Communications Technology Network claims Ariana blocks 90% of the more than 10 million sites for “immoral” reasons. The Arianian government made broadband Internet connections for home users illegal to prevent users from downloading Western cultural products like music and films. Many external reports indicate the government bans far more than the 90% of Internet sites it claims.
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The Central Information Agency for Technology (CIAT) controls all of the countries Internet address allocations that provides all internet access. Internet connection in North Torbia is provided by a joint venture between North Torbia and Olvana. Prior to this joint venture, Internet access was available only through a satellite link with an unidentified European country, but the government has also accessed some Internet through connections with the People's Republic of Olvana in the recent past. Only certain groups within North Torbia are permitted to access the internet, with special authorization, such as the central party or some Cabinet-level government organizations. Additionally, foreign diplomatic missions, joint ventures, and foreign individuals staying in Baguio can have full, but monitored, access to the Internet at their workplaces and certain international hotels.
 
 
Proxy services, usually hosted abroad, responded to the attempted bans by offering a means for many Arianians to circumvent the government bans. Thus, a race continues between the Arianian government and activists as the activists attempt to create and disseminate usable proxy addresses before the Arianian government can detect them and add them to the filter.
 
 
 
Due to its technological nature, the Internet lends itself to a more educated and urban population. Since the educated, young, urban population comprises the domestic anti-Arianian movement’s core, the Internet serves as a practical method for support and communication between themselves, Arianian expatriates, and Western sympathizers. Members of Ariana’s anti-government movement have crafted simple, but effective, English messages to speed dissemination to Western media outlets and non-Farsi speaking supporters abroad.
 
 
 
The domestic opposition movement has also distanced itself from any foreign government or the idea of change to the current political structure. Instead, the domestic effort has focused on electoral irregularities. Some analysts suggest the domestic movement does not want to be associated with movements that appear either anti-religious or anti-government.
 
 
 
Ariana’s government controls several internal Arianian websites. These include over 15 different news and discussion sites that, while appearing to deliver a variety of opinions, are controlled by the Arianian government. Most Arianians, when able, access Western news sites. An important additional source is the Arianian blogosphere, which connects Arianians internationally and domestically and is considered by most to be highly trustworthy.
 
  
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In addition to the new and limited Internet access, North Torbia developed a nationwide Intranet fifteen years ago with a sophisticated architecture and a backbone capacity of 1.5 GB per second. This Intranet is controlled by the CIAT who also has the responsibility for connecting all government institutions at the national, provincial, and county levels. The Intranet is filtered by the CIAT, which regulates information deemed acceptable by the government that can be accessed through the network. The majority of the general population does not seem to have a problem with no outside internet access, as most have no knowledge of what the internet is due to the restrictive policies currently in place by the government.
 
=== Television ===
 
=== Television ===
The government maintains broadcast control over all television content aired in Ariana. A highly popular media, the US Government estimates that television reaches almost 80% of Arianian households. The country’s five major networks broadcast a combination of news, sports, religious,  and historical programming. All networks are controlled by the Arianian government. Arianians are avid consumers of foreign satellite broadcasts via Very Small Aperture Television (like DIRECTV®). The Arianian government periodically cracks down on unlicensed satellite reception, but the prevalence of satellite dishes prevents such crackdowns from being widespread or persistent.
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Television in North Torbia is subject to the control of the Central Committee for Radio and Television.  Currently more than fifty percent of the population have access to television. Televisions are supplied pre-tuned to only North Torbian stations and subject to inspection for compliance. State television is always off air until its evening news broadcast at 5:00 pm. The exception to this is on Sundays which starts at 6:00 am, as well as in emergency events, live events and national holidays.   
 
 
The Arianian government has attempted to jam foreign-sourced satellite transmission, especially from the US, UK, and EU. It has also  enlisted foreign allies like Cuba to jam the uplink signal. It is likely the government will continue to aggressively control viewing choices for Arianians.
 
  
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There are currently seven nationwide television channels, as well as a local channel at the province level that broadcast media in some way that promotes the regime's ideologies and positions. Two years ago, a state-approved video streaming service was launched to stream live national TV, on-demand video and newspaper articles from state controlled news services over the internet. The service is currently available only to citizens in the Capitol due to the country's limited internet access. The national population is also prohibited to tune into any foreign broadcasts as they are deemed to portraying a negative image of the regime accessed illegally along the border regions of South Torbia over black marketed services.
 
=== Radio ===
 
=== Radio ===
The Arianian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. In December 2002, the US- funded Radio Safa began regular broadcasts in Farsi on short-wave, medium-wave, and satellite. Major Arianian-controlled radio stations include a government network; foreign broadcasting in multiple languages, including Atropian  and  Limarian; and multiple news, talk, cultural, and youth-oriented networks. Practically all Arianians and most people living within 200 kilometers of the Arianian border have access to this programming.
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The North Torbian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. Due to the economic conditions in the country and the short broadcast day, 9am to 3 pm, radio is the most widely used medium. All radios are modified to receive only government stations.  The AM stations, Baguio Broadcasting Station (Radio Baguio) and Voice of Torbia (Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia Central Broadcasting Station), as well as the FM station “One Torbia” are the main domestic radio media. In addition, smaller community stations air local programming to individuals. North Torbia has a national broadcast radio station that operates throughout the country that provides a majority of the information for the average citizen. In addition, any person visiting North Torbia, for business or pleasure, is banned from bringing a radio into the country.
  
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Refugees from North Torbia in the Republic of Torbia have created an independent radio station near the border in an attempt to better inform and influence the population of North Torbia, using loudspeakers and black marketed radios.  Radio Free Torbia broadcast daily to North Torbia’s population and serves as an independent news outlet for the populace, allowing international news to reach them.
 
=== Print Media ===
 
=== Print Media ===
After the election of mildly reformist politicians in the late 1990s, the privately-owned Arianian print media began to flourish. Since the return of the conservatives to power, the Arianian government  has adopted aggressive state censorship that bans many reformist newspapers and their employees from the field.
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North Torbia has eight principal newspapers and thirteen major periodicals, all published in Baguio which are then shipped to the different regions for distribution. Censorship abounds as the regime limits the ability of the citizens to access outside information. Those that attempt to listen to or read any outside media risk harsh penalties such as forced labor. Only senior party officials are permitted access to external news sources. North Torbia journalists all belong to the ruling party and use their position to consolidate national unity.
  
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Foreign journalists are typically defamed in official government media for attempting to destabilize the government. Foreign journalists are encouraged to not enter North Torbia unless invited by the government and are not allowed to have or use cell phones and GPS devices. Foreign journalists are warned not to speak about sensitive political issues with citizens and their movements are also very strictly restricted, as they are typically accompanied by a guide at all times to prohibit them from visiting restricted areas without prior permission.
 
=== Telephone ===
 
=== Telephone ===
Ariana’s modern telecommunications began in 1971. The Arianian government, under both the Pasha and Islamic Republic, ran the Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) as the national telecommunications monopoly. As it did with many other former state enterprises, the Arianian government planned to privatize the ATC. Recently, the Arianian military used a government subsidy to purchase control of the ATC through a shell company, Elburz Enterprises.
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North Torbia has an adequate telephone system, with a nationwide fiber-optic network and mobile-cellular service that expand out beyond Baguio. However, most landline phones are only installed for senior government officials. Someone wanting a phone installed must fill out a form indicating their rank, why they want a phone, and how they will pay for it. Most of these are installed in government offices, collective farms, and state-run businesses, with only perhaps fifteen percent controlled by individuals or households. As of three years ago, thirty percent of Baguio citizens between the ages of twenty and fifty have a mobile phone.
[[File:Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage.png|thumb|Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage]]
 
Currently, Arianian telecommunications operate with a combination of landlines (increasingly fiber optic since 1984, with digital switching since 1989) and mobile services (text messaging remains popular). Ariana operates an estimated 25 million landlines and 43 million mobile lines. Foreign operators plan to provide Third Generation (3G) mobile services, but capital and foreign control issues shifted the new network’s ownership and construction responsibility to various Arianian government agencies.
 
 
 
Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links (INMARSAT and INTELSAT), high-frequency (HF) radio, and fiber optic cable. The ATC, from its outset in 1971, assumed responsibility for all Arianian telecommunication affairs, and the ATC began the same year to manufacture the network’s required national long- distance equipment. After the first fiber optic cable operational testing at the ATC’s research center in 1984, the government began constructing the Shahid's Voice Communications Company in Esfahan the next year; it became operational in 1989.
 
 
 
By the end of the decade, the US government estimated 8.5 million Arianians enjoyed mobile telephone service operated through one heavily-congested mobile network with a long waiting list. In 2005, the Arianian parliament forced the Kalarian company Kalacell to withdraw from a potential mobile phone consortium. The failed business deal damaged Arianian-Kalarian relations despite Ariana’s need for another network. Later that year, South Africa’s Mobile Telephones Network of South Africa accepted Ariana’s stringent licensing conditions and replaced Kalacell in the mobile phone consortium.
 
  
Additionally, Ariana embarked on a homegrown satellite program to improve its communications network. In February 2009, the Arianians used a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), which weighed about 60 pounds, to launch a first-generation communications satellite into orbit. Ariana can use this or future satellites for communication or possibly for intelligence purposes. Significantly, the launch validated Arianian ballistic missile and rocket capabilities, laying the groundwork for a possible change in the Middle East balance of power.
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Currently, the North Torbian telephone architecture operates with a combination of landlines and mobile services. North Torbia has an estimated 1.07 million landlines and 3.16 million mobile subscribers. North Torbian mobile phones use a digital signature system to prevent unauthorized access to certain files, as well as logs usage information that can be physically inspected. As of three years ago, no mobile phones can dial into or out of the country as well as no Internet connection was available. The current 3G network covers eighty percent of the population, but only covers sixteen percent of the territory.
  
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Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links, fiber optic cable and other international connections. A satellite ground station near Baguio provides direct international communications using the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Indian Ocean satellite. Additionally, a satellite communications center was installed in Baguio fifteen years ago with Western technical support.
 
=== Postal/Courier ===
 
=== Postal/Courier ===
Ariana Postal Service (APS) and other private courier services within Ariana transport mail, packages, and other documents. The private couriers’ importance continues to decrease as business activity restrictions  by  the Arianian  military  and international  economic  sanctions  make it progressively more difficult to operate within Ariana. APS offers domestic and international service as it attempts to upgrade its postal system to international standards.
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North Torbia’s postal service or The Post of Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia is operated by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications Maintenance Bureau (MPTM), which oversees postal communications, telegrams, newspapers and other related materials. Each province has a branch of the MPTM and each village has a postal service office to deliver letters, packages and telegrams. Agents of the State Security and Inspectors Department are stationed at the Ministry's offices to open, read and generally watch citizens to ensure their loyalty to the state.
  
 
=== Word of Mouth ===
 
=== Word of Mouth ===
Word of mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Ariana. Because of the political situation, political or religious speech not specifically approved by the government is dangerous, so trust relationships are even more important than in most neighboring countries. The Arianian government often disseminates new policy through religious authorities to give government pronouncements the veneer of religious sanction.
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Word of mouth is an important communications apparatus, especially in rural North Torbia. With the current regime any type of speech, verbal or printed, not approved by the government is dangerous and could lead to detention or even death. Despite having a postal system, word of mouth remains the most common way information is spread throughout the country.
  
 
=== Information Control ===
 
=== Information Control ===
The government effectively controls all major media outlets and effectively muzzles dissent except on the Internet, where reformers operate with great difficulty. For over 30 years, Ariana’s government has maintained a massive anti-US INFOWAR campaign that is remarkable mostly for its ineffectiveness with both its own population and wider regional and international audiences. On the other hand, Ariana’s Persian ethnic majority warmly receives any perception management-driven messages of Persian “greatness” or “uniqueness.
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Information control is very strong within the borders of the country. The government limits the telecommunications network to ensure that only information they deem worthy and for the well-being of the country is provided to the populace. This includes access to outside media and tight control of the internet to deny the populace free access to other news and press agencies. The press is tightly controlled by the state, and the government only allows speech that supports it and the ruling regime. The one-party regime rigorously limits the ability of the people and foreign journalists to access internal information about state entities, and attempts to monitor and regulate all forms of communication. Under the current penal code, listening to unauthorized foreign broadcasts and possessing dissident publications are considered “crimes against the state” that carry serious punishments, including hard labor, prison sentences, and the death penalty. Citizens of North Torbia are often interrogated or arrested for speaking critically about the government; they also face arrest for possessing or watching black-market recordings of television programs. In recent years, the government issued an ordinance forbidding foreign diplomats from possessing any media critical of the regime.
  
 
== INFOWAR ==
 
== INFOWAR ==
INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.
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North Torbia has an Information Warfare (INFOWAR) capability, but relies on a lot of older technology in some of the areas. North Torbia will continue to research and develop more modern capabilities, but due to sanctions it will be a few years before any modern assets are available. North Torbia will rely on its maturing cyber operations and information operations to be most prominent capabilities used in their INFOWAR arsenal.
  
 
=== Electronic Warfare ===
 
=== Electronic Warfare ===
Ariana maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from 1970s Western equipment to international arms market purchases to domestically produced items. While still capable against regional foes, the Arianian electronic warfare (EW) capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with modern Arianian equipment. Arianian EW doctrine remains in a state of flux as the Arianian military struggles with slow abandonment of Western practices and adoption of more non-Western asymmetric practices.
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North Torbia has made limited advancements in its electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. While still capable against lesser regional foes, North Torbian EW capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with more modern EW equipment. North Torbia’s EW doctrine continually adapts to the changing advancements in their own technology and trying to stay on pace with other technological advanced countries. North Torbia maintains a large array of ground and airborne sensors and jammers in its inventory. The main objective of North Torbia’s EW operations is the disruption or destruction of enemy command and control systems by jamming the networks.
  
 
=== Computer Attack ===
 
=== Computer Attack ===
Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful they could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, the Arianians possess significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.
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Of the Pacific countries, North Torbia maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber cadre, possibly 2,500 to 4,000 personnel. North Torbia has a robust and effective training program for the individuals that employ computer attacks against foreign countries as well as allies if deemed necessary. The Government has employed computer attacks in the past with great success and will not hesitate to launch additional attacks if it perceives a threat against its sovereignty. In addition, North Torbia is able to use independent foreign hacker groups for personnel, hardware and software to further their capabilities with less chance of being caught. The country has trained cadres of hackers, both within North Torbia and in other nearby countries. After they complete their training, hackers are deployed throughout the world to launch attacks where a more reliable internet infrastructure exist.
  
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North Torbia’s cyber cadre will conduct operations such as reconnaissance, sabotage and criminal activities. These operations allow for minimal operational risk, while at the same time cause financial disruptions and generate illegal funds to support North Torbian goals and intent. In addition to the previously mentioned operations, other missions could possibly be to deny the enemy their command and control capabilities while at the same time defending North Torbia’s networks from enemy operations. The cyber cadre could also be used to disrupt enemy air defense radars and early warning systems to give them an operational advantage if North Torbia were to conduct offensive operations.
 
=== Information Attack ===
 
=== Information Attack ===
Ariana also possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia, even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force, and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Arianian IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies.
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North Torbia possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to the People’s Republic of Olvana. North Torbian IA capability has grown over the last eight years along with their cyber capability. While its capabilities continue to improve, North Torbian IA will still continue to be only slightly effective against top-tier nation states and their allies. Current capabilities could possibly be distributed denial of services, defacing of websites and implementation of a tool to gain access to systems done by teams outside of the country.
  
 
=== Deception ===
 
=== Deception ===
Deception remains a hallmark of Arianian military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. Arianians particularly focus on deception to mask operations and allow Arianian forces to close the gap with the US and other adversarial countries, which Arianians believe maintain an unbridgeable arms overmatch. Arianians will likely use a variety of ruses, such as wearing US-style or other countries’ military uniforms, to mask their involvement in military operations.
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Deception remains a major part of North Torbia’s military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. North Torbia particularly focuses on deception to mask operations and allow North Torbian forces to equal their strength against adversarial countries they believe to have an advantage. North Torbia will likely use a variety of ruses, such as decoys, when deployed to avoid or confuse enemy collection assets.
  
 
=== Physical Destruction ===
 
=== Physical Destruction ===
Ariana knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other high-end opponents is extremely limited. Ariana will probably only attack sensors as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. Ariana highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon.
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North Torbian deep strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special operations forces will aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. These elements could be combined with their strong cyber capabilities to further intensify targeting of key assets such as western intelligence collection assets and communication nodes allowing maximum freedom of maneuver and protection from enemy targeting.
  
 
=== Protection and Security Measures ===
 
=== Protection and Security Measures ===
Recently, Ariana made international news for being unable to protect its nuclear power SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks from malware. While significant damage occurred from this incident, the Arianians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Ariana uses both internally produced and commercial off-the- shelf network protection software.
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Due to North Torbia only having an emerging global internet and relying mostly on the intranet, the threat from outside entities is minimal. The only potential place a threat could happen would be to the limited outside internet connections utilized by select cabinet post and central party members for limited official government business. North Torbia also has a very stringent accountability of all documents produced by the government and armed forces to not leave approved facilities. These facilities are patrolled by armed guards with a central entry point to control access to the facility by only those approved.
  
 
=== Perception Management ===
 
=== Perception Management ===
Traditionally, Ariana attempts to craft a complete anti-Western, Revolutionary Islam message for both external and internal consumption. The Arianian government uses local proxies to downplay  the “Persian” and Shia origins of its message in non-Shia countries while consistently supporting world-wide communications that “Islam is the Answer” to the Muslim world’s problems. This idea of Revolutionary Islam’s value itself is an Arianian Islamic Republic message. Internally, the government conveys that the Arianian Islamic Republic is the primary Shia Islam defender. The Arianian government consistently references the Martyrdom of Hussein, a prime element of Shia, to rally populous support from the rural, religiously conservative Shia. Additionally, INFOWAR messages merge perceived threats (such as Western cultural imperialism/pollution) with the Islamic Republic as a threat against Ariana itself. This rallying cry to defend the Arianian nation resonates with all levels of Arianian society.
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Traditionally, North Torbia attempts to craft a complete anti-Western message for both external and internal consumption through their state run media. North Torbia will use perception management most aggressively on their own population as a mechanism to generate support for North Torbian government operations, while at the same time messaging to maintain preservation of the current regime. Regionally, North Torbia will attempt to portray themselves as defending against outside forces they deem are intent on replacing the current regime. In government and population discussions, North Torbia will stress their shared social values and underscore the Republic of Torbia minority population’s integration within North Torbia while also strengthening their relations with People’s Republic of Olvana. North Torbia will likely attempt to portray the Republic of Torbia as “lackeys” of the West due to the influence of business ties and reliance on military support.
 
 
Regionally, Arianians attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against aggressive outside forces. In government and population discussions, Arianians stress their shared religious beliefs and play up the Atropian minority population’s integration within Ariana. Arianians also continue to strengthen their relations with Limaria, stressing common commercial interests. Arianians will likely attempt to portray Gorgans as “puppets” of the West. Despite their historical and political status as the “odd man out” of the Caucasus region, the Arianians will deftly play up elements of political, social, religious, or economic commonality with other nations.
 
  
 
== Intelligence ==
 
== Intelligence ==
Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe Ariana to be the second most capable space power in the region as it has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, Ariana has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite  imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian- produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.
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North Torbia operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. North Torbian intelligence operations are focused on supporting operations suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists, as well as Western and regional threats. North Torbia has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. North Torbia’s open source intelligence (OSINT) program is most likely conducted by teams outside of the country where internet access is more abundant and then providing information back to select   government members that have access to the limited available internet in country. Additionally, North Torbia has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT). North Torbia’s IMINT program will likely continue to operate at a slightly lower development rate than their more sophisticated capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs. Additionally, North Torbian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic and familial connections for collection and influence.
 
 
Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.
 
  
 
=== Human Intelligence ===
 
=== Human Intelligence ===
Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the Arianian military’s World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.
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North Torbia has a robust HUMINT program that operates internally to suppress opposition groups and externally to collect against foreign governments. Members of the program endure an extended training program, normally four to twelve months, on how to conduct operations before being transferred to an operational unit. The majority of HUMINT operations are conducted along the border with and inside of North Torbia. These operations will focus on identifying individuals of the local populace that are a threat to the stability of the government within North Torbia, as well as any individuals trying infiltrate into the country to assist those who seek to overthrow the government. Additionally these teams may be operating south of the border to gain information on the composition and disposition of forces that constitutes the main external threat to the regime.  
 
 
Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the “Persian” and “Shia” origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.
 
 
 
Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers  and Arianian military’s associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.
 
 
 
Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.
 
  
The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.
+
Due to sanctions imposed by the United Nations and select Western nations, access to more advanced technologies will be one of the major missions for HUMINT agents outside of North Torbia.  These agents will use all necessary means to acquire technical data to be replicated within North Torbian borders to further the security of the nation. Additionally, HUMINT operations outside of North Torbia may entail blackmail, extortion and recruitment of foreign nationals. The money received from blackmail or extortion operations will be used to procure resources currently unavailable to North Torbia. The recruitment of foreign nationals will assist with infiltration of corporations to enable operations to acquire technical information not available otherwise. The personnel recruited are normally sympathetic to the North Torbian international issues and will do whatever it takes to ensure the regime stays in power with their assistance.
  
 
=== Open Source Intelligence ===
 
=== Open Source Intelligence ===
Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.
+
North Torbia probably operates a massive OSINT program against South Torbia, the US, and other Western countries with government and government-affiliated operators. North Torbia continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the North Torbian government and adversaries like the Peoples Republic of Torbia, as well as other regional and Western nations. This data will be used to project future regional tensions and give the North Torbian government a platform from which to react to perceived regional and international threats.
  
 
=== Signals Intelligence ===
 
=== Signals Intelligence ===
Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.
+
The North Torbian SIGINT program consistently operates in key areas that are of high interest to the government, such as along the border with South Torbia. Regional and Western countries can expect the North Torbian SIGINT to provide the military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most North Torbian SIGINT operators have significant experience and capabilities from continuous operations in the region. North Torbian SIGINT inventory consist of ground, airborne and maritime platforms. Additionally, North Torbia may cooperate extensively with the People’s Republic of Olvana and Donovia in SIGINT operations.
  
 
=== Imagery Intelligence ===
 
=== Imagery Intelligence ===
Arianian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Ariana has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped  to a ground station located somewhere in Ariana. To further supplement its IMINT requirements,  the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.
+
North Torbian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. North Torbian UAV’s can be used along the border areas and further south into South Torbia to detect any buildup of forces that could be indications of possible future operations by South Torbia. The use of these UAVs for IMINT operations are due to the current state of the fixed wing aircraft in North Torbia and are easier to infiltrate across the border due to their small size, making them harder to detect by South Torbian air defense assets.
  
 +
 North Torbia also has access to a government owned and operated earth observation satellite. This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and believed to have a life span of four to eight years. Images received from this satellite are periodically transmitted to a ground station located somewhere in North Torbia at least three to four times a day. To further supplement its IMINT requirements, the North Torbian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.
 
=== Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ===
 
=== Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ===
Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open- source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.
+
North Torbia does not have a MASINT capability and would need to rely on its military partner’s for any such information.
  
 
== Summary ==
 
== Summary ==
Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future.
+
North Torbia maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, and will continue to research and develop more advanced systems to protect itself. North Torbia has utilized its cyber program against external opposition parties and foreign governments with success and will continue its operations providing their cyber operators with greater experience and more advanced techniques. North Torbia will retain total control over the nation’s information environment to continue to deter internal and external opposition parties.
  
 
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Revision as of 15:25, 23 April 2018

This page is a section of North Torbia.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia, also known as North Torbia, is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. The Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia is very adept at information control, utilizing programs that have been in place for years to monitor and direct communications. In addition, the Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia’s INFOWAR capability is extremely capable, with areas of excellence in select disciplines.

Satellite Telecommunications

The Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia advancements in satellite communication services are slowly developing in manufacturing and launching their own satellites. Presently, North Torbia operates one earth observation satellite that utilizes X-Band transponders to communicate images for download while in a sun-synchronous polar orbit. This satellite is projected to be operational for at least four to eight years and is claimed to be used for agriculture, exploration, mapping, utilities management, and urban planning. North Torbia is also possibly using satellites from other countries, such as Olvana, Donovia, and possibly other Western Nations, both inside and outside of the region, to advance its weapons research programs.

Navigation

North Torbia does not have its own Global Positioning System (GPS) system and must rely on other countries that are friendly to its government. The military is believed to use Donovian and People's Republic of Olvana satellite navigation systems; although the possibility exist that it may utilize Western GPS systems as well. Additionally, by utilizing commercial sector technologies that could be adapted to support military objectives is also possibly being utilized by North Torbia.

Public Communications Media

North Torbia’s use of heavy-handed control of public communications has allowed the country to exert total control over its population. This allows them to deny any internal opposition group from opposing the manner in which the current regime runs the country by utilizing public media forums. All significant public media is not just government-controlled, but messages are crafted to portray North Torbia’s government in the best possible light.

Internet

North Torbia is a relative newcomer to the Internet and has not been fully adopted mainstream Internet technology due to its isolationist ways. The Internet is viewed as a potential threat by allowing access to a variety of views and opinions not consistent with the government’s views and opinions and to protect against this the government has exerted very strong control of the development. The country has some broadband infrastructure, to include fiber optic links between major institutions. Online services for most individuals and institutions are provided through a free domestic-only network known as Net-Torbia, with limited global access to a select group of users.

The Central Information Agency for Technology (CIAT) controls all of the countries Internet address allocations that provides all internet access. Internet connection in North Torbia is provided by a joint venture between North Torbia and Olvana. Prior to this joint venture, Internet access was available only through a satellite link with an unidentified European country, but the government has also accessed some Internet through connections with the People's Republic of Olvana in the recent past. Only certain groups within North Torbia are permitted to access the internet, with special authorization, such as the central party or some Cabinet-level government organizations. Additionally, foreign diplomatic missions, joint ventures, and foreign individuals staying in Baguio can have full, but monitored, access to the Internet at their workplaces and certain international hotels.

In addition to the new and limited Internet access, North Torbia developed a nationwide Intranet fifteen years ago with a sophisticated architecture and a backbone capacity of 1.5 GB per second. This Intranet is controlled by the CIAT who also has the responsibility for connecting all government institutions at the national, provincial, and county levels. The Intranet is filtered by the CIAT, which regulates information deemed acceptable by the government that can be accessed through the network. The majority of the general population does not seem to have a problem with no outside internet access, as most have no knowledge of what the internet is due to the restrictive policies currently in place by the government.

Television

Television in North Torbia is subject to the control of the Central Committee for Radio and Television.  Currently more than fifty percent of the population have access to television. Televisions are supplied pre-tuned to only North Torbian stations and subject to inspection for compliance. State television is always off air until its evening news broadcast at 5:00 pm. The exception to this is on Sundays which starts at 6:00 am, as well as in emergency events, live events and national holidays.   

There are currently seven nationwide television channels, as well as a local channel at the province level that broadcast media in some way that promotes the regime's ideologies and positions. Two years ago, a state-approved video streaming service was launched to stream live national TV, on-demand video and newspaper articles from state controlled news services over the internet. The service is currently available only to citizens in the Capitol due to the country's limited internet access. The national population is also prohibited to tune into any foreign broadcasts as they are deemed to portraying a negative image of the regime accessed illegally along the border regions of South Torbia over black marketed services.

Radio

The North Torbian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. Due to the economic conditions in the country and the short broadcast day, 9am to 3 pm, radio is the most widely used medium. All radios are modified to receive only government stations.  The AM stations, Baguio Broadcasting Station (Radio Baguio) and Voice of Torbia (Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia Central Broadcasting Station), as well as the FM station “One Torbia” are the main domestic radio media. In addition, smaller community stations air local programming to individuals. North Torbia has a national broadcast radio station that operates throughout the country that provides a majority of the information for the average citizen. In addition, any person visiting North Torbia, for business or pleasure, is banned from bringing a radio into the country.

Refugees from North Torbia in the Republic of Torbia have created an independent radio station near the border in an attempt to better inform and influence the population of North Torbia, using loudspeakers and black marketed radios.  Radio Free Torbia broadcast daily to North Torbia’s population and serves as an independent news outlet for the populace, allowing international news to reach them.

Print Media

North Torbia has eight principal newspapers and thirteen major periodicals, all published in Baguio which are then shipped to the different regions for distribution. Censorship abounds as the regime limits the ability of the citizens to access outside information. Those that attempt to listen to or read any outside media risk harsh penalties such as forced labor. Only senior party officials are permitted access to external news sources. North Torbia journalists all belong to the ruling party and use their position to consolidate national unity.

Foreign journalists are typically defamed in official government media for attempting to destabilize the government. Foreign journalists are encouraged to not enter North Torbia unless invited by the government and are not allowed to have or use cell phones and GPS devices. Foreign journalists are warned not to speak about sensitive political issues with citizens and their movements are also very strictly restricted, as they are typically accompanied by a guide at all times to prohibit them from visiting restricted areas without prior permission.

Telephone

North Torbia has an adequate telephone system, with a nationwide fiber-optic network and mobile-cellular service that expand out beyond Baguio. However, most landline phones are only installed for senior government officials. Someone wanting a phone installed must fill out a form indicating their rank, why they want a phone, and how they will pay for it. Most of these are installed in government offices, collective farms, and state-run businesses, with only perhaps fifteen percent controlled by individuals or households. As of three years ago, thirty percent of Baguio citizens between the ages of twenty and fifty have a mobile phone.

Currently, the North Torbian telephone architecture operates with a combination of landlines and mobile services. North Torbia has an estimated 1.07 million landlines and 3.16 million mobile subscribers. North Torbian mobile phones use a digital signature system to prevent unauthorized access to certain files, as well as logs usage information that can be physically inspected. As of three years ago, no mobile phones can dial into or out of the country as well as no Internet connection was available. The current 3G network covers eighty percent of the population, but only covers sixteen percent of the territory.

Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links, fiber optic cable and other international connections. A satellite ground station near Baguio provides direct international communications using the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Indian Ocean satellite. Additionally, a satellite communications center was installed in Baguio fifteen years ago with Western technical support.

Postal/Courier

North Torbia’s postal service or The Post of Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia is operated by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications Maintenance Bureau (MPTM), which oversees postal communications, telegrams, newspapers and other related materials. Each province has a branch of the MPTM and each village has a postal service office to deliver letters, packages and telegrams. Agents of the State Security and Inspectors Department are stationed at the Ministry's offices to open, read and generally watch citizens to ensure their loyalty to the state.

Word of Mouth

Word of mouth is an important communications apparatus, especially in rural North Torbia. With the current regime any type of speech, verbal or printed, not approved by the government is dangerous and could lead to detention or even death. Despite having a postal system, word of mouth remains the most common way information is spread throughout the country.

Information Control

Information control is very strong within the borders of the country. The government limits the telecommunications network to ensure that only information they deem worthy and for the well-being of the country is provided to the populace. This includes access to outside media and tight control of the internet to deny the populace free access to other news and press agencies. The press is tightly controlled by the state, and the government only allows speech that supports it and the ruling regime. The one-party regime rigorously limits the ability of the people and foreign journalists to access internal information about state entities, and attempts to monitor and regulate all forms of communication. Under the current penal code, listening to unauthorized foreign broadcasts and possessing dissident publications are considered “crimes against the state” that carry serious punishments, including hard labor, prison sentences, and the death penalty. Citizens of North Torbia are often interrogated or arrested for speaking critically about the government; they also face arrest for possessing or watching black-market recordings of television programs. In recent years, the government issued an ordinance forbidding foreign diplomats from possessing any media critical of the regime.

INFOWAR

North Torbia has an Information Warfare (INFOWAR) capability, but relies on a lot of older technology in some of the areas. North Torbia will continue to research and develop more modern capabilities, but due to sanctions it will be a few years before any modern assets are available. North Torbia will rely on its maturing cyber operations and information operations to be most prominent capabilities used in their INFOWAR arsenal.

Electronic Warfare

North Torbia has made limited advancements in its electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. While still capable against lesser regional foes, North Torbian EW capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with more modern EW equipment. North Torbia’s EW doctrine continually adapts to the changing advancements in their own technology and trying to stay on pace with other technological advanced countries. North Torbia maintains a large array of ground and airborne sensors and jammers in its inventory. The main objective of North Torbia’s EW operations is the disruption or destruction of enemy command and control systems by jamming the networks.

Computer Attack

Of the Pacific countries, North Torbia maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber cadre, possibly 2,500 to 4,000 personnel. North Torbia has a robust and effective training program for the individuals that employ computer attacks against foreign countries as well as allies if deemed necessary. The Government has employed computer attacks in the past with great success and will not hesitate to launch additional attacks if it perceives a threat against its sovereignty. In addition, North Torbia is able to use independent foreign hacker groups for personnel, hardware and software to further their capabilities with less chance of being caught. The country has trained cadres of hackers, both within North Torbia and in other nearby countries. After they complete their training, hackers are deployed throughout the world to launch attacks where a more reliable internet infrastructure exist.

North Torbia’s cyber cadre will conduct operations such as reconnaissance, sabotage and criminal activities. These operations allow for minimal operational risk, while at the same time cause financial disruptions and generate illegal funds to support North Torbian goals and intent. In addition to the previously mentioned operations, other missions could possibly be to deny the enemy their command and control capabilities while at the same time defending North Torbia’s networks from enemy operations. The cyber cadre could also be used to disrupt enemy air defense radars and early warning systems to give them an operational advantage if North Torbia were to conduct offensive operations.

Information Attack

North Torbia possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to the People’s Republic of Olvana. North Torbian IA capability has grown over the last eight years along with their cyber capability. While its capabilities continue to improve, North Torbian IA will still continue to be only slightly effective against top-tier nation states and their allies. Current capabilities could possibly be distributed denial of services, defacing of websites and implementation of a tool to gain access to systems done by teams outside of the country.

Deception

Deception remains a major part of North Torbia’s military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. North Torbia particularly focuses on deception to mask operations and allow North Torbian forces to equal their strength against adversarial countries they believe to have an advantage. North Torbia will likely use a variety of ruses, such as decoys, when deployed to avoid or confuse enemy collection assets.

Physical Destruction

North Torbian deep strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special operations forces will aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. These elements could be combined with their strong cyber capabilities to further intensify targeting of key assets such as western intelligence collection assets and communication nodes allowing maximum freedom of maneuver and protection from enemy targeting.

Protection and Security Measures

Due to North Torbia only having an emerging global internet and relying mostly on the intranet, the threat from outside entities is minimal. The only potential place a threat could happen would be to the limited outside internet connections utilized by select cabinet post and central party members for limited official government business. North Torbia also has a very stringent accountability of all documents produced by the government and armed forces to not leave approved facilities. These facilities are patrolled by armed guards with a central entry point to control access to the facility by only those approved.

Perception Management

Traditionally, North Torbia attempts to craft a complete anti-Western message for both external and internal consumption through their state run media. North Torbia will use perception management most aggressively on their own population as a mechanism to generate support for North Torbian government operations, while at the same time messaging to maintain preservation of the current regime. Regionally, North Torbia will attempt to portray themselves as defending against outside forces they deem are intent on replacing the current regime. In government and population discussions, North Torbia will stress their shared social values and underscore the Republic of Torbia minority population’s integration within North Torbia while also strengthening their relations with People’s Republic of Olvana. North Torbia will likely attempt to portray the Republic of Torbia as “lackeys” of the West due to the influence of business ties and reliance on military support.

Intelligence

North Torbia operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. North Torbian intelligence operations are focused on supporting operations suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists, as well as Western and regional threats. North Torbia has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. North Torbia’s open source intelligence (OSINT) program is most likely conducted by teams outside of the country where internet access is more abundant and then providing information back to select   government members that have access to the limited available internet in country. Additionally, North Torbia has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT). North Torbia’s IMINT program will likely continue to operate at a slightly lower development rate than their more sophisticated capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs. Additionally, North Torbian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic and familial connections for collection and influence.

Human Intelligence

North Torbia has a robust HUMINT program that operates internally to suppress opposition groups and externally to collect against foreign governments. Members of the program endure an extended training program, normally four to twelve months, on how to conduct operations before being transferred to an operational unit. The majority of HUMINT operations are conducted along the border with and inside of North Torbia. These operations will focus on identifying individuals of the local populace that are a threat to the stability of the government within North Torbia, as well as any individuals trying infiltrate into the country to assist those who seek to overthrow the government. Additionally these teams may be operating south of the border to gain information on the composition and disposition of forces that constitutes the main external threat to the regime.

Due to sanctions imposed by the United Nations and select Western nations, access to more advanced technologies will be one of the major missions for HUMINT agents outside of North Torbia.  These agents will use all necessary means to acquire technical data to be replicated within North Torbian borders to further the security of the nation. Additionally, HUMINT operations outside of North Torbia may entail blackmail, extortion and recruitment of foreign nationals. The money received from blackmail or extortion operations will be used to procure resources currently unavailable to North Torbia. The recruitment of foreign nationals will assist with infiltration of corporations to enable operations to acquire technical information not available otherwise. The personnel recruited are normally sympathetic to the North Torbian international issues and will do whatever it takes to ensure the regime stays in power with their assistance.

Open Source Intelligence

North Torbia probably operates a massive OSINT program against South Torbia, the US, and other Western countries with government and government-affiliated operators. North Torbia continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the North Torbian government and adversaries like the Peoples Republic of Torbia, as well as other regional and Western nations. This data will be used to project future regional tensions and give the North Torbian government a platform from which to react to perceived regional and international threats.

Signals Intelligence

The North Torbian SIGINT program consistently operates in key areas that are of high interest to the government, such as along the border with South Torbia. Regional and Western countries can expect the North Torbian SIGINT to provide the military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most North Torbian SIGINT operators have significant experience and capabilities from continuous operations in the region. North Torbian SIGINT inventory consist of ground, airborne and maritime platforms. Additionally, North Torbia may cooperate extensively with the People’s Republic of Olvana and Donovia in SIGINT operations.

Imagery Intelligence

North Torbian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. North Torbian UAV’s can be used along the border areas and further south into South Torbia to detect any buildup of forces that could be indications of possible future operations by South Torbia. The use of these UAVs for IMINT operations are due to the current state of the fixed wing aircraft in North Torbia and are easier to infiltrate across the border due to their small size, making them harder to detect by South Torbian air defense assets.

 North Torbia also has access to a government owned and operated earth observation satellite. This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and believed to have a life span of four to eight years. Images received from this satellite are periodically transmitted to a ground station located somewhere in North Torbia at least three to four times a day. To further supplement its IMINT requirements, the North Torbian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

North Torbia does not have a MASINT capability and would need to rely on its military partner’s for any such information.

Summary

North Torbia maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, and will continue to research and develop more advanced systems to protect itself. North Torbia has utilized its cyber program against external opposition parties and foreign governments with success and will continue its operations providing their cyber operators with greater experience and more advanced techniques. North Torbia will retain total control over the nation’s information environment to continue to deter internal and external opposition parties.

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