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[[Category:TC|7-100.1-10]]
The OPFOR system of air defense includes assets and actions at the strategic (national), operational, and tactical levels. The focus in this chapter is on air defense of maneuver forces at the operational level. However, op- erational-level air defense does not exist in isolation from the overall system of OPFOR air defense. For more information on tactical-level air defense, see FM 7-100.2.
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: ''This page is a section of [[FM 7-100.1 Opposing Forces Operations|FM 7-100.1 Opposing Forces Operations]].''
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The OPFOR believes success in battle requires extensive engineer support at every level. Engineer plans at the operational level support the various strategic-level courses of action involved in the State’s strategic campaign. Engineers facilitate the mobility and high rate of movement of combined arms forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the tactical level, it also maximizes activities conducted at the operational level to disaggregate, disrupt, delay, block, or canalize enemy forces. See FM 7-100.2 for more information on tactical-level engineer actions.
  
 
__TOC__
 
__TOC__
  
==All-Arms Air Defense==  
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==Assets==  
The main objective of air defense is to prevent enemy air action from in- terfering with mission accomplishment of the entire force. For the OPFOR, air defense is not just a particular organization or branch of service. It is a mission.
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Military engineers fall into two basic categories: combat engineers and special-category engineers.  Combat engineers are those  whose tasks  may bring them in direct contact with the enemy. Special-category engineers (such as bridge- and road-building units) do not normally engage the enemy and generally use utility vehicles as their primary transportation rather than engineer vehicles designed to survive close combat. Together, these two categories of engineers are responsible for the more difficult and complex engineering tasks. Their missions require specialized training and the use of special equipment or munitions. Often the distinction of engineer categories is blurred somewhat depending on task organizations and their mission-driven employment.
  
To do this, the OPFOR uses a combined arms and joint approach, involv- ing not only air defense units, but also other forces such as--
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At the operational level, the OPFOR plans the complete integration of civilian and military engineer resources. For example, maneuver commanders may use civilian earthmoving, road-building, and construction equipment and personnel, especially in support zones. This allows constituent combat engineer equipment and personnel to accompany maneuver forces in battle. Civilian workers or maneuver units can perform many basic combat engineer tasks, with engineers providing guidance and technical expertise.
* Aviation.
 
* Special-purpose forces (SPF).
 
* Rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
 
* Artillery and mortars.
 
* Infantry.
 
* Engineers.
 
* Affiliated forces.
 
These forces are often used in combination or participate separately in attacking targets, which in effect achieves a combined result.
 
 
 
Against a sophisticated enemy, the OPFOR recognizes that it will have to adapt the operations and tactics employed by air defense units to improve their chances of success. It also views the creative and adaptive use of other arms to accomplish air defense objectives as part and parcel of the overall air defense effort. This practical application of the combined arms concept calls for the simultaneous employment of several arms, in some cases including air defense systems, to achieve an effect against the enemy air threat that will render greater results than the use of air defense assets and systems alone.
 
 
 
The extent to which the concept of all-arms air defense can be applied is limited only by the commander’s and staff’s knowledge of the enemy air threat, capabilities of their own systems, and their ability to apply that knowledge to come up with innovative solutions. The air defense-related activities of all arms are part of an overall campaign to defeat or at least degrade enemy air capabilities. The results may produce effects at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels.
 
 
 
== Goals ==
 
Air defense forces and other arms work together to protect ground units and other potential targets from attacks by fixed-wing ground-attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters. They also try to deny aerial reconnaissance platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A secondary mission is to protect OPFOR air and airborne or heliborne mis- sions over enemy-held territory. OPFOR air defense focuses on destroying or disrupting the activities of not only enemy aircraft, but also the command and control (C2) systems associated with enemy air operations.
 
 
 
=== Concepts ===
 
The OPFOR’s concept of air defense is not purely defensive in nature. Destruction of enemy aircraft is not always linked to military objectives. The destruction of high-visibility or unique systems employed by enemy forces offers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat power of the OPFOR. However, it also has possibly decisive effects in the information and psychological arenas. Losses among these premier systems demonstrate the vulnerability of even a technologically superior enemy and may undermine enemy morale, degrade operational capability, and inhibit employment of other enemy weapon systems. High-visibility (flagship) systems that could be identified for destruction could include stealth aircraft, attack helicopters, or aerial reconnaissance and surveillance platforms. The OPFOR can also attack high-payoff targets such as high-technology communications nodes and other information systems that support enemy air operations.
 
 
 
The OPFOR emphasizes that air defense does not necessarily have to destroy aircraft to accomplish the mission, although that is obviously desirable. The mission is accomplished if air defense prevents enemy aircraft from conducting successful air activities. For example, air defense units can force enemy aircraft to break off their attacks or to expend their ordnance inaccurately without having to destroy the aircraft. In fact, the mere presence of active and effective air defense weapon systems can reduce the effectiveness of enemy air activities by forcing aircraft to avoid the systems or otherwise use less than optimum procedures. The OPFOR can also use air defense jammers, GPS jammers, and other electronic warfare (EW) methods to disrupt the enemy’s air capability.
 
 
 
The role of air defense can be to create opportunity for fire and maneuver by clearing or minimizing the air threat in the airspace above friendly forces. This is especially important when the OPFOR lacks the air power or air superiority necessary to create opportunity with air attacks. The OPFOR can concentrate the fires of its air defense assets to create a window of opportunity for a limited-duration and limited-objective offensive action (such as a spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, or ambush). Likewise, air defense can enhance the ability to defend or transition from defense to offense. Air defense can also mass fires to protect the key reconnaissance and fire assets that perform reconnaissance fires.
 
 
 
Another important OPFOR concept is that air defense is an integral part of combined arms combat. The maneuver unit commander who disregards the enemy air threat or fails to properly plan for defending against it risks mission failure.
 
 
 
A closely related concept is that air defense weapons, radars, and associated equipment cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even units engaged in combat actions but as parts of an integrated air defense system (IADS). Proper integration of these assets in mission planning and execution is the only way the commander can effectively deal with the enemy air threat.
 
 
 
=== Principles ===
 
In pursuit of these goals and concepts, the OPFOR follows several basic principles when conducting air defense: surprise, firepower, mobility, continuity, initiative, coordination, and security. Of these, the element of surprise is the most critical.
 
 
 
==== Surprise ====
 
Achieving surprise is fundamental to successful air defense. Surprise can be achieved by--
 
* Positioning air defense systems in unexpected locations.
 
* Using other arms for air defense.
 
* Using camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
 
The OPFOR is aware of the potential physical destruction it can achieve by attacking an unsuspecting and unprepared enemy. It is also aware of the psychological effects of violent and unexpected fires on aviation crews. These effects are often only temporary, but at critical moments they can reduce the effectiveness of aircrews preparing to attack.
 
 
 
The element of surprise is also increasingly important because of modern technological advances. The speed and evasiveness of modern aircraft reduce engagement times. Modern aircraft also have a great amount of firepower with which to suppress air defenses. These two factors make it necessary for units to achieve some degree of surprise. Of course, the air enemy also is trying to achieve surprise, and the OPFOR must consider how enemy aircraft might exploit the terrain in making a concealed approach.
 
 
 
The principle of surprise is also important in the wider context of denying the enemy's intelligence organization an accurate and comprehensive picture of the deployment of air defense weapons and radars. Otherwise, the enemy also can use air defense formations as a principal means of determining the organization for combat and organization of forces of supported maneuver units.
 
 
 
==== Firepower ====
 
The OPFOR force structure includes a wide variety of air defense weapons (both missiles and guns). This mix of capabilities gives ground force commanders outstanding firepower for air defense. It is important that air defense planning consider and employ all assets available, across all arms, to achieve maximum firepower.
 
 
 
==== Mobility ====
 
Air defense assets must have mobility comparable to the ground forces for which they provide cover. When planning air defense, the commander must always consider the mobility of air defense weapons and the time required for their deployment. The ground forces, for which air defenses provide cover, are quite mobile and frequently change formation as they deploy. The air enemy is mobile and can attack from many directions or altitudes. Therefore, the commander must use to the maximum the mobility and firepower of his assets, creating optimum groupings and fire plans.
 
 
 
==== Continuity ====
 
Air defense forces must provide continuous protection of critical organizations and assets. Only constantly-moving air defense units that have adequate logistics support can ensure comprehensive air coverage. They must provide air defense day or night in all weather conditions. Mobility contributes directly to continuity.
 
 
 
==== Initiative ====
 
The modern battlefield is a fluid and volatile environment. Air defense unit commanders must respond to constant changes in the situation with initiative and aggressive action. Units must continue to operate efficiently even when communications with other air defense units fail. For example, if the supported unit receives a modified mission, the air defense commander must reevaluate his own unit’s deployment in light of the new requirements. He also must be aware of changes in the tactics that enemy air forces are employing.
 
 
 
==== Coordination ====
 
The OPFOR stresses coordination between air defense units and supported maneuver units, other air defense units, and units of other arms performing air defense functions. It views air defense as a single, integrated system composed of various parts. Air defense is an integral element of the air and ground battle.
 
 
 
All tactical-level air defense weapons must coordinate precisely with flanking units, with operational-level air defense units, and with aviation units. Failure to coordinate can result in gaps in the air defense umbrella, excessive ammunition expenditure, and casualties to friendly air forces. To achieve efficient coordination, the OPFOR stresses centralization of control, with operational-level headquarters playing a key role as a land-air interface.
 
 
 
==== Security ====
 
The OPFOR recognizes that enemy air assets can attack from any quarter. Therefore, it must provide security for units anywhere on the battlefield or in sanctuary areas against air attack from any direction. Air defense must function with unremitting reliability and overall security. This requires careful deployment, uninterrupted ammunition supply, and a comprehensive early- warning system. Commanders must factor security into air defense planning.
 
  
 
== Command and Control ==
 
== Command and Control ==
The OPFOR combines ground-based national-, operational-, and tactical- level air defense assets with fixed-wing aircraft forces to provide an integrated air defense umbrella for ground units. Consequently, effective control of the airspace becomes more complex. The OPFOR stresses the need for operations conducted with a single integrated plan under unified command and control.
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Engineer units allocated to an operational-strategic command (OSC) in constituent or dedicated relationships may be directly under the command of the OSC commander. The OSC commander or his subordinate commanders can control—but do not command—other engineer assets that are allocated to them in a supporting relationship. Rather than keeping all allocated engineer assets under his direct command and control (C2), the OSC commander may suballocate some engineer units to his subordinate maneuver units or to his integrated fires command (IFC) and/or integrated support command (ISC).
  
=== Integrated Air Defense System ===
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=== Staff Responsibility ===
OPFOR air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an integrated air defense system (IADS) that presents a threat to any potential enemy. Air defense effectively supports the concept and requirements of combined arms combat. The best way to accomplish this is to integrate a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into a redundant air defense system.
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Various staff elements under the operations officer advise him on engineer matters and allow him to advise the commander on the employment of engineer assets. The chief of force protection and the chief of infrastructure management receive liaison teams from each constituent, dedicated, or supporting engineer unit. These teams provide the staff with detailed expertise on engineer functions and provide a direct communications conduit to the engineer units executing such functions. Based on the advice of the liaison teams and coordination with the engineer units through the respective liaison teams, these functional staff chiefs advise the commander on engineer employment within their functional areas. Other liaison teams may fall under the chief of current operations, to advise and assist in mobility and countermobility functions. The engineer liaison teams also coordinate, as necessary, with other staff elements, including the chief of information warfare (IW). Liaison team leaders speak for the commanders of their respective units.
  
The OPFOR’s intent is to integrate air defense assets at all levels of command into a continuous, unbroken umbrella of air defense coverage. Integration can be vertical and/or horizontal. ''Vertical integration'' is between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, while ''horizontal integration'' is within each of those levels.
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=== Task Organization ===
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At each level of command, the commander or his operations officer decides on the task organization of subordinate engineer units. Operational employment of engineer units does not follow strict organizational lines. The OPFOR does not always employ engineer units as complete entities.
  
The dispersed positions of OPFOR units, as well as enemy actions to suppress OPFOR air defense and C2 capabilities, may make it difficult to maintain vertical or horizontal integration. Enemy capabilities may present a situation where a vertically integrated system at the strategic or even operational level is neither possible nor desirable.
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Engineer tasks are integral to all OPFOR organizations. Although engineer assets generally are constituent at no lower than brigade or brigade tactical group (BTG) level, the OPFOR prefers to task organize for mission success at even lower levels, when the assets are available. This may dictate that, instead of maintaining large engineer units, the commander may choose to break them down and combine them into smaller (sometimes much, much smaller) multirole engineer support groupings. These engineer groupings range in size from brigades down to multirole platoons and engineer squads. An example of this flexible task organization would be the allocation more minelaying assets on an exposed flank or a high-speed avenue of approach for enemy armored vehicles. Another would be that an OSC that is task- organized for operations in a desert environment would not receive water obstacle-crossing units, but might add more mineclearing units.
  
An integrated communications system is established to provide target information and early warning to air defense and ground maneuver units. If communications with other air defense units fail, however, commanders may have to use their own initiative and flexibility, in order to respond to frequent changes in the ground or air situation.
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There are no real doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is restrained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission. At the operational level, however, the primary responsibility of the engineers is to support and ensure the mobility and survivability  of  operational units while retaining a significant countermobility capability to impede (or canalize) the enemy’s progress. The primary engineer reconnaissance function at the operational level is route reconnaissance.
  
==== National Level ====
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With advice from engineer experts on his functional staff, the operations officer on the OSC staff uses the OSC’s engineer resources to form task-oriented groupings according to the commander’s decision for the operation and his instructions on engineer support. He forms groupings to—
Against regional opponents, the OPFOR may be able to use an IADS that is centrally directed from the national level. Centralization of control gives the OPFOR flexibility in the employment of resources to meet the overall goal of air defense. The national-level air defense organization can play a major role in the control of air defense assets of operational-level commands.
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* Conduct engineer support (reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability) at any level.
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* Augment maneuver units.
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* Augment other operational-level units.
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* Support IW.
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The most frequent operational employment of constituent or dedicated engineer, engineer reconnaissance, and road- and bridge-construction units generally involves the formation of one or more functional groupings. Some of these are—
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* Obstacle detachments (ODs) to create minefields and other obstacles.
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* Movement support detachments (MSDs) to perform route reconnaissance, route preparation, mineclearing, and route marking.
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* Obstacle-clearing detachments.
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* Engineer reconnaissance patrols.
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An OSC may form several of each, and each may be based on an engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC may also create an engineer reserve.
  
==== Sector Level ====
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== Missions ==
Against a modern extraregional force, however, the OPFOR accepts that it may not be able to employ a nationally integrated air defense system to defend its entire airspace. In fact, a vertically integrated system centrally directed from the national level could be a liability from a C2 standpoint. Thus, the OPFOR is prepared to adapt its air defense operations to use IADS at sector levels. Within sectors, it may be able to challenge the most modern air forces, at least initially. It can prevent extraregional air forces from at- taining air supremacy, for a time.
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The primary engineer missions performed in combat are in the categories of reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The OPFOR recognizes several basic combat tasks engineers perform in support of combined arms operations. Some of these tasks are to—
Air defense sector boundaries do not necessarily parallel geographic boundaries or the boundaries of military areas of responsibility (AORs). It is quite possible that boundaries could coincide, if air defense assets are allocated to provide support for theater- or operational-level commands. In some cases, however, an air defense sector could cover a larger area that includes the AORs of one or more operational-level commands and could cover air- space not included in any of those AORs. It is possible that the OPFOR could divide a large geographic area into air defense sectors even when it does not establish multiple theater headquarters within that area.
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* Reconnoiter the enemy and the terrain.
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* Prepare fortifications.
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* Prepare and maintain movement routes.
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* Clear passages through obstacles and areas of destruction.
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* Equip and maintain gap crossings.
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* Establish engineer obstacles.
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* Support IW.
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* Extract and purify water and establish water supply points.
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* Carry out engineer measures to eliminate the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and precision weapons.
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For more detail, see the sections later in this chapter dedicated to Engineer Reconnaissance, Survivability, Countermobility, and Support to Information Warfare. For more detail on mobility support, see FM 7-100.2.
  
Sector air defense can reduce the physical and electronic signature of defensive systems. To the extent possible, the OPFOR disperses high-value assets. Still, air defense assets may be close enough together to be hard- wired. Sector IADS enables the OPFOR to mass the effects of air defense assets from dispersed sites to protect the most critical targets. It also facilitates the use of passive air defense techniques including dispersal, deception, and camouflage.
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=== Support to Offensive Operations ===
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In the offense, the engineers’ primary mission is to support the operation plan. Emphasis is on—
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* Clearing and maintaining routes for maneuver units.
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* Clearing or removing mines and other obstacles.
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* Crossing gaps.
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* Creating obstacles to assist in flank protection and protection against counterattacks.
  
In choosing to fight within sectors, the OPFOR accepts risk, in that air defense sectors present seams in the defenses and may be unable to provide mutual support. Within sectors, the OPFOR develops air defense ambushes along the most likely air avenues of approach.
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==== Preparation ====
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To prepare for offensive operations, engineer tasks include—
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* Performing engineer reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy.
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* Preparing assembly areas and movement routes for maneuver forces, including reserves.
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* Constructing protective  positions  for systems,  units, and  command posts (CPs).
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* Establishing and improving road networks to support maneuver forces.
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* Preparing alternative airfields and highway strips to support air assets.
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* Ensure the integration of engineer support to IW.
  
==== Operational and Tactical Level ====
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==== Conduct ====
In most situations, an operational-strategic command (OSC) directs the employment of the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level subordinates--divisions and division tactical groups (DTGs) or separate brigades or brigade tactical groups (BTGs). Brigades and BTGs that are part of a division or DTG provide coverage for their own units and vertically integrate with division or DTG coverage. When not part of a division or DTG, they vertically integrate with OSC-level coverage, which would be their next- higher level of command. There may be skip-echelon situations when the OSC will specify how divisional maneuver brigades employ their air defense batteries. Normally, however, the division or DTG will dictate that.
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During  the  conduct of offensive  operations,  engineer support  includes—
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* Providing tailored engineer support where it is needed, when it is needed.
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* Continuing reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
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* Maintaining airfields and roads.
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* Improving road networks and other movement routes to support commitment of reserves or follow-on forces.
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* Providing support for the crossing of water obstacles and other gaps.
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* Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and CPs, as they relocate.
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* Helping to repel enemy counterattack.
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* Supplying engineer equipment, materials, and technical assistance to maneuver units and other OPFOR units.
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* Facilitate maneuver despite enemy and natural obstacles and possibly NBC-contaminated areas.
  
At the tactical level, the commander normally strives to achieve horizontal integration. His ability to integrate or be integrated vertically will depend on the air defense course of action taken at the next-higher level.
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=== Support to Defensive Operations ===
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OSC engineer forces are heavily engaged in the preparation and conduct of an operational defense. Comprehensive engineer preparation in the entire area of responsibility (AOR) is an important precondition for holding battle positions, as well as for troop maneuver.
  
=== Centralization Versus Decentralization ===
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Engineer support for defensive operations places emphasis on fortifying battle positions and assembly areas, performing engineer camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, and adapting the terrain for defense. The defense is also conducive to the extensive use of various obstacles to interfere with the enemy’s advance.
Air defense control relationships are subject to conflicting pressures for centralization and decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection systems and the increased ranges of modern surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Centralized control is necessary, especially during defensive operations, to ensure that the coverage of air defense units is mutually supporting and comprehensive. Centralization of control gives the OPFOR flexibility in the employment of air defense resources to meet the overall goal of an operation. In most situations, therefore, an operational-level command directs the employment of the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level subordinates.
 
  
Nevertheless, the complexity and fluidity of the modern battlefield require the possibility of some decentralization. Decentralized control provides flexibility and shorter response times for supporting fast-paced operations by ground maneuver units and the many contingencies that can arise in local situations. The OPFOR expects its air defense commanders, like their maneuver counterparts, to demonstrate aggressive action and originality, responding to changes in the tactical situation and operating effectively when cut off from communications with other air defense units. In general, the OPFOR imposes enough centralization to optimize efficiency while allowing sufficient decentralization for effectiveness.
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The general aims of engineer support to defensive operations include—
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* Controlling access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy forces.
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* Establishing conditions necessary for organizing the defense.
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* Protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional direct and indirect fires, precision munitions, and NBC attacks.
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* Building fortifications, battle positions, and assembly areas.
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* Preparing and maintaining maneuver and supply routes.
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* Creating or improving existing obstacles.
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* Preparing decoys and deception positions.
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* Ensuring the integration of engineer support to IW.
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The type and scale of engineer support depends on the operational situation, enemy forces, and the conditions under which an OPFOR transitions to the defense. If the OPFOR does so during the course of the offense, support may have to begin with the protection of threatened axes by ODs and antitank reserves (ATRs) and the route work needed for regrouping.
  
=== Airspace Management ===
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==== Preparation ====
When the OPFOR Air Force is able to fly, airspace management is the most complex aspect of air defense operations. Commanders must divide the airspace among ground-based air defense systems and aviation.
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Engineer support for preparing an AOR for defensive operations consists of the following:
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* Conducting engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
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* Preparing fortifications for protecting weapons, personnel, and equipment.
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* Preparing routes for counterattack forces.
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* Constructing  obstacles (coordinated  with  the  fire support  plan  and natural obstacles).
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* Preparing C3D measures in support of IW.
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* Maintaining the water supply.
  
==== Staff Responsibility ====
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==== Conduct ====
A single operational-level commander must control the full scope of combined arms and/or joint activity, including air defense within his AOR. It is the combined arms or joint commander who is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of air defense in his AOR. He approves the overall operation plan prepared by his staff. The operation plan includes the air defense plan and coordinating instructions.
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During defensive operations, engineer support consists of improving on and expanding the scope of all the above measures and undertaking new tasks as situations develop. Such tasks include clearing obstacles, crossing gaps, and eliminating the effects of NBC and precision weapons.
  
The OSC is the lowest level of joint command with control of both Army and Air Force units. On the staff of an OSC, under the operations officer, the chief of airspace operations (CAO) is responsible for airspace management is- sues and procedures. The CAO maintains the airspace control net for control- ling the command’s airspace. OSC headquarters typically receive liaison teams from all constituent, dedicated, and supporting Air Force, army avia- tion, and air defense units associated with the command. All these units and their liaison teams are on the airspace control net.
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=== Support to Information Warfare ===
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The OPFOR has responded at all organizational levels to the challenge posed by enemy advances in sensors and weapons. A wide variety of engineer activities contribute to IW, particularly in support of C3D measures. This support involves three interrelated areas:
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* Deception (signature-enhancing measures).
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* Camouflage and concealment (signature-reduction measures).
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* Obscurants (measures used both to conceal real equipment and enhance the effectiveness of decoy equipment).
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OPFOR combat engineer units are a high priority for deception efforts, since their composition and disposition on the battlefield are indicators of how and where the OPFOR expects to conduct its main offensive or defensive effort. Therefore, the OPFOR establishes deception positions and engineer obstacles, supported by decoy vehicles.
  
==== Zones of Responsibility ====
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==== Offense ====
The OPFOR establishes zones of responsibility in order to minimize mutual interference between its fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense weapons. Zones of responsibility could also be used to determine areas or altitudes to be covered by national-level Air Defense Forces, as opposed to operational- or tactical-level air defense assets. However, the use of such zones does not preclude engagement of high-priority targets by more than one type of weapon system if there is centralized control of all weapon systems involved.
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During the offense, engineer support of deception measures can include—
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* Construction of decoys and deception positions.
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* Preparation of false routes to provide misleading indicators.
  
The OPFOR may assign zones of responsibility in the vertical dimen- sion. Thus, fighter aviation would engage enemy aircraft at certain altitudes, while ground-based air defense assets would be responsible for engagement at other altitudes. See example A in Figure 9-1.
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==== Defense ====
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The OPFOR uses various deception measures to mislead the enemy about size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of defensive engineer preparations. Engineer support of deception measures can include—
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* Use of screening characteristics of terrain, darkness, and other conditions of limited visibility during engineer preparation of defensive positions and positioning of forces.
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* False actions to draw attention from actual defensive preparations.
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* Construction of artificial screens and concealment (such as horizontal and vertical screens, or corner reflectors).
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Sufficient engineer support is critical to the success of any defensive deception plan. Units in the main defense force receive the priority of effort. However, engineers typically do not begin work supporting deception until they have completed all measures required for camouflage, concealment, and cover.
  
In the horizontal dimension, zones of responsibility may be in terms of the direction from which target aircraft are approaching (example B). The OPFOR may also choose to delineate responsibility according to the type of target (example C). For instance, fighter aircraft might engage manned aircraft, while ground-based air defense might be responsible for engaging enemy missiles or UAVs. Sometimes, specific targets are assigned to specific systems. However, the latter is likely only in a very low air threat environment.
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== Engineer Reconnaissance ==
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The specific missions of engineer reconnaissance are to—
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* Discover enemy engineer measures taken to fortify battle positions and to lay and clear minefields and demolitions.
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* Determine movement routes (by the conditions of roads, bridges, and fording sites).
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* Determine the characteristics of obstacles and locate bypass routes.
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* Determine water availability (or add more robust capability).
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* Observe enemy engineer activity.<ref>The composition and disposition of enemy combat engineer units are important indicators of how and where the enemy expects to conduct his main offensive or defensive effort. Positioning of bridging and mineclearing assets may tip off planned enemy offensive action. When the enemy is preparing to defend, all obstacle-creating assets, such as minelayers, are of particular interest.</ref>
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* Determine requirements for special engineer equipment, allocation of engineer assets, and the subsequent task organizations of subordinate and supporting engineer units.
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* Report the locations of any enemy units encountered.
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* Advise the commander and staff on locations the enemy is likely to occupy, based on the presence of favorable conditions, such as accessibility, concealment, and water supply.
  
Another way of dividing air defense responsibility is in terms of lines. Particularly when the OPFOR does not have air superiority, the first line(s) of air defense responsibility could be for ground-based air defense weapons to engage enemy aircraft. OPFOR fighter aviation would then operate in the relatively safe airspace behind those lines, where its fighters would engage only those aircraft that managed to get through the first line(s). See example D in Figure 9-1.
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=== Route Reconnaissance ===
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A primary goal of engineer reconnaissance at the operational level is to provide comprehensive information on the suitability of movement routes. Engineer reconnaissance, performed independently or with other reconnaissance forces, plays a significant role in ensuring freedom of movement and access to various areas of the battlefield. Units performing engineer reconnaissance make the following determinations:
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* The degree of trafficability of the entire route.
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* The location and nature of obstacles and forces or assets needed to overcome them.
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* The condition of crossing sites over rivers, canals, streams, and ravines.
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* The location and quantity of material potentially useful for improving the movement route.
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* The nature of  the terrain  and location  of areas  without natural concealment.
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The purpose of route reconnaissance is to select suitable routes along the axis of movement and to identify suitable halt areas that provide concealment. Engineer reconnaissance can also identify possible infiltration routes. The reconnaissance patrol relays topographical and terrain information back to the unit that sent it out. Route reconnaissance can occur throughout the AOR, in offense or defense.
  
If the OPFOR does have air superiority, it might establish a boundary line parallel to and forward of the battle line. This boundary would be generally at the range limit of medium-range SAMs, possibly beyond the supported ground force unit’s limit of responsibility. Ground-based air defense systems would engage aircraft out to this boundary. Fixed-wing aircraft would engage the enemy beyond this boundary. See example E in Figure 9-1. However, the OPFOR is unlikely to use this technique unless it possesses air superiority.
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=== Offense ===
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During the offense, the primary engineer reconnaissance mission is to obtain more precise information on—
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* Battle damage created both during offensive preparation and during the execution of the offense.
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* Troop movement routes and trafficability of off-road terrain.
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* Locations where the enemy established obstacles.
 +
* Locations for establishing obstacles during enemy counterattacks.
 +
* Water obstacles on friendly forces’ axes of advance.
 +
Engineer reconnaissance during the offense seeks to obtain information on the nature of enemy fortifications, defensive positions, and obstacles. The basic methods for obtaining this information are observation and aerial or ground photography.
  
There will never be sufficient specialized air defense assets to protect all units and vital assets from air attack. Therefore, all units must be capable of using their organic weapons for self-defense against air attack. Self-defense is never denied. Thus, air defense units with short-range weapons always have the capability to defend themselves from immediate air threats, regardless of whether another aviation or ground-based air defense unit has responsibility for the airspace above them.
+
=== Defense ===
 +
Engineers assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and by helping select positions for CPs and unit battle positions. Engineers also determine road and bridge conditions in the AOR, availability of local materials for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply.
  
==== Air Defense Control Measures ====
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== Survivability ==
9-45. The OPFOR uses various types of air defense weapons control status and procedural controls to coordinate the use of airspace by aviation assets and ground-based air defense. Primarily, it employs a system of identification, friend or foe (IFF) between aircraft and air defense systems. When using non-IFF-capable systems, it may enact strict procedural controls in order to protect friendly aircraft from fratricide. The air defense coverage may be “switched off” to allow friendly aircraft to pass on a mission planned in ad- vance and then “switched on” as they exit the area. For other missions, air defense coverage may allow aircraft to transit only on “safe corridors” based on air routes or other procedural methods. In general, however, the OPFOR would prefer to risk losing some aircraft through fratricide, rather than al- lowing gaps in its radar and air defense coverage that the enemy might exploit.
+
Preparing fortified positions is a task for engineers in both the offense and defense. Fortified positions increase weapons effectiveness and protect personnel, weapons, and materiel. Engineers give priority to digging in CPs and key components of the OPFOR’s combat power. Fortification preparation combines and uses to best advantage the terrain’s protective properties, local construction materials, and engineer excavation equipment. The C3D measures discussed above, under Support to Information Warfare, also contribute to survivability.
  
=== Command Posts and Communications ===
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=== Offense ===
The CAO and his staff are part of the OSC staff at the main command post (CP). Also located there are Air Force, army aviation, and air defense liaison teams with whom he closely coordinates for airspace management. A deputy CAO and possibly an air defense officer from the liaison team may also be present at the forward CP to advise the OSC commander.
+
In preparation for offensive action, the primary use of field fortification is in the preparation of assembly areas. Even there, the tasks of preparation typically exceed the capability of engineers in the limited time available. Consequently, the preparation of assembly areas becomes a shared responsibility involving all available personnel and equipment of all branches.
  
The basic rule for the establishment of communications between supported and supporting unit is that the higher command allocates landline, radio relay, and mobile communication means, while radio equip- ment is allocated by both higher and subordinate levels. This ensures proper coordination of communications. If communication is lost, the commanders and staffs of all units involved are responsible for the immediate restoration of communication. An air defense and NBC warning communications net is established to warn maneuver units, the staffs, and logistics units of incoming enemy aircraft. The warning is communicated through signal equipment that is specially allocated for this purpose.
+
Normally, the OPFOR locates assembly areas far enough from enemy forces to deny the enemy ground observation and to lessen direct-fire effects. It uses field fortification in a way that allows a smooth and protected movement of troops and supplies in and out of the assembly areas.
  
== Phases ==
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=== Defense ===
The OPFOR plans to employ its air defense units and all-arms air defense in three phases. The phases are defined by where the enemy aircraft are and what they are doing:
+
When the OPFOR is transitioning to the defense and preparing complex battle positions or sanctuary areas, advance engineer deployment allows better use of terrain features and constructed fortifications. Engineers also have more time to construct or improve routes for movement of troops and supplies and to conceal forces and caches or short-duration storage facilities. In most cases, engineer units must concentrate their effort on only the most important parts of the AOR.
* '''Phase I:''' Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the ground before they are employed.
 
* '''Phase II:''' Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight but before they enter the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces.
 
* '''Phase III:''' Actions against enemy aircraft that have penetrated into that airspace.
 
While these phases may occur sequentially after the initiation of hostilities, they are not wholly distinct. They may overlap, and all three may occur simultaneously. The OPFOR roughly equates the three phases with where they will primarily occur on the ground and in the air. Thus, phases I, II, and III occur in the “basing area,” “flight area,” and “target area,” respectively. The purpose of these phases and areas is to assist planners in rationalizing, planning, and organizing the overall air defense effort.
 
  
=== Phase I ===
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The full preparation of defensive positions involving entrenchments, communications trenches, positions for tanks and infantry vehicles, and protected CPs is a labor-intensive process. It often exceeds the capability of pure engineer units. Consequently, the OPFOR’s approach is to use all available personnel and equipment. Units of all arms and services receive training in preparing field fortifications and emplacements.
The first phase includes all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft and control systems before they are employed. It targets aircraft while they are still on the ground at airfields or in marshalling or staging areas. This “basing area” extends from enemy home territory, to allied basing and staging areas, to and including in-theater enemy support areas down to enemy division level.1 It is the area in which aircraft are based, refueled, maintained, and resupplied. This area is the overall responsibility of the OPFOR theater commander. A large part of it could be given an OSC. Part of the area assigned could fall within the OSC’s disruption zone, which can include enemy airfields and attack helicopter forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).
 
  
==== Planning ====
+
== Countermobility ==
Planning for Phase I begins at the national level, when the General Staff is considering various contingency plans for possible strategic campaigns before the actual threat of war or extraregional intervention. This planning includes any OSCs that might be involved in a particular contingency.
+
Creating engineer obstacles and carrying out demolition activities are significant engineer functions in all phases of combat. The obstacle plan is tailored and integrated into the overall operation plan. Engineer obstacles include any actions taken to inflict losses and to delay and impede enemy movement. In the offense, obstacles protect flanks, disrupt counterattacks, and strengthen captured positions. In the defense, engineer obstacles may strengthen the defense, disrupt enemy operations, and cover gaps.
  
Each contingency plan developed includes detailed analysis of the area involved, including the identification of key airfields, facilities, and lines of communication (LOCs) that could support enemy air operations. In those areas controlled by the OPFOR, preparations are made to support planned missions. These include the identification of complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets, potential cache sites, and forces to perform missions.
+
=== Explosive Obstacles ===
 +
The widespread use of landmines on today’s battlefields results from a combination of mass production, plastic mines, improved battlefield delivery systems, and development of sophisticated fuzing. Remotely-delivered mines have expanded capability for changing the tempo of combat.
  
Areas not in the direct control of the OPFOR, but anticipated to be included in the contingency, are also analyzed. In this case, in addition to all the factors mentioned above, planners would also examine potential means and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. They would also try to identify potential “affiliated” forces that could assist in attacking key targets: insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, groups that sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, terrorist groups, and even criminal organizations.
+
==== Minefields ====
 +
The five basic types of OPFOR minefields are antitank (AT), anti-personnel (AP), mixed, decoy, and antilanding. AT minefields are the primary type of OPFOR engineer obstacle and serve to destroy or disable armored and other vehicles. They are primarily established in belts consisting of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for armored vehicles. Wherever possible, minefield belts will be tied into natural terrain obstacles to reduce the mine requirement. The OPFOR sets up conventional AP minefields in support of friendly battle positions, in front of AT minefields, or along dismounted avenues of approach. Mixed minefields consist of both AP and AT mines. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception used to slow movement or deceive as to true unit locations. Antilanding minefields prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assault forces.
  
Based on this information, planners identify key targets and missions and task OPFOR units and/or affiliated forces to be prepared to perform them. This information is shared with the OSCs assigned to the particular contingency, and the planning effort is coordinated with them.
+
==== Minelaying ====
 +
The methods and extent of minelaying depend on—
 +
* The OPFOR’s intentions.
 +
* The operational and/or tactical situation.
 +
* Terrain characteristics.
 +
* The type of mine.
 +
* Time available.
 +
* Available engineer support.
 +
Emplacement means may be manual, mechanical, or remote. Manual emplacement is the most labor-intensive and time-consuming method and may not always be possible in a fluid battlespace. The OPFOR not only will use mechanical minelayers, but also will continue to develop methods of remote minelaying, including delivery by minelaying helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, or cannon and rocket artillery. Rapidly laid and scatterable AT mines in support of maneuver operations will predominate on most battlefields. The same types of minefield may also support a situational defense. If the OPFOR plans only a temporary halt or defensive action, it can mechanically surface-lay small protective minefields. It may also use remotely-laid minefields (probably with self-destruct options) and controlled minefields.
  
What is developed is an integrated plan consisting of a large number of tactical actions that support air defense objectives at all levels. This is the basic plan from which the OPFOR operates at the initiation of hostilities. It is modified and updated and new missions are assigned as the contingency situation develops.
+
==== Remotely-Delivered Mines ====
 +
The ability to remotely deliver mines provides the OPFOR with the capability to respond rapidly with thousands of landmines at any point on the battlefield. The OPFOR can employ remotely-delivered minefields against choke points to delay and cause bunching that could create vulnerability to air or artillery attack. Remotely-delivered minefields fill gaps created by enemy
  
Plans are developed which, taken as a whole, may constitute a battle or operation within the designated area. This is particularly true in the basing area, since most of the forces operating there will be small units. Their actions are timed to occur simultaneously or sequentially to achieve a result over time. For example, a series of actions against an airfield, set to occur within certain timeframes, can have the net effect of not only destroying air- craft and their support facilities but also degrading enemy air operations. An additional payoff is the possible diversion of enemy forces from other areas to secure the facility.
+
minefield breaching efforts and can cause confusion and delay in assembly areas. They can halt enemy attacks in areas not covered by an OD (or gain time for an OD to do its work). Maneuver forces use remote mining to protect their flanks or to attack targets deep in enemy territory or anywhere in the AOR. Remote minelaying can be useful against enemy columns, areas of concentration, CPs, firing positions, and other targets. Such unpredictable minefields increasingly dominate OPFOR countermobility operations.
  
==== Participants ====
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Remotely-delivered (or scatterable) mines are laid without regard to classical patterns. They are designed to be delivered by aircraft, cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), or ground vehicles, or they can be hand-thrown or emplaced by man-portable mine dispensers.
Attacks on airfields and related facilities feature coordinated operations by all available forces, and they are ''primarily not air defense units''. Aviation, SSMs, artillery, or SPF can destroy air C2 facilities, aviation support facilities, and the enemy’s aircraft while they are still on the ground. When the enemy is operating from bases in or near State territory, the destruction or degradation of these systems may be achieved through the use of raids and ambushes by regular ground forces, insurgents, or partisans.
 
  
'''Disruption Forces.''' Typical targets for attack by all forces in the disruption zone include enemy airfields and attack helicopter FARPs. The forces employed for such attacks consist almost exclusively of small units.
+
'''Artillery.''' Some cannon artillery systems are capable of delivering both AP and AT mines. However, MRLs are the primary means of remote minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing exposure to enemy targeting and weapon systems.
  
When the OPFOR is forced to withdraw from an area, this may become a basing area for the enemy. In such cases, the OPFOR may leave behind a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) in a hide position. In other cases, it can infiltrate a single-round rocket launcher or single mortars to occupy hide positions near the target. The hides are situated in complex terrain, highly camouflaged, and dispersed over a wide area. Once given the order to execute, the firing systems work on a predetermined firing schedule issued as part of an overall plan.
+
'''Ground Vehicles.''' Within recent years, the trend has been to mount scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to reseed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.
  
MRL system hides might contain only one system, which is loaded and ready to fire, with previously determined firing data set on the weapon. Crews manning the systems bivouac away from the system to keep it cold. Crews have communication capability but are kept on radio silence. When monitoring and acknowledging one-time orders to execute, they do so away from the system. Once given the order to execute, the firing systems work on a predetermined firing schedule issued as part of an overall plan. Each MRL may be assigned the mission of firing once. Firing occurs in a predetermined sequence separated by time. The net effect of this tactic is to destroy or damage facilities and/or aircraft on the ground and degrade the operating capability of support personnel. Munitions loads can be mixed dependent on the desired effect. They can include scatterable mines, delayed-fuzed munitions, high-explosive (HE), and chemical.
+
'''Infantry.''' OPFOR infantry units may employ man-portable remote mine dispensers. These man-portable dispensers, weighing only a few pounds, are ideal for installing small, defensive, AP or AT minefields. Infantry-fired ground dispensers allow units to remotely emplace minefields to protect their battle positions, flanks, and boundaries between units, or to cover firing lines and gaps in combat formations. They can quickly close breaches in existing protective minefields and increase the density of mines on armor avenues of approach.
  
This effort can be enhanced through the employment of single mortars and/or single-round rocket launchers. The weapon crews operating from preselected hides can move to firing positions where rounds are cached. Once laid in, the mortars can fire rounds in rapid succession at targets on the air- field and then move back to hides. Given range and terrain considerations, larger-caliber mortars (120-mm) can be used in conjunction with laser target designators to place rounds on point targets such as large aircraft, fuel storage and ammunition facilities, and hangers.
+
'''Aerial.''' Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelaying systems. Bombers or ground-attack aircraft can lay remotely-delivered minefields throughout the AOR.
  
Small SPF teams equipped with explosives or man-portable antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) can target aircraft on the ground, or air traffic con- trol or maintenance vehicles and facilities. SPF teams with shoulder-fired
+
Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace small or large minefields in the execution of offensive or defensive operations. This type of aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly territory—along flanks or in support zones. When supporting an airborne or heliborne landing, helicopters may lay mines on enemy-held territory. Helicopter mine chutes are a tool available to even low-technology helicopter forces for installation on a variety of helicopters by low-echelon maintenance units.
  
SAMs can engage enemy aircraft taking off or landing at airfields. OPFOR SPF or affiliated insurgents or terrorists can conduct raids against enemy air bases and other installations, using terror tactics to destroy enemy systems and generate fear. The goal is to present the enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Attacking such targets not only denies the enemy sanctuary, but also can weaken his national will to continue the conflict.
+
=== Obstacle Detachment ===
 +
The OD is the basic building block of the OPFOR’s countermobility effort. It is a task organization composed primarily of engineers. An OD can vary in size depending on the operational situation and the needs of the commander. An OSC may form several ODs based on its constituent or dedicated engineer units. An OD formed at this level is typically based on an engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC generally tries to create one OD for each ATR formed from its AT assets.
  
Infiltrated or stay-behind SPF and infantry can conduct on-call raids against airfields and ground support facilities. These raids can be timed in conjunction with other methods so that they assist in keeping the target under constant pressure. SPF or infantry can also conduct ambushes along LOCs to destroy certain types of vehicles or equipment related to air operations.
+
ODs formed by an OSC may be assigned in a supporting relationship to the OSC’s subordinate maneuver units, or they can act independently at the OSC level (for example, to protect an exposed flank). They are a standard feature of tactical and operational task organizations. With their ability to rapidly lay mines and construct obstacles, their mission is to deny the enemy access to key terrain, particularly those avenues of approach most suitable for armored vehicles.
  
'''National- and Operational-Level Assets.''' Some of the means available to attack these targets may be national- and operational-level assets. Since the OPFOR may be unable to reach such targets with its own Air Force aircraft, it may use long-range artillery, rockets, or missiles—possibly to deliver persistent chemical attacks or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—to disrupt or degrade enemy activities in the basing area.
+
Although the OD can operate independently, it usually operates with an ATR to provide flank protection and to repel enemy counterattacks. ATRs may provide covering fire over the minefields that the ODs emplace. The OD sometimes operates with mechanical minelaying platoons.
  
'''Affiliated Forces.''' In each contingency area, OPFOR planners try to identify insurgents, sympathizers, terrorist groups, and even criminal organizations that might participate in Phase I. Some of these affiliated forces can conduct raids or ambushes and any of them can employ terror tactics to disrupt enemy operations at bases. They can also intimidate host country civilian contractors to force them to sabotage the enemy operations they were hired to support.
+
==== Offense ====
 +
In the offense, the OD usually moves with the ATR either on an open flank or in a central position ready to deploy to any threatened axis. In the latter case, it usually advances with maneuver units to ensure a prompt response to any threat.
  
== Phase II ==
+
The OPFOR considers surprise a critical factor in mine warfare. Enemy reconnaissance can discover minefields laid too long in advance and can take measures to overcome them. Therefore, it is often more effective to lay a minefield during the course of a battle, preferably at the last minute, directly in the path of a developing threat. Using mines in this way is not only tactically advantageous, but also economical. This may be an important consideration when supplies are limited.
The second phase of air defense aims at destroying enemy aircraft while in flight and before they enter the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces. The “flight area” overlaps the basing area and extends from enemy bases to the battle zones of OPFOR units. Thus, the OPFOR’s disruption zone(s) are included in this area, since one of the missions per- formed in this zone is to destroy aerial platforms before they get to the battle zone. The OPFOR often plans air defense ambushes in the flight area.
 
  
==== Planning ====
+
The OPFOR uses ODs aggressively, maintaining close contact with the enemy and attempting to mine areas in which the enemy has already committed himself. An OD may join an ATR to ward off enemy counterattack threats.
As with Phase I, planning for Phase II occurs primarily at the national and operational levels. This planning includes any OSCs whose AORs fall in the “flight area.” Although tactical units in the disruption zone can carry out air defense-related actions, these actions are part of a larger plan.
 
  
==== Participants ====
+
==== Defense ====
In Phase II, OPFOR SPF teams can infiltrate man-portable, shoulder-fired SAMs close to airfields or along identified and potential flight routes in the flight area. These teams are best employed in pairs. One team can over-watch an airfield and transmit information on the departure of aircraft and their direction of flight to another team with SAMs. Alternatively, the SPF observers could pass this information as early warning to other air defense units.
+
In the defense, the OPFOR commander may hold the OD and other forces in reserve and can quickly employ them during an enemy attack, to mine potentially vulnerable gaps. Engineer tasks during the defense implement obstacle plans, particularly AT obstacles. Together with ATRs, ODs provide a quick-reaction AT force to block enemy penetrations.
  
After that, the Phase II mission is performed primarily by air defense forces at the strategic and operational levels. Interceptor aircraft and long- and medium-range SAMs conduct this phase of the air defense.
+
Engineers create obstacles on possible enemy approaches to OPFOR battle positions or artillery and air defense firing positions, in the gaps between battle positions, and on flanks. They normally construct barrier systems in coordination with the overall fire support plan
  
When the enemy aircraft enter an OPFOR disruption zone, shorter-range operational- and tactical-level air defense systems can engage them. Such systems often conduct air defense ambushes from positions within the disruption zone.
+
Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle construction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equipment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages.
  
== Phase III ==
+
=== Offensive Countermobility ===
The third phase entails the destruction of enemy aircraft that have penetrated into the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces. Thus, the “target area” consists of the area where enemy aircraft have penetrated over the OPFOR disruption, battle, and support zones. The disruption zone is included here, since part of the air defense mission in it is to protect forces on the ground within that zone.
+
Engineer countermobility missions are not strictly an engineer function. Rather, they are part of an overall, all-arms effort to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver. For example, many remotely-delivered mines are emplaced by means other than engineer assets. The OPFOR will also employ all means available to attack the enemy’s mobility assets at every opportunity. The elimination or degradation of key mobility assets (such as bridging and mine-clearing assets) can severely limit the enemy’s progress, range, or sustainability. This is part of the OPFOR’s systems warfare approach to combat.
  
In Phase III, it is not always necessary to destroy the enemy aircraft. After all, the objective is to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with OPFOR ground maneuver units. The OPFOR can accomplish this either by destroying enemy aircraft or by forcing them to expend their munitions beyond effective range or by diverting the aircraft before they reach their targets.
+
Preemptive attacks against the enemy’s bridging and mineclearing systems can occur at very early stages in the conflict, often well before the foreseen usage of such mobility assets. The OPFOR might try to destroy all mobility assets, thereby confining the enemy to his aerial or sea port of debarkation (APOD or SPOD), or it might let the enemy commit his assets and then destroy them piecemeal. Whichever method the OPFOR chooses, it would attempt to mask the identity of the true target by also hitting what the enemy may deem “higher-value targets,” such as maneuver troops and equipment, during the same attack. Thus, the enemy may believe the destruction of his mobility assets to be collateral damage rather than the intended target, and he may not place a high priority on replacing these as critical items.
  
===== Planning =====
+
== Strategic Context ==
Planning for Phase III extends down to the tactical level. However, tactical efforts are typically part of a plan for integrated air defense at the operational and perhaps the national level.
+
Operational-level engineers support the State’s various strategic-level courses of action and the OPFOR principles of operations versus an extraregional power (discussed in Chapter 1 and in FM 7-100). Specific engineer requirements are determined by the operational mission of the supported OSC within whichever strategic-level course of action is occurring in a given AOR at a given time. That may be regional, transition, or adaptive operations. Because of the requirement to transition rapidly from regional to adaptive operations and perhaps back to regional operations, engineers assigned to OSCs may be supporting more than one course of action simultaneously.
  
===== Participants =====
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=== Regional Operations ===
In Phase III, the OPFOR may be able to employ its own tactical fighter aircraft, operating in the relatively safe airspace of the “target area.” These fighters and fighter-interceptors can engage enemy aircraft that have “leaked through” ground-based air defenses. However, the bulk of the air defense effort in Phase III falls upon short- to medium-range SAMs and antiaircraft (AA) guns of tactical air defense units, complemented by operational- and national- level air defense assets and other weapons of the ground maneuver units.
+
Operational-level engineer units involved in regional operations facilitate the mobility and high rate of advance of joint, combined arms, interagency, and/or multinational forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the tactical level, it tailors the obstacle plan to the overall operation and integrates it into the operation plan. It uses obstacles to disaggregate, delay, block, and canalize enemy forces.
In the “target area,” the OPFOR is particularly concerned about attack helicopters using standoff firing techniques. It is critical to identify likely firing positions for these helicopters through terrain analysis. These sites will be located primarily in the disruption zone. The planned combined use of antihelicopter mines, artillery, and remote sensors by OSCs and their constituent organizations can be an effective tactic against attack helicopters.
 
  
Once identified, potential sites for attack helicopter firing positions can be seeded with antihelicopter mines. These are directional fragmentation mines that function like a Claymore mine, but are larger. Once emplaced, the mines can be left unattended. Built-in sensors detect approaching helicopters and initiate the mine when a helicopter enters the lethal zone. Thus, the antihelicopter mine systems can autonomously detect and engage enemy helicopters. This technique can be used at some potential sites to economize other air defense assets for use at the most likely sites.
+
=== Transition Operations ===
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Since transition operations can overlap both regional and adaptive operations, engineer actions can be various combinations of those occurring during regional or adaptive operations. The need for rapid transition from regional to adaptive operations (and vice versa) presents the engineers several challenges. For example, engineers still supporting regional operations may be involved in water-crossing activities, while engineers
  
Another method is to emplace remote sensors to overwatch the sites, and have the sites registered as preplanned artillery targets. Once the sen- sors pick up the incoming helicopters, the information is relayed to artillery units that take the sites under fire using variable-time-fuzed munitions. This tactic can either destroy or damage the aircraft or cause the area to be unusable. In lieu of remote sensors, small teams of SPF or affiliated forces can be positioned to overwatch the most likely sites and relay information back to the guns.
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supporting units transitioning to adaptive operations may be blowing up bridges to preserve friendly forces. Engineers supporting joint, combined arms, interagency, and/or multinational units transitioning to regional operations may be laying minefields to fix an extraregional foe while other engineers are providing mobility and survivability support to units launching offensive operations against a regional foe. Therefore, some engineers in transition operations may be involved in those tasks normally associated with regional operations while other engineers units may be involved in tasks normally associated with adaptive operations.
  
Another crude but potentially effective method is to have engineers string cables across the helicopters’ avenues of ingress. Engineers can also assist in the construction of deception positions to divert enemy air attack from actual forces or to lure the enemy into air defense ambushes.
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Several engineer missions become more critical during transition operations when shifting to adaptive operations. For example, IW takes on a more significant role with use of C3D measures to protect forces while they are attempting to get into sanctuary and begin adaptive operations. Engineer reconnaissance must locate clear, and preferably concealed, routes to expedite units’ movement to sanctuary and limit their exposure to extraregional forces.
  
== Assets ==
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The State may have done some advance preparation of defensive positions in peacetime or during regional operations. However, the OPFOR takes advantage of any time required for the extraregional enemy to build up combat power, using that time for additional engineer preparation involving all means available. Engineer units or other forces supervised by engineers provide fortified positions or repair or reinforce those positions already in place. Caches and water sources, if not in place, will have to be prepared.
In the OPFOR’s approach to all-arms air defense, various services of the Armed Forces and various branches within the services participate in the mission of air defense. However, there are some forces that specialize in air defense.
 
  
Both the Air Force and the Army maintain air defense forces. In peacetime, all these air defense assets belong to the OPFOR’s administrative force structure. Even in wartime, some of them--such as the national-level Air Defense Forces--may remain centrally controlled at the national or theater level. Other assets from the administrative force structure are initially allocated to OSCs. An OSC, in turn, may allocate some of its air defense assets to augment those of its tactical subordinates. Thus, it is hard to predict where national-, operational-, and tactical-level assets may actually appear in the wartime, fighting force structure.
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=== Adaptive Operations ===
 +
During adaptive operations, several trends in engineer employment may be at odds with one another. On the one hand, the dispersal of forces may require task organization of engineer units into smaller groupings. With dispersal and decentralization, however, the task organization of operational-level engineer assets to support tactical-level missions becomes increasingly difficult. As the OPFOR goes into a force-preservation mode, commanders may tend to create larger engineer reserves and put into protected storage some scarce engineer assets that will be critical to success in later operations. Examples of such high-value assets could be bridging, route-clearing equipment, mechanical minelayers, and other heavy engineer equipment. The process begins during transition operations but has the largest impact during adaptive operations. This equipment will be protected and might only be used for high-priority missions or in areas shielded from the enemy. The shortage of key equipment is further intensified by any combat losses.
  
Within the limits of its economic capabilities, the OPFOR has incorporated recent technological developments into its air defense weapons. It may invest in a few high-technology systems that provide it a technological niche that it can exploit against even the most modern enemy air forces. Deployment of advanced air defense systems, even in limited numbers, would affect all enemy air operations.
+
Since requirements for engineer support do not change during the absence of heavy equipment, the OPFOR has planned the complete integration of civilian and military engineer resources to help compensate for this loss. The lack of engineer units and assets available to the lower levels is compensated for by the sharing of engineer tasks and responsibilities throughout the OPFOR branches and maximizing the use of manual labor (military and civilian) and assets other than those of engineer units. Since maneuver units or civilian workers may have to perform the majority of engineer tasks, engineers are also responsible for supervising and providing guidance and technical expertise to these groups. This allows the tasks to be performed with the least amount of engineers and mitigates the loss of units and equipment.
  
=== National-Levels Assets ===
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The basic engineer missions during adaptive operations remain reconnaissance, countermobility, survivability, and mobility, along with the task of support to IW. These all occur at all levels of command all over the battlefield, and priorities of engineer effort vary according to the specific situation, which can be unpredictable. Examples of how these missions and tasks support adaptive operations are listed below.
National-level air defense forces focus their efforts on destroying enemy aircraft, while protecting critical defensive positions and key political and economic sites. National-level assets include fighter-interceptor aircraft of the Air Force. Against a regional opponent, the OPFOR can use these aircraft to prevent enemy aircraft from entering or operating in OPFOR airspace. It can destroy enemy aircraft before they even take off by using air attacks and the long-range rockets and missiles of the Strategic Forces or direct action teams from its SPF Command.
 
  
The Air Force also includes Air Defense Forces with which the OPFOR can successfully defend its airspace against regional opponents. These national-level assets, along with operational-level air defenses, also provide the capability to challenge or deny air access into the region by out- side forces, at least initially.
+
==== Reconnaissance ====
 +
The focus of engineer reconnaissance during  adaptive  operations will be on areas that support the creation of windows of opportunity or the exploitation of opportunities that result from existing conditions in the AOR. Engineers can help determine the most likely routes the enemy might take, as well as identify routes for OPFOR units undertaking counterattacks or the maneuver component of a strike.
  
The State’s national-level Air Defense Forces have medium- and long- range SAMs, some short-range AA guns, and early warning radar units. These forces reflect the State’s force development philosophy. They combine obsolescent and state-of-the-art air defense firing units to support area coverage and point protection of high-value assets. The State is investing in point-protection technology that it believes can prove effective in defending against cruise missiles. This capability would include the ability to deploy and use GPS jammers.
+
==== Countermobility ====
 +
The OPFOR makes extensive use of countermobility operations to control access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy forces. The obstacle plan is completely integrated with the maneuver, fire support, and IW plans. Minefields and other obstacles used in support of adaptive operations are extremely innovative, irregular-shaped, and thoroughly merged with the terrain. Minefields also tend to be much smaller than those laid in regional operations (especially linear operations). Many are nuisance minefields, rather than being designed to destroy large numbers of enemy forces.
  
=== Operational-Level Assets ===
+
==== Survivability ====
The Army recognizes the importance of preventing or at least delaying enemy air superiority. Therefore, it maintains its own operational- and tactical-level air defense forces in addition to those subordinate to the Air Force. Army air defense includes mobile air defense units and large numbers of shoulder-fired SAMs. However, air defense involves use of all arms of the ground forces, not just the specialized air defense units.
+
The construction of battle and fighting positions is a labor-intensive process and is therefore a shared responsibility of engineers and supported units. Maximum use of civilian engineer assets and personnel continues during adaptive operations. Survivability activities during adaptive operations have several unique engineer requirements. Some examples are to—
 +
* Take full advantage of the screening, protective, C3D techniques, along with careful selection of terrain to passively deny the enemy the ability to acquire OPFOR positions for targeting.
 +
* Make extensive use of local building materials, equipment, and work force.
 +
* Protect CPs and logistics sites.
 +
* Bury communications lines.
 +
* Construct false positions, equipment, movement routes, and lines of communication.
 +
* Assimilate minefields and obstacles to the terrain.
 +
* Prepare caves, tunnels, and tunnel complexes in which troops can live and from which they can fight.
  
The inventory of operational-level air defense weapons includes a variety of missiles, guns, and support equipment. The numbers and types of air defense assets vary with the size and composition of the OSC. An OSC may have some air defense assets that it reserves for coverage of its own operational support zone and for engaging enemy aircraft that get past tactical air defenses. It also has assets it can allocate to subordinates to augment tactical air defenses at critical points on the battlefield or to cover gaps in the air defense umbrella.
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==== Mobility ====
 
+
It is critical that the OPFOR maintain the ability to move unimpeded during adaptive operations. This ability allows the OPFOR to control the access and tempo of enemy forces. As long as the OPFOR has complete access to the battlefield, it will allow no sanctuary to the enemy and determine the nature of the conflict. Engineer support can create opportunities for infiltration of small forces into unexpected locations, to inflict damage or to support IW.
==== Surface-to-Air Missiles ====
 
Operational-level air defense systems include medium-range SAMs (and perhaps some long-range SAMs) for medium- to high-altitude area coverage. Some SAMs have the capability to engage ballistic or cruise missiles, as well as aircraft. Medium-range SAM units typically have some AA guns or shoulder-fired SAMs for self-protection.
 
 
 
==== Antiaircraft Guns ====
 
Operational-level commands may have some short-range AA guns for point protection. The AA guns found at the operational level are typically towed systems that lack the mobility of self-propelled SAM systems and cannot fire on the move. These AA gun units are capable of only a limited area coverage and are better suited for short-range, point protection of individual locations. Within their range capabilities, however, these  AA guns are extremely lethal weapons.
 
 
 
==== Radars ====
 
OSCs normally have early warning units with a variety of air surveillance and target acquisition radars, plus some AA guns or shoulder-fired SAMs for self-protection. The majority of air defense surveillance radars are at the operational level. (See the Air Surveillance section later in this chapter for more detail.)
 
 
 
=== Tactical-Level Assets ===
 
Aside from air defense assets that might be allocated down from the operational level, tactical maneuver units have a number of systems de- signed for air defense. They also have systems belonging to other arms that can contribute to the air defense mission.
 
 
 
==== Air Defense Systems ====
 
Tactical-level air defense includes short- and medium-range SAMs, short-range AA guns, and shoulder-fired SAMs. Tactical assets may also include some combination AA gun and missile systems, offering added flexibility. The OPFOR’s tactical air defenses support the need to protect ground forces and the desire to seize any opportunity to shoot down high- visibility (flagship) enemy airframes.
 
 
 
The Army considers every soldier with a shoulder-fired SAM to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost. Therefore, the OPFOR is acquiring as many of them as possible, within economic constraints, and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near OPFOR units. The OPFOR could also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters in an attempt to bring down what it perceives to be an enemy flag- ship system.
 
 
 
Radar-controlled self-propelled AA guns can fire on the move. Aside from short-range air defense, they also can be employed against all but the heaviest of enemy ground force systems, as well as against personnel, with devastating effects. Shoulder-fired SAMs can also find use against light vehi- cles when other, more likely systems are unavailable.
 
 
 
==== Other Arms ====
 
Throughout maneuver units, there are also a number of other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy AA machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense, although they can also be used against ground targets. Machineguns on APCs and automatic cannon on IFVs can engage both ground and air targets. Some ATGMs can be effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme.
 
A variety of relatively new systems, which significantly enhance air defense capabilities, have entered the OPFOR inventory. These include remote helicopter infrared (IR) sensing devices and passive acoustic acquisition systems. Antihelicopter mines are widely available and increase the OPFOR ability to deny firing positions and landing sites to enemy rotary-wing aircraft. Another example of OPFOR all-arms air defense is the use of artillery in conjunction with antihelicopter mines against attack helicopter firing positions.
 
 
 
The OPFOR continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense. It attempts to adapt these systems and develop new tactics that may help to fill the void when a more sophisticated enemy denies the OPFOR a specific capability.
 
 
 
=== Nonlethal Air Defense Assets ===
 
The OPFOR also uses nonlethal air defense-related systems, such as air defense jammers, radar corner reflectors, and GPS jammers. Such systems are potential combat multipliers, when employed in conjunction with SAM and AA gun systems, to defend high-value assets.
 
 
 
==== Air Defense Jammers ====
 
OSCs can have air defense jamming units. These units employ a variety of radar and communications jamming and target acquisition systems. Electronic intercept systems provide targeting information to the jammers.
 
 
 
Air defense jammers target the onboard emitters of enemy aircraft used for terrain-following, navigation, and radar-aided bombing, as well as airborne radar reconnaissance systems. The goal of jamming these systems is twofold. The primary goal is to force the attacking enemy aircraft to alter their flight profile, bringing them into the targeting umbrella of SAMs or AA guns. Jamming the terrain-following radars or radar altimeters employed by attacking aircraft does this by forcing low-flying aircraft to gain altitude. The secondary goal is to cause the aircraft to miss their target or abort the mission through the disruption of radar-aided bombing and target acquisition systems.
 
 
 
The OPFOR deploys air defense jamming assets, in conjunction with lethal systems, to defend what the OPFOR has identified as high-value assets. Examples of these include air bases, major logistics centers, critical LOCs and choke points, and higher-level military CPs.
 
 
 
==== Corner Reflectors ====
 
Radar corner reflectors provide a low-cost and effective addition to ex- pensive air defense jammers. These passive systems can deceive enemy airborne surveillance and target acquisition radars by providing false or multiple targets. Corner reflectors can also mask or distort radar reference points.
 
 
 
==== GPS Jammers ====
 
The OPFOR also can employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt aircraft navigation and precision munitions targeting. GPS jammers are also effective against cruise missiles.
 
 
 
=== Passive Air Defense Measures ===
 
In addition to active air defense, the OPFOR practices a variety of passive air defense measures. Many of these measures involve use of C3D or maneuver and dispersal techniques. Sophisticated camouflage, deception, decoy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of enemy systems. When conducting actions against a superior foe, the OPFOR must seek to operate on the margins of enemy technology and maneuver during periods of reduced exposure. These and other measures constitute passive air defense.
 
 
 
==== Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception ====
 
The OPFOR emphasizes the use of natural terrain and vegetation, camouflage netting and other artificial materials, smokescreens, and decoy equipment to provide C3D. Deception includes deception positions and decoys. The OPFOR can use quick-setup, high-fidelity decoys; derelict vehicles; radar emitter decoys; quick-hardening foams; and many other  types  of manufactured and field-expedient means. It also employs simple heat sources to confuse IR sensors and weapons seekers.
 
 
 
The dispersion measures discussed below should be employed with consideration of the protective and screening properties of natural and artificial screens, and would be combined with thermal camouflage and engineer preparation of positions. Natural screens consist of vegetation, terrain folds, populated areas, and local features or objects. Artificial screens include camouflage nets that would enhance natural screens, and radar-opaque screens using local features, radar nets, metallic nets, and corner reflectors. Concealment would be combined with the use of deception positions, using decoy equipment and activities. Like real positions, deception positions would be changed periodically. Dummy emitters and jammers would be used to attract enemy reconnaissance and targeting.
 
 
 
==== Maneuver and Dispersal ====
 
9-105. Maneuver and dispersal of air defense assets, both emitters and other types of equipment, is important for their survival both during movement and in combat formations. Sudden maneuver and periodic changes of position are simple and effective means to counter enemy reconnaissance and preci- sion weapons; these measures are planned and implemented at the tactical level.
 
 
 
9-106. All, or only a portion of, an air defense unit may maneuver to alter- nate positions, depending on such factors as the degree of air threat, time of day, and meteorological conditions. The first parts of the unit to shift posi- tions are those that have performed combat alert duty for an extended pe- riod, or that have been deployed in the position they currently occupy since before the onset of combat. The optimum configuration for shifting to alter- nate positions involves no more than one-third of the assets of a given unit shifting at one time, in order to maintain adequate air defense coverage.
 
 
 
9-107. The OPFOR uses certain rules of thumb for distances related to dis- persion and distances of air defense units from supported units and from the battle line. The OPFOR recognizes that these distances vary with the situa- tion and the threat. Of special concern is the enemy ATGM and precision weapon capability. If it is high, the OPFOR increases the spacing between SAM launchers and the distances of air defense systems from the battle line. Ideally, the degree of dispersal for units would be the same whether the en- emy is employing conventional or precision weapons or even tactical nuclear weapons. A general rule for the degree of dispersion is that the enemy attack should not destroy two adjacent units simultaneously. A maximum of one- third of a unit should be vulnerable to a single precision weapon attack.
 
 
 
==== Other Survivability Measures ====
 
Other measures taken to improve the security and survivability of air defense systems include the following:
 
* '''Signals security.''' SAM and AA gun system radars, which move forward to cover the offensive or defensive action of a maneuver unit, remain silent until after the maneuver unit begins to execute its mission.
 
* '''Frequency spread.''' Each of the air defense systems operates within separate radar frequency bands. (No one jamming system could oper- ate simultaneously against all bands.)
 
* '''Frequency diversity.''' Tracking and guidance radars change frequen- cies to overcome jamming.
 
* '''Multiple and interchangeable missile guidance systems.''' Some OPFOR systems work on pulsed radar; others work on continuous waves. Some radar tracking systems also possess optical tracking for continued operations in a high electronic countermeasures environ- ment; others systems use IR homing.
 
* '''Mobility.''' All OPFOR tactical air defense systems and most opera- tional-level systems are mobile. They can quickly change positions af- ter firing or after enemy reconnaissance units detect them.
 
 
 
== Reconnaissance ==
 
Reconnaissance related to air defense takes two basic forms. First, commanders conduct terrain reconnaissance to determine likely avenues of approach for enemy aircraft and optimum positions for air defense weapons. Then air surveillance seeks to detect approaching aircraft and provide early warning and target information.
 
 
 
=== Terrain Reconnaissance ===
 
The OPFOR places significant emphasis on identifying all potential attack routes for low-flying enemy aircraft of all types. Routes of approach suit- able for armed helicopters and positions from which these helicopters might employ ATGMs are of special concern. The OPFOR considers armed helicopters to be a serious threat to its ground maneuver units. The OPFOR trains commanders to look for areas masked by trees or folds in the terrain where enemy aircraft might use nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight techniques to avoid radar detection.
 
 
 
Both the commander of the supported maneuver unit and the com- mander of the supporting air defense unit usually conduct terrain reconnaissance. A preliminary map reconnaissance can tentatively identify positions for deployment of air defense weapons in defensive areas, along movement routes, or in areas seized by advancing OPFOR units.
 
 
 
=== Air Surveillance ===
 
The principle objective of air surveillance is to provide the earliest possible warning of approaching enemy aircraft and to develop target information for planning and conducting air defense. Forearmed with this information, the OPFOR can ensure that it can mass the fires of dispersed air defense units to engage the intruders. Ground-based and airborne reconnaissance assets at the operational level play a major role in gathering, integrating, and disseminating information to tactical units. Continuous surveillance of surrounding airspace ensures current data on the enemy air situation.
 
 
 
The OPFOR uses electronic and electro-optical means and visual observation to conduct air surveillance. The air defense forces have a passive early warning system based on a combination of radar systems and observers that will serve them well in the early stages of combat operations against even the most modern opponents. In later stages, the OPFOR accepts that it will either lose many of its airborne and/or ground-based early warning systems or at least not be able to use them with optimum effectiveness. When technical early warning systems are not available, the OPFOR is prepared to continue air defense operations while relying primarily on observers for air surveillance.
 
 
 
==== Radars ====
 
Air defense radars fall into two general categories: surveillance and fire control. The category of surveillance radars includes early warning, target-acquisition, and height-finding radars. Some fire control radars also have limited target-acquisition capability.
 
 
 
National-, operational-, and tactical-level surveillance and target- acquisition radars detect and monitor targets. The radars then provide the necessary data for engagement. Radars work as part of the IADS rather than as separate units. Air defense planners at all levels integrate radars into an overall system of coverage.
 
 
 
Operational-level early warning units deploy their radars as close as possible to the supported ground force unit’s battle line, in order to detect enemy aircraft at maximum radar range. National-level early  warning units can establish a second line of radar posts behind the first line of operational-level systems, in order to give depth. The types and capabilities of the systems employed and whether the battlefield is linear or nonlinear will determine the distances between lines.
 
 
 
Both national- and operational-level air defense forces maintain reserves to expand coverage as the operation develops, to replace casualties, or to establish a new line of radar posts. When the OPFOR is preparing for offensive operations, operational-level early warning radars remain inactive as part of C3D, and the national-level reserve radars deploy forward.
 
 
 
In many cases, long-range surveillance radars in early warning units at the national and operational levels can gather target information long be- fore the enemy aircraft come into the range of air defense firing units. These radar units pass preliminary target data to air defense commanders and their firing batteries. Commanders then select the weapon system that can best engage a given target. The early warning units also pass warning information to operational and tactical maneuver units and air defense firing units.
 
 
 
SAM systems and AA guns may have their own radars in the firing positions or mounted on self-propelled systems. However, higher-level radars can gather the information without unnecessarily exposing the air defense firing units to detection and subsequent neutralization by enemy forces. This practice reduces the vulnerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun carriages and missile launchers to jamming or to destruction by antiradiation missiles (ARMs) or other means.
 
  
The air surveillance radar network is difficult to avoid or defeat. Many air defense radars are highly mobile and can displace quickly. Fire control units turn on radars at the last minute to achieve surprise and to avoid exposing themselves to enemy electronic or physical attack. The more advanced radar systems have enhanced electronic protection from jamming and ARMs. The wide spread of operating frequencies makes jamming difficult. Operator training stresses electronic counter-countermeasure skills and the use of radio and electronic silence where possible. Units back up radar reconnaissance with visual observation. Maneuver units have a radio net devoted exclusively to the passage of air and NBC warnings. Radar provides an all-weather detection capability.
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Rarely during adaptive operations would the OPFOR attempt the classic opposed water crossings it can use during regional operations. However, there may be times when the OPFOR must cross rivers in territory occupied by the enemy. Even then, it would attempt an opposed crossing only if convinced of success and if the enemy did not believe the OPFOR would attempt the crossing. Such crossings would be integrated into the overall operation plan and the IW plan.
  
==== Visual Observation ====
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More likely, however, is that the OPFOR would attempt to cross the river surreptitiously at night or during inclement weather. This would allow the OPFOR to infiltrate units—a few vehicles at a time—across the river. The units would regroup at a designated area and continue operations. Engineer support for this may be only engineer reconnaissance of the river and routes. The situation may also call for the engineers to build (undetected) an underwater bridge out of sandbags, or to make rafts rigged to transport vehicles.
Despite the presence of a technologically advanced early warning system, the OPFOR continues to stress the importance of visual observation. Air defense and maneuver units deploy air observers as a backup to radars and so air defense units may not need to use their radars. In later stages of combat against more modern opponents, the OPFOR may have to rely heavily on observers after losing much of its radar capability.
 
  
An effective system of visual observation may often provide the first warning of an enemy air attack, especially one conducted by low-flying aircraft or armed helicopters using NOE techniques. When operating close to enemy forces or in areas where enemy air attack is considered likely, all units post air observers. In the defense, air observation posts are set up at suitable locations, usually on terrain offering good visibility, near CPs, and/or close to air defense units in firing positions. During tactical movement and during both the defense and offense, observers are posted on each vehicle. Observers are changed frequently to reduce fatigue and maintain their effectiveness.
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The OPFOR may be required to breach enemy minefields. Although it may breach them in the more conventional manner described in FM 7-100.2, the OPFOR can also devise innovative methods the cross the minefield. One such method might be to manually clear a path through the minefield surreptitiously. Several paths could be cleared in this fashion. Then, at a time of the OPFOR’s own choosing, dismounted troops could infiltrate through the minefield and rendezvous at a designated location on the other side, undetected by the enemy.
  
Whenever possible, the OPFOR tries to get SPF teams, human intelligence (HUMINT) agents, or sympathetic civilians to visually observe enemy airfields in or near the region. These observers report by radio or telephone the number and types of aircraft taking off and their direction of travel. Other observers stationed along probable approach routes can monitor and report the progress of the enemy aircraft en route to their targets. Thus, OPFOR air defense units may not need to use their radars to detect and track incoming aircraft.
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==== Support to Information Warfare ====
 +
The complete integration of engineer support to IW continues to be critical in adaptive operations. Deception is one of the basic elements of IW. Engineer support of the deception plan is vital for the deception to succeed. Engineers’ largest role in an integrated deception plan is that of constructing physical decoys (simulations in deception positions) enabling the enemy to see what he expects to see. These decoys cover a wide spectrum of types and must be introduced or allowed to be “discovered” in the same sequence in which a “real or existing” unit would emplace them. The general priority of engineer construction is from front to rear, beginning with the primary fighting positions, then the temporary and alternate positions. The time sequence in which these “appear” gives credibility to the deception.
  
=== Requirements ===
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However, engineer support to IW is not limited to C3D measures. For example, engineers may support psychological warfare with activities to lower morale and instill a sense of tentativeness among enemy soldiers or to undermine confidence of “enemy-friendly” populations. This can be achieved simply by the ubiquitous use of booby traps and AP mines.
The information required by air defense units falls into two categories: information on enemy air actions and information that can complete the picture of the overall air situation. The first category is a joint responsibility of all reconnaissance forces, and the second is the specific responsibility of air defense reconnaissance units.
 
  
The first category includes data from which the OPFOR can determine probable enemy air actions. This information is critical for planning and organizing the air defense system. Such information could include—
+
== References ==
* The composition and strength of enemy air power.
+
<references />
* The capabilities of enemy aircraft.
 
* The enemy’s basic methods for operational and tactical employment of air power.
 
* The locations of enemy airfields, C2  centers, resupply bases, and pro- duction facilities.
 
* Avenues of low-level flight.
 
* Locations of FARPs.
 
* Locations of ground stations for UAVs.
 
The second category includes data from which the OPFOR can develop a clear picture of the air situation as it unfolds. This information is necessary to determine the enemy’s plans, air order of battle, and air attack objectives. The OPFOR can then assign targets to fire units or redeploy resources. Necessary data also include the positions, types, numbers, direction, speed, and altitude of aircraft in flight. Radio intercept provides some data, but most comes from air defense radars.
 

Latest revision as of 21:08, 31 July 2017

This page is a section of FM 7-100.1 Opposing Forces Operations.

The OPFOR believes success in battle requires extensive engineer support at every level. Engineer plans at the operational level support the various strategic-level courses of action involved in the State’s strategic campaign. Engineers facilitate the mobility and high rate of movement of combined arms forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the tactical level, it also maximizes activities conducted at the operational level to disaggregate, disrupt, delay, block, or canalize enemy forces. See FM 7-100.2 for more information on tactical-level engineer actions.

Assets

Military engineers fall into two basic categories: combat engineers and special-category engineers.  Combat engineers are those  whose tasks  may bring them in direct contact with the enemy. Special-category engineers (such as bridge- and road-building units) do not normally engage the enemy and generally use utility vehicles as their primary transportation rather than engineer vehicles designed to survive close combat. Together, these two categories of engineers are responsible for the more difficult and complex engineering tasks. Their missions require specialized training and the use of special equipment or munitions. Often the distinction of engineer categories is blurred somewhat depending on task organizations and their mission-driven employment.

At the operational level, the OPFOR plans the complete integration of civilian and military engineer resources. For example, maneuver commanders may use civilian earthmoving, road-building, and construction equipment and personnel, especially in support zones. This allows constituent combat engineer equipment and personnel to accompany maneuver forces in battle. Civilian workers or maneuver units can perform many basic combat engineer tasks, with engineers providing guidance and technical expertise.

Command and Control

Engineer units allocated to an operational-strategic command (OSC) in constituent or dedicated relationships may be directly under the command of the OSC commander. The OSC commander or his subordinate commanders can control—but do not command—other engineer assets that are allocated to them in a supporting relationship. Rather than keeping all allocated engineer assets under his direct command and control (C2), the OSC commander may suballocate some engineer units to his subordinate maneuver units or to his integrated fires command (IFC) and/or integrated support command (ISC).

Staff Responsibility

Various staff elements under the operations officer advise him on engineer matters and allow him to advise the commander on the employment of engineer assets. The chief of force protection and the chief of infrastructure management receive liaison teams from each constituent, dedicated, or supporting engineer unit. These teams provide the staff with detailed expertise on engineer functions and provide a direct communications conduit to the engineer units executing such functions. Based on the advice of the liaison teams and coordination with the engineer units through the respective liaison teams, these functional staff chiefs advise the commander on engineer employment within their functional areas. Other liaison teams may fall under the chief of current operations, to advise and assist in mobility and countermobility functions. The engineer liaison teams also coordinate, as necessary, with other staff elements, including the chief of information warfare (IW). Liaison team leaders speak for the commanders of their respective units.

Task Organization

At each level of command, the commander or his operations officer decides on the task organization of subordinate engineer units. Operational employment of engineer units does not follow strict organizational lines. The OPFOR does not always employ engineer units as complete entities.

Engineer tasks are integral to all OPFOR organizations. Although engineer assets generally are constituent at no lower than brigade or brigade tactical group (BTG) level, the OPFOR prefers to task organize for mission success at even lower levels, when the assets are available. This may dictate that, instead of maintaining large engineer units, the commander may choose to break them down and combine them into smaller (sometimes much, much smaller) multirole engineer support groupings. These engineer groupings range in size from brigades down to multirole platoons and engineer squads. An example of this flexible task organization would be the allocation more minelaying assets on an exposed flank or a high-speed avenue of approach for enemy armored vehicles. Another would be that an OSC that is task- organized for operations in a desert environment would not receive water obstacle-crossing units, but might add more mineclearing units.

There are no real doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is restrained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission. At the operational level, however, the primary responsibility of the engineers is to support and ensure the mobility and survivability  of  operational units while retaining a significant countermobility capability to impede (or canalize) the enemy’s progress. The primary engineer reconnaissance function at the operational level is route reconnaissance.

With advice from engineer experts on his functional staff, the operations officer on the OSC staff uses the OSC’s engineer resources to form task-oriented groupings according to the commander’s decision for the operation and his instructions on engineer support. He forms groupings to—

  • Conduct engineer support (reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability) at any level.
  • Augment maneuver units.
  • Augment other operational-level units.
  • Support IW.

The most frequent operational employment of constituent or dedicated engineer, engineer reconnaissance, and road- and bridge-construction units generally involves the formation of one or more functional groupings. Some of these are—

  • Obstacle detachments (ODs) to create minefields and other obstacles.
  • Movement support detachments (MSDs) to perform route reconnaissance, route preparation, mineclearing, and route marking.
  • Obstacle-clearing detachments.
  • Engineer reconnaissance patrols.

An OSC may form several of each, and each may be based on an engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC may also create an engineer reserve.

Missions

The primary engineer missions performed in combat are in the categories of reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The OPFOR recognizes several basic combat tasks engineers perform in support of combined arms operations. Some of these tasks are to—

  • Reconnoiter the enemy and the terrain.
  • Prepare fortifications.
  • Prepare and maintain movement routes.
  • Clear passages through obstacles and areas of destruction.
  • Equip and maintain gap crossings.
  • Establish engineer obstacles.
  • Support IW.
  • Extract and purify water and establish water supply points.
  • Carry out engineer measures to eliminate the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and precision weapons.

For more detail, see the sections later in this chapter dedicated to Engineer Reconnaissance, Survivability, Countermobility, and Support to Information Warfare. For more detail on mobility support, see FM 7-100.2.

Support to Offensive Operations

In the offense, the engineers’ primary mission is to support the operation plan. Emphasis is on—

  • Clearing and maintaining routes for maneuver units.
  • Clearing or removing mines and other obstacles.
  • Crossing gaps.
  • Creating obstacles to assist in flank protection and protection against counterattacks.

Preparation

To prepare for offensive operations, engineer tasks include—

  • Performing engineer reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy.
  • Preparing assembly areas and movement routes for maneuver forces, including reserves.
  • Constructing protective  positions  for systems,  units, and  command posts (CPs).
  • Establishing and improving road networks to support maneuver forces.
  • Preparing alternative airfields and highway strips to support air assets.
  • Ensure the integration of engineer support to IW.

Conduct

During  the  conduct of offensive  operations,  engineer support  includes—

  • Providing tailored engineer support where it is needed, when it is needed.
  • Continuing reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
  • Maintaining airfields and roads.
  • Improving road networks and other movement routes to support commitment of reserves or follow-on forces.
  • Providing support for the crossing of water obstacles and other gaps.
  • Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and CPs, as they relocate.
  • Helping to repel enemy counterattack.
  • Supplying engineer equipment, materials, and technical assistance to maneuver units and other OPFOR units.
  • Facilitate maneuver despite enemy and natural obstacles and possibly NBC-contaminated areas.

Support to Defensive Operations

OSC engineer forces are heavily engaged in the preparation and conduct of an operational defense. Comprehensive engineer preparation in the entire area of responsibility (AOR) is an important precondition for holding battle positions, as well as for troop maneuver.

Engineer support for defensive operations places emphasis on fortifying battle positions and assembly areas, performing engineer camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, and adapting the terrain for defense. The defense is also conducive to the extensive use of various obstacles to interfere with the enemy’s advance.

The general aims of engineer support to defensive operations include—

  • Controlling access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy forces.
  • Establishing conditions necessary for organizing the defense.
  • Protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional direct and indirect fires, precision munitions, and NBC attacks.
  • Building fortifications, battle positions, and assembly areas.
  • Preparing and maintaining maneuver and supply routes.
  • Creating or improving existing obstacles.
  • Preparing decoys and deception positions.
  • Ensuring the integration of engineer support to IW.

The type and scale of engineer support depends on the operational situation, enemy forces, and the conditions under which an OPFOR transitions to the defense. If the OPFOR does so during the course of the offense, support may have to begin with the protection of threatened axes by ODs and antitank reserves (ATRs) and the route work needed for regrouping.

Preparation

Engineer support for preparing an AOR for defensive operations consists of the following:

  • Conducting engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
  • Preparing fortifications for protecting weapons, personnel, and equipment.
  • Preparing routes for counterattack forces.
  • Constructing  obstacles (coordinated  with  the  fire support  plan  and natural obstacles).
  • Preparing C3D measures in support of IW.
  • Maintaining the water supply.

Conduct

During defensive operations, engineer support consists of improving on and expanding the scope of all the above measures and undertaking new tasks as situations develop. Such tasks include clearing obstacles, crossing gaps, and eliminating the effects of NBC and precision weapons.

Support to Information Warfare

The OPFOR has responded at all organizational levels to the challenge posed by enemy advances in sensors and weapons. A wide variety of engineer activities contribute to IW, particularly in support of C3D measures. This support involves three interrelated areas:

  • Deception (signature-enhancing measures).
  • Camouflage and concealment (signature-reduction measures).
  • Obscurants (measures used both to conceal real equipment and enhance the effectiveness of decoy equipment).

OPFOR combat engineer units are a high priority for deception efforts, since their composition and disposition on the battlefield are indicators of how and where the OPFOR expects to conduct its main offensive or defensive effort. Therefore, the OPFOR establishes deception positions and engineer obstacles, supported by decoy vehicles.

Offense

During the offense, engineer support of deception measures can include—

  • Construction of decoys and deception positions.
  • Preparation of false routes to provide misleading indicators.

Defense

The OPFOR uses various deception measures to mislead the enemy about size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of defensive engineer preparations. Engineer support of deception measures can include—

  • Use of screening characteristics of terrain, darkness, and other conditions of limited visibility during engineer preparation of defensive positions and positioning of forces.
  • False actions to draw attention from actual defensive preparations.
  • Construction of artificial screens and concealment (such as horizontal and vertical screens, or corner reflectors).

Sufficient engineer support is critical to the success of any defensive deception plan. Units in the main defense force receive the priority of effort. However, engineers typically do not begin work supporting deception until they have completed all measures required for camouflage, concealment, and cover.

Engineer Reconnaissance

The specific missions of engineer reconnaissance are to—

  • Discover enemy engineer measures taken to fortify battle positions and to lay and clear minefields and demolitions.
  • Determine movement routes (by the conditions of roads, bridges, and fording sites).
  • Determine the characteristics of obstacles and locate bypass routes.
  • Determine water availability (or add more robust capability).
  • Observe enemy engineer activity.[1]
  • Determine requirements for special engineer equipment, allocation of engineer assets, and the subsequent task organizations of subordinate and supporting engineer units.
  • Report the locations of any enemy units encountered.
  • Advise the commander and staff on locations the enemy is likely to occupy, based on the presence of favorable conditions, such as accessibility, concealment, and water supply.

Route Reconnaissance

A primary goal of engineer reconnaissance at the operational level is to provide comprehensive information on the suitability of movement routes. Engineer reconnaissance, performed independently or with other reconnaissance forces, plays a significant role in ensuring freedom of movement and access to various areas of the battlefield. Units performing engineer reconnaissance make the following determinations:

  • The degree of trafficability of the entire route.
  • The location and nature of obstacles and forces or assets needed to overcome them.
  • The condition of crossing sites over rivers, canals, streams, and ravines.
  • The location and quantity of material potentially useful for improving the movement route.
  • The nature of  the terrain  and location  of areas  without natural concealment.

The purpose of route reconnaissance is to select suitable routes along the axis of movement and to identify suitable halt areas that provide concealment. Engineer reconnaissance can also identify possible infiltration routes. The reconnaissance patrol relays topographical and terrain information back to the unit that sent it out. Route reconnaissance can occur throughout the AOR, in offense or defense.

Offense

During the offense, the primary engineer reconnaissance mission is to obtain more precise information on—

  • Battle damage created both during offensive preparation and during the execution of the offense.
  • Troop movement routes and trafficability of off-road terrain.
  • Locations where the enemy established obstacles.
  • Locations for establishing obstacles during enemy counterattacks.
  • Water obstacles on friendly forces’ axes of advance.

Engineer reconnaissance during the offense seeks to obtain information on the nature of enemy fortifications, defensive positions, and obstacles. The basic methods for obtaining this information are observation and aerial or ground photography.

Defense

Engineers assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and by helping select positions for CPs and unit battle positions. Engineers also determine road and bridge conditions in the AOR, availability of local materials for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply.

Survivability

Preparing fortified positions is a task for engineers in both the offense and defense. Fortified positions increase weapons effectiveness and protect personnel, weapons, and materiel. Engineers give priority to digging in CPs and key components of the OPFOR’s combat power. Fortification preparation combines and uses to best advantage the terrain’s protective properties, local construction materials, and engineer excavation equipment. The C3D measures discussed above, under Support to Information Warfare, also contribute to survivability.

Offense

In preparation for offensive action, the primary use of field fortification is in the preparation of assembly areas. Even there, the tasks of preparation typically exceed the capability of engineers in the limited time available. Consequently, the preparation of assembly areas becomes a shared responsibility involving all available personnel and equipment of all branches.

Normally, the OPFOR locates assembly areas far enough from enemy forces to deny the enemy ground observation and to lessen direct-fire effects. It uses field fortification in a way that allows a smooth and protected movement of troops and supplies in and out of the assembly areas.

Defense

When the OPFOR is transitioning to the defense and preparing complex battle positions or sanctuary areas, advance engineer deployment allows better use of terrain features and constructed fortifications. Engineers also have more time to construct or improve routes for movement of troops and supplies and to conceal forces and caches or short-duration storage facilities. In most cases, engineer units must concentrate their effort on only the most important parts of the AOR.

The full preparation of defensive positions involving entrenchments, communications trenches, positions for tanks and infantry vehicles, and protected CPs is a labor-intensive process. It often exceeds the capability of pure engineer units. Consequently, the OPFOR’s approach is to use all available personnel and equipment. Units of all arms and services receive training in preparing field fortifications and emplacements.

Countermobility

Creating engineer obstacles and carrying out demolition activities are significant engineer functions in all phases of combat. The obstacle plan is tailored and integrated into the overall operation plan. Engineer obstacles include any actions taken to inflict losses and to delay and impede enemy movement. In the offense, obstacles protect flanks, disrupt counterattacks, and strengthen captured positions. In the defense, engineer obstacles may strengthen the defense, disrupt enemy operations, and cover gaps.

Explosive Obstacles

The widespread use of landmines on today’s battlefields results from a combination of mass production, plastic mines, improved battlefield delivery systems, and development of sophisticated fuzing. Remotely-delivered mines have expanded capability for changing the tempo of combat.

Minefields

The five basic types of OPFOR minefields are antitank (AT), anti-personnel (AP), mixed, decoy, and antilanding. AT minefields are the primary type of OPFOR engineer obstacle and serve to destroy or disable armored and other vehicles. They are primarily established in belts consisting of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for armored vehicles. Wherever possible, minefield belts will be tied into natural terrain obstacles to reduce the mine requirement. The OPFOR sets up conventional AP minefields in support of friendly battle positions, in front of AT minefields, or along dismounted avenues of approach. Mixed minefields consist of both AP and AT mines. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception used to slow movement or deceive as to true unit locations. Antilanding minefields prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assault forces.

Minelaying

The methods and extent of minelaying depend on—

  • The OPFOR’s intentions.
  • The operational and/or tactical situation.
  • Terrain characteristics.
  • The type of mine.
  • Time available.
  • Available engineer support.

Emplacement means may be manual, mechanical, or remote. Manual emplacement is the most labor-intensive and time-consuming method and may not always be possible in a fluid battlespace. The OPFOR not only will use mechanical minelayers, but also will continue to develop methods of remote minelaying, including delivery by minelaying helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, or cannon and rocket artillery. Rapidly laid and scatterable AT mines in support of maneuver operations will predominate on most battlefields. The same types of minefield may also support a situational defense. If the OPFOR plans only a temporary halt or defensive action, it can mechanically surface-lay small protective minefields. It may also use remotely-laid minefields (probably with self-destruct options) and controlled minefields.

Remotely-Delivered Mines

The ability to remotely deliver mines provides the OPFOR with the capability to respond rapidly with thousands of landmines at any point on the battlefield. The OPFOR can employ remotely-delivered minefields against choke points to delay and cause bunching that could create vulnerability to air or artillery attack. Remotely-delivered minefields fill gaps created by enemy

minefield breaching efforts and can cause confusion and delay in assembly areas. They can halt enemy attacks in areas not covered by an OD (or gain time for an OD to do its work). Maneuver forces use remote mining to protect their flanks or to attack targets deep in enemy territory or anywhere in the AOR. Remote minelaying can be useful against enemy columns, areas of concentration, CPs, firing positions, and other targets. Such unpredictable minefields increasingly dominate OPFOR countermobility operations.

Remotely-delivered (or scatterable) mines are laid without regard to classical patterns. They are designed to be delivered by aircraft, cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), or ground vehicles, or they can be hand-thrown or emplaced by man-portable mine dispensers.

Artillery. Some cannon artillery systems are capable of delivering both AP and AT mines. However, MRLs are the primary means of remote minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing exposure to enemy targeting and weapon systems.

Ground Vehicles. Within recent years, the trend has been to mount scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to reseed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.

Infantry. OPFOR infantry units may employ man-portable remote mine dispensers. These man-portable dispensers, weighing only a few pounds, are ideal for installing small, defensive, AP or AT minefields. Infantry-fired ground dispensers allow units to remotely emplace minefields to protect their battle positions, flanks, and boundaries between units, or to cover firing lines and gaps in combat formations. They can quickly close breaches in existing protective minefields and increase the density of mines on armor avenues of approach.

Aerial. Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelaying systems. Bombers or ground-attack aircraft can lay remotely-delivered minefields throughout the AOR.

Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace small or large minefields in the execution of offensive or defensive operations. This type of aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly territory—along flanks or in support zones. When supporting an airborne or heliborne landing, helicopters may lay mines on enemy-held territory. Helicopter mine chutes are a tool available to even low-technology helicopter forces for installation on a variety of helicopters by low-echelon maintenance units.

Obstacle Detachment

The OD is the basic building block of the OPFOR’s countermobility effort. It is a task organization composed primarily of engineers. An OD can vary in size depending on the operational situation and the needs of the commander. An OSC may form several ODs based on its constituent or dedicated engineer units. An OD formed at this level is typically based on an engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC generally tries to create one OD for each ATR formed from its AT assets.

ODs formed by an OSC may be assigned in a supporting relationship to the OSC’s subordinate maneuver units, or they can act independently at the OSC level (for example, to protect an exposed flank). They are a standard feature of tactical and operational task organizations. With their ability to rapidly lay mines and construct obstacles, their mission is to deny the enemy access to key terrain, particularly those avenues of approach most suitable for armored vehicles.

Although the OD can operate independently, it usually operates with an ATR to provide flank protection and to repel enemy counterattacks. ATRs may provide covering fire over the minefields that the ODs emplace. The OD sometimes operates with mechanical minelaying platoons.

Offense

In the offense, the OD usually moves with the ATR either on an open flank or in a central position ready to deploy to any threatened axis. In the latter case, it usually advances with maneuver units to ensure a prompt response to any threat.

The OPFOR considers surprise a critical factor in mine warfare. Enemy reconnaissance can discover minefields laid too long in advance and can take measures to overcome them. Therefore, it is often more effective to lay a minefield during the course of a battle, preferably at the last minute, directly in the path of a developing threat. Using mines in this way is not only tactically advantageous, but also economical. This may be an important consideration when supplies are limited.

The OPFOR uses ODs aggressively, maintaining close contact with the enemy and attempting to mine areas in which the enemy has already committed himself. An OD may join an ATR to ward off enemy counterattack threats.

Defense

In the defense, the OPFOR commander may hold the OD and other forces in reserve and can quickly employ them during an enemy attack, to mine potentially vulnerable gaps. Engineer tasks during the defense implement obstacle plans, particularly AT obstacles. Together with ATRs, ODs provide a quick-reaction AT force to block enemy penetrations.

Engineers create obstacles on possible enemy approaches to OPFOR battle positions or artillery and air defense firing positions, in the gaps between battle positions, and on flanks. They normally construct barrier systems in coordination with the overall fire support plan

Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle construction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equipment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages.

Offensive Countermobility

Engineer countermobility missions are not strictly an engineer function. Rather, they are part of an overall, all-arms effort to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver. For example, many remotely-delivered mines are emplaced by means other than engineer assets. The OPFOR will also employ all means available to attack the enemy’s mobility assets at every opportunity. The elimination or degradation of key mobility assets (such as bridging and mine-clearing assets) can severely limit the enemy’s progress, range, or sustainability. This is part of the OPFOR’s systems warfare approach to combat.

Preemptive attacks against the enemy’s bridging and mineclearing systems can occur at very early stages in the conflict, often well before the foreseen usage of such mobility assets. The OPFOR might try to destroy all mobility assets, thereby confining the enemy to his aerial or sea port of debarkation (APOD or SPOD), or it might let the enemy commit his assets and then destroy them piecemeal. Whichever method the OPFOR chooses, it would attempt to mask the identity of the true target by also hitting what the enemy may deem “higher-value targets,” such as maneuver troops and equipment, during the same attack. Thus, the enemy may believe the destruction of his mobility assets to be collateral damage rather than the intended target, and he may not place a high priority on replacing these as critical items.

Strategic Context

Operational-level engineers support the State’s various strategic-level courses of action and the OPFOR principles of operations versus an extraregional power (discussed in Chapter 1 and in FM 7-100). Specific engineer requirements are determined by the operational mission of the supported OSC within whichever strategic-level course of action is occurring in a given AOR at a given time. That may be regional, transition, or adaptive operations. Because of the requirement to transition rapidly from regional to adaptive operations and perhaps back to regional operations, engineers assigned to OSCs may be supporting more than one course of action simultaneously.

Regional Operations

Operational-level engineer units involved in regional operations facilitate the mobility and high rate of advance of joint, combined arms, interagency, and/or multinational forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the tactical level, it tailors the obstacle plan to the overall operation and integrates it into the operation plan. It uses obstacles to disaggregate, delay, block, and canalize enemy forces.

Transition Operations

Since transition operations can overlap both regional and adaptive operations, engineer actions can be various combinations of those occurring during regional or adaptive operations. The need for rapid transition from regional to adaptive operations (and vice versa) presents the engineers several challenges. For example, engineers still supporting regional operations may be involved in water-crossing activities, while engineers

supporting units transitioning to adaptive operations may be blowing up bridges to preserve friendly forces. Engineers supporting joint, combined arms, interagency, and/or multinational units transitioning to regional operations may be laying minefields to fix an extraregional foe while other engineers are providing mobility and survivability support to units launching offensive operations against a regional foe. Therefore, some engineers in transition operations may be involved in those tasks normally associated with regional operations while other engineers units may be involved in tasks normally associated with adaptive operations.

Several engineer missions become more critical during transition operations when shifting to adaptive operations. For example, IW takes on a more significant role with use of C3D measures to protect forces while they are attempting to get into sanctuary and begin adaptive operations. Engineer reconnaissance must locate clear, and preferably concealed, routes to expedite units’ movement to sanctuary and limit their exposure to extraregional forces.

The State may have done some advance preparation of defensive positions in peacetime or during regional operations. However, the OPFOR takes advantage of any time required for the extraregional enemy to build up combat power, using that time for additional engineer preparation involving all means available. Engineer units or other forces supervised by engineers provide fortified positions or repair or reinforce those positions already in place. Caches and water sources, if not in place, will have to be prepared.

Adaptive Operations

During adaptive operations, several trends in engineer employment may be at odds with one another. On the one hand, the dispersal of forces may require task organization of engineer units into smaller groupings. With dispersal and decentralization, however, the task organization of operational-level engineer assets to support tactical-level missions becomes increasingly difficult. As the OPFOR goes into a force-preservation mode, commanders may tend to create larger engineer reserves and put into protected storage some scarce engineer assets that will be critical to success in later operations. Examples of such high-value assets could be bridging, route-clearing equipment, mechanical minelayers, and other heavy engineer equipment. The process begins during transition operations but has the largest impact during adaptive operations. This equipment will be protected and might only be used for high-priority missions or in areas shielded from the enemy. The shortage of key equipment is further intensified by any combat losses.

Since requirements for engineer support do not change during the absence of heavy equipment, the OPFOR has planned the complete integration of civilian and military engineer resources to help compensate for this loss. The lack of engineer units and assets available to the lower levels is compensated for by the sharing of engineer tasks and responsibilities throughout the OPFOR branches and maximizing the use of manual labor (military and civilian) and assets other than those of engineer units. Since maneuver units or civilian workers may have to perform the majority of engineer tasks, engineers are also responsible for supervising and providing guidance and technical expertise to these groups. This allows the tasks to be performed with the least amount of engineers and mitigates the loss of units and equipment.

The basic engineer missions during adaptive operations remain reconnaissance, countermobility, survivability, and mobility, along with the task of support to IW. These all occur at all levels of command all over the battlefield, and priorities of engineer effort vary according to the specific situation, which can be unpredictable. Examples of how these missions and tasks support adaptive operations are listed below.

Reconnaissance

The focus of engineer reconnaissance during  adaptive  operations will be on areas that support the creation of windows of opportunity or the exploitation of opportunities that result from existing conditions in the AOR. Engineers can help determine the most likely routes the enemy might take, as well as identify routes for OPFOR units undertaking counterattacks or the maneuver component of a strike.

Countermobility

The OPFOR makes extensive use of countermobility operations to control access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy forces. The obstacle plan is completely integrated with the maneuver, fire support, and IW plans. Minefields and other obstacles used in support of adaptive operations are extremely innovative, irregular-shaped, and thoroughly merged with the terrain. Minefields also tend to be much smaller than those laid in regional operations (especially linear operations). Many are nuisance minefields, rather than being designed to destroy large numbers of enemy forces.

Survivability

The construction of battle and fighting positions is a labor-intensive process and is therefore a shared responsibility of engineers and supported units. Maximum use of civilian engineer assets and personnel continues during adaptive operations. Survivability activities during adaptive operations have several unique engineer requirements. Some examples are to—

  • Take full advantage of the screening, protective, C3D techniques, along with careful selection of terrain to passively deny the enemy the ability to acquire OPFOR positions for targeting.
  • Make extensive use of local building materials, equipment, and work force.
  • Protect CPs and logistics sites.
  • Bury communications lines.
  • Construct false positions, equipment, movement routes, and lines of communication.
  • Assimilate minefields and obstacles to the terrain.
  • Prepare caves, tunnels, and tunnel complexes in which troops can live and from which they can fight.

Mobility

It is critical that the OPFOR maintain the ability to move unimpeded during adaptive operations. This ability allows the OPFOR to control the access and tempo of enemy forces. As long as the OPFOR has complete access to the battlefield, it will allow no sanctuary to the enemy and determine the nature of the conflict. Engineer support can create opportunities for infiltration of small forces into unexpected locations, to inflict damage or to support IW.

Rarely during adaptive operations would the OPFOR attempt the classic opposed water crossings it can use during regional operations. However, there may be times when the OPFOR must cross rivers in territory occupied by the enemy. Even then, it would attempt an opposed crossing only if convinced of success and if the enemy did not believe the OPFOR would attempt the crossing. Such crossings would be integrated into the overall operation plan and the IW plan.

More likely, however, is that the OPFOR would attempt to cross the river surreptitiously at night or during inclement weather. This would allow the OPFOR to infiltrate units—a few vehicles at a time—across the river. The units would regroup at a designated area and continue operations. Engineer support for this may be only engineer reconnaissance of the river and routes. The situation may also call for the engineers to build (undetected) an underwater bridge out of sandbags, or to make rafts rigged to transport vehicles.

The OPFOR may be required to breach enemy minefields. Although it may breach them in the more conventional manner described in FM 7-100.2, the OPFOR can also devise innovative methods the cross the minefield. One such method might be to manually clear a path through the minefield surreptitiously. Several paths could be cleared in this fashion. Then, at a time of the OPFOR’s own choosing, dismounted troops could infiltrate through the minefield and rendezvous at a designated location on the other side, undetected by the enemy.

Support to Information Warfare

The complete integration of engineer support to IW continues to be critical in adaptive operations. Deception is one of the basic elements of IW. Engineer support of the deception plan is vital for the deception to succeed. Engineers’ largest role in an integrated deception plan is that of constructing physical decoys (simulations in deception positions) enabling the enemy to see what he expects to see. These decoys cover a wide spectrum of types and must be introduced or allowed to be “discovered” in the same sequence in which a “real or existing” unit would emplace them. The general priority of engineer construction is from front to rear, beginning with the primary fighting positions, then the temporary and alternate positions. The time sequence in which these “appear” gives credibility to the deception.

However, engineer support to IW is not limited to C3D measures. For example, engineers may support psychological warfare with activities to lower morale and instill a sense of tentativeness among enemy soldiers or to undermine confidence of “enemy-friendly” populations. This can be achieved simply by the ubiquitous use of booby traps and AP mines.

References

  1. The composition and disposition of enemy combat engineer units are important indicators of how and where the enemy expects to conduct his main offensive or defensive effort. Positioning of bridging and mineclearing assets may tip off planned enemy offensive action. When the enemy is preparing to defend, all obstacle-creating assets, such as minelayers, are of particular interest.
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