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Difference between revisions of "Information: Olvana"

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''This page is a section of [[Olvana]].''
 
''This page is a section of [[Olvana]].''
  
[[Olvana]] is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. Ariana is one of the most sophisticated nations in the world at information control, utilizing advanced capabilities to monitor and direct communications. Despite this, the fragmented Arianian opposition uses the Internet extensively, though its ultimate effect on the political environment is mixed at best. Ariana’s INFOWAR capability is generally good, with pockets of excellence in a variety of disciplines.
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The People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO) maintains a large information environment, with its internet industries counted among the world’s most active. Olvana is, however, one of the world’s most restrictive media environments. The PRO’s INFOWAR capability is highly developed and world-leading in a number of critical areas.
  
 
== Satellite Telecommunications ==
 
== Satellite Telecommunications ==
Ariana’s advancements in satellite communication services are rapidly developing. Presently, Ariana operates one government-owned telecommunication satellite which utilizes Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. When necessary, Ariana contracts with foreign allies to lease satellite communication systems that also operate Ku-band transponders.
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The PRO possesses a wide range of satellite capabilities. Most are suited for dual-use by the Olvanese People’s Army (OPA) and civilian users. Currently, Olvana operates seven commercial telecommunications satellites utilizing Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. All satellites are powered by solar array panels. These commercial satellites may be used to support military operations when necessary. Additionally, the OPA operates four communication satellites using Ku and C band transponders. The satellites are in a geostationary-orbit powered by solar array antenna. TheOlvanese government also leases bandwidth from commercial satellite companies that support government and military operations when necessary.
  
 
== Navigation ==
 
== Navigation ==
Ariana’s military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers that are reciprocal with GPS or GLONASS for navigation. This highlights the significance of dual-use technologies, utilizing technologies designed for the commercial sector yet adaptable to support military objectives.
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Olvana has an established history in the development and use of navigation satellite systems. Currently, Olvana operates 16 navigation satellite systems using E-band transponders. The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. The services are free to civilians and licensed to the Olvanese government and military.
  
 
== Public Communications Media ==
 
== Public Communications Media ==
Ariana’s heavy-handed control of public communications has allowed the country to weather a sustained protest movement and slowly squeeze opposition voices from the public arena—either to internal silence or external exile. All significant public media is not just government-controlled, but the messages are crafted expertly to portray the Arianian government and the Council of Guardians Revolution in the best possible light and to shift the blame for most issues to an implacably hostile West.
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Olvana’s control of public communications is heavy-handed. All significant public media government-controlled; messages are crafted to portray the Olvanese Communist Party (OCP) in a positive way. Olvana possesses a diversified communications system that links all parts of the country by the different types of telecommunication systems. Olvana has a substantial national telecommunications infrastructure. Fiber optic cables cover most of the nation, and plans exist to improve and expand to areas not yet incorporated. Television continues to be the primary source of information within Olvana, with internet and mobile services growing in popularity due in part to their ability to evade censorship.
  
 
=== Internet ===
 
=== Internet ===
Internet use in Ariana is blossoming, and the Arianian Internet is a dynamic center for discussing politics, culture, and religion. World Bank economic indicator studies suggest about one-third of Arianians use the Internet.  Arianian Internet usage growth is among if not the fastest in the Caucasus region.
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Olvana has the one of the world’s largest number of internet users, but major obstacles to ease-of-access still exist. These include poor infrastructure, inefficient state-owned internet enterprises, and centralized control over international gateways. Olvana, however, hosts more national bandwidth potential— currently more double than any Western nation.
[[File:Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message.png|thumb|Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message]]
 
Despite Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) control of all Ariana Internet service backbones (packet-switching and bandwidth), the government still finds it a challenge to control Internet information. The Internet now serves as the main forum for Ariana’s dissident voices because of its decentralized nature and the fact that most of the infrastructure is outside Ariana’s borders. Broad anti- government protests following recent Arianian presidential elections increased the importance, content, and quantity of Internet blogs.
 
  
The Arianian government responded to the proliferation of Internet anti-government messages by adopting one of the most sophisticated Internet censorship systems in the world. Officially, the Arianian government introduced Internet filters to block perceived pornographic or immoral material. In practice, it attempts to block sites with political content as it limits access and identifies those who make posts. The Director of the Arianian Communications Technology Network claims Ariana blocks 90% of the more than 10 million sites for “immoral” reasons. The Arianian government made broadband Internet connections for home users illegal to prevent users from downloading Western cultural products like music and films. Many external reports indicate the government bans far more than the 90% of Internet sites it claims.
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Five state-run operators maintain Olvana’s gateways to the global internet, giving authorities the ability to cut off outside information requests. Additionally, all service providers must subscribe via the gateway operators under Ministry of Information Technology (MIT) oversight.
  
Proxy services, usually hosted abroad, responded to the attempted bans by offering a means for many Arianians to circumvent the government bans. Thus, a race continues between the Arianian government and activists as the activists attempt to create and disseminate usable proxy addresses before the Arianian government can detect them and add them to the filter.
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An estimated 52% of the population has access to the internet on a daily basis, this number being higher in urban areas and lower in rural areas. Large numbers of internet users connect through cyber cafes and public computers, due to high demand and limited availability of privately owned access points. Mobile services are replacing fixed-line broadband as Olvana’s preferred means of accessing the internet, due to cost and inefficient service of other providers.
 
 
Due to its technological nature, the Internet lends itself to a more educated and urban population. Since the educated, young, urban population comprises the domestic anti-Arianian movement’s core, the Internet serves as a practical method for support and communication between themselves, Arianian expatriates, and Western sympathizers. Members of Ariana’s anti-government movement have crafted simple, but effective, English messages to speed dissemination to Western media outlets and non-Farsi speaking supporters abroad.
 
 
 
The domestic opposition movement has also distanced itself from any foreign government or the idea of change to the current political structure. Instead, the domestic effort has focused on electoral irregularities. Some analysts suggest the domestic movement does not want to be associated with movements that appear either anti-religious or anti-government.
 
 
 
Ariana’s government controls several internal Arianian websites. These include over 15 different news and discussion sites that, while appearing to deliver a variety of opinions, are controlled by the Arianian government. Most Arianians, when able, access Western news sites. An important additional source is the Arianian blogosphere, which connects Arianians internationally and domestically and is considered by most to be highly trustworthy.
 
  
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Current cybersecurity laws require internet companies in Olvana to censor information, register the users’ real names, and shut down services for security reasons as directed. A new law restricts use of virtual private networks (VPNs) throughout the country, in order to deny access to unauthorized sites from other countries. Olvana uses a sophisticated and evolving censorship apparatus—which utilizes both automated and manned processes—to monitor networks and block and filter material that criticizes or challenges government individuals or policies.
 
=== Television ===
 
=== Television ===
The government maintains broadcast control over all television content aired in Ariana. A highly popular media, the US Government estimates that television reaches almost 80% of Arianian households. The country’s five major networks broadcast a combination of news, sports, religious,  and historical programming. All networks are controlled by the Arianian government. Arianians are avid consumers of foreign satellite broadcasts via Very Small Aperture Television (like DIRECTV®). The Arianian government periodically cracks down on unlicensed satellite reception, but the prevalence of satellite dishes prevents such crackdowns from being widespread or persistent.
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The television industry in Olvana includes high-tech program production, transmission and coverage —though all is controlled by the government. There are no privately owned television stations in Olvana. Cable television is the transmission method in all urban areas. Cable systems usually carry all the Olvana Central Television (OCTV) channels in the national language. These broadcast a combination of news, sports, and historical programming. They may also carry a local channel for a particular province. An extremely small number of compounds with many foreign residents may carry selected channels from regional countries and select Western nations, with Chimera Television having the widest carriage under this rule. Approximately 75 percent of all Olvanese have access to a television, with the OCP periodically cracking down on unlicensed satellite services.
 
 
The Arianian government has attempted to jam foreign-sourced satellite transmission, especially from the US, UK, and EU. It has also  enlisted foreign allies like Cuba to jam the uplink signal. It is likely the government will continue to aggressively control viewing choices for Arianians.
 
  
 
=== Radio ===
 
=== Radio ===
The Arianian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. In December 2002, the US- funded Radio Safa began regular broadcasts in Farsi on short-wave, medium-wave, and satellite. Major Arianian-controlled radio stations include a government network; foreign broadcasting in multiple languages, including Atropian  and  Limarian; and multiple news, talk, cultural, and youth-oriented networks. Practically all Arianians and most people living within 200 kilometers of the Arianian border have access to this programming.
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The radio industry in Olvana includes program production, transmission and coverage, also controlled by the government. There are no privately owned radio stations. There are currently over 1000 radio stations in the country. Radio is the most widely used electronic media, with 80 percent of the populace having access. Radio broadcasting is done over AM, FM and Shortwave, but internet radio is slowly taking over the market. The major radio companies are PRO National Radio and PRO Radio International. Additionally, every province has at least one radio station operated by provincial government, with at least two different channels providing general interest, as well as original programming in specialized areas such as music and business news.
  
 
=== Print Media ===
 
=== Print Media ===
After the election of mildly reformist politicians in the late 1990s, the privately-owned Arianian print media began to flourish. Since the return of the conservatives to power, the Arianian government  has adopted aggressive state censorship that bans many reformist newspapers and their employees from the field.
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Olvana has over 2000 daily and non-daily newspapers in circulation. Despite heavy government monitoring, print media has become an increasingly commercial market, with growing competition and diversified content. Although Olvana has many newspapers, the front runners are all government-run, such as, the People's Daily, Hong Kong Daily and the Independent Daily. The primary news agencies in Olvana are Shanghai News Agency and PRO News Service.
  
 
=== Telephone ===
 
=== Telephone ===
Ariana’s modern telecommunications began in 1971. The Arianian government, under both the Pasha and Islamic Republic, ran the Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) as the national telecommunications monopoly. As it did with many other former state enterprises, the Arianian government planned to privatize the ATC. Recently, the Arianian military used a government subsidy to purchase control of the ATC through a shell company, Elburz Enterprises.
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Olvana is served by an extensive system of automatic telephone exchanges, connected by modern networks of fiber-optic cable, coaxial cable, microwave radio relay, and a domestic satellite system. Fixed landline and mobile services are controlled by three telecommunication companies owned and controlled by the government. All approvals and licensing for new fixed land line and mobile services is conducted by the Ministry of Public Information (MoPI).
[[File:Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage.png|thumb|Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage]]
 
Currently, Arianian telecommunications operate with a combination of landlines (increasingly fiber optic since 1984, with digital switching since 1989) and mobile services (text messaging remains popular). Ariana operates an estimated 25 million landlines and 43 million mobile lines. Foreign operators plan to provide Third Generation (3G) mobile services, but capital and foreign control issues shifted the new network’s ownership and construction responsibility to various Arianian government agencies.
 
  
Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links (INMARSAT and INTELSAT), high-frequency (HF) radio, and fiber optic cable. The ATC, from its outset in 1971, assumed responsibility for all Arianian telecommunication affairs, and the ATC began the same year to manufacture the network’s required national long- distance equipment. After the first fiber optic cable operational testing at the ATC’s research center in 1984, the government began constructing the Shahid's Voice Communications Company in Esfahan the next year; it became operational in 1989.
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There are some 230 million fixed landlines in Olvana, but this number is slowly decreasing due to the shift towards mobile service.  Mobile phones subscribers are now number over one billion, and this number will likely increase at a steady pace as more towers and providers are introduced to the country. Olvana continues to develop its telecommunications infrastructure, and is partnering with foreign providers to expand its global reach. In recent years, an agreement was signed with a major telecommunications company to build the first next-generation optical cable system directly linking the West with Olvana.
  
By the end of the decade, the US government estimated 8.5 million Arianians enjoyed mobile telephone service operated through one heavily-congested mobile network with a long waiting list. In 2005, the Arianian parliament forced the Kalarian company Kalacell to withdraw from a potential mobile phone consortium. The failed business deal damaged Arianian-Kalarian relations despite Ariana’s need for another network. Later that year, South Africa’s Mobile Telephones Network of South Africa accepted Ariana’s stringent licensing conditions and replaced Kalacell in the mobile phone consortium.
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International telephone communications are provided by a number of submarine cables providing connectivity to Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. In addition, international access to satellite earth stations provide additional international overseas access.
 
 
Additionally, Ariana embarked on a homegrown satellite program to improve its communications network. In February 2009, the Arianians used a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), which weighed about 60 pounds, to launch a first-generation communications satellite into orbit. Ariana can use this or future satellites for communication or possibly for intelligence purposes. Significantly, the launch validated Arianian ballistic missile and rocket capabilities, laying the groundwork for a possible change in the Middle East balance of power.
 
  
 
=== Postal/Courier ===
 
=== Postal/Courier ===
Ariana Postal Service (APS) and other private courier services within Ariana transport mail, packages, and other documents. The private couriers’ importance continues to decrease as business activity restrictions  by  the Arianian  military  and international  economic  sanctions  make it progressively more difficult to operate within Ariana. APS offers domestic and international service as it attempts to upgrade its postal system to international standards.
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Olvana’s postal and courier systems are generally well-established, reliable, and capable of moving significant amounts of freight throughout the nation. Along with the Olvanese national postal system, international freight providers and local freight forwarders are well entrenched in the nation. Olvana is the home to many specialty freight movement providers, such as heavy-lift aircraft and railway delivery.
  
 
=== Word of Mouth ===
 
=== Word of Mouth ===
Word of mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Ariana. Because of the political situation, political or religious speech not specifically approved by the government is dangerous, so trust relationships are even more important than in most neighboring countries. The Arianian government often disseminates new policy through religious authorities to give government pronouncements the veneer of religious sanction.
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Word-of-mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Olvana. With mobile technology gradually reaching rural areas, younger generations will likely displace word-of-mouth with social media services; as mobile subscriber numbers grow, traditional word-of-mouth channels typically becomes less prevalent.
  
 
=== Information Control ===
 
=== Information Control ===
The government effectively controls all major media outlets and effectively muzzles dissent except on the Internet, where reformers operate with great difficulty. For over 30 years, Ariana’s government has maintained a massive anti-US INFOWAR campaign that is remarkable mostly for its ineffectiveness with both its own population and wider regional and international audiences. On the other hand, Ariana’s Persian ethnic majority warmly receives any perception management-driven messages of Persian “greatness” or “uniqueness.
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The government effectively controls all major media outlets to suppress dissent, with the notable exception of the internet. Although Olvana claims its citizens enjoy freedom of speech, regulations allow the Central Propaganda Agency (CPA) to suppress news that is deemed a threat to the security of the country. This CPA reviews information and deems what is acceptable and unacceptable for publication. The Olvanese government will often use strict media controls, such as monitoring systems and firewalls, blocking publications and/or websites, as well as jailing journalists, bloggers, and activists who write about the government in a bad way. As internet access via mobile devices continues to climb, censorship efforts will be unable to completely stop the circulation of unfavorable news by users who continually circumvent the technologies in place to stop it.
  
 
== INFOWAR ==
 
== INFOWAR ==
INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.
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Olvana’s information warfare (INFOWAR) capability is highly developed. Olvana utilizes the full range of INFOWAR operations to present a credible peer-level threat. Olvana’s INFOWAR is directed towards information detection sources, information channels, and information-processing and decision making systems. The ultimate goal is to gain information superiority against the threat, disrupt the threat’s information control capabilities, and maintain and protect its own information systems and capabilities.
  
 
=== Electronic Warfare ===
 
=== Electronic Warfare ===
Ariana maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from 1970s Western equipment to international arms market purchases to domestically produced items. While still capable against regional foes, the Arianian electronic warfare (EW) capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with modern Arianian equipment. Arianian EW doctrine remains in a state of flux as the Arianian military struggles with slow abandonment of Western practices and adoption of more non-Western asymmetric practices.
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Olvana has the most advanced and robust electronic warfare (EW) capability in the Western Pacific. Olvana’s EW capability is all-encompassing. EW effects can be employed from air-, ground- and sea-based platforms. Olvana uses EW as a force multiplier in support of combat arms operations by conducting jamming and anti-jamming operations. Olvana also has a robust and technical training and proficiency program, ensuring these capabilities are used to their maximum capacity. Olvana integrates EW into all force-on-force exercises and simulations to maintain operator proficiency. In addition, Olvana may also combine EW and Cyber operations into a single unit to enhance effectiveness against a more formidable threat.
  
 
=== Computer Attack ===
 
=== Computer Attack ===
Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful they could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, the Arianians possess significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.
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Olvana’s cyber warfare capability is among the world’s best. Olvana sees cyber warfare as a cost-effective way to conduct asymmetric warfare. Olvana integrates offensive and defensive cyber operations to support larger objectives. Additionally, cyber operations are combined with other battlefield effects, such as kinetic strikes or psychological operations, to achieve a desired outcome at the strategic and/or operational level. Offensive cyber capabilities include distributed denial of services (DDoS) and hacking. Defensive cyber capabilities consist of surveillance and counter-intrusion. These operations can be conducted both inside and outside Olvana, depending on the desired outcome and the desired deniability. Cyber operations personnel are well-trained at universities that specialize in Information Security and Technologies; once graduated they reside either within the OPA or possibly in other higher-level government organizations. In addition, it possible that Olvana is also training personnel from the Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia in cyber warfare operations.
  
 
=== Information Attack ===
 
=== Information Attack ===
Ariana also possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia, even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force, and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Arianian IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies.
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Olvanese capability for information attack (IA) has increased over the past five years; it now ranks globally as one of the top actors in the world. The Olvanese are expert at integrating this capability with other INFOWAR elements, and will rely on IA in a conflict against enemies that are equal or slightly more advanced in this area. Recent Olvanese INFOWAR theory states that IA is the core of any attack, from tactical to strategic echelons. Olvana will use these capabilities not only on the battlefield, but also in the homeland of opponents.
  
 
=== Deception ===
 
=== Deception ===
Deception remains a hallmark of Arianian military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. Arianians particularly focus on deception to mask operations and allow Arianian forces to close the gap with the US and other adversarial countries, which Arianians believe maintain an unbridgeable arms overmatch. Arianians will likely use a variety of ruses, such as wearing US-style or other countries’ military uniforms, to mask their involvement in military operations.
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Olvanese deception operations are among the best in the world due to the robust and advanced technologies available. Olvana utilizes deception from the tactical to strategic level. Deception operations at the strategic level consist of false actions conducted by diplomatic officials, fake military targets and propaganda. At the tactical and operational level, Olvana employs a robust manufacturing capability to make high-fidelity decoys that, when deployed, deceive or confuse enemy collection assets. These decoys are used to protect high-value assets, such as air defense or artillery units, from detection and targeting.
  
 
=== Physical Destruction ===
 
=== Physical Destruction ===
Ariana knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other high-end opponents is extremely limited. Ariana will probably only attack sensors as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. Ariana highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon.
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Olvanese tactics maintain the importance of physically destroying enemy INFOWAR capabilities. OPA deep strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special operations forces aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. Olvanese doctrine stresses the eventual destruction of enemy INFOWAR assets after their neutralization. Among these assets is a growing anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. This ASAT effort includes a robust sensor-to-shooter kill-chain, using a variety of ground-based radar and visual sensors cueing ground-launched missiles. It is likely that ASAT efforts would attempt to neutralize enemy space-based surveillance and communications efforts early in any potential conflict. Olvana continues to research new and better ASAT capabilities, such as electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and different delivery means, to further enhance the lethality of their program.
  
 
=== Protection and Security Measures ===
 
=== Protection and Security Measures ===
Recently, Ariana made international news for being unable to protect its nuclear power SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks from malware. While significant damage occurred from this incident, the Arianians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Ariana uses both internally produced and commercial off-the- shelf network protection software.
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Olvana’s protection and security measures (PSM) continue to evolve from basic applications to more advanced programs. Various investments and additional training for all personnel that use information systems are intended to ensure that personnel and companies adhere to published directives. These measures apply not only to information networks, but also physical security measures like access control, accountability of sensitive items, and critical infrastructure, to deny leaks and theft of materials.
  
 
=== Perception Management ===
 
=== Perception Management ===
Traditionally, Ariana attempts to craft a complete anti-Western, Revolutionary Islam message for both external and internal consumption. The Arianian government uses local proxies to downplay  the “Persian” and Shia origins of its message in non-Shia countries while consistently supporting world-wide communications that “Islam is the Answer” to the Muslim world’s problems. This idea of Revolutionary Islam’s value itself is an Arianian Islamic Republic message. Internally, the government conveys that the Arianian Islamic Republic is the primary Shia Islam defender. The Arianian government consistently references the Martyrdom of Hussein, a prime element of Shia, to rally populous support from the rural, religiously conservative Shia. Additionally, INFOWAR messages merge perceived threats (such as Western cultural imperialism/pollution) with the Islamic Republic as a threat against Ariana itself. This rallying cry to defend the Arianian nation resonates with all levels of Arianian society.
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Olvana’s perception management is a robust and integral part of their INFOWAR program. Its objective is to portray the government as a powerful and peace-loving member of the international community. Olvana uses different initiatives in the diplomatic, economic and information realms to project themselves as a non-threatening regional power. While publically portraying a positive image to the international community, other elements covertly expand Olvanese influence abroad, especially within emerging and smaller nations.
 
 
Regionally, Arianians attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against aggressive outside forces. In government and population discussions, Arianians stress their shared religious beliefs and play up the Atropian minority population’s integration within Ariana. Arianians also continue to strengthen their relations with Limaria, stressing common commercial interests. Arianians will likely attempt to portray Gorgans as “puppets” of the West. Despite their historical and political status as the “odd man out” of the Caucasus region, the Arianians will deftly play up elements of political, social, religious, or economic commonality with other nations.
 
  
 
== Intelligence ==
 
== Intelligence ==
Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe Ariana to be the second most capable space power in the region as it has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, Ariana has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite  imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian- produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.
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Olvana possesses the third-largest intelligence complex in the world. Olvana maintains a sophisticated and able intelligence apparatus that operates both at home and abroad. The State Security Agency (SSA) is responsible for foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence at the national defense level, and focuses on threats from regional and Western nations. The OPA has oversight of well-trained and resourced tactical and operational intelligence disciplines. These disciplines consist of human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) and continual research and fielding of new and advanced capabilities as they become available in each discipline.
 
 
Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.
 
  
 
=== Human Intelligence ===
 
=== Human Intelligence ===
Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the Arianian military’s World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.
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Olvanese human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities are among the best in the world. Considering the high level of interest that the Pacific region maintains in Olvanese defense and diplomatic circles, it is reasonable to assess high activity of Olvanese HUMINT collection in the area. Olvanese HUMINT services are aggressive in exploiting these relationships and other enablers to effectively service HUMINT targets. The State Security Agency (SSA) counterintelligence service focuses on threats from external agencies seeking to acquire information on government and military forces, as well as major industrial companies. In addition, foreign intelligence activities handled by the SSA attempt to acquire technological and military secrets from abroad. These operations are normally carried out by travelers, businessmen, and academics, with a special emphasis on the overseas Olvanese students and high-tech professionals working abroad. These foreign agents are known to use pressure against Olvanese immigrants who work in technological and/or military research fields to acquire specific data. The SSA is responsible for domestic clandestine operations against foreign governments and corporations residing in Olvana.  These operations normally consist of wire-taps, video surveillance and casual discussions to acquire information on selective fields or categories. Olvanese HUMINT activities conducted by the armed services are mainly at the operational and tactical levels, but may include military attachés at Olvanese embassies abroad.
 
 
Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the “Persian” and “Shia” origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.
 
 
 
Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers  and Arianian military’s associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.
 
 
 
Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.
 
 
 
The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.
 
  
 
=== Open Source Intelligence ===
 
=== Open Source Intelligence ===
Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.
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Olvanese open source intelligence (OSINT) efforts generally focus on Western rivals as opposed to other smaller Pacific nations. Olvanese intelligence likely uses OSINT for strategic analysis efforts, versus those at operational or tactical levels. Analyst will utilize the power of the internet to obtain key information on other nations from multiple sources to exploit vulnerabilities and advancements of militaries and industrial companies. They will conduct research to support strategic objectives by reviewing reporting from multiple media agencies to determine intentions, significant new advancements and political agendas of nations which may pose a threat to Olvana.
  
 
=== Signals Intelligence ===
 
=== Signals Intelligence ===
Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.
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Olvanese signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets include ground, aircraft, maritime and satellite collection platforms. Olvana has the most extensive SIGINT capabilities in the region, and continues to research and upgrade these capabilities to remain ahead of its foes. These assets are scattered throughout the country and focused on internal as well as external threats. Compared to other major powers of the world, Olvana focuses more on their regional competitors. Personnel who operate in this discipline are well-trained, as most are sent to specialized institutions or universities with an emphasis on technical aspects and language skills.
  
 
=== Imagery Intelligence ===
 
=== Imagery Intelligence ===
Arianian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Ariana has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped  to a ground station located somewhere in Ariana. To further supplement its IMINT requirements,  the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.
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Olvanese imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection capability maintains a fleet of manned and unmanned platforms for strategic and tactical collection, as well as a robust space collection capability. UAVs are utilized as a tactical collection platform along its borders and in support of maritime security and interdiction operations. Fixed and rotary wing assets are used as collection platforms. Olvana maintains dedicated military imaging satellite systems which includes electro-optical (EO) sensors for collecting digital imagery in the visual and near infrared spectrums and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors capable of imaging targets through cloud cover and at nighttime.
  
 
=== Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ===
 
=== Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ===
Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open- source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.
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Olvana has a basic measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) capability, primarily residing in anti-submarine warfare sensors.  Olvana continues to research new capabilities in this discipline, and with its state of the art technology may employ an improved MASINT capability within the next few years.
  
 
== Summary ==
 
== Summary ==
Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future.
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Olvana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities that will continue to expand in capability and availability. Olvana is a world leader in internet and INFOWAR technology and tactics and will leverage their capabilities to the utmost whenever necessary. Olvana will utilize its cyber capabilities against external opposition parties and foreign governments. Olvana will also attempt retain total control over the nation’s internal information environment by suppressing dissent within the populace over all communications mediums, though the internet remains the most free and accessible.
  
 
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Revision as of 15:05, 23 April 2018

This page is a section of Olvana.

The People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO) maintains a large information environment, with its internet industries counted among the world’s most active. Olvana is, however, one of the world’s most restrictive media environments. The PRO’s INFOWAR capability is highly developed and world-leading in a number of critical areas.

Satellite Telecommunications

The PRO possesses a wide range of satellite capabilities. Most are suited for dual-use by the Olvanese People’s Army (OPA) and civilian users. Currently, Olvana operates seven commercial telecommunications satellites utilizing Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. All satellites are powered by solar array panels. These commercial satellites may be used to support military operations when necessary. Additionally, the OPA operates four communication satellites using Ku and C band transponders. The satellites are in a geostationary-orbit powered by solar array antenna. TheOlvanese government also leases bandwidth from commercial satellite companies that support government and military operations when necessary.

Navigation

Olvana has an established history in the development and use of navigation satellite systems. Currently, Olvana operates 16 navigation satellite systems using E-band transponders. The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. The services are free to civilians and licensed to the Olvanese government and military.

Public Communications Media

Olvana’s control of public communications is heavy-handed. All significant public media government-controlled; messages are crafted to portray the Olvanese Communist Party (OCP) in a positive way. Olvana possesses a diversified communications system that links all parts of the country by the different types of telecommunication systems. Olvana has a substantial national telecommunications infrastructure. Fiber optic cables cover most of the nation, and plans exist to improve and expand to areas not yet incorporated. Television continues to be the primary source of information within Olvana, with internet and mobile services growing in popularity due in part to their ability to evade censorship.

Internet

Olvana has the one of the world’s largest number of internet users, but major obstacles to ease-of-access still exist. These include poor infrastructure, inefficient state-owned internet enterprises, and centralized control over international gateways. Olvana, however, hosts more national bandwidth potential— currently more double than any Western nation.

Five state-run operators maintain Olvana’s gateways to the global internet, giving authorities the ability to cut off outside information requests. Additionally, all service providers must subscribe via the gateway operators under Ministry of Information Technology (MIT) oversight.

An estimated 52% of the population has access to the internet on a daily basis, this number being higher in urban areas and lower in rural areas. Large numbers of internet users connect through cyber cafes and public computers, due to high demand and limited availability of privately owned access points. Mobile services are replacing fixed-line broadband as Olvana’s preferred means of accessing the internet, due to cost and inefficient service of other providers.

Current cybersecurity laws require internet companies in Olvana to censor information, register the users’ real names, and shut down services for security reasons as directed. A new law restricts use of virtual private networks (VPNs) throughout the country, in order to deny access to unauthorized sites from other countries. Olvana uses a sophisticated and evolving censorship apparatus—which utilizes both automated and manned processes—to monitor networks and block and filter material that criticizes or challenges government individuals or policies.

Television

The television industry in Olvana includes high-tech program production, transmission and coverage —though all is controlled by the government. There are no privately owned television stations in Olvana. Cable television is the transmission method in all urban areas. Cable systems usually carry all the Olvana Central Television (OCTV) channels in the national language. These broadcast a combination of news, sports, and historical programming. They may also carry a local channel for a particular province. An extremely small number of compounds with many foreign residents may carry selected channels from regional countries and select Western nations, with Chimera Television having the widest carriage under this rule. Approximately 75 percent of all Olvanese have access to a television, with the OCP periodically cracking down on unlicensed satellite services.

Radio

The radio industry in Olvana includes program production, transmission and coverage, also controlled by the government. There are no privately owned radio stations. There are currently over 1000 radio stations in the country. Radio is the most widely used electronic media, with 80 percent of the populace having access. Radio broadcasting is done over AM, FM and Shortwave, but internet radio is slowly taking over the market. The major radio companies are PRO National Radio and PRO Radio International. Additionally, every province has at least one radio station operated by provincial government, with at least two different channels providing general interest, as well as original programming in specialized areas such as music and business news.

Print Media

Olvana has over 2000 daily and non-daily newspapers in circulation. Despite heavy government monitoring, print media has become an increasingly commercial market, with growing competition and diversified content. Although Olvana has many newspapers, the front runners are all government-run, such as, the People's Daily, Hong Kong Daily and the Independent Daily. The primary news agencies in Olvana are Shanghai News Agency and PRO News Service.

Telephone

Olvana is served by an extensive system of automatic telephone exchanges, connected by modern networks of fiber-optic cable, coaxial cable, microwave radio relay, and a domestic satellite system. Fixed landline and mobile services are controlled by three telecommunication companies owned and controlled by the government. All approvals and licensing for new fixed land line and mobile services is conducted by the Ministry of Public Information (MoPI).

There are some 230 million fixed landlines in Olvana, but this number is slowly decreasing due to the shift towards mobile service.  Mobile phones subscribers are now number over one billion, and this number will likely increase at a steady pace as more towers and providers are introduced to the country. Olvana continues to develop its telecommunications infrastructure, and is partnering with foreign providers to expand its global reach. In recent years, an agreement was signed with a major telecommunications company to build the first next-generation optical cable system directly linking the West with Olvana.

International telephone communications are provided by a number of submarine cables providing connectivity to Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. In addition, international access to satellite earth stations provide additional international overseas access.

Postal/Courier

Olvana’s postal and courier systems are generally well-established, reliable, and capable of moving significant amounts of freight throughout the nation. Along with the Olvanese national postal system, international freight providers and local freight forwarders are well entrenched in the nation. Olvana is the home to many specialty freight movement providers, such as heavy-lift aircraft and railway delivery.

Word of Mouth

Word-of-mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Olvana. With mobile technology gradually reaching rural areas, younger generations will likely displace word-of-mouth with social media services; as mobile subscriber numbers grow, traditional word-of-mouth channels typically becomes less prevalent.

Information Control

The government effectively controls all major media outlets to suppress dissent, with the notable exception of the internet. Although Olvana claims its citizens enjoy freedom of speech, regulations allow the Central Propaganda Agency (CPA) to suppress news that is deemed a threat to the security of the country. This CPA reviews information and deems what is acceptable and unacceptable for publication. The Olvanese government will often use strict media controls, such as monitoring systems and firewalls, blocking publications and/or websites, as well as jailing journalists, bloggers, and activists who write about the government in a bad way. As internet access via mobile devices continues to climb, censorship efforts will be unable to completely stop the circulation of unfavorable news by users who continually circumvent the technologies in place to stop it.

INFOWAR

Olvana’s information warfare (INFOWAR) capability is highly developed. Olvana utilizes the full range of INFOWAR operations to present a credible peer-level threat. Olvana’s INFOWAR is directed towards information detection sources, information channels, and information-processing and decision making systems. The ultimate goal is to gain information superiority against the threat, disrupt the threat’s information control capabilities, and maintain and protect its own information systems and capabilities.

Electronic Warfare

Olvana has the most advanced and robust electronic warfare (EW) capability in the Western Pacific. Olvana’s EW capability is all-encompassing. EW effects can be employed from air-, ground- and sea-based platforms. Olvana uses EW as a force multiplier in support of combat arms operations by conducting jamming and anti-jamming operations. Olvana also has a robust and technical training and proficiency program, ensuring these capabilities are used to their maximum capacity. Olvana integrates EW into all force-on-force exercises and simulations to maintain operator proficiency. In addition, Olvana may also combine EW and Cyber operations into a single unit to enhance effectiveness against a more formidable threat.

Computer Attack

Olvana’s cyber warfare capability is among the world’s best. Olvana sees cyber warfare as a cost-effective way to conduct asymmetric warfare. Olvana integrates offensive and defensive cyber operations to support larger objectives. Additionally, cyber operations are combined with other battlefield effects, such as kinetic strikes or psychological operations, to achieve a desired outcome at the strategic and/or operational level. Offensive cyber capabilities include distributed denial of services (DDoS) and hacking. Defensive cyber capabilities consist of surveillance and counter-intrusion. These operations can be conducted both inside and outside Olvana, depending on the desired outcome and the desired deniability. Cyber operations personnel are well-trained at universities that specialize in Information Security and Technologies; once graduated they reside either within the OPA or possibly in other higher-level government organizations. In addition, it possible that Olvana is also training personnel from the Democratic People’s Republic of Torbia in cyber warfare operations.

Information Attack

Olvanese capability for information attack (IA) has increased over the past five years; it now ranks globally as one of the top actors in the world. The Olvanese are expert at integrating this capability with other INFOWAR elements, and will rely on IA in a conflict against enemies that are equal or slightly more advanced in this area. Recent Olvanese INFOWAR theory states that IA is the core of any attack, from tactical to strategic echelons. Olvana will use these capabilities not only on the battlefield, but also in the homeland of opponents.

Deception

Olvanese deception operations are among the best in the world due to the robust and advanced technologies available. Olvana utilizes deception from the tactical to strategic level. Deception operations at the strategic level consist of false actions conducted by diplomatic officials, fake military targets and propaganda. At the tactical and operational level, Olvana employs a robust manufacturing capability to make high-fidelity decoys that, when deployed, deceive or confuse enemy collection assets. These decoys are used to protect high-value assets, such as air defense or artillery units, from detection and targeting.

Physical Destruction

Olvanese tactics maintain the importance of physically destroying enemy INFOWAR capabilities. OPA deep strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special operations forces aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. Olvanese doctrine stresses the eventual destruction of enemy INFOWAR assets after their neutralization. Among these assets is a growing anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. This ASAT effort includes a robust sensor-to-shooter kill-chain, using a variety of ground-based radar and visual sensors cueing ground-launched missiles. It is likely that ASAT efforts would attempt to neutralize enemy space-based surveillance and communications efforts early in any potential conflict. Olvana continues to research new and better ASAT capabilities, such as electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and different delivery means, to further enhance the lethality of their program.

Protection and Security Measures

Olvana’s protection and security measures (PSM) continue to evolve from basic applications to more advanced programs. Various investments and additional training for all personnel that use information systems are intended to ensure that personnel and companies adhere to published directives. These measures apply not only to information networks, but also physical security measures like access control, accountability of sensitive items, and critical infrastructure, to deny leaks and theft of materials.

Perception Management

Olvana’s perception management is a robust and integral part of their INFOWAR program. Its objective is to portray the government as a powerful and peace-loving member of the international community. Olvana uses different initiatives in the diplomatic, economic and information realms to project themselves as a non-threatening regional power. While publically portraying a positive image to the international community, other elements covertly expand Olvanese influence abroad, especially within emerging and smaller nations.

Intelligence

Olvana possesses the third-largest intelligence complex in the world. Olvana maintains a sophisticated and able intelligence apparatus that operates both at home and abroad. The State Security Agency (SSA) is responsible for foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence at the national defense level, and focuses on threats from regional and Western nations. The OPA has oversight of well-trained and resourced tactical and operational intelligence disciplines. These disciplines consist of human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) and continual research and fielding of new and advanced capabilities as they become available in each discipline.

Human Intelligence

Olvanese human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities are among the best in the world. Considering the high level of interest that the Pacific region maintains in Olvanese defense and diplomatic circles, it is reasonable to assess high activity of Olvanese HUMINT collection in the area. Olvanese HUMINT services are aggressive in exploiting these relationships and other enablers to effectively service HUMINT targets. The State Security Agency (SSA) counterintelligence service focuses on threats from external agencies seeking to acquire information on government and military forces, as well as major industrial companies. In addition, foreign intelligence activities handled by the SSA attempt to acquire technological and military secrets from abroad. These operations are normally carried out by travelers, businessmen, and academics, with a special emphasis on the overseas Olvanese students and high-tech professionals working abroad. These foreign agents are known to use pressure against Olvanese immigrants who work in technological and/or military research fields to acquire specific data. The SSA is responsible for domestic clandestine operations against foreign governments and corporations residing in Olvana.  These operations normally consist of wire-taps, video surveillance and casual discussions to acquire information on selective fields or categories. Olvanese HUMINT activities conducted by the armed services are mainly at the operational and tactical levels, but may include military attachés at Olvanese embassies abroad.

Open Source Intelligence

Olvanese open source intelligence (OSINT) efforts generally focus on Western rivals as opposed to other smaller Pacific nations. Olvanese intelligence likely uses OSINT for strategic analysis efforts, versus those at operational or tactical levels. Analyst will utilize the power of the internet to obtain key information on other nations from multiple sources to exploit vulnerabilities and advancements of militaries and industrial companies. They will conduct research to support strategic objectives by reviewing reporting from multiple media agencies to determine intentions, significant new advancements and political agendas of nations which may pose a threat to Olvana.

Signals Intelligence

Olvanese signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets include ground, aircraft, maritime and satellite collection platforms. Olvana has the most extensive SIGINT capabilities in the region, and continues to research and upgrade these capabilities to remain ahead of its foes. These assets are scattered throughout the country and focused on internal as well as external threats. Compared to other major powers of the world, Olvana focuses more on their regional competitors. Personnel who operate in this discipline are well-trained, as most are sent to specialized institutions or universities with an emphasis on technical aspects and language skills.

Imagery Intelligence

Olvanese imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection capability maintains a fleet of manned and unmanned platforms for strategic and tactical collection, as well as a robust space collection capability. UAVs are utilized as a tactical collection platform along its borders and in support of maritime security and interdiction operations. Fixed and rotary wing assets are used as collection platforms. Olvana maintains dedicated military imaging satellite systems which includes electro-optical (EO) sensors for collecting digital imagery in the visual and near infrared spectrums and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors capable of imaging targets through cloud cover and at nighttime.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

Olvana has a basic measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) capability, primarily residing in anti-submarine warfare sensors.  Olvana continues to research new capabilities in this discipline, and with its state of the art technology may employ an improved MASINT capability within the next few years.

Summary

Olvana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities that will continue to expand in capability and availability. Olvana is a world leader in internet and INFOWAR technology and tactics and will leverage their capabilities to the utmost whenever necessary. Olvana will utilize its cyber capabilities against external opposition parties and foreign governments. Olvana will also attempt retain total control over the nation’s internal information environment by suppressing dissent within the populace over all communications mediums, though the internet remains the most free and accessible.

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