Military: Bothnia

This page is a section of Bothnia.

Military Overview

The essence of Bothnia’s Defense Policy is to defend the Bothnian State and the achievements of the Bothnian people against all aggressors and threats, whether external or internal. To this end, the purpose of the MOD is to prepare, plan and execute the total defense of Bothnia, in conjunction with all other agencies of the Bothnian State. The policy allows for all methods to be used to ensure the survival of the State and does not preclude preemptive actions or limit actions to the territory of Bothnia.

The distant threat of NATO has now become a geographically immediate one. It sees Donovia as an ally, and indeed it has become a useful counter‐balance to the influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) as well as the unification of Germany (DEU). The admission of Poland (POL), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU) and Estonia (EST) into NATO and the EU, has proved disturbing to the Bothnian political establishment.

Military Forces

The Bothnian People’s Army (BPA) consists of Land (BPAL), Naval (BPAN), and Air (BPAA) branches of service, with the supporting Rear Services and Weapons & Technology Directorates.  Additionally, although not part of the BPA as such, the Border Troops and Civil Defense organizations report to the Minister of Defense through the Chief of Defense (CHOD) (4*).  The Ministry of Defense (MOD) also provides the Main staff and Secretariat to the National Defense Council (NDC).

 The BPAL is currently undergoing a modernization program, with the aim of its front-line formations fielding Tier 1 equipment and reserve formations inheriting the previously fielded Tier 2/3 equipment.  It is anticipated that the program will be complete by 2030.

 The military establishment of the regular Bothnian forces is around 120,000, or about 2.2% of the population.  Of these, approximately 50% are conscripts.  It is estimated that expenditure on national defense and security is 5% of GDP. 

 All males aged 18 years of age or over are liable for national military and non‐military service, with an obligation that varies between 8 and 12 months, depending on specialization.  On completion of their service period, conscripts are either inducted into the regular armed forces, or join the reserves.  Females may serve voluntarily, but there is no compulsion.  Service in either the regular forces, or reserves, terminates at age 60.  Bothnia has a theoretical potential manpower pool of some 1,000,000 men and slightly fewer women, with some 33,000 men reaching military age each year.  There are only a small number of opportunities to join the regular forces each year and these are usually oversubscribed.

(For additional information on tier tables, see Section 4: Appendix C and the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG): Vol I, Chapter 1, OPFOR Tier Tables.)

Military Strategy

National Command Authority

Bothnian Military

The National Defense Council of Bothnia (NDC) was created in 1960 as the supreme body of the BPA in charge of national defense matters, including mobilization planning. The NDC holds the supreme command of the BPA and internal security forces, and the NDC’s chairman is the commander‐in‐chief of the BPA. The NDC is designated as the supreme leadership body of the state in time of war or national emergency and possesses full legislative and executive authority when in session. The NDC consists of a chairman and normally, 12 other members, all of whom are also members of the Central Committee of the SPB. Most, but not all of these will also be members of the Politburo. Some NDC members can also hold leadership roles in the ‘armed elements’ of the state (BPA; Police; Ministry for Constitutional Security).(See TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics: Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.)

Supreme High Command

Strategic Operational Framework

The Central Headquarters of the Bothnian MOD is located in the capital, Brahea.  The Chief of Defense Staff and his staff provide the Minister and the NDC with military advice.  The final decision on all major matters of defense, including approval of changes in the readiness state, the authorization of military operations and any matters of military command that are important in principle, or practice, rests with the Chairman of the NDC.  The headquarters consists of a number of departments and administrations, several of which appear to have overlapping areas of authority.  Within the HQ structure, the Operations Directorate (in conjunction with the Planning Directorate) forms the basis of a General Staff in the event of hostilities being declared. 

There are approximately 3,200 personnel in the central HQ.

Adjacent to the HQ staffs and coequal with the CHOD is the Main Political Administration Office (MPAO) with some 200 staff.  Headed up by a senior political appointee who is given a 4* equivalent rank, this office nominally reports to the Minister and is responsible for overseeing and ensuring the political reliability of the armed forces.  In reality, the Chief reports directly to and receives guidance from the Politburo.  Each arm of the military services has an embedded branch of the Political Administration within it; these branches bypass the normal reporting structure and report directly to the MPAO.

(See FM   7-100.4  Opposing Force Organization Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.)

National Strategic Goals

Although Bothnia’s Defense Plans are classified, the following Defense Priorities are publically promulgated:

•   DP1: Protect the socialist achievements against all external attacks.

•   DP2: Protection of the Homeland (including territorial waters and economic zones).

•   DP3: Defend Bothnia’s interests through the projection of appropriate power.

•   DP4: Provide Aid to the Civil Power in times of Emergency or Crisis.

Collectively they contribute to the overall mission: ‘Defense and preservation of the State against all threats’.

Named after its author, Gen Urho Saarinen (CHOD 1956 ‐1961), the Saarinen Plan envisaged an extremely aggressive forward response to any hostile act from the Donovia.  In essence, the aim was to conduct the maximum amount of combat outside of Bothnian territory.  It was recognized that ultimately Bothnia could not win a war with the Donovia, but by inflicting sufficient damage on the opposition, a favorable end state could be achieved.  Otso was to be turned into a positive buffer and Bothnian troops would advance rapidly as far forward as possible.  Considerable use of infiltration units to strike behind enemy lines was envisaged and mobility combined with firepower was seen as key.  Bothnian air forces were unlikely to be able to match those of the WP, so the focus was on Air Defense (initially AAA, later augmented by multiple SAM systems), with the provision of adequate tactical transportation to position and support deep penetration parties.  Bothnian naval units were charged with control of the Gulf of Finland and interdiction of WP warships in the Baltic Sea; considerable use of mine warfare was envisaged.

Bothnian military doctrine has been largely shaped from the experience of World War II that led to the delineation of the current borders. 

Notwithstanding the official ‘line’ that the separation of the territory that is now Otso represented no real loss, the truncation of the former country was a traumatic experience for many in the military, not least because it drove home the limitations of a small country in the face of overwhelming military power. While the official enemy was clearly the capitalist West, the main perceived existential threat to Bothnia’s independence from the late 1940s to 1990 was Donovia and the Warsaw Pact. The invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 reinforced this view.  The collapse of the wider Donovian Union in the 90s has permitted the pursuit of wider political aims and has allowed the Defense Staffs to look beyond the immediate requirements of self‐defense and to modify their operational concepts to match changing political requirements.  Bothnian military analysis of recent, worldwide conflicts has influenced changes in the operational concepts that underpin the doctrine. However, the broad tenets of Bothnian military doctrine have remained unchanged since their formulation during the period from 1960 to the mid‐80s. 

Bothnia’s prime strategic capability is its Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Brigade, which possesses the ability to strike into the Baltic States.  Although it is part of the normal C2 structure of the Land branch of the BPA, it is viewed as a strategic asset, not a tactical or operational one. The SCUD Brigade incorporates a Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN) organization within its structure to deal with accidents or incidents arising from fuel spills during missile preparation.

Bothnian Strategic Operations in Peace and War

Implementing National Security Goals

Strategic operations remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or war preparation. Once war begins, strategic operations  continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.

In pursuit of its national security strategies, Bothnia is prepared to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action:

• Strategic operations use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve a country’s national security strategy goals through attacks against the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity.
• Regional operations include conventional, force-on-force military operations against over-matched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
• Transition operations bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to over-match its military.
• Adaptive operations preserve the country’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that over-match the country’s military.

National Security Strategy

Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Bothnia has turned to Donovia to form an alliance.  The Bothnian government see the previous alliance with Torrike as unworkable, especially since the dispute over the island of Gotland brought historical tensions to a head.

Donovia has been instrumental in the modernization program which is underway in the BPA.  They have supplied military hardware to Bothnia at below-cost price.  Analysis suggests that Donovia could plan to utilize Bothnia as a proxy in any future conflict with NATO.

Military Forces Overview

Military Strategy

Military Forces Disposition

The Bothnian military ethos seeks to build on the preparatory work of the Youth Society of Bothnia (YSB) and the education system in producing well rounded individuals who are grounded in the socialist philosophy of Bothnia. Every unit has its own political officers to assist this project.  However, Bothnia’s military leaders also need to imbue their conscripts with an effective military ethos in a very short time.  The key to this is emphasis on comradeship, practical experience and initiative.  The majority of training concentrates heavily on practical and challenging activities, usually outdoors.  Formal drill is kept to a minimum, and the maximum amount of time possible is spent on realistic military duties.  From the first day in service, troops are taught both to support each other and to rely on each other.  Although discipline is strict when on duty, socially, all ranks mix as co‐equals and considerable effort is expended in creating a strong sense of comradeship.  On duty, officers go out of their way to be seen to be sharing the tribulations of the troops.  This foundation is then nurtured in the reserve forces.  This approach has proved to be highly successful.

Their prime mission is the defense and preservation of the State against all threats.  The following roles and tasks are derived from that mission:

•   Surveillance of national borders, on land, sea and the air

•   Organization of the total defense of the nation

•   Provision of military assistance to national security authorities against internal strife

•   Provision of an ability to project military power beyond the nation’s borders

•   Coordination of defense efforts with other regional powers

•   Provision of military assistance to national or international authorities in response to natural or manmade disasters

Army Overview

The heart of the BPA is the Land Force (BPAL).  The BPA is charged with the defense of territorial integrity of Bothnia and the protection of the socialist achievements of the Bothnian state. In the event of war, the BPAL takes the lead in total defense and the other military and civil arms act in conjunction with and support of its operations.   Traditionally organized on Donovian lines, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the political and military establishment realigned the armed forces, including the C2 structure in recent times.  Administratively the BPAL still utilizes a Corps/Division/Regiment model; typically it task-organizes into a more hybrid and agile brigade tactical group (BTG) under a Strategic High Command (SHC).  The new structure is less manpower and materiel intensive and easier to direct and control.

Army Size and Structure

The structure of the Land force is conventional with a central staff, one operational Command with a number of Corps controlling the regular forces, and two ancillary Commands; The normal non‐crisis establishment is around 70,000 personnel, of whom 40,000 are conscripts. Combat power is organized in a number of ‘balanced’ divisions incorporating tanks, mechanized and motorized infantry with artillery and mobile anti‐aircraft defense (AAA and SAM).  However, the basic operational unit is the BTG and it is expected that commanders will form all arms brigades from the constituent elements of the division, mixing and matching capabilities as the situation requires.  In addition to the divisional structure, there are several stand‐alone brigades (airborne; naval infantry; theater missiles and attack helicopters) and a specialist special purpose forces (SPF) organization.  Administratively, these are controlled by IV Corps, but their employment is dictated by the central staffs.  

With the exception of IV Corps, the corps structure is regionally based and provides peacetime administration and control of the deployable units and command and control of the regions fixed bases.  Each corps is responsible for the planning, organization and execution of the defense of its region and assumes command of the fixed defense structure of the region upon mobilization of the reserve forces.

The Bothnian army designs its maneuver brigades to serve as the basis to form a brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division or division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an operational-strategic command (OSC), an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of a field group (FG). (For additional information, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.)

Operations Command (3*)

Operations Command based in Brahea is composed of 4 corps which together provide geographic coverage of the entire region:

 

I Corps (3*)

Based at Oulu, I Corps is responsible for the Arctic and Northern region of Bothnia.  It incorporates the Arctic Motorized Infantry Division which is equipped and trained to operate within the specialized environment north of the Arctic Circle.

 II Corps (3*)

Based at Vaasa, responsible for defense of the west.  The corps controls two operational divisions and two reserve divisions.

 VI Corps (3*)

Based at Hameenlinna, responsible for defense of the south.  The corps controls two operational divisions and two reserve divisions.

IV Corps (3*)

IV Corps based in Brahea provides the organizational structure for the independent Brigades – airborne, naval infantry and the attack helicopter brigade, as well as the administrative home of the SPF Battalion and the Theater Missile Brigade.

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 Home-front Command (3*)

Home-front Command based in Tampere is a skeleton structure that assumes command of the regional defense of Bothnia once a total state of emergency is declared. In peacetime, its primary function is the administration of the regional military command structures and management of the nominal allocation of reserves to regions for defense purposes and the integration of regional defense and civil defense planning. 

 Land Support Command (3*)

Land Support Command, based in Brahea and co‐located with Land Forces HQ, is responsible for training and materiel support of the Land Forces. It runs the military academies, logistics and manpower administration for the BPA.

Army Doctrine and Tactics

From the mid‐80s, a reappraisal of doctrine moved the emphasis further away from heavy armored formations and more importance was given to mobility.  Analysis of the conduct of the First Gulf War showed the vulnerability of tanks and fixed defenses to agile and flexible formations.  The Bothnian visualization of this, is as ‘fluid’ warfare, rather than maneuver warfare.  The equipment and training programs were amended to support this approach emphasizing mobility, firepower and deep penetration operations.  Current doctrine remains firmly bedded in the key tenets outlined above.  It is considered that defense of the homeland is best achieved by carrying the fight to the aggressor through aggressive forward operations secured on a solid defense organization within Bothnian territories.

Army Training and Readiness

All recruits undertake three months intensive basic military skills training at the end of which they are streamed by ability and aptitude to a specific branch of service. Specialist follow on training lasts between one and three months depending on the subject; this may be in a specialist school or in a unit.  Once every three years, all reserves are called up and a complete force exercise is held, which integrates all units and branches of the service in exercising an outline defense plan.  The most recent exercise of this nature was held in the three years ago. Most units maintain a 70% operational readiness rate.

Army Equipment and Weapons

The BPAL operates a variety of equipment throughout its force structure ranging from tier 1 for selected equipment to tier 3 for other gear. The newest and best equipment is purposely assigned to the Regular Divisions or in units that directly report to the SHC. As new equipment is purchased and received, their equipment is cascaded down to the Reserves that in turn either transfer their equipment to storage for the use of Homefront Command as required; excess equipment is sold as surplus to other countries. (For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), Vol. 1, Chapter 1, OPFOR Tier Tables.)

Naval Forces Overview

The Arianian navy patrols the Persian Gulf and maintains a small, agile contingent on the Caspian Sea. The navy has attempted to upgrade its capabilities with the purchase of Donovian ships and equipment, including submarines, missiles, and fast attack craft. Recently, the Arianian navy conducted exercises in the Persian Gulf that demonstrated at least a tier 2 rating for both equipment and training.

Ariana maintains the strongest regional naval force after Donovia, and only the US Navy possesses enough ships and firepower to open the Strait of Hormuz if Ariana attempted to close it. If Ariana blocked shipment lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, many Middle Eastern countries would become essentially landlocked.

Arianian Navy

Navy Size and Structure

Like most navies, the Arianian navy’s shore establishment borders its sea frontiers. The Arianian navy divides the country into four naval districts. The First Naval District, also the most important, sits astride the Strait of Hormuz at Bandar-e Abbas. This is Ariana’s most modern and well- developed port facility and where Ariana constructed its main repair facilities. It also serves as the home port for most of its larger ships. The Second Naval District covers the northern Persian Gulf, and Third Naval operates in the general vicinity of the northern Persian Gulf. The Fourth Naval District covers Ariana’s northern border where it shares the Caspian Sea with Donovian and Atropian fleets.

Ariana also has an Indian Ocean base in the very southeastern part of the country near the Pakistan border. This base serves as the Arianian navy’s main outlet to the open sea. Some experts believe this port will eventually become the home port for the submarines currently berthed at Bandar-e Abbas. (See diagram on page 2A-2-10 and the OB at the end of this country’s variable).

Navy Doctrine and Tactics

Arianian naval strategy has four main priorities:

• Control the Strait of Hormuz and thereby access to the Persian Gulf
• Project naval power into the Persian Gulf and dominate the disputed islands there
• Disrupt sea lines of communication for nearby countries
• Intimidate other countries through its naval presence

Although Ariana maintains the second most capable regional naval force, it will likely operate more or less as a “guerilla navy.” The Arianian navy would employ small boats in hit-and-run type missions, deploy mines, fire anti-ship cruise missiles, and use fixed wing and helicopter forces against stronger naval forces.

Arianian naval missions might include:

• Mine laying, particularly of narrow channels and coastal areas
• Insertion/extraction of SOF
• Seizure of disputed islands
• Raids on coastal areas and isolated oil rig platforms
• Harassment and closure of the Strait of Hormuz
• Defensive patrolling of coastal areas

Ariana created a new and mixed naval dimension with the recent acquisition of three Donovian submarines currently based at Bandar-e Abbas. A foreign navy could bottle up the submarines because of the location of Bandar-e Abbas in the constricted Strait of Hormuz.

There are seven naval bases including one headquarters element in Ariana’s capital. The majority of the bases are in the Persian Gulf. The total service fleet consists of 120 craft and 24 submarines.

Navy Training and Readiness

Ariana’s naval forces can successfully conduct day and night operations. Ariana’s navy is well- trained and at a high rate of readiness. Most naval units maintain operational readiness rates of approximately 93%.

Navy Equipment and Weapons

Ariana’s naval equipment and weapons contain largely tier 2 capabilities throughout the navy’s force structure, which is based on modern competitive military systems fielded over the last 10 to 20  years. Upgrades to some systems, however, provide a number of tier 1 niche naval capabilities.

Air Force Overview

Ariana divides its air force into three commands: Western, Southern, and Eastern. The Arianian air force consists of four divisions, with the 10th Fighter Aviation Division as the premier air force unit.

The air force has a reputation for flying skill and the ability to put ordnance on target. Recent exercises provide evidence that, for regional standards, Arianian pilots remain skillful in air strikes against ground targets and using terrain to mask themselves from radar. Arianian pilots maintain a deep strike capability. The air force primarily supports its ground forces and is likely positioned near strategic sites such as nuclear plants, dams, and government buildings in order to intercept enemy air activity.

Arianian Air Force

Air Force Size and Structure

The Arianian air force fields four aviation divisions divided up into one fighter, two bomber and one fighter/bomber units based on their aviation assets. It also possesses several other regiments designed for ground attack, reconnaissance, combat operations, transportation, or Arianian SPF unit support. The Arianian air force also has limited heliborne jamming capabilities. (See the OB at the end of this country’s variable).

Air Force Doctrine and Tactics

The Arianian air force modified its doctrine and tactics based on observing other countries’ conflicts, including the US. It will use force-on-force engagement with a regional competitor. Additionally, the Arianian air force will likely exhibit a show of force as a warning before actually committing to air combat and use its air force to support ground troops and protect key infrastructure.

Air Force Training and Readiness

Ariana’s air force operates mostly well-trained units with a 95% equipment operational readiness rate throughout.

Air Force Equipment and Weapons

The Arianian air force operates mainly tier 2 equipment and weapons, but now possesses limited modern upgrades and the potential for random tier 1 niche capabilities. Ariana’s air force can successfully conduct day and night operations. (For further information see the WEG, Vol 2: Airspace and Air Defense Systems.)

Government Paramilitary Forces

The Arianian government tasks its paramilitary forces (government forces like police that  are distinct from regular armed forces yet similar in organization or training) with the following missions: basic law enforcement, border control, and maintenance of public order. Arianian agencies with these responsibilities include the Ministry of Intelligence and the Law Enforcement Forces under the Interior Ministry. Last year, the US State Department reported Ariana’s security forces and paramilitary forces faced corruption issues and acted with impunity as they conducted serious human rights violations, especially when reacting to demonstrations after recent presidential elections.

Non-State Paramilitary Forces

Insurgent/Guerrilla Forces

Attempting to generalize the irregular conflict motivation of different population segments is problematic. Nonetheless, two major considerations are an ethnocentric or separatist motivation compared to a nationalistic motivation. Such strife has devolved to forms of irregular warfare and a violent struggle among state and non-state actors to gain legitimacy and influence over relevant segments of the population.

Several foreign anti-Ariana insurgent groups operate with sporadic violence and have attacked current government entities and key leaders. The largest group is located in southeast Ariana and has been opposing leaders for two decades through a low-level pseudo-insurgency. The group, God’s Helpers Brigade, promotes violent populace opposition to state taxation policies; unreliable electrical service, sewage treatment, and potable water issues; substandard medical preventive services; lack of access to state education programs for working class citizens; and a state judicial system that illegally favors the political party currently in control of the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Other groups and affiliates across Ariana are sympathetic to pro-Western economic initiatives and social-political state governance concepts. Whether these groups align with a pro-Western coalition  in future possible operations or continue with separate domestic agendas, the distinction between criminal organizations, private militia, insurgents, or guerrillas will be significant in assessing  which forces support coalition objectives.

At least three forms of armed and unarmed combatants will emerge from these domestic groups if a regional host nation invites US and coalition presence to the area. First, factions may oppose the  host nation government and be unfriendly toward the US-coalition presence. These factions will initiate overt resistance through violent and nonviolent protests against the host nation and US coalition. Next, factions will oppose host nation government policies but be potentially friendly toward the US coalition presence when this regional presence promotes and supports a domestic faction agenda. Third, several extremist factions will quickly resort to expanded terrorism if a US coalition enters the region. The groups will initially target US coalition forces, logistical staging points, host nation law enforcement, and internal security forces. Any of these domestic factions can be influenced by financing, training, and materiel support from foreign entities that are intent on agitating civil unrest or insurgency-like actions in the region.

Operational reach actions range from subversive and violent confrontations with adversary nation- states or a host nation government in power, to actions by a contracted individual or small cell capable of inflicting strategic consequences. Irregular forces can be unusually flexible and adaptable in ways and means to counter traditional advantages of stronger opponents, disregard sanctions intended to control conflict, and optimize actions with self-announced justification based on populist regional social justice or ideological perspectives. An irregular force will optimize a range of organizational options, from small, loosely affiliated cells to global networks, in order to promote mission success and psychological effect. Such networks can be local, regional, international, or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs programs; and attain covert or overt financial, political, military, economic, or social support. In summary, people conducting irregular warfare will seek to gain capabilities such as co-opting an indigenous population or hiring a domestic criminal organization, encouraging a militia with robust international connections, protecting transnational networking affiliations, or applying a combination of these capabilities to degrade practical or perceived power by a rival criminal organization or militia, or the host nation governmental authority.

The NCA commands the militia, another category of reserve military personnel that was formed about 20 years ago. The militia became famous when young boys martyred themselves in suicidal human wave attacks against Iraq during the border wars. The militia can conduct limited traditional military operations; most units can perform civil support missions.

Criminal Organizations

Despite a lack of official reports on criminal enterprises, the country’s drug and weapons trades remain lucrative businesses. Reports indicate certain SPF elements have links to the black market. These domestic elements generally are categorized with criminal organizations.

Private Security Organizations

In troubled areas of Ariana, small groups of local civilians band together to provide security for their businesses, homes, and families, as these people feel that the police and military cannot arrive in time when trouble does occur. The news media indiscriminately uses the “militia” label when reporting armed  violence  in  the  region by  such  groups. A  militia  is commonly  defined  as a paramilitary force organized and controlled by a sovereign government similar to an internal  security force. Although militias typically are not irregular forces, some groups of armed Arianian individuals band together formally or informally, and either self-declare or are categorized with the “militia” term.

Nonmilitary Armed Combatants

While nonmilitary armed combatants (insurgent forces, guerrilla forces, criminal organizations, and private security organizations) may not see eye-to-eye with the Arianian government, they are at best neutral in support of US activities in the region and at worst, predominately hostile.

Military Functions

Command and Control

The core of Ariana’s command and control (C2) concept remains the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the military operates from the view that centralized planning helps assure both command (establishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim), leading to strategic and operational directions. Necessarily then, the military relies on the loyalty of its forces and extends far-ranging authority for troops to act while foregoing rigorous control as unproductive in the modern environment. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.)

Arianian military battalions have a headquarters composed of a command section including the commander, deputy commander, and a small staff element, as well as a staff section with the chief of staff and the remainder of the battalion staff. The battalion staff consists of the operations officer, assistant operations officer, intelligence officer, and resources officer. The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer, and the reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance, while the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.)

C2 at the tactical level of command emphasizes survivability through mobility, redundancy, and security. Command posts and procedures are streamlined at the operational level, relying heavily on common procedures for important recurring tactical tasks.

Maneuver

The Arianian military has a robust capability to conduct combined arms operations; the basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In the administrative force structure, maneuver brigades are typically constituent to divisions—called divisional brigades. However, some are organized as separate brigades, designed to have greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from higher-level tactical headquarters.

Air Defense

The Arianian Air Defense Command (ADC), subordinate to the Supreme High Command, provides air defense coverage for Arianian units. It also supports combined arms combat by the comprehensive integration of a large number and variety of weapons and associated equipment into an effective, redundant air defense system. Employment of this system pursues the basic objectives of air defense by employing certain concepts and principles. This is best accomplished by establishing an integrated air defense system (IADS). Air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an IADS. This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of air defense coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.

Ariana recognizes that air defense is an all-arms effort. Thus, all ground units possess some type of an organic air defense capability to differing degrees, depending on the type and size of the unit. The ADC continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense. Many weapons not designed as air defense weapons will also damage and/or destroy tactical aircraft when within range.

Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy antiaircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense. Machine guns on armored personnel carriers and automatic cannon on infantry fighting vehicles can engage both ground and air targets. Most antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are extremely effective against low-flying helicopters. Several ATGM manufacturers offer antihelicopter missiles and compatible fire control, which are especially effective against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme. All these weapons can be extremely lethal when used in this role.

Ariana considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. Therefore, Arianian ground forces are acquiring as many MANPADS as possible and issuing them in large numbers to a wide variety of units. The military can also disseminate them to selected affiliated forces. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near Arianian units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (For more information, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics,  Chapter 11, Air Defense.)

INFOWAR

Ariana defines information warfare (INFOWAR) as specifically planned and integrated actions to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal is to influence an enemy’s decision-making cycle through collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information and information-based processes and systems. Ariana has a robust INFOWAR capability with the  brigade headquarters out of Tehran.

RISTA

Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) is viewed as the single- most important function for the Arianian military. Thus, Arianian forces typically commit significant resources to RISTA-related operations, which are usually aggressive with overlapping redundancy in the intelligence disciplines. The table on the next page summarizes the effective ranges for reconnaissance assets that can support Ariana’s tactical commanders.

Fire Support

Arianian military doctrine stresses that fire support combines air assets, surface-to-surface missiles, and artillery into an integrated attack against enemy defenses as well as for offense operations. In past conflicts, Ariana’s military successfully integrated fire support into operations, from close to deep-strike capability. The commanders always seek to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire to destroy enemy formations, weapons systems, or key components of an enemy combat system. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support.)

Protection

Ariana will attempt to minimize civilian casualties to a large extent. The military has engineering assets to reinforce civilian and military positions. The C2 and fire support systems are  sophisticated enough to minimize the threat of “friendly fire” or other accidents. However, military and civilian populations are closely integrated, making it difficult for invaders to launch attacks without the risk of civilian casualties that would enrage the population and be used as ammunition for INFOWAR. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support and Chapter 7, Information Warfare.)

Effective Ranges of Arianian Reconnaissance Assets

Logistics

The Arianian military fields a robust logistics capability that can support its maneuver units for any length of time. Ariana’s military continues to improve its logistics systems, including increased emphasis on support zone security and plans to stockpile war materiel throughout the country.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Ariana possesses a capable and growing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capability. In this region emerging CBRN capability and technology is viewed as a status symbol. Countries possessing these capabilities are firm in their belief that they should be viewed as a powerbroker and that their weapons equate to symbols of national might with the ability to have regional and possibly strategic impact.

Arianian strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it believes its national security is in jeopardy. National policy also supports the use of preemptive CBRN strikes against a neighbor either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack. It may also use, or threaten to use, CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological pressure.

Ariana has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means organic to its military forces. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying CBRN warheads, most Arianian artillery systems are capable of delivering chemical munitions. Artillery systems that are 152-mm or larger are also capable of firing nuclear rounds. The Arianian air force can also use its aircraft to deliver a CBRN attack. Trained Arianian SPF may also be used as alternate means of delivering CBRN munitions packages. Ariana is also well-prepared to employ civilian and military CBRN protection measures and has chemical defense units organic to all division and brigade maneuver units.

Ariana has a substantial industrial base that produces large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC), which are chemical substances possessing acute toxicity. An adjunct to chemical weapons is use of TIC, which can easily be exploited as improvised (or converted into) chemical weapons by military and civilians alike. (For a listing of possible high- and moderate-risk TIC possibly available to Ariana see the WEG, Vol. I, Chapter 14, Improvised Military Systems.)

For additional information on the capabilities, release authority (NCA), and employment of CBRN see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 13, CBRN and Smoke. For specific technical information, delivery means, agents, and effects of CBRN see the WEG, Vol. I, Chapter 11, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN).

Research and Development Goals

Over the past two decades, Ariana carried out secretive research supporting its uranium enrichment program, which directly violated the policy set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During this time period, Ariana strongly refuted any claims that it sought nuclear weapons while covertly pursuing a dual parallel uranium enrichment program. One program uses a laser process (based on Donovian technology) and the other applies a centrifuge process. The Donovian government terminated cooperation with Ariana on the laser enrichment program after extensive dialogue with the US, and the program still appears inactive. Ariana admitted that it has obtained uranium centrifuge technology through unofficial channels. Recently, Ariana became the tenth country in the world to develop a nuclear weapon. Though less powerful in terms of kilowatts compared with other nuclear powers, Ariana now possesses a small number of tactical nuclear weapons.

Summary

Ariana maintains the second-strongest military in the region after Donovia, with primarily tier 1 and 2 equipment. Ariana operates a capable army, navy, and air force that provide it with a considerable edge compared to its neighboring countries. The Ariana military has the capability to inflict severe losses on any military force that attempts to invade its homeland, but also fields the forces to conduct offensive operations against neighboring countries.