Military: North Torbia

This page is a section of North Torbia.

The Torbian People’s Army (TPA) controls the ground, air, and naval forces in the DPRT and is one of the most militarized countries in the world with over one million active duty military personnel and over six million reservists. The DPRT spends around 20% of its GDP on the military and about one-quarter of all adults serve in some military capacity.

Military Forces

Despite their physical formation of a group of islands, the army comprises the largest portion of the TPA at about 80% of all military personnel. The army is responsible for all TPA ground units, the Special Purpose Forces (SPF), and low-level air defense missions. About 75% of all TPA ground forces are located in the southern half of the country. Much of the TPA artillery is located in hardened positions close to the RoT border in order to maximize its weapons systems’ ranges placing the RoT capital city, Manila, within artillery range with its longest ranging weapons without displacement.

The DPRT army’s basic unit is foot infantry transported in trucks, but there are also a few mechanized and armor brigades or divisions. The TPA also fields a number of missile brigades and its engineers continuously practice water crossings and facilitation of amphibious landings.

The Torbian People’s Air Force (TPAF) of 100,000 personnel have the primary mission to defend its homeland from the air with secondary missions to provide tactical air support to the army and navy, transportation, logistical support, and SPF insertion/extraction.

The Torbian People’s Navy (TPN) is primarily a brown water force, with little capacity to operate more than 80 kms off the DPRT coastline. Even with approximately 75,000 seamen, the TPN fields no aviation units as those are operated by the TPAF. The TPN focuses on supporting amphibious assaults, insertion and extraction of SPF, and submarine warfare. The TPN will use their submarines to prevent the reinforcement of the RoT by outside powers and to interdict any sea lines of communication.

Military Strategy

National Command Authority

DPRT National Command Authority

Most countries in the DATE Pacific share a similar National Command Authority (NCA) construct including the DPRT. DPRT’s NCA exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the country’s national security strategy. The NCA includes the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Information, Finance and Economic Affairs, Interior, and Defense, along with other members selected by the Secretary-General, who chairs the NCA.

The Secretary-General appoints the Minister of National Security, who exercises responsibility for the NCA’s Strategic Integration Department (SID). The SID serves as the overarching agency responsible to integrate all the instruments of national power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the plans and actions of all DPRT’s ministries, but particularly those associated with the instruments of national power. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.)

DPRT Supreme High Command and Military Force Structure. Regional commands are in diagrams below. All units without a listed location are co-located with their higher headquarters.

Strategic Operational Framework

The strategic operational framework for all countries in the region is similar in construct and application. This is primarily the result of historic influences transcending the region.

The DPRT exercises command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC) that includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes the responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components, while its functional directorates assume responsibility for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters. Planning is very centralized with each lower level of command less likely to take initiative for fear of repercussions of failure.

The DPRT currently configure their military in an administrative force structure (AFS) that manages its military forces in peacetime. This AFS contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into divisions and brigades for administrative purposes. In some cases, the militaries may group their forces administratively under operational strategic commands (OSC) designated as military regions. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the AFS to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the AFS consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See FM 7-100.4 Opposing Force Organization Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.)

Except for the 96th Airborne Infantry Division, all units that report directly to the DPRT Supreme High Command are stationed in the capital city of Baguio.

National Strategic Goals

The DPRT forms its strategic goals from its history that involved the historical seizure and rule of their islands by outside forces due to their historic weakness. The three primary goals of the DPRT is for the Secretary-General Song Chong-Su to maintain total control of the country under the guise of a communist government, the unification of the two countries under Song’s control, and the prevention of outside interference into DPRT’s internal affairs by other countries. Examples of specific strategic goals include:

• Maintenance of the Song family in complete control of the country
• Defense of DPRT’s sovereignty against outsiders
• The unification of the two Torbias under Song’s control
• Maintenance of its status as a nuclear power despite any outside objections
• Imprisonment or death for anyone that opposes the Song’s regime

Arianian Strategic Operations in Peace and War

Implementing National Security Goals

Similar to other DATE countries, the DPRT conduct operations to achieve their national goals. Strategic operations for the DPRT remain a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.

In pursuit of its national security strategy, the DPRT prepares to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. The four types of operations include:

• Strategic operations use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve DPRT’s national security strategy goals through attacks against any enemy’s strategic centers of gravity.
• Regional operations include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats.
• Transition operations bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military.
• Adaptive operations preserve the country’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country’s military.

National Security Strategy

Although the DPRT may refer to them as “operations,” each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country’s strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.

The DPRT’s strategy typically starts with actions directed at a regional opponent that the government overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instruments of power whenever the Song family feel their control is threaten or perceived threats against the DPRT. If possible, the DPRT will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. Accordingly, these governments do not limit strategic operations to military means and usually do not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power or nuclear weapons against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of “strategic operations” and is a significant indicator that other countries will need to analyze for what the DPRT may intend to do in the future.

The DPRT government may resort to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the DPRT to undertake “regional operations” that may include military means. Prior to the initiation of hostilities and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent, the DPRT government will continue to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. The main method for the DPRT to do this is their submarine fleet, air defense weapons, and the threat of using nuclear weapons. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power providing the DPRT with the capability for their subordinate leaders to understand their missions.

Military Forces Overview

Military Strategy

North Torbia ground forces dispositions. All units not shown are co-located with their higher headquarters.

The DPRT military strategy revolves around the overarching desire to reunite the RoT territory under Secretary-General Song’s control while preventing regional or extra-regional powers from intervening if war were to break out between the two Torbias. The TPA will fight a conventional war with its main army while using its SPF and civilian spies hidden among the RoT population to conduct irregular warfare aimed at command and control (C2) nodes, logistic units, and key weapon systems.

Army Overview

The DPRT ground forces field over one million soldiers, most of them long-term soldiers. The military is well regarded in the DPRT as a great career so competition to remain on active duty is intense for the non-commissioned officer corps and officers.  While the soldiers are well trained and disciplined, the readiness of their equipment is often lacking. Due to the large number of soldiers in the prime of their life serving in the military, the government often directs them to work in the agricultural industry during rice planting and harvesting seasons, lumber milling operations, and in the mining industry digging for minerals. This non-military work affects the training readiness of the army meaning that the army is most prepared for combat at the end of its dry training cycle that coincides with the mobilization training of the reserve forces.  

Torbian People's Army Northern Command Force Structure. All units without a listed location are co-located with their higher headquarters.

Army Size and Structure

The maneuver division serves as TPA’s basic combined arms unit, but there are also a large number of mechanized or armored brigades. In the AFS, some maneuver brigades are constituent, or organic, to the base structure such as divisions. The NCA calls them divisional brigades. These armies, however, organize some units as separate brigades, designed to possess greater ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of forces from a higher tactical-level headquarters. Separate brigades possess some subordinate units with the same force structure as a divisional brigade of the same type (for example, the headquarters); some units that are especially tailored to the needs of a separate brigade, marked “(Sep)” in the organizational directories; and some that are the same as units of this type found at division level, marked “(Div).”

The TPA army designs its maneuver divisions and brigades to serve as the basis to form a division tactical group (DTG) or brigade tactical group (BTG) if necessary. A brigade, separate or as part of a BTG, can fight as part of a division or division tactical group (DTG), a separate unit in an OSC, an organization of the AFS (such as army, corps, or military district), or as part of a field group (FG). (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.)

The regular TPA is estimated to field over one million ground troops divided into three regional commands (Western, Northern, and Eastern) and units reporting directly to the SHC.

Northern Command: Tuguegarao

• 20th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Vigan
• 21st Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Aparri
• 22nd Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Gonzaga
• 906th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV-Separate): Laoag
• 907th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV-Separate):Batac
• 205th Tank Brigade (Separate): Tuguegarao

Western Command: San Fernando

• 10th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): San Fernando
• 11th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Santo Tomas
• 12th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Santa Fe
• 903rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV-Separate): Burgos
• 904th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV-Separate): San Fernando
• 105th Tank Brigade (Separate): San Fernando

Torbian People's Army Eastern Command Force Structure. All units without a listed location are co-located with their higher headquarters.

Eastern Command: Cauayan

• 30th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Kasibu
• 31th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): San Luis
• 32th Motorized Infantry Division (Truck): Tabu
• 908th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV-Separate): Santiago
• 909th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (IFV-Separate): Ilagan
• 105th Tank Brigade (Separate): Cauayan

Army Doctrine and Tactics

The TPA’s ground doctrine and tactics is a combination of those generated by the People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO) and the Republic of Donovia due to the historical relationship of the DPRT to PRO and Donovia where the TPA has sent many of its officers and a few senior NCOs for training.

There are seven doctrinal principles that have guided the creation of the DPRT’s strategy and tactics: First, the overall DPRT ideology comes from the lessons learned from wars the country has fought in and the observation of wars fought during the past 100 years. The second principle is the overall national objective is the reunification of Torbia under DPRT control. The next principle is the idea of self-reliance by the DPRT government to seek as little external help as possible and that the Torbian people must be responsible for their own actions. The fourth principle is the general military strategy that consists of use of surprise, a quick and decisive war, and the use of mixed force tactics. These three requirements for the DPRT to go to war created their principles of war and the creation of their operational and tactical doctrine. And lastly, from all previous principles, the DPRT has created their offensive and defensive tactics.

Military Strategy

Torbian People's Army Western Command Force Structure. All units without a listed location are co-located with their higher headquarters.

Surprise Attack:

The TPA will attempt to attack its enemy in an unexpected place, time, or means. The characteristics of a surprise attack could include the use of inclement weather, night operations, or rugged terrain; a detailed deception plan; skilled infiltration units to include SPF units; parachute or air assault operations; the massing of fires; the quick concentration of forces at the decisive point and time; or the unexpected employment of mechanized or armor forces.

Quick Decisive War:

Even though the DPRT could mobilize millions of civilians for war, the DPRT still lacks the resources to fight a protracted war and therefore any war must be quick and decisive. Based on recent experience, the DPRT also realizes that many democratic countries take time to react. If the war is over before any Western powers can react, there new status quo may be allowed to be retained.

Mixed Force Tactics:

Offensively, the TPA plans a two-front war through both conventional and unconventional means. The DPRT is willing to launch a pre-emptive strike and is willing to risk its country’s annihilation in order to defeat its enemies. The first front would consist of a massive conventional assault with substantial firepower and chemical attacks on selected forward positions. Additionally, ballistic missile strikes, including some with chemical warheads, would hit air bases; ports; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets. The second front would be an attack by the TPA SPF throughout their enemy’s rear area in conjunction with DPRT agents already in place. The SPF could reach their objectives by a number of means including helicopters, hovercraft, light planes, parachutes, small boats, submarines, or a small number of infiltration tunnels through the volcanic rock. The TPA or DPRT agents will not hesitate to attack civilian targets or hide among civilians making it difficult for other militaries to kill them without creating collateral damage. The DPRT will not hesitate to use hostages as human shields or even their own civilians if it will help them achieve their ultimate goals.

Operational/Tactical Doctrine:

Surprise Attack:

Already discussed above, but this principle goes down to all levels in the TPA.

Mass and Dispersion:

The TPA will concentrate its combat power at the decisive point and time while weighting the main effort. The TPA believes its forces only need a 2:1 force ratio advantage at the decisive point for successful offensive operations. The main effort will operate on a narrower front than the attacks to its flanks and supporting attacks will disperse over a wider front to deceive their enemy about where the main attack will occur.

Maneuverability:

The TPA wants to fight and win quickly any war and to do so the combat units will seek to use the terrain to their advantage. The TPA will employ trucks to quickly reposition its infantry. The TPA will still, however, conduct night moves, use minor roads and rugged terrain to surprise their enemies. The SPF or other forces may conduct raids to seize key transportation nodes.

Slyness:

While the TPA says it trains its troops and emphasizes to its leaders to use initiative and aggressiveness with no hesitation, fear of failure sometimes prevents lower level leaders from actually executing any plan other than the one given to them by their higher commander. The DPRT is not a signatory country to a number of treaties on land warfare and will not feel restricted by the Geneva Convention or any other pact. If a TPA leader thinks some tactic will work, they will do it.

Operational Security:

The TPA keeps a close hold on all plans, but also distributes false information to confuse its enemies. Activities to secure the TPA’s plans include reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, deceptions, counterintelligence operations, and conducting operations in inclement weather or darkness. Most of the TPA’s night vision equipment is tier 3 level.

Army Training and Readiness

For the most part, the TPA ground forces relies on long-term conscription to field the majority of its army. Each year, about 200,000 DPRT males graduate from high school and all those deemed physically fit must serve 10 years in the military. About the same number of female DPRT females graduate from high school and must serve three years in the military if they meet the medical standards.  Those selected to attend college can defer their military commitment. The collegians would later serve after graduation, often as officers. Upon leaving the military at the end of the commitment, all able-bodied personnel must continue to serve in the reserves until age 55. Since the navy and the air force receive their pick of those who score highest in aptitude for military service, the army units receive lower quality recruits unless the new soldier requests service in the ground forces. After a short basic training period, new draftees report to their first unit for on-the-job training in a field chosen through their aptitude test. Many middle and senior officers and NCOs receive training in Olvana or Donovia or by Olvanian and Donovian instructors in the DPRT. Due to the large number of soldiers that enter the military each year, it is estimated the operational readiness rate for the TPA is around 90%.

The TPA maintains a large special purpose force (SPF) for a country its size and often trains with the SPF from Olvana or Donovia. Individual combat skills and political indoctrination are the building blocks of all SPF training. All TPA soldiers are taught to perform the duties of those holding the next rank above them. A regular day in the TPA lasts from 0500 hours to 2200, with at least ten of those hours scheduled for training, education, or political indoctrination. This instruction does not include time for meals, where soldiers typically receive less than 1000 grams of food per day, depending on military specialty. There have been recent reports of soldiers selling uniforms, fuel, weapons, and ammunition on the black market, in order to obtain additional food. No provision exists for time off on weekends; leave is a rarity, and corporal punishment used regularly even for minor infractions. Soldiers when not training often perform other duties such as planting or harvesting crops, cutting lumber, or assisting in mining operations. The TPA selects commissioned officers based on demonstrated loyalty to the Torbian Communist Party, while noncommissioned officers (NCO) must show superior physical and combat ability. The TPA produces a physically tough soldier with individual discipline that is firmly grounded in the political party line. The soldiers assigned to the SPF display an inordinate amount of esprit de corps and feel a sense of pride in belonging to an elite TPA unit.  SPF soldiers call themselves “supermen” [translated from Torbian].

The TPA selects its best soldiers for SPF units, usually after five years of service in regular units. These soldiers receive additional training on demolitions, infiltration, intelligence gathering, martial arts, mountaineering skills, night combat, and swimming. The SPF endures more intensive physical training and additional political indoctrination to inure them from the temptation to defect, as some of them will be expected to operate deep behind enemy lines. If required for credentials by their unit, the SPF soldiers will go through airborne or amphibious training. SPF soldiers practice food deprivation.  TPA SPF practice swimming/floating all day with only a single handful of rice. Soldiers who successfully complete SPF training are either promoted to NCO rank, or receive commissions as junior officers. These personnel will likely serve in an operational SPF units for the rest of their military careers. The end result of this rigorous training regimen is a TPA SPF soldier who on scant rations can travel faster and cover more ground with a heavy equipment load than counterparts in most other armies.  SPF soldiers are mentally conditioned to accept orders without question and will most likely fight to the death if cornered. The SPF will constitute the bulk of the TPA forces fighting the second front in their enemies’ rear area.

Army Equipment and Weapons

Major North Torbian naval bases. The DPRT navy will use any port necessary to support the operations.

The TPA ground forces operate primarily tier 2 equipment throughout its force structure, but there are a number of tier 3 equipment on active duty. The TPA rarely discards any of its old equipment, but instead transfers equipment not needed for the active duty units to the reserves cascading down to the lowest level of units based on readiness. Any excess equipment not needed for the reserves is placed in storage in case of a national emergency. Due to the large variety of equipment causing maintenance issues and the need for a large variety of replacement parts, the TPA equipment readiness rate is only 80%. Recently, Olvana and Donovia provided the DPRT with some more modern systems, so the DPRT army does possess the potential for selected tier 1 niche capabilities. The DPRT military forces can operate in all terrain types and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations. (For further information see Section 4: Appendix C or the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), Vol. 1, Chapter 1, OPFOR Tier Tables.)

Naval Forces Overview

The TPN, subordinate to the TPA, fields a naval infantry regiment, submarines, and surface ships. The TPN operates no aviation as all rotary and fixed-wing aircraft belong to the TPAF. The TPN uses its submarines to interdict the sea lines of communication to prevent outsiders from becoming involved in their affairs, secure coastal areas using mines and patrols, assisting in amphibious assaults, and the insertion and extraction of SPF personnel.

Navy Size and Structure

The TPN operates primarily in three naval groups: one that protects the west coast, a second that protects the east coast, and the third that trains to operate (in case of war) in the strategic straights to the east of the RoT that belong to RoT or Belesia. At 75,000 sailors, the TPN contains a large enough force that personnel can rotate between sea and shore duty assignments. Many of the navy personnel operate in support of the TPA’s SPF. There have been discussions in the DPRT government to increase the size of the naval infantry force, submarine fleet, and amphibious ships. This would allow the modernization of the most strategic TPN assets. While units have a home port, mission requirements may have the ships operating from other ports.

• Headquarters: San Fernando
• 1st Naval Infantry Regiment: San Fernando
• 2nd Missile Attack Boat Squadron: Batac
• 3rd Missile Attack Boat Squadron: Maconacon
• 4th Missile Attack Boat Squadron: Gonzaga
• 5th Patrol Torpedo Boat Squadron: Baler
• 6th Patrol Torpedo Boat Squadron: Dicalayo
• 7th Patrol Torpedo Boat Squadron: Vigan
• 8th Straits Defense Squadron: Dicalayo
• 9th Western Coast Defense Squadron: Laoag
• 10th Eastern Coast Defense Squadron: Maconacon
• 11th Amphibious Support Squadron: San Fernando
• 12th Frigate Squadron: Banlon
• 13th Submarine Squadron: Candon
• 14th SubmarineSquadron: Casiguran
• 15th Submarine Chaser Squadron: Gonzaga
• 16th Minesweeper Squadron: Baler
• 17th Minesweeper Squadron: San Fernando

Torbian People's Navy Force Structure. Units without a location listed are co-located with its parent headquarters. The Torbian People's Navy may move ships from its home port to other ports for specific missions.

Navy Doctrine and Tactics

The TPN protects the DPRT’s coastal borders and patrol the rivers for illegal activities. The security of the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea remains a paramount mission for the TPN. As secondary missions, TPN maritime forces may conduct search and rescue (SAR) and port security operations.

Typical TPN missions might include:

• Defensive patrolling of coastal areas
• Minelaying in their own territorial waters during times of war
• Anti-smuggling operations
• Amphibious operations
• SPF infiltration/exfiltration
• Submarine interdiction of sea lines of communicatio

Navy Training and Readiness

The TPN conducts most of its individual ship training in the Philippine Sea to avoid issues with Olvana. Olvana and the TPN sometimes conduct joint naval patrols and training in the South China Sea. The TPN has been known to conduct exchange programs with the Olvanian and Donovian navy. DPRT citizens can choose to perform their military service with the navy, but with the same obligations of time and reserve service. The number of personnel assessed each year into the navy depends on the TPN’s requirements, based on the number of sailor retirements and departures after mandatory service obligations are completed. After a short basic training period, new recruits are assigned to ships and learn most of their necessary skills through on-the-job training. Due to the lack of training of new sailors before their arrival at their first post, the operational readiness rate hovers around 80%.

Navy Equipment and Weapons

Location of major North Torbia airports or runways. The DPRT aviation assets will use any runway necessary to complete missions.

The TPN operates weapons and equipment with primarily tier 2 and 3 capabilities, but there may be a very small amount of tier 1 equipment. There are discussions to upgrade the TPN’s equipment, especially in the areas of submarines, amphibious craft, and small boats for SPF insertion/extraction. Lack of funds is often the stumbling block for newer equipment as the TPN takes a back seat to the ground forces in the budget process. The TPN can operate in all waters in and around the country, with the ability to conduct most both day and night operations. Units habitually work with the same SPF, the Marine Infantry Regiment, or the amphibious units during training. Due to the age of equipment and the number of new sailors each year, the equipment readiness rate does not usually exceed 85%.

Air Force Overview

The TPAF’s primary mission is to defend its homeland from the air with secondary missions to provide tactical air support to the TPA ground and naval forces, transportation, logisitcial support, and SPF insection/extraction. The TPAF force operates primarily tier 2 and 3 equipment and planes. TPAF pilots possess a respectable reputation for their flying skills despite the lesser number of hours of flying compared to many western air forces.

Torbian People's Air Force Structure. Units without a listed location are co-located with their higher headquarters.The Torbian People's Air Force will base planes out of an airbase or civilian airfield based on mission requirements.

Air Force Size and Structure

The TPAF is approximately 100,000 personnel with approximately fifty percent of the aviation assets located within 100 km of their shared border with RoT. Air defense is provided by TPA ground force units. While KPAF units have home bases, mission requirements will force them to operate out of other bases. During combat, any operational runway will be used by the TPAF to conduct missions. Home base locations are as follows:

• Headquarters: Tuguegarao
• 1st Ground Attack Regiment (Independent): San Fernando
• 2nd Recon Aviation Regiment (Independent): Baguio
• 3rd Mixed Aviation Regiment: San Luis
• 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment: Baguio
• 6th Transportation Aviation Regiment: Baguio
• 7th Transportation Aviation Regiment: Tuguegarao
• 8th Attack Helicopter Regiment: San Fernando
• 9th SPF Aviation Squadron: Baguio
• 10th Heliborne Jamming Squadron: Laong
• 10th Fighter Aviation Division: Laong
• 11th Fighter/Bomber Division: Cauayan
• 12th Bomber Aviation Division: Laong
• 13th Bomber Aviation Division: Tuguegarao
• 17th Mixed Aviation Regiment: Baguio

Air Force Doctrine and Tactics

The TPAF pilots receive much of their training from Olvanian and Donovian airmen, either in DPRT or through exchange programs to the other countries. Due to the close working relationship with Olvana and Donovia, the TPAF air force doctrine and tactics reflects this partnership.

Air Force Training and Readiness

Each year, newly drafted personnel take a battery of tests to determine their aptitude for specific jobs found in the ground, naval, and air force elements of the TPA. The TPA assigns those scoring highest in the mechanical skills area receive an air force assignment. The draftees’ time commitment is still ten years with reserve service until age 55. The number assigned to the TPAF each year depends on their needs.   Despite the influx of new airmen each year, it is estimated that the TPAF maintains a fairly well-trained air force with around an 87% operational readiness rate.

Air Force Equipment and Weapons

The TPAF primarily operates tier 2 equipment and weapons with some tier 3 with very limited numbers and tier 1 in only selected niche areas. There is always discussion about upgrading the air force, but partisan bickering in the government usually leads to the army taking the most of the budget. The TPN can conduct most both day operations with limited night operations’ capabilities. Recent increased emphasis on night operations has improved the TPAF’s efficiency in that area. Due to the older equipment in the inventory, the equipment operational readiness rate in the TPAF usually never exceeds 91%.

Government Paramilitary Forces

The DPRT Ministry of the Interior (MOI) controls ten brigades of personnel whose purpose is to prevent the overthrow of the Song regime. Based in the DPRT capital city, the MOI’s forces use military-style light weapons from wheeled vehicles. The MOI can also use these forces for riot control and in wartime would be used for rear-area security missions.

Paramilitary Brigades

The MOI controls five brigades of the most loyal soldiers whose sole purpose is to maintain the Song regime. The MOI selects these soldiers from the army and besides being well trained are considered the most political loyal in the country. The chain of command for this organization runs from the Secretary-General to the MOI to the State Security Directorate who normally exerts operational control of the paramilitary brigades. The nickname for these soldiers are “The Black Tigers.”

MOI Special Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigades

Through the same chain of command as the paramilitary brigades, the MOI controls five SPF brigades. Selected from the TPA’s SPF units, these SPF personnel are the best of the best. During peacetime, they train hard and likely conduct missions into the RoT for reconnaissance purposes in case of future war. Most of these SPF personnel speak a second language and some of the units contain female personnel. In wartime, these units will conduct strategic missions as part of the “second front” dressed in RoT uniforms or those of RoT’s allies.

Reserves and Militia

Regular Reserves

The DPRT maintains a robust reserve force of over six million personnel due to the requirement for almost all healthy males to serve ten years and healthy females to serve three years in some part of the military. If the male or female decides to leave the service after their mandatory obligation, they will serve in some sort of reserve status until reaching the age of 55. Army veterans will be assigned to a first reserve unit from their departure from active duty (around age 28) for ten years. First reserve units meet for four weeks of training once per year at the end of the active duty’s dry training period. Veterans, 40 to 50 years of age, participate in the second reserve units and participate in one week of training once each year at the end of the first reserve units’ four-week training period. It is at the end of this annual reserve training period, that the entire TPA is at its highest readiness state for the entire year. Those veterans who reach 50 years of age are in the third reserve and are just a name on list that is available for reactivation during a national crisis. TPN and TPAF veterans go through the same reserve process except their annual training period for first and second reserve units is two weeks each year. Due to the job skills they learned in the service, the technical expertise gained in the TPN and TPAF makes them an essential part of the civilian sector.

Torbian Youth Group (TYG)

The TYG is a school program for male and females from 14 years of age until graduation from school and their entry into the regular army. The TYG conducts 450 hours of classroom training and seven days of military training each semester. The TYG seeks to locate potential anti-government militants or counter-revolutionaries and can be called upon to defend the country at a time of war. It is estimated that there are over 1.6 million TYG members. By the time, a DPRT male or female joins the military after their high school graduation, they already know how to march and shoot. This is the reason for the truncated basic training program for all three branches of the TPA.

Militia Command

The Supreme High Command fields nine motorized infantry brigades that compose the 6th Militia Command. Using wheeled armored personnel carriers, the militia brigade serves several purposes. The brigades can be dispatched to cities outside the capital city to quell riots leaving the MOI’s forces to protect Baguio. If necessary, the militia could be used to support the MOI’s SPF or paramilitary brigades in their missions.

Non-State Paramilitary Forces

Insurgent/Guerrilla Forces

Due to the oppressive nature of the Song regime, there are no known insurgent groups operating in the DPRT. There are individuals in the RoT, such as United Torbia, that would like to reunite the two countries under a democratic style of government, but cannot make any headway in the country. Due to the HUMINT provided by children spying on their parents and people turning in other people for minor offenses against the Song regime, any known insurgents are quickly rounded up. Anyone who discusses regime change in DPRT is executed after a very short trial or for those lucky enough, placed in concentration camps at hard labor as political prisoners.

Yusingco Enterprises is heavily involved in smuggling goods that the DPRT citizens cannot buy from their government ran stores.

Criminal Organizations

Most crime in the DPRT is basic in order to survive in a difficult regime such as selling goods on the black market including vegetables grown on small family plots intended for personal use. The government’s collective farming system distributes the produces from the larger farms. As long as the families with the small plots of land do not draw attention to their criminal activity, the local governmental officials usually leave them alone.

Violent crime is almost non-existent because the Song regime considers execution the normal sentence for murder, rape, and armed robbery. While drug use is around, its cost means that few DPRT citizens can pay for it. The people’s main vice is cigarettes often found through the black market.

The one organized criminal group is Yusingo Enterprises that operates in the vicinity of San Fernando City. Their primary activity is smuggling goods in from RoT to sell on the black market such as cigarettes, alcohol, electronics, and medical supplies. Yusingo Enterprises will also sell drugs if they can find the buyers. The local San Fernando City police look the other way because the mayor receives a cut of the profits. There are sporadic reports that the Tantoco Cartel is attempting to expand into North Torbia.

Private Security Organizations

Due to a no gun ownership policy, there are no private security organizations in the DPRT. The only people allowed to have guns are the police and the military. Teachers tell their school children to turn in the names of anyone who may have a gun to them for “safety” reasons as the teachers do not want the children to be killed by an accidental discharge. This includes their family members as school children receive an award each time one of their tips leads to the seizure of an illicit firearm and the arrest of the gun owner.

Foreign Military Presence

There are no foreign military units in the DPRT. Foreign military advisors train the TPA, TPN, and TPAF. Most of these advisors come from Olvana or Donovia, but other countries have also been known to conduct training in the DPRT.

Nonmilitary Armed Combatants

It is unlikely that any nonmilitary armed combatants would be found in the DPRT due to gun ownership’s illegality. Any guns will be found in the hands of the military, the police, or other government officials. If someone has a gun, they work for the government.          

Military Functions

Joint Capabilities

The TPA is capable of conducting joint operations as the ground, naval, and air forces all come under the TPA’s command. There are cases of rivalry between the ground, air, and sea services that sometimes reduce the effectiveness during joint operations. Those TPN and TPAF units that work with ground units or SPF elements normally do so on a regular basis creating a good working relationship between the two units. Despite the TPA controlling all units, there is still competition between the ground, naval, and air force units for funding and the ground units usually win out over the TPN and TPAF. This sometimes creates a strife between the higher ranking officers of the three services despite their shared uniform.

Command and Control

The TPA’s ground units are the DPRT’s primary military force. The TPN and TPAF support the TPA ground forces, primarily through defense of the homeland and the deployment of SPF in the enemy’s rear area. The TPA uses the old Donovian C2 structure with a highly structured chain of command with higher units dictating the actions of subordinate units. While the TPA publicly states that it trains its soldiers to operate at the next higher command level, many commanders may hesitate or show the initiative desired by the chain of command in fear of doing the wrong thing if out of communication

Maneuver

The TPA will use Donovian tactics along mobile corridors during offensive operations. The armored and mechanized forces will likely place two-thirds of its ground forces forward in the first echelon and a little less than one-third in its second attack echelon. TPA SPF will likely land it its enemy’s rear areas by helicopter, plane, or via a tunnel. The TPA wants to mesmerize their enemy by concentrating a force in front of them while the SPF opens the “second front” in their enemy’s rear areas by attacking combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Enemies of the DPRT need to watch their flanks and for foot attacks from unexpected direction.

In the offense, the TPA will attack even if they only maintain a 2:1 force advantage. They will attempt to break through the initial defensive line with its infantry forces and then pass an armor or mechanized force through the gap in the lines to attack the CS/CSS elements in the rear areas. If possible, the TPA does not want to get involved with a combat arms on combat arms battle.

In the defense, the TPA is most worried about the enemy’s armored forces and concentrates on setting up kill zones focused on the destruction of tanks using a maneuver defense found in TC 7-100.2. A TPA division in defense will put approximately 1/3 of its units along the front lines and 5/9 in the second echelon. The remaining 1/9 of the division will serve as an anti-tank mobile reserve or as the division’s counterattack force.

Air Defense

The TPA fields a large number of air defense weapons including an air defense command within each OSC and the Capital Defense Air Defense Command at the SHC level. These commands each feature an integrated fire command with a variety of long-range, medium-range, and short-range air defense artillery weapons. The Capital Defense Air Defense Command also operates an electronic warfare brigade.

The DPRT considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near DPRT units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (For more information, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 11, Air Defense.)

INFOWAR

The DPRT will likely use all seven INFOWAR capabilities—electronic warfare (EW), computer attack, information attack, deception, physical destruction, protection and security measures, and perception management—as best they can. Many of these systems are in permanent locations while others are mobile. The DPRT has already practiced EW with several previous attacks against RoT GPS, hacking of RoT websites, and the attempts to steal bitcoins from RoT entities. The TPA places great emphasis on camouflage, a major component of deception operations. The DPRT directs their social media campaign at RoT citizens not their own as the common person cannot access the Internet. The DPRT attempts to manage the perception of its own people through the control of the information environment. The TPA will likely use old school techniques such as leaflets and other propaganda methods to attempt to turn South Torbians into supporting the DPRT. Periodically, the DPRT drops leaflets from balloons over RoT that try to convince the South Torbian people that President’s government is illegitimate and that Song should be ruling all of Torbia.

RISTA

The TPA emphasizes reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities and will use its intelligence resources to gain information about its enemies. The DPRT will also use spies and SPF units in its enemies’ rear areas to conduct its RISTA activities. The TPA can deploy UAVs to obtain additional information on its enemies. Despite no declared war between the two countries, DPRT UAVs have crashed landed in the RoT. Several times in the last decade, the crashed UAVs contained photographs of military installations taken illegally. Whenever the RoT government finds a mysterious UAV in their country and charges the DPRT with spying, the DPRT government always denies ownership. Most DPRT UAVS are tier 2 or 3, but the TPA is in the process of upgrading its UAV fleet to drones that carry cameras that can provide real-time data back to the controller. The chart shows the RISTA capabilities for all units in the DATE-Pacific region including those assets belonging to the DPRT.

Effective Ranges of Regional Reconnaissance Assets

Fire Support

The TPA doctrine is similar to Donovian doctrine with heavy emphasis on artillery, missiles, and multiple rocket launchers combined on a single target. If aviation assets are available and not involved in homeland defense on the insertion of SPF elements, the TPAF will most likely use any additional aviation assets to provide close air support to the TPA ground forces.

Protection

TPA doctrine, due to its belief that its forces cannot achieve air superiority against most of its enemies, expounds maximum use of both active and passive camouflage, concealment, and deception in order to prevent the enemy from locating TPA units and important static positions. The more ordnance that its enemies use against decoys, the less ammunition will hit actual TPA units, positions, buildings, and weapons. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support and Chapter 7, Information Warfare.)

Logistics

While TPA doctrine states that adequate logistics is important, it is likely that the DPRT would run out of vital supplies within a short time of any military operation. It is likely that the DPRT maintains only a two- to three-month stockpile of food, POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), and replacement parts. It is likely that the DPRT maintains one million tons of rice in storage for potential military operations and only under the severest conditions will release some of its food stores to help the North Torbians avoid starvation. In any case, the capture of enemy food, equipment, and ammunition will become a high priority for the TPA in order to continue its military operations for any sustained period of time. The DPRT may store up to 10 million barrels of fuel in storage for wartime use, but there are reports of soldiers trading fuel on the black market for fuel to avoid starvation. There are 150 arms factories in the DPRT and 100 other nonmilitary factories that have a dedicated wartime materiel production mission. Any supplies from these factories will go to the military before civilians. Within the last decade, the DPRT purchased 4,000 trucks from Olvana. While the trucks will be used in all units, many of them were specifically purchased to improve the logistical capabilities of the ground forces.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

The DPRT possesses chemical as well as nuclear weapons and possibly biological weapons. The DPRT has not renounced the first use of any of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is expected that the TPA will use chemical weapons during their artillery bombardments. The DPRT will most likely use non-persistent agents against objectives where their soldiers may need to pass through. In areas where the DPRT does not intend to occupy, expect heavy doses of persistent VX nerve agents.

The DPRT has less than ten nuclear weapons, but their missile technology prevents them launching against any target over 500 km away. If Secretary-General Song perceives that his regime is about to collapse or that an extra-regional power is contemplating regime change, he may order the use nuclear weapons on the belief that there is no DPRT without him in power.

There are indications that DPRT scientists have been conducting biological research with military applications. A DPRT soldier who recently defected was found to have been vaccinated against anthrax.

Research and Development Goals

The DPRT is working on its missile capabilities and has recently launched an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the range to reach the far western edge of the United States. This puts all countries within DATE-Pacific in range as well as US possessions in the Pacific Ocean and the state of Hawaii. The issue is miniaturization of the nuclear weapon to a small enough size to fit in the payload of a missile with enough range to reach the continental US. It is expected that the DPRT will achieve this breakthrough within the next five years.

Special Considerations

The DPRT is a military dictatorship ran by a despot. Almost everyone has served in the military and even if they leave active military service, all veterans must continue to serve in the reserves until age 55. The DPRT youth begin receiving basic military training when they are 14 years old. If necessary, Song will use every person in his country to defend his regime. Do not expect massive surrenders as the people have been indoctrinated to fight to the death.

To prevent their people from leaving the country, the DPRT strictly controls the mutual border with the RoT. Those who attempt to illegally cross into the RoT are imprisoned if caught along with three generations of their family. This fear of what may happen to their family, prevents many DPRT citizens from fighting back against the regime. Large numbers of DPRT soldiers are constantly patrolling the border to prevent defections. The DPR government says it is to prevent smugglers and other criminals from coming from south of the border, but in reality it is to prevent people fleeing the Song regime.

Summary

The DPRT maintains a large military with the goal to eventually unify all of Torbia under the control of the DPRT leader, Secretary-General Song Chong-Su. The TPA trains hard, but is faced with issues revolving around outdated equipment and its maintenance. The individual TPA soldier is tough, but may be limited by his equipment and a fear of not following orders exactly as given. While the KPA says they want their soldiers to take initiative, what happens to those that do take initiative and failing prevents the majority from acting on their own. But do not underestimate the TPA, the TPN, or the TPAF. Due to their numbers alone, all three branches of the military maintain the capability to inflict massive damage upon their enemies during a war.