Chapter 5: Information Warfare

Modern information technologies (ITs) have created conditions for the con- frontation of states, combatants, and non-state actors in a fundamentally new arenathe information sphere. Information, information processing, and communications networks are at the core of every military activity. The concepts of time, space, force, navigation, speed, precision, and lethality have changed because of the capabilities of information-age technology and the availability of information. These changes have a tremendous effect on how military forces conduct activities. The OPFOR addresses this issue through continued refinement of its information warfare (IW) doctrine.

The OPFOR defines information warfare as the specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The ultimate goal of IW is to influence decision makers. The OPFOR conducts IW at all levels of warfarestrategic, operational, and tacticalbut without regard to strict definitional boundaries among these levels. Opponents of the State are subject to IW regardless of the level and degree of engagement in other types of operations. The State’s leadership integrates all instruments of powerdiplomatic-political, economic, military, and informationalto implement an information strategy. One element of power may have primacy over the others at a given time, but all work together.

In the OPFOR’s view, skillful application of IW can facilitate the defeat of a technologically superior enemy. It can challenge or counter an enemy’s goal of information dominance. The OPFOR can target key components (such as technology providing situational awareness, and advanced com- puting and communications technologies) that provide such dominance, thus shaking the opponent’s confidence.

Strategic Context

Defensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR strategic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of defensive actions may differ during the various types of strategic-level actions.

Regional Operations

The State possesses an overmatch in all elements of power against internal and regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in regional operations in a conventional operational design. This overmatch does not imply, however, that regional operations are entirely offensive. Consolidation of gains, security actions, and economy-of-force measures can all produce defensive courses of action inside a larger offensive design.

The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single regional neighbor, but not necessarily an alliance or coalition of neighboring countries. They may not be a match for the forces an extraregional power can bring to bear. Thus, the OPFOR seeks to exploit its numerical and

technological overmatch against one regional opponent rapidly, before other regional neighbors or an extraregional power can enter the fight. In some cases, this may require defensive operations against one or more regional neighbors who are not the main target of the strategic campaign, to mitigate their ability to disrupt an OPFOR offensive against the one that is.

Regional operations include essentially defensive security actions to maintain internal stability. In addition, the Internal Security Forces help control the population in territory the OPFOR seizes or engage enemy forces that invade State territory.

The State’s military goal during regional operations is to destroy its re- gional opponents’ military power in order to achieve specific ends. The State plans regional operations well in advance and executes them as rapidly as is feasible in order to preclude intervention by outside forces. Still, at the very outset of these operations, it lays plans and positions forces to conduct access- control operations in the event of outside intervention. Extraregional forces may also be vulnerable to conventional operations during the time they require to build combat power and create support at home for their intervent