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''This page is a section of [[Pirtuni]].''
 
''This page is a section of [[Pirtuni]].''
  
Atropia is slowly developing its public broadcast and INFOWAR capabilities, both of which are driven by oil revenue. TV and the Internet are the most powerful media, while Atropian INFOWAR capability focuses on potential threats from Ariana and Limaria. Atropian INFOWAR assets are generally tier two and three, though increasingly tier one elements are being purchased from abroad and integrated into the Atropian military and government.
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The information environment in Pirtuni is positive. It has constitutionally-based and judicially-upheld freedom of expression. This has allowed the Pirtunian media industry to flourish throughout the country. Citizens are able to freely protest against the government. Pirtuni’s INFOWAR capabilities rival those of Donovia, its biggest perceived threat, and the country benefits from its relationships with Western nations in both equipment acquisition and training.
  
 
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==Satellite Telecommunications==
 
==Satellite Telecommunications==
As a less technologically developed country, Atropia relies on third party satellite services, leasing commercial Ku-band transponders from larger, more developed countries. This capability may also be used to support government and military operations. Analysts assess that Atropia is in the process of developing an independent space program designed to augment economic and commerce functions of the country. However, dual-use technologies that exist would indicate that these satellites could ultimately assist in military operations.
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Pirtuni possesses a wide range of satellite capabilities. Concerns over Donovia’s capabilities drive Pirtuni’s satellite policies and funding considerations. Most of the country’s satellites are dual-purposed to allow both military and commercial use. Pirtuni operates three commercial telecommunications satellites utilizing Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. All satellites are powered by solar-array panels. These commercial satellites may be used to support military operations when necessary. Additionally, the military operates one communication satellite using Ku- and C-band transponders. The satellite is in a geostationary orbit and powered by a solar-array antenna. The government also leases Ku, L, and S bandwidth from commercial satellite companies that support government and military operations when necessary.
  
 
==Navigation==
 
==Navigation==
Atropia commercially purchases global positioning receivers that support commercial needs as well as military navigation and targeting operations.
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Pirtuni operates three navigation satellite systems using L-band transponders. The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide regional coverage of the surrounding areas. Its military units are also authorized to purchase off-the-shelf commercial GPS receivers for navigation support.
  
 
==Public Communications Media==
 
==Public Communications Media==
Public communications media is growing in importance in Atropia, though most major outlets are controlled by the government or by confederates of the president. The exception is the Internet, where relative freedom exists, but government monitoring for anti-government messages occurs. While social media is blossoming, TV remains the most widely available medium.
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Pirtuni’s communications environment is uniquely free compared to others in the region. Television is the most important means of communication; however, the advent of the Internet and the popularity of social media make these means of communication increasingly influential. All media is subject to disproportionate influence by business and political interests. Judicial rulings and government actions have favored freedom of expression with limited intrusions and attempts to exercise control.
  
 
===Internet===
 
===Internet===
The Internet in Atropia exists in a zone relatively free from state interference or censorship, though evidence indicates some limited state filtering and direct monitoring of political content. Despite this relative Internet freedom, mockery of the government by Atropian users recently resulted in arrest and detention. The Atropian government likely takes a view that as long as Internet activity does not threaten Atropian government interests, it is allowed, but mockery or criticism is forbidden.
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Internet penetration in Pirtuni continues to grow steadily, due in part to diminishing costs and increasing access, particularly to mobile Internet service providers (ISPs). Pirtuni had an Internet penetration rate of 43% last year, compared to 41% the previous year and just 18% seven years ago. International statistics for last year show that 73% of adults use the Internet at least occasionally. International tracking organizations also found that 53% of Pirtunian adults use the Internet on a daily basis. For fixed-line broadband subscriptions, the penetration rate was approximately 8.8% last year, while mobile broadband had a penetration rate of just over 5%. The average broadband connection speed in Pirtuni was 9.3 megabytes per second (Mbps) last year, compared to 7.3 Mbps in the previous year.
  
Almost 1.45 million Atropians, or over one in every eight of the Atropian populace, use the Internet. Most users access the Internet from cybercafés or their workplaces, as the cost of computers and the Internet connection ($40-50 per month, compared to an average income of $100 per month) preclude personal Internet connections.
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Among current internet users, 82% live in urban areas; 37% of these users live in larger cities. Internet penetration in rural areas is increasing with improvements to infrastructure and government investment in these areas. Most people access the Internet from home or work, though many middle- and higher-end cafés and restaurants also provide free Wi-Fi. Access is also common in public libraries and schools. Internet cafés, once popular places to access the Internet, are gradually losing popularity. Access to broadband Internet in Pirtuni is reasonably-priced for the average family.
  
The Atropian government maintains centralized Internet control via two governmental Internet Service Providers (ISPs). They, in turn, distribute bandwidth to over 20 private Internet providers.
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Social media networks are gaining ground. Activists are increasingly using these Internet platforms for organizing and promoting ideas. Political parties and the government have also started using the Internet as another tool of political competition, engaging in both legitimate forms of communication, such as social media profiles and blogging, and manipulative techniques such as trolling. This method of manipulation uses paid commentators or “trolls” on news websites and on social networks, especially around election time when various political supporters engage in defamatory and offensive comments on issues of politics, nationality, language, etc. on media websites. Most political analysts, however, do not see this as an effective political strategy because users quickly recognize the trolls and do not take the comments seriously. Pirtunian politicians are increasingly realizing the value of social media, and many have started accounts on Facebook, Twitter, LiveJournal, and/or YouTube in the hopes of influencing voters.
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Laws governing the Internet in Pirtuni continue to be general and untested by legal prosecutions. Government security agencies are concerned about the potential for social media to be used for subversive and terrorism purposes and are struggling to find ways to monitor the Internet for illegal activities. There is no current institutionalized blocking or filtering, nor a regulatory framework for censorship of content online, although indirect government attempts at creating legislation that could help censor or limit content are occurring. A number of parliamentary legislative initiatives aimed at controlling electronic media have emerged, including authority to conduct surveillance of Internet content in order to ‘‘protect national security’’ and limit other forms of ‘‘undesirable’’ content. These regulations have the potential for expanded formal and informal control and privacy intrusion. The Law on Protection of Public Morals, passed in November thirteen years ago, prohibits the production and circulation of pornography; dissemination of products that propagandize war or spread national and religious intolerance; humiliation or insult to an individual or nation on the grounds of nationality, ethnicity, or religion; and the propagation of illegal drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and other government-discouraged vices. Due to funding constraints and political and social variables, enforcement is selective.
  
 
===Television===
 
===Television===
Atropians receive the majority of theirthrough television. While the Atropian government banned rebroadcasts of foreign-produced English language programs by their local television outlets in December 2008 (presumably due to reporting on government fraud and corruption), the authorities do allow Kalarian state television rebroadcasts. Atropians who live along the southern border can also receive spillover from Arianian television stations. Recent reports indicate that 10 television stations operate within Atropia. The top five television networks are:
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The most popular source of news is television, with 642 stations in operation. Two years ago, officials continued a process of transforming Pirtuni’s state television and radio outlets into public-service broadcasters. A bill signed into law during the same year established a new public broadcasting corporation that is to be overseen by a supervisory board with strong civil society representation. Most media outlets in Pirtuni are privately-owned and exert influence in both the social and political environments. Media ownership has long been nontransparent in practice, although it is widely understood that most of the sector is controlled by a small number of wealthy people with political and business interests.
 
 
*ASTV - Atropian State TV
 
*PTVA - Atropian Public TV; the Atropian government created PTVA to meet requirements for joining the Council of Europe
 
*National TV Atropi - Private broadcaster
 
*DeepSpaceBroadcasting TV - Private broadcaster; owned by the sister of the president
 
*Atropi Broadcasting System - Private broadcaster; controlled by a cousin of the president
 
 
 
The Atropian television media ownerships’ connections to the highest sectors of government remain quite obvious. Due to the power of broadcast media in elections and the Atropian television stations’ compliant nature, the television media serves as a powerful tool in the hands of the president and most Atropians receive their news through government-controlled sources.
 
  
 
===Radio===
 
===Radio===
A variety of radio stations serve Atropia and include state-run, public radio networks and private stations. Additionally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty operates Atropian language programming, known as Radio Qaja. Radio Qaja broadcasts over the Internet, via satellite, and over shortwave. Ten FM, 11 AM, and one shortwave station are in operation. The top five radio networks are a combination of private and public broadcasters. In Atropia, even private broadcasts have significant ownership links to the ruling family and are generally unlikely to report adverse material about the government.
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The radio broadcast market, a mix of independent and state-owned networks, is comprised of 524 stations. Radio is most popular in the rural areas where television reception is poorer. The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Agency obtained court orders two years ago to temporarily suspend the retransmission of certain Donovian radio stations in Pirtuni. The suspensions came after Donovian state-controlled news outlets carried aggressively propagandistic content designed to support the Donovian separatist groups in eastern Pirtuni. The issue of censorship continued to be a topic of debate the following year, and despite criticism of the suspensions by international media rights groups, the retransmission of several Donovian radio stations has remained barred.
  
 
===Print Media===
 
===Print Media===
For a nation of its size, Atropia maintains a remarkably large print media establishment. Significant numbers of magazines, newspapers, and news bureaus exist, but must operate within the limits of politically permissible speech. While a nominal freedom of the press exists within Atropia, watchdog groups chronicled recent incidents of journalists killed or imprisoned for reporting that was critical  of the government or political conditions within Atropia. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports four journalists killed in Atropia and one death while in prison. In addition to governmental interference, the relatively high cost and low print runs of the country’s magazines make them significantly less important in Atropia than broadcast media.
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Two years ago, the president approved a law to facilitate the privatization of print media owned by central government authorities, which watchdogs praised as an important step toward increasing pluralism in the sector. Separate legislation signed last December initiated the formation of a state-run multiplatform news service to boost the country’s international media presence and image, and to provide prompt and responsive information about developments in Pirtuni.
 
 
Three major Atropian news bureaus exist and all offer English, Donovian, and Atropian feeds. More importantly, all generally support the Atropian government, especially on issues that involve Limaria.
 
  
A number of magazines offer both online and hard-copy versions. Most print is in the Atropian language, though English language outlets like Baku Post, "Atropian Times", and "Atropian News" exist. Four major Atropian language publications are dominant, though their circulation is primarily among Atropian-speaking expatriates, urban Atropians, and Atropians living abroad.
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Advertising revenue for print media has declined in recent years, leaving newspapers even more financially dependent on moneyed elites with particular political and business interests. Paid content disguised as news remains widespread and weakens the credibility of journalists, especially during elections. Difficult economic conditions in Pirtuni have placed the media sector, particularly small outlets, under financial strain in recent years.
  
 
===Telephone===
 
===Telephone===
The Atropian telecommunications infrastructure operates through a combination of recently built cellular components constructed over a framework of trunk architecture. Due to the government’s control of landlines and the long wait for new installation, Atropians usually resort to more expensive cellular phones. Trunk connectivity internationally is slowly moving toward fiber optic, including participation in the Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber optic line, and away from microwave links.
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Pirtuni's telecommunications development plan emphasizes improving domestic trunk lines, international connections, and the mobile-cellular system. Two decades ago, the country possessed a telephone system that was antiquated, inefficient, and in disrepair. More than 3.5 million applications for telephones could not be satisfied. Telephone capacity has improved significantly over the past several years as government investment in telecommunications infrastructure is now a priority. About one-third of Pirtuni’s networks are digital, and a majority of regional centers now have digital switching stations. The mobile-cellular telephone system's expansion has slowed, largely due to saturation of the market, which has reached 125
 
 
The Atropian phone network will unquestionably operate within the cellular realm in the future. Atropian cellular phone use continues to increase. As of this year, 1.5 million fixed phone lines are in operation, versus over 6.4 million mobile subscribers.
 
  
Like many countries, the initial investment for cellular phones (towers) compared to landline phones (fiber and wire, connected switches) makes cellular conductivity clearly superior based on normal return on investment criteria. A public pay telephone network does exist in Atropia and consists of traditional pay phones and call offices where an attendant will place a call for a nominal fee. Atropian culture also considers it polite for businesses to offer patrons phone service, if needed. 3G and 4G LTE services are expanding as frequencies once allocated for analogue television broadcasts become available to GSM providers, thus freeing those frequencies for more advanced services.
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mobile phones per 100 people. Pirtuni has two new domestic trunk lines that are part of the fiber-optic Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) system. Three Pirtunian links have also been installed in the fiber-optic Trans- European Lines (TEL) project that connects 18 countries.
  
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The information and communication technologies (ICT) sector is regulated by the National Agency for Communications and Information (NACI), which was reformed from the previous National Committee on Communications (NCC) five years ago. Members of NACI are appointed by the President of Pirtuni. The lucrative nature of the ICT industry has driven a high degree of corruption within the government. Appointments to the Commission are often not transparent. The Law on Communications, passed thirteen years ago, does not guarantee the independence of the NACI. Instead, industry experts point to a number of inconsistencies between sector laws and the NACI’s decisions. For example, five years ago the Commission refused to prolong the operating license of a mobile provider with no explanation.
 
===Postal/Courier===
 
===Postal/Courier===
The Atropian postal service possesses a reputation for lack of service and reliability. A number of international and local courier companies known for better service exist. These couriers include FEDEX, UPS, and DHL. Capabilities are increasing to support the variety of foreign companies engaged in the oil and gas industry.
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The Pirtunian Postal Service (PPS) is well-established and capable of moving mail and freight to all areas of the country. Demands from the business community spurred a decade-long investment in infrastructure to increase the efficiency and capabilities of the PPS. The organization has achieved internationally-accepted standards for mail service. Additionally, a number of private local and international package-delivery companies supplement and compete with the PPS.
  
 
===Word of Mouth===
 
===Word of Mouth===
Word of mouth communication in Atropia remains a common method for rural residents to receive their news and information. Within urban Atropian settings, residents often use short message service (SMS) texting and cell phones to replace face-to-face communication. Combined with social media, this combination of Internet and personal communication will be an increasingly important fixture in Atropia. As communications mature in the country, cell phones will likely become more common in rural Atropia. Religious-based appeals are apt to fail outside of the most conservative rural settings.  
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Word-of-mouth communication is more important in rural areas and among older populations. The wide and convenient availability of other forms of communication, such as television, radio, and the Internet, has decreased the importance of word-of-mouth communication in general. Personal interactions have given way to e-mailing, texting, YouTube, Facebook, and other forms of social media.  
 
==Information Control==
 
==Information Control==
While the government of Atropia does not directly control information flow, the Atropian state- connected elite creates boundaries of “soft censorship,” where free speech includes everything except discussion of the government. Atropians currently push back against this limited censorship, especially with the new social media, in attempts to avoid direct governmental interference with their freedom of speech. It is likely that the Atropian government allows this limited degree of freedom of speech as the leaders know those with computer access (the urban elite) are unlikely to violently rebel.
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Citizens enjoy widespread and regionally-unique freedom of expression. There are no burdensome restrictions on journalists and a number of groups and associations, including the Pirtunian Journalist Union (PJU) and the Independent Media Union of Pirtuni (IMUP), are able to support the interests of journalists. There continue to be small attempts to censor and control the media, usually during the time leading up to elections; however, these seem to be attempts by groups to test the extent to which current laws and regulations can be pushed for self-serving interests. Judicial decisions generally support an environment that values freedom of expression.
  
 
==INFOWAR==
 
==INFOWAR==
INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.
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Pirtuni’s INFOWAR capabilities are a mixture of old and new technology. Older equipment forms the basis for much of Pirtuni’s INFOWAR warfighting capability; however, it has recently purchased more-modern equipment from Western countries. The Pirtunian military conducts advanced INFOWAR operations through an INFOWAR battalion that includes units dedicated to deception, computer warfare and information attack, perception management, electronic warfare, intelligence management, and Information protection and security.
 
 
Criminal organizations such as the Saints of Cognitio (SoC) utilize a variety of INFOWAR actions to right perceived wrongs as well as to raise revenue. Where effective INFOWAR capabilities were once limited to state actors, SoC is known to employ a combination of media manipulation and information activities, alongside computer warfare, to disrupt organizations—state or non-state—that it believes act outside of its own moral code.  
 
  
 
===Electronic Warfare===
 
===Electronic Warfare===
Generally speaking, the Atropians will operate outdated equipment, such as counter-battery and battlefield surveillance radars. Also, Atropian jammers likely remain relics of earlier buys from Donovians. The possibility exists, however, that improved Atropian relations with Kalaria and Israel could result in newer critical equipment procurement in the future or perhaps limited samples of advanced equipment for operational testing purposes.
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The Pirtunian military fields an electronic warfare (EW) company within its information warfare battalion. The country maintains an extensive EW capability. It is able to leverage relationships with Western countries to enhance its capabilities. Pirtuni’s EW is well-integrated into its force structure and is a key enabler for combat forces. Pirtuni maintains a wide variety of sensors and jammers on ground, air, and naval platforms. Relationships with Western countries give it access to EW training; however, there is still a limited number of trained operators for its EW capacity.
  
 
===Computer Attack===
 
===Computer Attack===
While Atropian hackers actively attack Limarian websites, hard data on their identities or Atropian government involvement remains extremely limited and unreliable. While the Limarians claim Atropian government sponsorship of computer attacks, that evidence remains very circumstantial.
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The Pirtunian military fields a computer warfare/information attack company within its information warfare battalion. The military maintains the ability to conduct computer attack (CA) along a spectrum of abilities ranging from small, deniable probes to massive, overwhelming onslaught. Pirtuni will attempt to use other INFOWAR capability, such as deception and protection, to enable computer attack.
 
 
Incidents of cyber-related activities, such as hacking and website defacement, have been observed in Atropia. Most of these activities have been centered on the conflict in Lower Janga province. Five years ago, suspected Arianian hacktivists attacked a number of Atropian ministerial sites. Four years ago, an attack thought to originate in Ariana attempted to transfer funds from an Atropian bank. While direct involvement has not been proven, some intelligence analysts believe the Arianian government was at least complicit in these attacks.
 
  
 
===Information Attack===
 
===Information Attack===
Atropia maintains a limited information attack (IA) capability with the skill to deface websites or engage in basic tactics like distributed denial of service attacks or basic forensics. When compared to aggressive and capable Donovian or Arianian information attack, it appears doubtful that Atropian capabilities will successively deter those of its larger neighbors. It remains possible that any IA will attempt to compromise similar unsophisticated Limarian systems.
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The Pirtunian military fields a computer warfare/information attack company within its information warfare battalion. Its military is expert at integrating this capability with other INFOWAR elements and will rely on information attack (IA) against enemies with technological overmatch. Pirtuni’s INFOWAR theory states that IA is the core of any attack, from the tactical to the strategic.
 
   
 
   
 
===Deception===
 
===Deception===
Atropia upholds emphasis on battlefield deception. Atropians will likely uses decoys to great effect, and tactically will use feints and other techniques to prevent the determination of the main effort by their adversaries until the last minute. Atropian overseas defense procurement and training has emphasized the acquisition of the latest reconnaissance and deception techniques and tools to improve their capability at executing deception operations.
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The Pirtunian military fields a deception company within its information warfare battalion. Pirtunian doctrine emphasizes battlefield deception. Its doctrine requires the use of decoys, tactical feints, and other techniques to prevent or delay the enemy’s main effort. Its international defense procurement and training emphasizes acquisition of the latest reconnaissance and deception techniques and tools to improve its deception operation capabilities.
  
 
===Physical Destruction===
 
===Physical Destruction===
Physical destruction probably exists as the most developed of Atropian INFOWAR capabilities, as the Atropians mimicked Donovian doctrine that stressed the neutralization of high-value targets like INFOWAR assets through various strike and fires capabilities. Since Atropia finds its military capabilities about a decade behind the current state of the art, the Atropian ability to neutralize enemy INFOWAR remains limited to other militaries with similar capabilities.
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Pirtunian deep-strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special-purpose forces will aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. Pirtunian doctrine stresses the eventual destruction of enemy INFOWAR assets after their neutralization by non-strike means.
  
 
===Protection and Security Measures===
 
===Protection and Security Measures===
Since so many protection and security measures (PSM) fall under the control of the Atropian Ministry of National Security, it remains probable that security practices of two decades ago continue. The Atropians, through their relationships with the US, probably view the application of integrated Western technology to their systems as a way to safeguard their information.
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The military fields an information protection and security platoon within its information warfare battalion. Protection and security measures (PSM) are a defined weakness of the military. Pirtuni views the application of integrated Western technology to its systems as a way to safeguard its information; however, Pirtunian doctrine has not been upgraded for over a decade.
  
 
===Perception Management===
 
===Perception Management===
Perception management exists as the most visible element of Atropian INFOWAR, as the Atropian government expends considerable effort to demonstrate Limarian “terrorism” and “aggression” on websites, public pronouncements, and other official media. Even a brief tour of official Atropian government websites reveals the significance of events in the province of Lower Janga. Also, the Atropian government openly acknowledges its recent weapons procurements, especially those from Israel, to demonstrate its strength and military potential to Limaria.
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The Pirtunian military fields a perception management company within its information warfare battalion; however, its ability to influence populations beyond its borders is limited. It will likely use perception management most aggressively on its own citizens, particularly separatist populations, as a way to generate support for government operations.
  
 
==Intelligence==
 
==Intelligence==
The Atropian government maintains an intelligence Ministry of Security Protection (MSP). Its mission focus is on threats to government control from extremists and unfriendly governments and to ascertain the intentions of Atropia’s neighbors, especially Limaria and Ariana. Its official website states that the MSP maintains responsibility for a number of missions. Unlike the US, where a variety of organizations possesses different roles and missions, the MSP maintains a very broad mandate that includes intelligence gathering; counterintelligence; government information and personnel security; and national-level, anti-organized crime efforts. According to one of the few authoritative sources, the MSP suffers from high turnover and bureaucratic infighting. It remains likely that the general security situation and large number of foreign companies in Baku  will create a demand and corresponding higher wages for trained local security personnel. Reports estimate the size of the Atropian intelligence community at about 5,000 personnel. Currently, the leadership of the MSP is slanted toward anti-crime rather than the intelligence collection and analysis element of the organization.
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Pirtuni possesses a capable intelligence organization. It has a foreign intelligence service, the Pirtunian Foreign Information Service (PFIS); a domestic intelligence service, the Pirtunian National Defense Service (PNDS); and a military intelligence organization, the Pirtunian Military Information Service (PMIS). All three organizations are very involved in operations globally and are capable of collecting intelligence from a variety of sources. Much of that capability is focused on the surrounding region to combat terrorism, economic competition, and local influence competitors. Pirtuni’s Western relationships provide it with limited access to intelligence from these and other countries.
  
 
===Human Intelligence===
 
===Human Intelligence===
Atropia intelligence’s strongest suit focuses on human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. As with many countries that have a variety of local threat actors and large neighbors, the maintenance of a strong HUMINT cadre becomes important. Recently, Atropian  HUMINT  scored  some    notable successes against Bad Nafar and Arianian-backed extremist elements that operate in Atropia. Additionally, the HUMINT service will probably continue to focus on Limarian actions, especially in Lower Janga. The service will remain focused on religious extremists, both Shia and Sunni, that operate within Atropia.
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Pirtuni enjoys a robust human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. Its HUMINT services are aggressive and able to exploit many locally-influential political, economic, military, and social entities. Additionally, Pirtuni is able to leverage relationships with Western countries for the sharing of HUMINT.
  
 
===Open Source Intelligence===
 
===Open Source Intelligence===
Atropian intelligence analysts probably employ open source intelligence (OSINT) to determine the intentions of actors, especially those with significant media reporting, such as Western nations, Donovia, and Ariana. OSINT’s general low cost represents a bargain for Atropian policy makers, as many Atropians possess fluency with Donovian, Arianian, directorate under the Ministry of the Interior, the and Western European languages.
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Open source intelligence (OSINT) efforts generally focus on regional rivals, particularly Donovia. Pirtuni is also concerned with separatist movements within its borders.
  
 
===Signals Intelligence===
 
===Signals Intelligence===
While Atropia may operate signals intelligence (SIGINT) at the tactical level, it remains doubtful that the government maintains a robust national-level capability for signals collection. The MSP probably maintains the capability to monitor cellular communications occurring within Atropia, and is expected to cooperate with any SIGINT capabilities the Atropian military maintains. The Atropian fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) purchased from Israel may also contribute to SIGINT collection.
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Pirtunian signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets include ground, aircraft, and satellite collection capability. The military’s SIGINT provides the early-warning and target-discrimination capability for hard-kill capable platforms. The country also maintains SIGINT collection stations in other parts of the world. Its relationships with Western countries gives Pirtuni limited access to SIGINT products from those countries.
  
 
===Imagery Intelligence===
 
===Imagery Intelligence===
Atropian imagery intelligence (IMINT) probably comes from commercially purchased imagery (one to two meter resolution) and various air-breathing assets, especially a fleet of Israeli-built unmanned aircraft and MiG-25 FOXBAT reconnaissance aircraft. Atropia can also use rotary wing assets, such as the Mi-24 HINDs, as tactical collection platforms.
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Pirtunian imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection capability is comparable to other countries in the region with the exception of Donovia. The military maintains air-breathing manned and unmanned aerial vehicle platforms for tactical collection capability. It maintains one dedicated military imaging satellite with electro-optical (EO) capabilities and synthetic aperture radar. Pirtuni has access to multiple commercial imaging capabilities through lease agreements with foreign countries.
  
 
===Measurement and Signatures Intelligence===
 
===Measurement and Signatures Intelligence===
Atropian resource constraints probably limit its measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) to first-generation capabilities, such as basic seismic detection or harbor defense sonar. Additionally, MASINT’s general cost and high analytical requirements probably render it an Atropian future requirement rather than a current operational need.
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Pirtuni has a capable national scientific intelligence apparatus. Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) operations typically support all other intelligence collection efforts and can provide direct support to combat operations through space-based collectors such as infrared imagers.
  
 
==Summary==
 
==Summary==
Atropian media and INFOWAR capabilities will continue to mature, and Atropia will develop increased capabilities as oil revenues drive increased disposable income. On the media side, social media will become the most free and most dynamic part of the Atropian information environment, and Atropia will develop better INFOWAR capabilities, likely by importing equipment against the continuing Arianian and Limarian threat.
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Pirtuni is free from many of the information constraints operative in other countries in the region. While censorship and other forms of information control have occurred, they have seldom been upheld by the courts. Protests and other forms of dissent are allowed. Journalistic freedom has led to government restraint, greater transparency, and significant reforms.
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Pirtuni’s greatest perceived threat is Donovia, due in part to Donovian agitation of separatist movements on their shared border. Due to the long-standing friction, Pirtuni has tried to maintain parity with Donovian INFOWAR capabilities. The country therefore leverages relationships with Western countries to acquire INFOWAR equipment and training to compete with Donovia.

Revision as of 16:14, 26 March 2018

This page is a section of Pirtuni.

The information environment in Pirtuni is positive. It has constitutionally-based and judicially-upheld freedom of expression. This has allowed the Pirtunian media industry to flourish throughout the country. Citizens are able to freely protest against the government. Pirtuni’s INFOWAR capabilities rival those of Donovia, its biggest perceived threat, and the country benefits from its relationships with Western nations in both equipment acquisition and training.

Satellite Telecommunications

Pirtuni possesses a wide range of satellite capabilities. Concerns over Donovia’s capabilities drive Pirtuni’s satellite policies and funding considerations. Most of the country’s satellites are dual-purposed to allow both military and commercial use. Pirtuni operates three commercial telecommunications satellites utilizing Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. All satellites are powered by solar-array panels. These commercial satellites may be used to support military operations when necessary. Additionally, the military operates one communication satellite using Ku- and C-band transponders. The satellite is in a geostationary orbit and powered by a solar-array antenna. The government also leases Ku, L, and S bandwidth from commercial satellite companies that support government and military operations when necessary.

Navigation

Pirtuni operates three navigation satellite systems using L-band transponders. The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide regional coverage of the surrounding areas. Its military units are also authorized to purchase off-the-shelf commercial GPS receivers for navigation support.

Public Communications Media

Pirtuni’s communications environment is uniquely free compared to others in the region. Television is the most important means of communication; however, the advent of the Internet and the popularity of social media make these means of communication increasingly influential. All media is subject to disproportionate influence by business and political interests. Judicial rulings and government actions have favored freedom of expression with limited intrusions and attempts to exercise control.

Internet

Internet penetration in Pirtuni continues to grow steadily, due in part to diminishing costs and increasing access, particularly to mobile Internet service providers (ISPs). Pirtuni had an Internet penetration rate of 43% last year, compared to 41% the previous year and just 18% seven years ago. International statistics for last year show that 73% of adults use the Internet at least occasionally. International tracking organizations also found that 53% of Pirtunian adults use the Internet on a daily basis. For fixed-line broadband subscriptions, the penetration rate was approximately 8.8% last year, while mobile broadband had a penetration rate of just over 5%. The average broadband connection speed in Pirtuni was 9.3 megabytes per second (Mbps) last year, compared to 7.3 Mbps in the previous year.

Among current internet users, 82% live in urban areas; 37% of these users live in larger cities. Internet penetration in rural areas is increasing with improvements to infrastructure and government investment in these areas. Most people access the Internet from home or work, though many middle- and higher-end cafés and restaurants also provide free Wi-Fi. Access is also common in public libraries and schools. Internet cafés, once popular places to access the Internet, are gradually losing popularity. Access to broadband Internet in Pirtuni is reasonably-priced for the average family.

Social media networks are gaining ground. Activists are increasingly using these Internet platforms for organizing and promoting ideas. Political parties and the government have also started using the Internet as another tool of political competition, engaging in both legitimate forms of communication, such as social media profiles and blogging, and manipulative techniques such as trolling. This method of manipulation uses paid commentators or “trolls” on news websites and on social networks, especially around election time when various political supporters engage in defamatory and offensive comments on issues of politics, nationality, language, etc. on media websites. Most political analysts, however, do not see this as an effective political strategy because users quickly recognize the trolls and do not take the comments seriously. Pirtunian politicians are increasingly realizing the value of social media, and many have started accounts on Facebook, Twitter, LiveJournal, and/or YouTube in the hopes of influencing voters.

Laws governing the Internet in Pirtuni continue to be general and untested by legal prosecutions. Government security agencies are concerned about the potential for social media to be used for subversive and terrorism purposes and are struggling to find ways to monitor the Internet for illegal activities. There is no current institutionalized blocking or filtering, nor a regulatory framework for censorship of content online, although indirect government attempts at creating legislation that could help censor or limit content are occurring. A number of parliamentary legislative initiatives aimed at controlling electronic media have emerged, including authority to conduct surveillance of Internet content in order to ‘‘protect national security’’ and limit other forms of ‘‘undesirable’’ content. These regulations have the potential for expanded formal and informal control and privacy intrusion. The Law on Protection of Public Morals, passed in November thirteen years ago, prohibits the production and circulation of pornography; dissemination of products that propagandize war or spread national and religious intolerance; humiliation or insult to an individual or nation on the grounds of nationality, ethnicity, or religion; and the propagation of illegal drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and other government-discouraged vices. Due to funding constraints and political and social variables, enforcement is selective.

Television

The most popular source of news is television, with 642 stations in operation. Two years ago, officials continued a process of transforming Pirtuni’s state television and radio outlets into public-service broadcasters. A bill signed into law during the same year established a new public broadcasting corporation that is to be overseen by a supervisory board with strong civil society representation. Most media outlets in Pirtuni are privately-owned and exert influence in both the social and political environments. Media ownership has long been nontransparent in practice, although it is widely understood that most of the sector is controlled by a small number of wealthy people with political and business interests.

Radio

The radio broadcast market, a mix of independent and state-owned networks, is comprised of 524 stations. Radio is most popular in the rural areas where television reception is poorer. The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Agency obtained court orders two years ago to temporarily suspend the retransmission of certain Donovian radio stations in Pirtuni. The suspensions came after Donovian state-controlled news outlets carried aggressively propagandistic content designed to support the Donovian separatist groups in eastern Pirtuni. The issue of censorship continued to be a topic of debate the following year, and despite criticism of the suspensions by international media rights groups, the retransmission of several Donovian radio stations has remained barred.

Print Media

Two years ago, the president approved a law to facilitate the privatization of print media owned by central government authorities, which watchdogs praised as an important step toward increasing pluralism in the sector. Separate legislation signed last December initiated the formation of a state-run multiplatform news service to boost the country’s international media presence and image, and to provide prompt and responsive information about developments in Pirtuni.

Advertising revenue for print media has declined in recent years, leaving newspapers even more financially dependent on moneyed elites with particular political and business interests. Paid content disguised as news remains widespread and weakens the credibility of journalists, especially during elections. Difficult economic conditions in Pirtuni have placed the media sector, particularly small outlets, under financial strain in recent years.

Telephone

Pirtuni's telecommunications development plan emphasizes improving domestic trunk lines, international connections, and the mobile-cellular system. Two decades ago, the country possessed a telephone system that was antiquated, inefficient, and in disrepair. More than 3.5 million applications for telephones could not be satisfied. Telephone capacity has improved significantly over the past several years as government investment in telecommunications infrastructure is now a priority. About one-third of Pirtuni’s networks are digital, and a majority of regional centers now have digital switching stations. The mobile-cellular telephone system's expansion has slowed, largely due to saturation of the market, which has reached 125

mobile phones per 100 people. Pirtuni has two new domestic trunk lines that are part of the fiber-optic Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) system. Three Pirtunian links have also been installed in the fiber-optic Trans- European Lines (TEL) project that connects 18 countries.

The information and communication technologies (ICT) sector is regulated by the National Agency for Communications and Information (NACI), which was reformed from the previous National Committee on Communications (NCC) five years ago. Members of NACI are appointed by the President of Pirtuni. The lucrative nature of the ICT industry has driven a high degree of corruption within the government. Appointments to the Commission are often not transparent. The Law on Communications, passed thirteen years ago, does not guarantee the independence of the NACI. Instead, industry experts point to a number of inconsistencies between sector laws and the NACI’s decisions. For example, five years ago the Commission refused to prolong the operating license of a mobile provider with no explanation.

Postal/Courier

The Pirtunian Postal Service (PPS) is well-established and capable of moving mail and freight to all areas of the country. Demands from the business community spurred a decade-long investment in infrastructure to increase the efficiency and capabilities of the PPS. The organization has achieved internationally-accepted standards for mail service. Additionally, a number of private local and international package-delivery companies supplement and compete with the PPS.

Word of Mouth

Word-of-mouth communication is more important in rural areas and among older populations. The wide and convenient availability of other forms of communication, such as television, radio, and the Internet, has decreased the importance of word-of-mouth communication in general. Personal interactions have given way to e-mailing, texting, YouTube, Facebook, and other forms of social media.

Information Control

Citizens enjoy widespread and regionally-unique freedom of expression. There are no burdensome restrictions on journalists and a number of groups and associations, including the Pirtunian Journalist Union (PJU) and the Independent Media Union of Pirtuni (IMUP), are able to support the interests of journalists. There continue to be small attempts to censor and control the media, usually during the time leading up to elections; however, these seem to be attempts by groups to test the extent to which current laws and regulations can be pushed for self-serving interests. Judicial decisions generally support an environment that values freedom of expression.

INFOWAR

Pirtuni’s INFOWAR capabilities are a mixture of old and new technology. Older equipment forms the basis for much of Pirtuni’s INFOWAR warfighting capability; however, it has recently purchased more-modern equipment from Western countries. The Pirtunian military conducts advanced INFOWAR operations through an INFOWAR battalion that includes units dedicated to deception, computer warfare and information attack, perception management, electronic warfare, intelligence management, and Information protection and security.

Electronic Warfare

The Pirtunian military fields an electronic warfare (EW) company within its information warfare battalion. The country maintains an extensive EW capability. It is able to leverage relationships with Western countries to enhance its capabilities. Pirtuni’s EW is well-integrated into its force structure and is a key enabler for combat forces. Pirtuni maintains a wide variety of sensors and jammers on ground, air, and naval platforms. Relationships with Western countries give it access to EW training; however, there is still a limited number of trained operators for its EW capacity.

Computer Attack

The Pirtunian military fields a computer warfare/information attack company within its information warfare battalion. The military maintains the ability to conduct computer attack (CA) along a spectrum of abilities ranging from small, deniable probes to massive, overwhelming onslaught. Pirtuni will attempt to use other INFOWAR capability, such as deception and protection, to enable computer attack.

Information Attack

The Pirtunian military fields a computer warfare/information attack company within its information warfare battalion. Its military is expert at integrating this capability with other INFOWAR elements and will rely on information attack (IA) against enemies with technological overmatch. Pirtuni’s INFOWAR theory states that IA is the core of any attack, from the tactical to the strategic.

Deception

The Pirtunian military fields a deception company within its information warfare battalion. Pirtunian doctrine emphasizes battlefield deception. Its doctrine requires the use of decoys, tactical feints, and other techniques to prevent or delay the enemy’s main effort. Its international defense procurement and training emphasizes acquisition of the latest reconnaissance and deception techniques and tools to improve its deception operation capabilities.

Physical Destruction

Pirtunian deep-strike elements such as short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, strike aircraft, and special-purpose forces will aggressively target enemy INFOWAR assets and capabilities. Pirtunian doctrine stresses the eventual destruction of enemy INFOWAR assets after their neutralization by non-strike means.

Protection and Security Measures

The military fields an information protection and security platoon within its information warfare battalion. Protection and security measures (PSM) are a defined weakness of the military. Pirtuni views the application of integrated Western technology to its systems as a way to safeguard its information; however, Pirtunian doctrine has not been upgraded for over a decade.

Perception Management

The Pirtunian military fields a perception management company within its information warfare battalion; however, its ability to influence populations beyond its borders is limited. It will likely use perception management most aggressively on its own citizens, particularly separatist populations, as a way to generate support for government operations.

Intelligence

Pirtuni possesses a capable intelligence organization. It has a foreign intelligence service, the Pirtunian Foreign Information Service (PFIS); a domestic intelligence service, the Pirtunian National Defense Service (PNDS); and a military intelligence organization, the Pirtunian Military Information Service (PMIS). All three organizations are very involved in operations globally and are capable of collecting intelligence from a variety of sources. Much of that capability is focused on the surrounding region to combat terrorism, economic competition, and local influence competitors. Pirtuni’s Western relationships provide it with limited access to intelligence from these and other countries.

Human Intelligence

Pirtuni enjoys a robust human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. Its HUMINT services are aggressive and able to exploit many locally-influential political, economic, military, and social entities. Additionally, Pirtuni is able to leverage relationships with Western countries for the sharing of HUMINT.

Open Source Intelligence

Open source intelligence (OSINT) efforts generally focus on regional rivals, particularly Donovia. Pirtuni is also concerned with separatist movements within its borders.

Signals Intelligence

Pirtunian signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets include ground, aircraft, and satellite collection capability. The military’s SIGINT provides the early-warning and target-discrimination capability for hard-kill capable platforms. The country also maintains SIGINT collection stations in other parts of the world. Its relationships with Western countries gives Pirtuni limited access to SIGINT products from those countries.

Imagery Intelligence

Pirtunian imagery intelligence (IMINT) collection capability is comparable to other countries in the region with the exception of Donovia. The military maintains air-breathing manned and unmanned aerial vehicle platforms for tactical collection capability. It maintains one dedicated military imaging satellite with electro-optical (EO) capabilities and synthetic aperture radar. Pirtuni has access to multiple commercial imaging capabilities through lease agreements with foreign countries.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

Pirtuni has a capable national scientific intelligence apparatus. Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) operations typically support all other intelligence collection efforts and can provide direct support to combat operations through space-based collectors such as infrared imagers.

Summary

Pirtuni is free from many of the information constraints operative in other countries in the region. While censorship and other forms of information control have occurred, they have seldom been upheld by the courts. Protests and other forms of dissent are allowed. Journalistic freedom has led to government restraint, greater transparency, and significant reforms.

Pirtuni’s greatest perceived threat is Donovia, due in part to Donovian agitation of separatist movements on their shared border. Due to the long-standing friction, Pirtuni has tried to maintain parity with Donovian INFOWAR capabilities. The country therefore leverages relationships with Western countries to acquire INFOWAR equipment and training to compete with Donovia.

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