Military: Arnland
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Contents
- 1 National Command Authority
- 2 Strategic Perception
- 3 Ministry of Defense
- 4 Defense Policy and Priorities
- 5 Military Forces Overview
- 6 Army Overview
- 7 Naval Forces Overview
- 8 Air Force Overview
- 9 Other Forces
- 10 Standby Defense Forces (SDF)
- 11 Paramilitary Forces
- 12 Military Industrial Complex
- 13 Research & Development
- 14 Chemical Program
- 15 Procurement
- 16 Special Considerations
Nominally, there are in total, some 29,000 ADF personnel in uniform. If the SDF is mobilized, the force expands to a theoretical strength of 56,000 (including 4,000 border guards) or approximately 2.5% of the population. In principle, there are a further 200,000 people with a reserve commitment that could be called to arms for a total national mobilization, but the structures to put a national mobilization into effect are virtually non‐existent.
Arnland’s military forces are essentially dysfunctional. Although there are pockets of excellence, the majority of the force is poorly trained, poorly equipped, badly paid, and ineffective. The situation is not helped by an overabundance of senior officers, and a command structure that is seriously rank heavy. In size, the forces are on a rough par with nations of similar size, but the command structure is much larger and more complicated than is justified by the forces themselves. In addition, each command represents a power base for its commander with spheres of influence that overlap and compete with those of other commanders and non‐military individuals and groups. Corruption within the forces is widespread. At approximately 1.3% of GDP, expenditure on the military is not unreasonable, but it is clear that not all of the money voted for defense actually reaches its intended destination. Money is siphoned off at all levels and positions of authority are seen as opportunities for personal enrichment with advancement to these posts subject to facilitation payments of increasing value to match the influence of the post.
National Command Authority
Under the 1992 Constitution, the President of the Republic of Arnland acts as the ceremonial Commander‐in‐Chief of the Arnish armed forces. In terms of formal control, the Minister of Defense holds supreme command authority over the Military, though the President assumes command during periods of crisis.
Strategic Perception
Arnland’s strategic perception is skewed by its view of Torrike and its assessment that Torrike’s ultimate aim is to suppress Arnland's independence and re‐establish control over the nation. Arnland sees the Gulf of Bothnia Cooperation Council (GBCC) as a Torrikan initiative to re-establish a Torrike-led empire. These deep seated fears date back to the declaration of independence in 1917. Arnland has always considered Torrikan acceptance of their state to be grudging; as Torrike has prospered and Arnland floundered, so this perception has started to verge on an obsession that colors all other strategic issues. As Arnland considers Framland to be in Torrike’s pocket, Framish efforts to promote stability in the region and assist the democratic development of Arnland are seen as backdoor attempts to unduly influence Arnland. Bothnia is considered a proxy for Torrike and is also viewed as a proxy threat. Arnland's approach to the European Union (EU) is also affected by this perception. EU membership is considered to be a useful shield against Torrikan ambitions, although it would also bring serious outside attention on Arnland’s own failings. Membership is seen as a distant prospect at best, but even engagement in the process seeking membership is considered to have benefits vis‐à‐vis the Torrikan re-assimilation threat.
Ministry of Defense
The ministry is charged with the political leadership of the Armed Forces. It comprises a series of departments and directorates. The ministry is responsible for the implementation of the Arnland Government defense policy.
After a relatively short time in office, the minister implemented a modern structure for the Ministry of Defense, this included assuming formal control of military intelligence, military higher education and military medical services.
The Minister of Defense is responsible for the political control and the overall strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Defense (CHOD) is the professional head of the Military.
Command and Control
The Military command structure evolved continuously in complexity and size over the past 20 years. One of the priorities announced by the Minister of Defense upon his nomination, was to reform and modernize the command and control structure. Nevertheless, for the time being, little change has been observed.
In peacetime, the President of the Republic performs the ceremonial role of Commander‐in‐Chief, but operational control of the Armed Forces rests with the Minister of Defense. In times of war, or after the declaration of a military state of emergency, the President assumes full control of the Armed Forces, both ADF and SDF.
The Chief of Defense (CHOD) sits in the central MoD and reports to the Minister of Defense. Beneath the MoD and the CHOD subordinates both the Active Defense Forces and the Standby Defense Forces. The General Staff in charge of the ADF including the Army, Navy and Air Force which have separate service headquarters. For operational purposes and training General Staff controls both the ADF and the SDF. The Directorate for General Procurement and Logistics (DGPL), Human Resources Management Directorate (HRMD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MISS) also possess their own, independent, organizations which also theoretically report to the Minister through the CHOD. The Ballistic Missile Force and the Special Forces report directly to the CHOD, although the support is provided by the Army through General Staff.
Defense Policy and Priorities
Arnland’s Defense Policy has traditionally been focused on the threat from the north. The political turmoil that followed the fall of the communist regime was not conducive to the formulation of a coherent defense policy beyond the defense of the State. Since the formation of a more stable government 10 years ago, consensus has been achieved and a new and more relevant Defense Policy issued.
Restatement of Defense Policy identified the following priorities for Defense making a clear allocation of responsibilities of the Active Defense Forces (ADF) and Standby Defense Forces (SDF):
- DP1 ‐ The protection of the territorial integrity of Arnland against external aggression (ADF supported where necessary by SDF).
- DP2 ‐ The protection of the constitutional order as determined by law (ADF supported where necessary by SDF).
- DP3 ‐ The provision of assistance to local government in times of crisis (SDF assisted where necessary by ADF).
- DP4 ‐ The provision of assistance to the population in the event of natural or industrial disasters. (SDF assisted where necessary by ADF).
Military Forces Overview
Roles and Missions
The primary mission of the Military is the defense and preservation of the Arnish State. This translates into the following tasks:- The surveillance and patrol of the territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zone, and airspace of Arnland.
- The preparation of defense plans for Arnland against external aggression.
- The training and equipping of the Military to discharge the defense plans.
- The organization and training of the Standby Defense Forces.
- The provision of suitable military advice to the Minister of Defense and the Government.
- The provision of military force in assistance to the Arnland Civil Defense Agency (ACDA)
Structure
By-and-large, Arnland has an adequate, if somewhat antiquated, set of armed forces. In addition to the usual services of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, there are three distinct entities: the Directorate General Procurement and Logistics (DGPL), the Human Resources Management Directorate (HRMD), and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MISS). MISS is double hatted covering tasks from strategic, operational to tactical intelligence. MISS components considered to be part of the Active Defense Forces consist of the intelligence branch from the General Staff and other unknown elements distributed throughout the ADF with both intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities and tasks.
In addition to a regular Army of three all‐arms brigades, a Ballistic Missile Force (BMF) and a Special Forces Brigade (SFB), there is a reserve force, the Standby Defense Forces (SDF) of six regional battalions. Additionally, there is a small Air Force and Navy structured to support the Army in the defense of the country. The ability of the Military to conduct a coherent and effective defense of Arnland is open to question. For the most part, their equipment is old and poorly maintained and the run of the mill conscript is poorly trained and poorly motivated. This is partly due to the lack of training of those actually conscript, coupled with an exclusion for those citizens who are undertaking higher education. Conversely, junior officers and NCOs are well schooled in the theory of combat and are certainly capable of conducting low level warfare effectively.
Endemic corruption represents a major challenge to military cohesion and efficiency. At unit level, a combination of severe discipline and forceful leadership keeps the conscripts in line. From a conscript point of view, military service is seen as something that must be endured and keeping a low profile by fulfilling basic military tasks is a standard survival strategy. Those who cannot cope often go Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and a percentage cross the border into Torrike or Denmark. All attempts to date to rein in the corruption have been unsuccessful. Ten years ago, a specialist Internal Audit Commission was set up reporting directly to the Minister of Defense. However, this was disbanded after an investigation had shown that paying off the auditors had merely added an extra 2 to 3% to the overall operating costs of the MOD. The President has outlined proposals for a new body to investigate and tackle corruption within the government, but details of this are limited at present.
The Military is largely made up of career soldiers and conscripts. The total personnel (including 12,000 civilian employees) numbers are approximately 41,000. The strength of the services is as follows:
- Army: 21,000 personnel
- Air Force: 3,500 personnel
- Navy: 4,500 personnel
Women make almost 13% of the Military, but there are few female senior and flag officers. Being a minority, military women are often treated with excessive attention or subjected to positive discrimination.
General Staff
The General Staff of the Military is Arnland's main military headquarters and is responsible for the conduct of strategic and joint military planning in order to meet the Defense Policy requirements.
General Staff main responsibilities include:
- Developing the military command structure
- Planning and observing the conscription
- Planning and observing the training of the military active and reserve forces
- Conducting military joint operations strategic planning
- Coordinating military joint operations
- Performing other tasks determined by National Defense Law
The General Staff is headquartered in Alsstad, it is responsible for coordinating the joint effort of the Active Defense Forces and its three major branches Army, Air Force and Navy (each headed by Commander under the direction of Chief of the General Staff, who in turn is responsible to the CHOD). The General Staff also retain staff and coordination responsibilities for the Standby Defense Force. The SDF is regionally based and although commanded by the SDF battalion commanders, they are under the control of the County Governor. In times of peace, the governor can mobilize the SDF units for disaster relief operations. Nevertheless, in times of crisis or war, the command and control of the SDF is held by the Chief of Defense through the General Staff.
Strategic Capabilities
Arnland’s sole strategic capability consists of the BMF, commanded by a Major General. Despite its impressive title, in reality it comprises four batteries of SCUD B with a total of 24 launchers (TEL – Transporter Erector Launcher). Arnland originally bought some 72 missiles in 1980, but several have been fired and it is thought that not all the remaining missiles are serviceable.
Army Overview
The Army is the most important branch of the Military. The Army is comprised of three regular Brigades, the Ballistic Missile Force and the Special Forces Brigade (SFB) , with a total strength of around 21,000 personnel, although called the Special Forces “Brigade”, the SFB are, in reality, a reinforced battalion. The structure consists of a headquarters, a training squadron, a reconnaissance squadron and four intervention companies.
The regular brigades have a standard structure of three motorized infantry battalions, with integral armor, artillery, reconnaissance, antitank, air defense, engineer, and logistics support. The nominal strength of an infantry battalion is around 950 troops.
The Army is equipped for conventional warfare, where their tactics and procedures are designed to utilize the equipment in a defensive delaying conflict against a more powerful neighbor. At the operational level the design for battle will be to fight a conventional war. But aging equipment and manning concerns have developed a more irregular style of tactics at the lower level which are well developed, practiced and understood and may prove effective. The inevitable consequences of this disconnect between the operational and tactical level is that the Military will fight incoherently.
Within the Armed Forces, the Army is responsible for Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD), although the overall lead for dealing with IEDs rests with the Arnland State Police Service (ASPS). Within the Army, while the ADF has some Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) capability, it has no Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) capability. The SDF has no EOD capability. The Military has limited exploitation capabilities and although the EOD teams have some basic knowledge of Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and level 1 exploitation, this is not widespread. The ADF does not possess an Electronic Counter Measures or Counter Remote‐Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (ECM/CREW) capability. Additionally, the ADF EOD (CMD) staff can only conduct CMD manually and has no remote capability or route clearance capability.
The Presidential Guard, consisting of one mechanized battalion with supporting anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and mortar, is stationed in the capital Alsstad. The Presidential Guard is under the administrative command to the Chief of Defense but under the direct control of the Presidential Administration of Arnland.
Army Size and Structure
The size of the Army is around 21,000 men and women, excluding the BMF and SFB of which numbers are not public. The numbers do not include the military and the civilian personnel composing the command structure above brigade level.
At first examination, the command structure of the Army is complex, but straightforward. The Army is under the direct command of the Chief of Defense whereas the operational control is ensured by the General Staff. The Army is headed by the Commander of the Army, whose HQ is located in Jönköping. The Army HQ comprises two distinct commands, one for operations and one for support:
- Land Operations Command (LOC). In peacetime, Land Operations Command is responsible for the command and control of the regular Brigades and for war and emergency planning for the Army in their entirety. The LOC incorporates liaison elements from the SDF HQ and SF HQ. In war, the separate HQs merge to form a Supreme High Command (SHC) which assumes responsibility for all land operations. However, the SBF will continue to plan their operations under the broad direction of the LOC.
- Land Support Command (LSC). The LSC is responsible for personnel, engineering, logistics and medical support to the Army. As such, it controls the Army contracting and estate management functions and is another source of the diversion of funds to nefarious ends. It is also responsible for Army training and runs the Army Training School (ATS) which covers the full gamut of functional courses from basic training through infantry and artillery to reconnaissance.
Special Forces Brigade. The SFB are headed by the Major General Malte Gradholm. The SF commander is responsible for all aspects of organization, training and operations. Theoretically the SF is tasked by General Staff, while the Army is supposed to provide only logistics and support to SF operations through the Land Support Command. In practice, the SF reports directly to the CHOD.
Ballistic Missile Force. As is the case for the SF, the Army provides only administrative support and assistance to the Ballistic Missile Force (BMF) through the Land Support Command. On paper the operational tasking comes directly from the General Staff; in practice the BMF reports directly to the CHOD. The support arrangements work reasonably efficiently on a day to day basis, but any exceptional support requirements are staffed through Army HQ and the General Staff before they are authorized.
Army Roles and Missions
The prime mission of the Army is the defense of the territorial integrity of Arnland against any aggressor. In addition to its main broad mission the Army has a number of other tasks:
- In times of war, or emergency, the protection of critical infrastructure against attack or sabotage, with a special emphasis on the country’s nuclear plants. In peace time this task falls under the Minister of Interior responsibility
- The preparation and training of the Army to meet its designated mission
- In times of war or emergency the provision of armed assistance to the Police Forces and other authorities to preserve law and order
- The provision of protection and assistance to the populace in the event of natural disasters, in coordination with other governmental agencies
The Army has no formal role or designated task in countering terrorism; however, elements do operate in conjunction with the Minister of Interior on specific operations. However, the increased effectiveness of the Arnish Popular Front (APF) terrorist organization has led to increasing Army assistance to the Ministry of Public Order (MOPO).
Army Training and Readiness
The Army is responsible for practical (military skills, etc.) training, while training of a more academic bent (staff work) is delivered by the War College. Within the Army, training is organized and managed by the Army Training School, which runs induction training and specialist military skills courses. Each unit is responsible for the integration training of new conscripts and for continuation training. Formation training is conducted periodically and there is a formal program of all arms training that culminates in an annual Army exercise, which lasts for two weeks each summer.
Army Equipment and Weapons
The majority of Arnland’s military equipment is old but relatively serviceable. Most of the equipment was sourced from Donovia and Olvana and little of it is newer than 30 years old. The reliability of the equipment is derived more from the robust nature of Donovian design than the quality of the Army’s maintenance organization. The main obstacle to updating the inventory is a lack of funds.
From the period after the collapse of the communist regime until around 2000, there was little money in the Government’s coffers and re‐equipping the Military has not been a priority. Since then, there have been a number of proposals to replace antiquated weapon systems, but these have had little success. The Army’s current priorities are the replacement of the MBT fleet and the modernization of the artillery. However, the actual process may be long and complicated. The initial success in placing an order for 100 main battle tanks (MBT) with Olvana seem to have hit finance related difficulties and only some 20% have been delivered to date. It is not clear what level of spares and technical support has been established for these vehicles. The other major program running at present is a bid to source an effective Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS). Arnland retains a sizeable number of BM21 Grad rocket launchers, but the Army leadership feels these are verging on obsolescence and would prefer something more effective. Contacts have been made with Olvana, South Torbia, Belesia, and Donovia, but no firm proposals have been made to date.
Less ambitious programs have been generally successful, although the relationship of costs paid to capability delivered probably does not pay too close an examination. The Army is well equipped with relatively modern Man‐portable air‐defense systems (MANPADS) and general purpose vehicles.
Traditionally, air defense has been the poor relation within the Army, receiving at best minimal command interest and funding. The systems in service are almost exclusively point defense, relying on twin 23mm anti‐aircraft artillery (AAA) and MANPADS. The sole exception to this approach was the 712th Air Defense Regiment and the 412th Air Defense Brigade of the Skåne Brigade which are charged with the air defense of the capital. These latter units operate the obsolescent S‐75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA‐2 GUIDELINE) system. In 2013, Bothnia proposed an affordable program to upgrade these systems to SA‐75M Volga standard and to further enhance Arnland’s air defense system with a number of 9K37 Buk (NATO reporting name SA‐11 GADFLY) mobile missile units which had been rendered surplus to requirements by the Bothnian’s own upgrade program. This prompted a series of objections and complaints from both Denmark and Torrike. In the event, Arnland could only afford a single battery and placated the protests of its neighbors by offering to base the unit in southern Kalmar, thus not offering an immediate threat to either Torrike or Denmark. The unit was stood up in early 2014 and was due to reach operational status in mid-2015. Whether Arnland possesses the skills to operate the equipment effectively, remains open to question.
Elements of a potentially effective air defense system exist, and some of the equipment sourced from Torrike could provide the foundation. The Arnish version of the Giraffe system is a capable platform, although the Arnish forces still need assistance and specialized expertise from Torrike or other specialized nations to organize these sensors into an effective functioning air control and reporting system. Technically the system is capable of detecting low‐flying, low signature objects, although the Arnish ability to use these capabilities to the full is doubtful. When fully integrated, the various elements could provide Arnland with a comprehensive air and sea picture. However, there have been distinct challenges in achieving that level of integration and reportedly some compatibility problems between equipment of various ages and origins.
Army Logistics and Medical
The Logistics Staff Division (under the LSC) is organized in separate staff branches covering fuels, maintenance, transportation, engineering and storage. Weapons storage and distribution is covered by the Ordnance Division. The logistic troops on Army level are organized in a Central Logistic Base (CLB) which counts four battalions (Maintenance battalion, supply and storage battalion, infrastructure engineering and medical support battalion). Although part of the Army logistics system, the CLB is directly subordinated to DGPL. Each ADF brigade has its own support battalion with a maintenance company, an engineering company and a supply and transport company in it. Each battalion has a small maintenance platoon and a supply and transport platoon. Surprisingly, perhaps, the logistics organization has the reputation of being both efficient and effective, albeit not very flexible. Stocks of spares, weapons, ammunition and most of the essentials of warfare are considered to be more than adequate. The degree to which Army's stocks are sold for non‐military use is difficult to determine, although fuel and transportation services are particularly prone to abuse. Elements within the Ordnance Division certainly appear to sanction a trade in weapons, both to organized crime gangs and potentially also the terrorists. Some weapons recovered from gangs in Europe have also been traced back to Arnland.
Medical.
Each brigade has an organic NATO Role‐2 equivalent field hospital providing emergency surgery with subsequent transfer to an established military hospital. Each Army brigade has access to a deployable field hospital. In theory this can be rapidly deployed, although it requires the employment of key surgical personnel working in the military hospitals, which would take several days. The field hospital is air‐transportable on helicopters or planes and fills the equivalent of six NATO pallets. Total manpower consists of 55 staff including medics, electricians and cooks. The structure of the field hospital is shown below:
Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) instead of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is the norm given the lack of adequate paramedical or nursing staff. Environmental Health services are non‐existent or extremely limited, thus exposing the Military to a much higher risk from disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI) than other militaries in the region.
From a naval perspective, Arnland is highly vulnerable. With the exception of the northern border Arnland is surrounded by water. The very busy international shipping route running through the exceptionally narrow strait between Denmark and its shore, presents it with some extremely demanding maritime defense challenges. The naval force has fared slightly better in terms of equipment and funding in comparison to the Army. Although the small fleet is not terribly modern, it operates a limited number of vessels that are well suited to the kind of operations with which it is charged. An additional bonus (in every sense of the word), is provided by the shared naval base at Karlskrona. Part of the fee for the lease to Torrike includes common training with Navy and partial maintenance of the facilities.
At some just under 5,000 personnel, the Navy is one of the smallest in Europe. For the most part, its personnel are on a full time engagement, initially for four years with the opportunity for a full career. Conscripts are called up to the Navy, but few actually serve. Those conscripts that do serve are usually employed as security guards at the bases, or in the Coastal Artillery units. Almost all seagoing personnel are professionals.
The structure is less complicated than that of the Army. The Commander of the Navy – Vice Admiral, divides his time between Naval Operational Command (NOC) located in Helsingborg, and the Navy HQ (NHQ) in Alsstad. The NHQ incorporates all normal HQ functions (equivalent to NATO N1 to N9). Within the NHQ, there is a separate office responsible for the Karlskrona Base ‐ Karlskrona Base Office - that handles relations with the Torrikan forces located in Karlskrona. The chief of the office is directly subordinated to the Commander of the Navy and works in close coordination with the Karlskrona Base Commander. The Karlskrona Base Office Head is the sole Commodore position within the Navy. The Commander of the Navy is supported by the Deputy Navy commander.
Beneath the Navy Headquarters (NHQ), similarly to the Army HQ, there are two commands: one for operations ‐ Navy Operational Command – (NOC) and one for support – Navy Support Command (NSC). NOC is responsible for the command and control of 3 operational Squadrons (Corvette; Patrol; FPB) and controls the navy training establishments. Both are commanded by two‐star Deputy Chiefs who are responsible for coordinating aspects of operations and support respectively.
Although the Coast Guard is not subordinate to the Navy, or indeed, the MoD, there are close links between the two services. Both have a role in combating smuggling and illegal immigration and work in close connection with the Customs Service. This, of course, is an area that is open to abuse.
The mission of the Navy is to train, organize and deploy naval capabilities to defend Arnland against any external maritime threat both in peacetime and in times of crisis. This includes the following primary tasks:
- Deter external aggression against Arnland
- Provide forces in peacetime to ensure the territorial integrity of Arnland and the protection and security of the Exclusive Economic Zone
- Maintain freedom of navigation through the international waters between Arnland and Denmark
- Support the Coast Guard in operations against criminal trafficking (counter narcotics, drugs, weapons, human and illegal goods)
- Contribute to humanitarian operations in the wider Baltic region.
- Maintain the integrity of the shared naval base at Karlskrona and ensure the associated relationship with Torrike remains mutually beneficial;
- Provide support to the civil authorities in times of civil emergency;
- Provide maritime advice to the CHOD. There are no specified tasks requiring the Navy to support or operate with either of the other services in joint operations.
The Commander of the Navy’s declared intent is to establish and maintain the Navy at a level of efficiency that enables it to discharge its tasks. In pursuit of this intent, he plans the gradual modernization of the fleet and hopes to be able to purchase a number of more modern vessels as they are declared surplus by other navies. The current economic downturn is seen as providing opportunities, even as it puts pressure on the State’s already limited funding. Ideally he would wish to acquire a helicopter capability beyond that the Coast Guard occasionally lends to the fleet. This may not be financially achievable.
Basic sea training and military skills are the responsibility of the Naval Training Establishment (NTE). Many of the courses in seamanship and the basics of naval operations are provided by Torrike and run in joint Torrikan/Arnish courses at Karlskrona. Advanced professional courses are provided either by academic institutions, or the Danish, Polish, or Torrikan Navies. However, the training budget is small and few places are actually taken up. Integration into a ship’s crew and practical training in operating both at individual ship level and in formations is the responsibility of the operational squadrons. There is an annual squadron level exercise and a biennial fleet exercise. The training programs for individual ships and the units build towards these exercises. Periodic informal exercises with the Coast Guard and the Air Force also take place. Combined training with the Army is limited to base defense exercises and liaison visits.
The major surface vessels are Donovian or Eastern European designs purchased during the height of the Cold War.
The Naval logistics set up is straightforward. Major programs and common use items are dealt with by the Director General Logistics’ department in the MoD while routine resupply, fuel, spares, etc. are in the province of the Logistics Branch in Navy Staff. Each of the naval bases incorporates its own depots and spares that are specific to type are centralized at the main operating base for the type. Transportation of logistics needs between bases is mainly by contracted commercial services.
The Naval medical establishment is very limited. Each base has a small medical center and each ship has one rating reportedly trained in advanced first‐aid, though standards are believed to be variable. There is a medical advisor on the staff of the Deputy Chief Support in the Navy Staff who, by virtue of his position, is able to provide access to well‐equipped military hospital facilities for the families of Service personnel, thus giving him greater influence than otherwise might have been the case.
Air Force Overview
The Arnland Air Force (AAF) is small and far from effective. Its aircraft are old and verging on the obsolete and for the most part, poorly maintained. Spares support is adequate, but operating funds are tight. There are a number of proposals for the modernization of the force, but whether any of these are affordable remains open to question.
As an organization, the Air Force is largely moribund. Promotion is slow to non‐existent and majority of the senior officers have been in place for too long. Relations with the other elements of the forces are poor and the Air Force is viewed as unresponsive and unreliable. There are justified views within the other forces that the tactical transport capabilities are more dedicated to commercial enterprise than meeting the needs of the Army or Navy.
Air Force Size and Structure
The command structure is simple. Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in Alsstad directly commands the small number of largely single role squadrons. AFHQ covers the normal range of staff functions; the manning is thin, but adequate for the purposes of the AAF. AFHQ has underneath two so called commands which in fact are merely two departments within the AFHQ. The AAF Operations Command (AOC) and the AAF Support Command (ASC).
Although the squadrons are coordinated through the air bases they are stationed at, there is no intermediate level of command, with each of the squadrons reporting directly to AFHQ. The AOC directs day to day operations. The AOC, in effect acts as the operations center, directly tasking the operational squadrons and monitoring and assessing their reports in return. The defense air and sea surveillance mechanisms are obsolete and barely functional. The AAF maintains a limited operational picture of Arnland’s air and maritime Areas of responsibility (AOR) and Areas of Interest (AOI). This relies heavily on commercial air traffic systems and the maritime AIS vessel tracking system (VTMIS), supplemented by reports from the military systems and naval and Coast Guard patrols to give it a slightly more operational focus. The JOC of General Staff in turn feeds information deemed of importance to the Naval HQ in Karlskrona. Besides its main operating base in Ljungbyhed in Skåne County, the AAF has other two bases in Kallinge (Blekinge County), where the helicopters squadron is stationed, and Hagshult (Jönköping County), where the ATC and Tactical Transportation Squadrons are stationed.
Air Force Roles and Missions
The prime function of the AF is to discharge its responsibilities under the identified Defense Priorities which can be summarized as the preservation of the territorial integrity of the State against aggression. Specifically this means the policing of its airspace both in the nation’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) and Area following tasks:
- The provision of Air Defense to the country
- The provision of support to Army or Naval operations
- The provision of maritime surveillance support
- The provision of appropriate assistance to civilian authorities for disaster relief
- The provision of a VIP transportation service to Government ministers In pursuit of these roles, the following secondary tasks have been identified:
- The preparation and organization of the force to meet the designated missions
- The preparation of appropriate contingency plans in conjunction with the Army and Navy
- The provision of appropriate specialist air advice to the other services, the MOD and the Government
Air Force Personnel, Training, Medical, and Readiness
The technical nature of most of the core AF activities means that it has little need for unskilled conscripts. Those who do serve fill menial roles for the most part. The majority of servicemen are full time professionals on 8 ‐10 year engagements, while most aircrew serve on 20 year engagements. One benefit of the disorganized command structure is that most pilots and other crew spend most of their service career flying. The downside is that the throughput of aircrew is low and the demand for new aircrew is correspondingly low. With a total strength of only some 3,500 personnel, the AF is a fairly intimate organization; with no deployment role and only three Bases, it is also a fairly static one.
Training within the AF falls into two categories; firstly professional training and secondly operational training. Professional training is delivered by a number of agencies. Basic military skills are learned in recruit training which is provided by the Army. Officers’ basic training is provided by the War College. The majority of technical training is delivered by commercial schools and basic flying training and all helicopters flying training is also provided by commercial organizations. Advanced jet flying training is delivered in‐house. Operational training is run against an annual program that integrates continuation training with unit and multi role exercises. The transport fleet exercise program feeds off the Army’s exercise program and contributes to the operational integration of the services.
Each base has a small medical unit and the Head of the AF Medical Branch is an aviation medicine specialist. Of interest, the current incumbent, despite being a political appointee and a member of the fairly moribund AF leadership, is actually professionally extremely competent has published a variety of cutting‐edge papers on his subject. He possesses the credibility (and political patronage) to liaise extensively internationally and has reported close professional links with his counterparts throughout the region.
Air Force Equipment, Weapons, and Logistics
With the exception of the VIP Transportation Squadron, the Air Force’s aircraft are old and tired. Although the standard of maintenance is fairly basic, in operational terms the aircraft are adequate for their day to day purpose. There are essentially two shortcomings; there are too few aircraft to form an effective fighting force and the level of funding means that aircrew in the combat fleet only have the bare minimum of flying hours to be safe. The transport and helicopter fleet are more heavily used, but largely for non‐military purposes.
The AF has ambitions to replace the fighter force with a more modern and effective weapon system, but at present no funds are available for such a project.
AF logistics is the responsibility of the ASC. As is the case with the other forces, the main procurement responsibility rests with DGPL, while each service deals with the management of the specifics for their service. Each base has a storage facility and as each aircraft is operated from a single base, there is little storage redundancy. Transportation of spares, etc., is by commercial service. The AAF performs first and second line maintenance only; deeper servicing and maintenance is carried out commercially. Maintenance of the VIP Transportation Squadron fleet and the transport fleet is performed by Arnish industry. Availability of funds is a major constraint in maintaining the fleet at the required levels, although funds are always available to keep the VIP fleet in top condition.
The Air Force has never lacked pilots, not least because of the availability of training aircraft and the attractiveness of flying as a career. However, the effectiveness of the force is in inverse ratio to the technical complexity of the specific aircraft type. An alternative way of looking at it is that the availability of a specific aircraft type is in direct proportion to its commercial prospects. The highest serviceability rates are found in the VIP fleet and the tactical transports, with the helicopter and flying training fleet lying in the middle. Serviceability and availability of the fast jet fleet is extremely low, partly due to a lack of spares leading to the cannibalization of some aircraft to support the others, and partly due to a lack of overall interest in their prime function. Olvana has been contacted with a view to modernizing the fleet, or at least bringing all the aircraft up to a safe standard. However, so far, no contracts have been signed.
Other Forces
Presidential Guard
The Presidential Guard Regiment is a specialized unit that has both state ceremonial duties and a conventional military function. Notwithstanding its title, the unit is part of the regular structure of the Military and reports to the CHOD through the General Staff. The Regiment’s ceremonial duties comprise both standard tasks (formal guard at the Presidential Palace, at the opening of the National Assembly, etc.) and state tasks (honor guard for visiting heads of state, etc.). Its prime military function is the protection of the capital and in particular the government (as an entity) against external attack. To this end, the unit is structured and equipped more along the lines of an all‐arms battle group, than a conventional infantry unit. The ceremonial detachment is drawn from within the overall ranks on a rotational basis. Although conscripts do serve within the Regiment, all are carefully selected and the unit suffers none of the problems observed in other ADF organizations.
Based on the perceived importance of its role, the Presidential Guards Regiment has priority within the Military for funding and equipment. As a result it is the best equipped unit within the Arnish forces. The Regiment is structured along the following lines.
- Regimental HQ (includes signals element with enhanced communications suite)
- Ceremonial detachment (drawn from within the overall structure)
- Armored squadron + Mechanized infantry company+
- Anti‐aircraft Company. Anti‐tank and light artillery company.
- Close protection company (drawn from SFB)
Military Intelligence and Security Service (MISS)
The MISS is directly subordinated to the Minister of Defense and has an important place in the national security and defense of the country. The mandated function of the MISS is to provide the military and political leadership with relevant strategic intelligence and early warning on the risks and threats to the national security of Arnland. It has close links with the intelligence branches of each of the services and recruits the majority of its staff from them.
The MISS is able to use the full range of military collection facilities, but these are extremely limited. Arnland has no strategic SIGINT collection platforms.
The major missions of the MISS are:
- Obtaining, analyzing and dissemination of the intelligence information to the senior civil and military authorities
- Performing special tasks in order to promote the national interests and policy in economic, political, military, technical, environmental and informational areas
- Contributing to the national defense, fostering the economic development, promoting science and technology, protecting the State borders
- Contributing to operations against terrorism, international organized crime, drug, arms and technologies trafficking, illegal immigration
- Counteracting external threats with potential to affect the national security, lives and health of its citizens and the state facilities abroad
Standby Defense Forces (SDF)
The Arnish reserve forces are called the Standby Defense Forces (SDF). In peacetime, the SDF are under the control of the respective regions governor. Although the Military are responsible for keeping track of the reservists, maintaining stockpiles of equipment for mobilization and periodically conducting combined training, for the time being, the SDF have only been mobilized and utilized for disaster relief activities.
The commander of the Standby Defense Force, is responsible for the organization, training and control of the SDF regional battalions. The commander has a separate HQ staff and holds equal rank with the Chief of the General Staff. As such he does not regard himself as subordinate to the General Staff. On mobilization, however, the SDF HQ staffs are absorbed into the General Staff and the SDF battalions come under their direct command.
Paramilitary Forces
There are no formally legal paramilitary troops within Arnland, although the police element of the SFB Hostage Rescue Company could be counted as paramilitary.
Military Industrial Complex
Arnland does not possess a functional formal military industrial complex as such. Arnish industry does produce a wide range of materiel that has potential military usage, such as vehicles (trucks) and some electronics and the shipyards at Karlskrona are capable of constructing or modifying small warships, however, there is no formal arms industry as such. Arnland industry does possess the ability to produce small arms and ammunition as well as to perform the overhaul and maintenance of complex equipment and vehicles. Arnland produces a version of the AK-47 under license obtained from Donovia in the 1970s. However, due to lack of orders from the international market and the financial scarcity on the national market, few weapons were produced by these capabilities in the last 10 years. Major weapons systems are supposed to be sourced from imports (when funds are available). All significant military purchases are managed through Director General Procurement’s establishment
Research & Development
Arnland has currently no significant military R&D programs.
Chemical Program
A chemical weapons program was initiated in 1950. The program was actively maintained by Arnland until the fall of communism in 1991. Apparently the chemical weapons produced in this time span were decommissioned starting from 2001 when Arnland joined the GBCC seeking to normalize relations with the GBCC countries and the Western world. Arnland joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2001, and declared 20 tons of mustard gas and 1,200 tons of chemical precursors, as well as 3,100 chemical weapon munitions.
In 2001 Arnland has officially started a process of transformation of the two production facilities located in Skåne and Jönköping Counties. The claimed intention was to turn these two facilities to food (in Skåne) and fertilizer (Jönköping) factories, respectively. The process was supposed to take less than 5 years but it has been systematically extended until present days with the Jönköping facility still under transformation.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been supervising the destruction of Arnland's chemical weapons caches since 2002. Allegedly, by 2013, the Arnish government had destroyed 60% of its precursor materials and 75% of its mustard gas, as well as the 90% chemical weapon munitions. In early 2013, OPCW said reports are indicating that the remainder is secured and the process continues to unfold appropriately.
Procurement
Maintenance of aircraft, weapons and systems is outsourced to the Arnish industry to the greatest extent possible, with the military performing only first and second line servicing. The intention is to boost local industry and also help counter the low quality of much of the conscript workforce. In fact, the DGPL has turned these contracts in significant sources of benefits. Fake tenders are organized and disadvantageous contracts are signed under the close monitoring of DGPL Director. Everything is a win‐win‐loss type of business where the loss goes for the state budget and the wins for the DGPL Director and respectively for the owners of the companies who "win" the contracts. Moreover, there is a political interference coming from opposite sides. However, the DGPL Director manages to stay politically neutral and follow only his self‐enrichment agenda.
Special Considerations
Corruption is the most serious issue within the Military. Low level corruption is endemic with much of the conscripts pay to NCOs and junior officers to evade unpleasant duties or even to get leave approved. Pay is not centralized and units disburse wages directly to their own personnel. Not all of the pay reaches the intended recipient. Some units release conscripts early (often after as little as a quarter of their formal commitment) but continue to report them in their manpower returns and claim the salaries. The resultant profit is then split between various members of the unit’s command and administration structure. Promotion within the officer corps depends on patronage and it is customary for the promoted to thank his patron (and others in the chain) financially after each promotion. The situation has had a deleterious effect on the military efficiency of the Military and is discussed further below.
High level corruption is also pervasive. The procurement area is seen as an especially rich target and every major arms purchase has had allegations of bribery attached to it. Other alleged areas of unusual practice include hiring out tactical transport aircraft to civilian companies, the illegal sale of Government property (including land and housing), the sale of fuel to commercial companies, hiring out conscripts as security guards and the use of SF personnel as bodyguards.