Volume 1: Ground Systems

Chapter 1: Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with organizing, collecting, and studying information on the enemy, terrain, and weather in the area of operation. Aggressive, continuous reconnaissance allows the timely accomplishment of combat missions with minimum losses. Poor reconnaissance can lead directly to failure.

The OPFOR term that addresses the totality of reconnaissance activities is RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition). Therefore, RISTA DOES NOT equal the US term, C4ISR (command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). For information on OPFOR command and control (C2), see Chapter 9.

The OPFOR commits significant resources to reconnaissance. Prior to hostilities, the OPFOR will already have developed an intelligence picture and expected military courses of actions. While the OPFOR practices similar intelligence and reconnaissance disciplines (HUMINT, SIGNINT, IMINT, etc.) as the US, the OPFOR conducts RISTA with different assets, focuses, and methodologies. Reconnaissance platforms must be able to operate in all spheres: ground, surface, below surface, air, space, naval, and littoral areas. The OPFOR fields reconnaissance assets at all echelons and products derived from those assets are used for actions on the battlefield.

This chapter describes ground maneuver forces and specialized ground troops (special purpose forces-SPF) reconnaissance assets. The most basic sensors are lasers/optics/electro-optics used by infantry units (see Chapter 2). When linked with a radio, these basic sensors can be used for unit reporting and other HUMINT reports. There are also dedicated reconnaissance assets with data sheets in other chapters.

• Aerial reconnaissance (Rotary-Wing and Fixed Wing aviation chapters in Volume 2)

• Air defense reconnaissance, early warning, and target acquisition (Air Defense chapter in Volume 2)

• Artillery target acquisition (Artillery chapter)
• Engineer reconnaissance (Engineer chapter)
• NBC reconnaissance (Chemical chapter)
• Signals reconnaissance (Information Warfare chapter)
• Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV chapter in Volume 2)

The reconnaissance effort depends upon sensor technologies for location, surveillance, and acquisition. Most units will employ a mix of older and newer systems, with recon vehicles, portable sensors, and man-portable sensors. The most prolific sensor on the battlefield is the human eye. Range is a critical factor. The table below gives general range capabilities.

The most prolific reconnaissance discipline is HUMINT reports generated by ground units. Much of this reconnaissance effort consists of tactical recon missions executed by maneuver units in their operational area. Any unit can generate reconnaissance. The OPFOR will exploit civilian information and acquisition assets for reconnaissance purposes. While OPFOR units may operate reconnaissance vehicles, most will have possess the ability to operate dismounted observation posts (OP). These dismounted OPs may possess similar capabilities as vehicle mounted patrol vehicles. The OPFOR will used many types of vehicles for reconnaissance including motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, or civilian vehicles. The OPFOR will use equipment such as multi-spectral concealment materials, navigation equipment, light-weight laptop computers, and long-range communications/digital transmission systems while conducing reconnaissance.

Questions and comments on reconnaissance for specific equipment should be addressed to the respective chapter POC. Questions concerning this chapter should be addressed to:

RISTA Key Technology Trends

Mr. H. David Pendleton DSN: 552-7946 Commercial (913) 684-7946

mail address: [[1]]

RISTA Key Technology Trends

Military forces continue to field new RISTA systems and upgrade old legacy systems. These systems can be found in both reconnaissance, tactical, and fir support units.

System Category	Technology Trend	Vol/ Page	System Example	Ref Page
Ubiquitous Handheld RISTA System	Remote electronic optics (EO)/3d generation thermal sight, 30x zoom precise location, video link, & graphic net	V1/1-17	Sophie MF	V1/1-32
	EO bionics with forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera, laser rangefinder (LRF), and goniometer for precise target location	V1/1-19	ADAD	V1/1-23
	LADAR optical augmentation scans & detects enemy weapon sights	V1/1-21	Mirage 1200	V1/1-21
	Robotic hand-thrown camera with PDA display, & robot/ball mount	V1/1-25	Macroswiss	V1/1-18
	Camera grenade (rifle, RPG, AGL) remotes in- flight image to display	V1/1-25	SPARCS	V2/4-8
RISTA Dismount Team Assets	Man-portable II camera net to display monitor & alert system	V1/1-17	Nighthawk	V1/1-18
	Site spy cameras with remote-display images on monitor	V1/1-18	NG-30	V1/1-17
	EO Laser target designator guides laser homing round to 10+ km	V1/1-20	DHY-307	V1/1-20
	Man-portable radar with 24 km range and LPI frequency	V1/1-22	Squire	V1/1-22
	Multi-sensor unattended ground sensors with remote monitor display	V1/1-24	CLASSIC 2000	V1/1-24
	Hand-launch UAVs/micro-UAVS for infantry, SPF, RISTA, AT, etc.	V1/1-26	Zala 421-08	V2/4-6
	Masted 50+x EO, 3d generation thermal sights & other sensors for real-time nets	V1/1-6	ATM	V1/4-9

RISTA Vehicles	Integrated weapons with sensor pods for combat reconnaissance vehicles	V1/1/6	BRM-3K	V1/1-11
	Mast-mounted motorized LPI radars & real- time digital transmission	V1/1-7	HJ-62C	V1/1/13
	Remote add-on turrets & radar modules for vehicle conversion	V1/1-7	Stalker	V1/1-7
Aerial RISTA Systems	Powered airship or aerostat with video camera or other sensor arrays	V1/1-23	TAOS/Sky Media Pro	V2/7-2
	Helicopter/weapon-launch UAV munitions for real time intel/targeting	V1/1-26	R-90	V2/1-8
	Helicopters & FW with real-time MTI; synthetic aperture radar	V2/2-21	Horizon	V2/2-21
Other RISTA Assets	INFOWAR, UAV, aerial & HUMINT assets tactically linked & fused	V1/1-7	HJ-62C	V1/1-13
	Handheld & embedded GNSS receivers for in- view displays	V1/1-14	Magellan GPS	V1/1-14
	EO laser RF weapon sights with 3d generation day & night capability	V1/1-14	IS-2000	V1/2-30
	Acoustic sensors quickly detect vehicles, weapons & aircraft	V1/1-21	HALO	V1/1-21
	Trip-wire charges, mines, or sensor-fused grenade launchers	V1/1-23	AJAX	V1/1-23
	Artillery/aerial-delivered & hand-emplaced UGS display in intelligence net	V1/1-24	BSA	V1/1-24
	Weapon launched sensor munitions for aircraft & artillery	V1/1-26	R-90	V2/1-7
	Laptop display data transmission systems, encryption, and satellite communication (SATCOM)	V1/1-30	Kredo-M1	V1/1-30

Reconnaissance Vehicles

The OPFOR conducts continuous and pervasive reconnaissance activity in all phases of military operations. To accomplish their reconnaissance, the OPFOR uses a variety of vehicles based on the enemy threat and the mobility desired. The spectrum of reconnaissance vehicles range from old systems ill-suited for modern requirements to mobile, lethal, and survivable systems equipped with complex sensor arrays and communication equipment. Some vehicles may work alone or as part of a patrol.

The vehicle most used for reconnaissance is an unarmored 4 X 4 wheeled rive tactical utility vehicle or TUV (see the Infantry chapter for examples). The US M151 or Jeep was originally designed as a reconnaissance vehicle and many countries still favor a similar system due to their small size, speed, and maneuverability in a variety of terrain. Some countries have upgraded their reconnaissance vehicles to something similar to the US HMMWV or British Land Rover.

Reconnaissance vehicles are designed or other vehicles are modified to fit the role desired, force requirements, and the terrain in which the vehicle needs to operate. The vehicles may be unarmed except for small arms carried by the personnel in the vehicle or other larger weapons such as a machine gun or automatic grenade launcher (AGL) may be mounted on the vehicle. Many TUV chassis are poorly suited to adding additional armor for protection of the crew. The additional weight compromises the other positive aspects of the vehicle.

The armored scout car is sometimes better suited for reconnaissance than the TUV. These wheeled vehicles offer good road mobility, and better all-terrain off-road mobility than other vehicle types. The vehicle can be based on a truck, armored personnel carrier, or indigenous chassis to handle the added armor requirements while maintaining good mobility. Many of these vehicles may resemble a TUV, but are designed from the ground up for reconnaissance missions. The armor is often light and the wheels are vulnerable to nearly all weapons. Other improvements may be amphibious capability such as with the French VBL and VBR and larger caliber weapons. Examples of these vehicles include the British Fox, Hungarian FUG-66, and Russian BRDM-2.

In heavy combat or when a larger number of soldiers is needed, the OPFOR will often use modified Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) or Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) as a reconnaissance vehicle. Other countries have produced specialized combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) designed to operate ahead of the forward line of troops (FLOT), not to initiate combat, but survived if attacked. These CRVs often sacrifice space for soldiers to gain increased mobility, additional sensors, or increased C2 capacity. Many CRVs use tracks instead of wheels, but the wheeled vehicles have amphibious capabilities the tracked vehicles do not. Examples of CRVs include the Russian BRM-3K, the British Scimitar, and the Austrian Pandur RECCE vehicle.

A newer generation came about with the addition of mast mounts and multi-sensor suites to create a sensor reconnaissance vehicle. These vehicles are not designed to operate forward of the FLOT, but behind the lines using cover while providing continuous data to ground forces. These vehicles feature powerful multi-sensor arrays using masts from five to 10 meters high provide longer-range surveillance with less vulnerability to enemy fires. Most of these sensor vehicles are built on an IFV or APC chassis provides the space for three to five work stations. These vehicles can also serve as an intelligence coordination and analysis center. These vehicles are likely to move less often than a CRV. Examples of these sensor reconnaissance vehicles include the Czech Snezka and Chinese Type 85 with HJ-62C radar. There are also sensor vehicles available for specific branches such as the Russian PRP- 3//PRP-4M for artillery units and the Russian Sborka for air defense units.

Many countries are not using their limited defense dollars not on producing new reconnaissance vehicles, but on improving the sensor suites and mounted them on other vehicles such as the Israeli Rafael Stalker or the French VBL. Some countries are going as far as putting sensors on motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles. See the Infantry chapter for various types of these vehicles are available.

Since reconnaissance forces often operate far away from other friendly units, they need to defend themselves. Some countries have developed vehicles for such purpose with enough firepower, but still can complete the reconnaissance requirements. Examples include the British Saladin Armored Car and the Austrian Pandur Fire Support Vehicle. The main guns on thse vehicles can range from 57 mm to 105 mm on the South African Rooikat. These vehicles are often modified versions of a basic IFV, APC, or other armored vehicle modified to make the vehicle most suitable for reconnaissance vehicles. Some of the more common reconnaissance vehicles are on the following data sheets.

Sensor Technologies for Tactical Ground Forces

Reconnaissance units use a mixture of high and low technologies. As noted in TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, forces may perform tactical reconnaissance using designated reconnaissance units/soldiers or maneuver unit soldiers. Sensors span an increasing wider segments of the electromagnetic spectrum while integration C2, navigation systems, data processing, and fusing technologies. Developers offer more compact packages, platforms, sensor integration, and mobility systems for greater situational awareness, better operational security, and shorter response time than ever before.

Reconnaissance starts with location and navigation. Instruments include survey instruments (i.e, Bulgarian PAB-2A theodolite), aiming circles or goniometers, GPS receivers, maps, compasses, terrain data, and inertial guidance systems. Commercial equipment such as the Magellan handheld GPS units are sufficient for most forces. Other more advance equipment such as navigation data for laser rangefinders (LRF) and improved communications with digital interface ensure precise navigation.

The primary battlefield sensor is still the human eye, but human vision receives much help. Weapons sights are often used. See the Infantry chapter for day and night weapon sights. Almost all reconnaissance forces use optics such as sights, binoculars, or telescopes to increase viewing capacity. Most of these sights operate in the visual light (0.4-0.75 µm) electro-magnetic  (EM) spectrum.  Binoculars  can vary  in  features and

magnifications and usually zoom from 7-12 (x) power. For longer-range day acquisition, the OPFOR uses spotting telescopes (Celestron and Swarovski models) with 60 x zoom capability. Other features could include anti-fogging lens coatings, camouflage netting, tripods for better stability or binocular periscopes (German RWDL) for covert viewing.

Night-time observation systems which operate in the visual band spectrum are all daylight observation systems similar to the human eye and therefore require visual light illumination to see. The Infantry chapter discusses the capability of using starlight, moonlight, or street lights to enable the average soldier to see greater distances. Illumination support equipment includes spotlights, flashlights, or pyrotechnics (grenades, illumination rounds) to bring light to dark spaces. Specialized devices are available, such as the Universal Tactical Light, which can be mounted on weapons and is located near the weapon’s trigger. Fires or other improvised lighting offer illumination support. To ensure operational security, the OPFOR will usually not use artificial illumination until the fire fight is underway.

Reconnaissance personnel on today’s battlefields have increased their use electro-optical (EO) systems to convert an image into a digital electronic signal that is sent to a display circuit (i.e., photocathode tube or micro-channel plate) for viewing. While optical zoom lens are still critical, EO cameras require almost no focal length or mirrors reducing their size and bulk. Polymers and composite material produce ergonomic devices that are easier to hold with image processing/transmission capabilities for rapid exploitation and dissemination. Zoom capacity can reach 84 x or more allows rapid detection at 10 km or more in distance for selected targets. Day and night EO technologies include TV cameras can convert video imagery into an RF signal to transmit it to a receiver/display unit. Tripod-mounted or aircraft sensor pods can acquire targets at 10-30+ km in distance. Larger systems allows vehicles and aircraft to mount sensors with even longer ranges, better resolutions, and longer transmission ranges.

ELECTRO-MAGNETIC SPECTRUM AND SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES
Light Band	Alternate Name	Microns	Technologies
Ultraviolet	UV/Black Light	0.01 – 0.40	Mercury Arc

Visible Light	Daylight	0.40 – 0.75	Eye, Optics, TV, Charged- Coupled Device (CCD)
Near Infrared	NIR	0.75 – 1.30	CCD, Image Intensifiers (II), Active IR
	Shore-Wavelength IR	1.30 – 3.00	Active IR
Mid-Infrared	Mid-Wavelength IR	3.00 – 6.00	Thermal
Far Infrared	Long-Wavelength IR	6.00 – 15.00	Thermal/Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)

All night-time observation systems that operate outside of the visual spectrum are EO systems. CCD offers some capability during dawn and dusk and periods of adverse weather that create low light levels. Sub-component improvements offer night vision devices that are clearer, more compact, more resistant to glare, require less power, more time between service, with new features including laser pointers, better zoom, greater magnification, or electronic zoom capability. Commercial grade viewers offer affordable alternatives to military systems. Electronic zoom (EZ) can expand images to multiply the optical zoom by a factor of 3-8 x resulting in magnification of 60-100+ x in affordable systems. This doubles or triples the acquisition range, but could reduce image clarity in the highest EZ modes.

One inexpensive digital technology is the charged-coupled device (CCD) used in many video camcorders and some cameras operate in the near IR

(0.75 – 1.3 µm) band. These CCDs generally lack ability to see in absolute darkness, but most (Bushnell Night- Hawk) offer superior day vision, video capability, and can be used in “low-light-level” (LLL) conditions. There are some 20-80 x CCD binoculars claim a day acquisition range of 10 km (8 km for man-sized targets).

The following table notes the evolution and variety of viewing sensors meld EO with other technologies used by reconnaissance as well as other ground force units.

EVOLUTION OF OPTICS AND EO SENSORS: GROUND FORCES APPLICATIONS
Surveillance and Observation	Added Technology	Weapons Target Acquisition
Binoculars Theodolites Telescopes	Optics (Lenses and Reticles)	Day Sights (Telescopes & Collimators)
Day/Night Viewers Digital Cameras Video Recorders	Electro-Optics	Day Sights Night Sights
Laser Rangefinders (LRF)	Laser Technology	Laser Aiming Sights & Pointers

Laser Illuminators “Radars”		FCS Optical Augmentation
Digital Survey Sets	Navigation/Unit Location (GPS, Computer, LRF, Goniometer)	LRF Fire Control Systems
UAV Drone Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV)	Rocket Motor/Airframe	Fiber-Optic Guided Missiles Attack UAVs Laser-Homing Missiles
Micro-UAV; Canister Launch UAV Artillery/Rocket Launch UAV TV Recon Grenades, Projectiles, or Rounds	Artillery/Grenade/Canister Launcher	Attack UAVs Laser-Homing Munitions, Rockets Laser Target Designators
Unattended Ground Sensors (Cameras) Multi-Sensor Pods (Vehicles/UGS) Passive IR (Autotracker) Alerters	Remote Cameras/Acoustics (Motor Drive Actuator/Controls)	Side-Attack Mine Sensor Units Unattended Anti-Tank Grenade Launchers (ATGL) Sensors
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)	Robotic Cameras (Robotic Chassis)	UGVs with guns, ATGLs, or ATGMs Robotic Mines

Night Infrared Viewers operate in the 0.75 – 2.00 µm band employ active light sources such as IR spotlights and this technology is easily detectible by adversaries with night vision systems. Therefore, the use of this technology has declined as the passive mode range is limited creating limited practical value. Passive night technology such as II can be found in the Infantry chapter. This technology is now in its 3rd generation, but some companies are claiming a 4th generation technology. This technology continues to expand due

to requirements from hunters, police, and the military. Night vision goggles (NVGs), such as the Malaysian NG-30, allows for hands-free operations such as for driving with many affordable ($200+) for the Nighthawk. The cheaper NVGs, however, may not offer as many features as those designed specifically for the military. Some cameras fuse II and CCD together for effective and affordable day/night use. Many night scopes, night views, and NVGs are not weapon’s sights, but can be used to improve accurate firing. These devices can be used to detect targets or queue new targets for weapons. An assistant with an NVG could use a visual light pointer to designate targets for the weapons operator to engage.

A newer night vision technology called thermal imagery (TI) is now challenging II in popularity as it surpasses the former in range and resolution. TI can “see” any object with temperature different than the background objects so TI can operate in absolute darkness. TI, however, does possess some limitations.

• Shapes are sometimes converted into images not readily recognized based on the human’s visual frame of reference.
• At certain times of the day, the temperature changes may alter shapes or render objects invisible.
• Lack of heat from selected targets means the TI may not see objects in the foreground or background, which helps to provide contrast and context to the observer.
• Generally TI are bulkier than II and require bulky and noisy coolant bottles or power supplies.
• TI sensors are usually more expensive than II sensors.

TI does offer several significant advantages as TI is particularly sensitive to temperatures of warm-blooded animals, vehicle engines, solar-heated metal surfaces, and running gear from moving vehicles. Even after a vehicle stops, the residual engine heat renders a clear TI image for an hour or more. Second, TI usually provides faster and easier detection than II. Many TI systems use cameras operating in the mid-IR band (3.00 – 6.00 µm) with ranges up to 2 to 3 km. FLIR, operating in the far-IR (6.00 – 15.00 µm) band, offers superior clarity and range (3-4 km) for most applications making it the preferred technology. Due to increased production and competition, the cost has declined so TI is affordable for priority weapons such as ATGM launchers, tanks, and IFV. In Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces, TI is commonly used in reconnaissance vehicles.

Over the years, TI has improved so it can be categorized by generation like II. The current proliferation of mercury- cadmium-telluride and SPRITE detector staring arrays increased ranges to 5+ km while improving the discrimination of the images. A recent development is the uncooled TI

that eliminates the bulky coolant bottle. An even more recent 3rd generation system combines II and FLIR to fuse them into one clear image. Reduction in the size of parts including microcircuits and imagers have produced portable TI viewing systems. In Tier 1 and 2 reconnaissance units and selected other units, key sensors and dismounted personnel will possess Sophie thermal binoculars with the II/FLIR upgrade. Some reconnaissance units may employ ATGM thermal sights for battlefield surveillance. The larger the system, the longer range and better clarity of most IR systems.

The     miniaturization     of    camera     technologies     through CMOS

(complementary metal-oxide semi-conductor) transistors and the spread of commercial products offer fertile ground for new military reconnaissance applications. EO systems, such as the Bushnell Nighthawk CCD Viewer and Digital Imaging System 22 x 60 spotter scope offers video output could be transmitted to computers or goniometer systems. These cameras allow remote viewing options. “Nanny-cams” such as the XCam2 or British Spy Vision can monitor close-in areas such as urban streets and then transmit the images. Tactical applications could include hand-thrown cameras such as the Macroswiss. Other off-the-shelf technology such as digital cameras, camera cell phones, and binocular CCD imagers possess military applications.

Lasers are important for measurement, location, and target acquisition. The most important of these is the laser rangefinder or LRF. The LRF is used to measure distances to targets, surveying, or self-location—all important in firing both direct and indirect fire weapons. Many fire control systems on crew-served weapons or on combat vehicles include  an in-viewer  LRF that provides  data into the  FCS computer for target acquisition. Dismounted

soldiers can used a hand-held LRF as as the Leica Vector or Aselan LH-7800 binoculars can precisely measure ranges out to 10 km. Some binocular LRFs, such as the Eloptro LH-40C and Russian 1D18, can range targets to 20 km limited only by line-of-sight and the subject’s size. Some of these hand-held systems such as the Bushnell Lytespeed with a 1 km range cost less than

$300.

One of the biggest benefits of lasers integrated into EO systems is increased responsiveness as the optics, EO, acoustics, radars, and other sensors can provide accurate location without the need for a second azimuth to solve an intersection problem. The time required to obtain the second azimuth could allow the target to escape if they are moving. Targets can be precisely located and engaged with only one azimuth, a laser snap, and a simple ballistic computer.

The goniometer uses LRF technology and is similar to the old aiming circles used in artillery and mortar units to fire indirect fire. The goniometer surveys itself  into  position  on  a  tripod  base with an azimuth viewer. Most

goniometers are illuminated for night-time use, carry a GPS mount, and a simple computer (or programmable calculator) to determine self-location, directions, and elevations/deflections. Some goniometers are linked to a digital transmission system or have one built right into the system. A binocular LRF could be mounted on top to sight and range objects, targets, and registration points. Night sights can be added for 24-hour operations. The system can be referred to as a goniometer system, a fire control system (Vetronix Mortar FCS-MORFIRE), a forward observer system or FOS (OIP Delft), an observation station (Leica Digital), a targeting system (Sure Strike), or other names. The modern goniometer-based LRF FOS for the OPFOR is the SG12 with GPS, Leica 21 LRF with 12 km range, thermal night sight, computer interface, and digital data transfer. The entire time to emplace the system is under two minutes.

An aiming circle can be used for similar purposes with the same accuracy, but only when all of the separate components (LRF, GPS, computer, digital transmission system) are present. Often, a goniometer-based system can be more responsive, move more quickly, and produce greater accuracy than an aiming circle. Any OPFOR aiming circle should be regarded as the base for an observation system. Most dismounted forces worldwide will use an aiming circle or goniometer-based system. Due to its size and ability to be broken down, the goniometer system is portable and easily carried almost anywhere on the battlefield. In the past, 100 meters was considered accurate. With the new systems, accuracy is now one to five meters creating the ability to call in precise fire against a target.

Multi-sensor suites fuse together a variety of recent technologies to create sensors that integrate day/night detection, location, and target acquisition. Most suites are found on vehicles, but suites can be created by dismounted personnel in observation posts (OP) linking the various systems together. The Eloptro LH-40C LRF can link GPS with a computer link for the viewer image to determine range,

bearing, and elevation before sending the data through a digital transmission. The LH-40C does not need a goniometer base for precise target location.

The laser target designator (LTD) is the next step in laser evolution. The LTD can guide semi-active homing bombs, artillery, naval gun rounds, mortar projectiles, rockets, and ATGMs directly onto their target. The seeker on the munitions directs the round onto the “laser splash” aimed on the target. Some LTDs, such as the Russian 1D26, can be carried by a single operator. Most LTDs include a tripod mount with other sub-assemblies such as a built-in LRF or night sight, for easy carrying by a team of two to three soldiers. It is likely that as technology increases, lighter materials will be used to create LTDs making them lighter weight and more easily carried for use by dismounted units. There have even been laser-homing grenades developed for squad ATGLs for well over a decade.

In some LTD-based FCS such as the French DHY-307, the LTD replaces the goniometer for an OP. The LTD FCS may contain such features as an encoded beam to ensure only one hit per target, counter-measures against the enemy looking for lasers, GPS, night sights, and the other sub-components found in a goniometer- based FCS. Most laser munitions can be used with most LTDs. Tier 1 and 2 OPFOR observers will operate the DHY-307 with a designation range of 10 km instead of goniometer-based system. OPFOR recon and AT observers possess the ability to call in laser rounds through man-portable LTDs with a night range out to 5 km with an accuracy of 1 m.

The laser aimer as discussed in the Infantry chapter or laser pointer are used by ground units to shoot direct fire weapons or point out targets to other personnel. The pointers, however, emit light and offer a risk of exposure to a prepared adversary. Thus, the pointers are only used when the fire fight

begins when the using unit possesses fire superiority.

A recent laser technology is the laser locator (also known as the “laser radar” or LADAR or when linked into a weapons fire control system as “optical augmentation) that uses light detection and ranging (LIDAR) to

detect and measure ranges. LIDAR can operate in the active or passive mode. In the active mode, it employs a laser to scan in the observed sector, scanning in a band pattern similar to radar. The aligned IR viewer then looks for IR light generated by laser light reflected by optics and sights. Although the LADAR operating in an active mode creates a narrow laser beam, it limits the beam spread beyond the scanned target. Passive use of LADAR is more difficult because it depends on the use of light close to or behind the viewer in the right frequency with sufficient brightness and the right angularity for the viewer to detect down-range reflections. An example

of LADAR is the Mirage 1200 hand-held “lens detector” with a range up to 1200 m. Laser filters on optics can reduce the effectiveness of detection by LADAR. Reconnaissance vehicles and aircraft employ LADARs for day and night imagery.

For many years, reconnaissance units have detected the enemy through the process of “triangulation.” When 2 or more azimuths are obtained from known locations of a particular target, the target’s location can be determined by drawing the lines on the map to determine where the lines intersect. This intersection is the target’s location. The system previously had some limitations as the time delay from receiving the two locations with azimuths could provide faulty information, especially if the target was on the move. Recent technology can exploit this old methodology. Precise self-location with GPS, computers, digital map displays, and digital data links from different sensors can provide the two locations with the azimuths in a matter of seconds, providing both sensors are aimed at the same target.

Acoustic sensors are also found on the battlefield including multi-directional microphones, directional microphones, sound-ranging arrays, vehicle arrays, which intersect azimuths to locate sound sources including guns, helicopters, and combat vehicles. Artillery sound-ranging systems include the Russian AZK-5 and AZK-7, Swedish Soras 6, and the British HALO all use microphones digitally linked to automated processors for rapid calculation of enemy firing locations. Sensitive microphones on various Israeli Helispot systems, including autonomous acoustic vehicles, enable them to detect and locate enemy helicopters in flight. Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) units also use acoustic sensors to determine target locations.

The military continues to find new applications for radar systems, whether they are battlefield surveillance systems mounted on tripods, carriages, weapons, vehicles, aerial platforms, or even trees. New technologies such as miniaturization, millimeter-wave (MMW), improved power supplies, links to laptop computers offer other new applications. Compact radars such as the Fara-1 offer man-portable carrying capability and attachment to weapons, such as automatic grenade launchers (AGL) for fire direction. Slightly larger systems include the Thales Squire two-man radar system with a 24 km operating range that is portable in packs. Tripod-mounted radars such as the Credo-1E can link to digital nets with the ability for easy emplacement or displacement.

The major disadvantage of radar is the system actively emits a signal the enemy can locate through Electronic Warfare (EW) or other systems making the radar vulnerable to attack. Squire is a low probability of intercept (LPI) radar due to its extremely low peak power. Other LIP features include phased array with lower power levels for detectors, reduced side lobes, and operating frequencies outside of most radar intercept system bandwidths. The most common frequency bands for land radar systems have been the I and J bands. In recent years, new radar technologies have been field to add LIP features to reduce intercept vulnerability. Airborne radar such as Horizon use moving target indicator (MTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and Doppler processing with secure stand- off for missions. MMW radars (30+ GHz) offer precise acquisition and fire control, compact size antennas, and lower signal detectability.

Two other technology trends are on the rise—remote sensors and robotic sensors. Remote sensors are generally immobile, although they may be able to change their field of view in order to see as required. A simple remote sensor is a side-attack mine, such as an anti-tank disposable grenade launcher placed along an expected advance for vehicles and linked to an autonomous acoustic sensor unit, such as AJAC. As the enemy approaches, usually along a road, the device will launch a grenade, thus audibly signaling the vehicle’s approach. Robotic sensors can relocate to perform their mission. Civilian applications have led to a wide variety of remote cameras, remote actuators on robotic systems, and the use with unattended ground sensors including acoustic, IR, seismic, tripwire-

electronic, and magnetic. Key technology constraints include detectability shortfalls, power supply and battery limitations, and signal transmission inadequacies, but the issues are in the process of being resolved. Use of fused sensors means more accurate, timely, and complete reports. Rechargeable batteries, acoustic.IR wake-up, miniaturization, and increased sensor sensitivity all make the use of remote sensors and sensor suites practical as well as marketable.

The British Radamec 1000L system is an example of a remote camera with limited operator presence to detect targets. Other applications include cameras tethered from concealed vehicles and operated through the vehicle power system. New technologies include passive IR scanning cameras with auto-track and alert algorithms such as the French Sirene or British ADAD IR units emplaced on the battlefield to link into sensor nets and monitor sensitive avenues of approach and unit flanks. Early systems include air defense sensors such as ADA, Sirene, or the hand-held Swedish IRS-700. A tethered aerostat balloon can hold a remote camera platform to increase surveillance beyond the line-of-sight. The Israeli TAOS system uses a gimbaled, stabilized, multi-sensor platform with a CCD and thermal camera for day or night use. Radar and laser illuminator applications are optional with the ground station mounted on a trailer. Ground forces are also adapting commercial camera network technologies to create a surveillance camera network that can monitor wide areas on the battlefield. These systems include the CELTICS, TACS, and Gamma 2000—all produced by Israel.

The use of an unattended ground sensor (UGS) by the US dates back to the Vietnam War where the UGS units were placed to detect enemy presence and movement. Some of these sensors were “break-wire” that generated a signal when broken. While the most common UGS is acoustic, other UGS units can monitor seismic, magnetic, infrared, or RF activity. Some UGS units can sleep to save energy and the size can vary from a few centimeters to a few inches in size. Relay systems may be required to forward the signal to the monitoring station. By analyzing the location and pattern of signals, the operator is cued to initiate additional battlefield surveillance activities in selected areas. Examples of UGS units include the Thales Miniature Intrusion Sensor (MIS) and Rafael. Current technology reduces false alarms such as from animals wandering in the area. Emplacement is important as if placed in too open of an area, the UGS can be seen. If placed in an urban or defilade position, the signal may not reach the monitoring station. Larger UGS units may be placed at road junctions, river crossing sites, and other important locations. Examples of the larger UGS units include the ATE UGS, Steel Eagle, Gateway, and Boden- Sensor-Ausstattung (BSA). The Thales CLASSIC 200 has been sold t over 39 countries for military, border control, police, and commercial purposes with a complete network with monitor, acoustic, cameras, and other sensors. Possible roles for the UGS include perimeter protection, route monitoring, and point surveillance. Emerging UGS technologies include linking to other sensors, mine activation, remote weapons system operation, and autonomous cueing to conduct precision targeting. A subset of the UGS is the remotely-delivered sensor that delivers reconnaissance rounds through a weapons system such as artillery or mortars. These rounds, once fired and activated, can provide target location, acquisition, and post-mission battle damage assessment. Cameras provide a low-cost method to obtain immediate view beyond the line-of-sight, over the hill, or behind the foliage, with a reduced risk of being seen. The Israeli IMI recently debuted a Refaim rifle grenade containing a camera that can transmit pictures back to the launching unit as the round descended on its target. A 40-mm under-barrel rifle grenade launcher can fire the Israeli Firefly that transmits video and sound back to a digital radio and laptop computer. In addition to their anti-tank role, fiber-optic ATGMs can use their camera to provide video footage for analysis by reconnaissance units.

Robotic sensors consist of single or multiple sensors mounted on robots or unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) chassis. Previous applications include the exploration of the ocean floor, other planets, and inaccessible areas

such as caves or volcanoes. The police often uses a robotic sensor for surveillance in hostile situations as well as examining contamination areas such as the Chernobyl nuclear plant. A military version is the tracked Matilda with a day TV camera used in Afghan caves, clearing minefields, and checking for potential IEDs. The OPFOR can use robotic sensors for surveillance and patrols in urban or open terrain to reduce troop vulnerability. A simple application is to use robots controlled from reconnaissance vehicles or nearby personnel. A robotic chassis features EO viewers for guidance and surveillance, such as a TV camera with an RF or cable link; GPS in-view readouts; a thermal or II night channel; and LRF. A robot can carry other sensors including acoustic microphones, NBC samples, radar, or weapons. Other robotic examples include the British tracked Wheelbarrow mine detection system or the Giant Viper wheeled line charge launcher vehicle that tows its own charge trailer. The German company, Telerob, produces tracked robots for industrial, police, and military applications. The Russian SPC robot can employ a number of sensors.

The earliest robotic sensors on the modern battlefield were unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). See Volume 2 for additional information on UAVs. UAVs can perform pre-programmed (drone) or operator control (remotely piloted vehicle—RPV) missions. The on-board TV camera and its ability to transmit the images to a ground station are the core of the UAV mission. In the last few years, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) have appeared to attack located targets. A UAV ground station can consist of only a notebook computer or PDA as a terminal. Due to the high cost of airplanes and the training required to become a proficient pilot, UAVs are an excellent way to work through budget constraints and lack of an efficient manned air force. Recent or expanded technology for UAVs include the following:

• Man-portable UAVs are light weight and can be carried in a backpack and launched by hand such as the German Carolo, Russian Pustelga, or French K100.
• Micro-aerial Vehicles (MAV) use radio-control (RC) model plane technology where some of these are not larger than a man’s hand.
• Improvised UAVs using RC aircraft.
• Vehicle/robotic launch UAVs including canister launchers such as the Israeli Skylite UAV or the UAV the French are looking for their next LeClerc tank upgrade.
• Weapons-launched UAVs such as the Russian R-90 300- mm launched by the 9A152-2 MRL can loiter for 30 minutes while transmitting imagery to an artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV).
• LTD UAV where the UAV substitutes as the laser designated in lieu of a soldier or vehicle.

Battlefield monitoring systems require the use of cable links or RF data transmission equipment, and display arrays such as those found in vehicles modified into ground stations. These systems can fuse various technologies, including commercial equipment, together to obtain the best situational awareness possible for the user.

Technology limitations will continue to challenge reconnaissance operations, but solutions will be found. Commercial applications will continue to cross over into the military as forces with limited budgets will continue to use off-the-shelf technology for military purposes. The OPFOR will supplement new technology with low technology to conduct their reconnaissance operations. Innovative military forces can use niche technologies and aggressive manned reconnaissance units to conduct battlefield surveillance operations. The battlefield surveillance networks will consist of personnel, organic sensors, vehicles, UGS, remote sensors, UAVs and any other reconnaissance assets available. Effective equipment, sound organization and planning, commitment to the OE variables, and effective reconnaissance tactics can enable the OFPRO to gain greater situational awareness within their operational area, and to challenge enemy capabilities to achieve tactical surprise.

Chapter 2: Infantry Weapons

Chapter 2 provides the basic characteristics of selected infantry weapons either in use or readily available to the OPFOR and therefore likely to be encountered by US forces in varying levels of conflict.

The chapter is divided into two categoriessmall arms and recoilless weapons. Small arms covers, in order, assault and battle rifles, sniper/anti-material rifles, automatic grenade launchers, under-barrel and hand held grenade launchers, light machineguns, general-purpose machineguns, and heavy machineguns. The second category, recoilless weapons, contains the most proliferated disposable launcher rocket propelled grenades and reloadable launcher RPGs and recoilless rifles.  While originally limited to shoulder-fired unguided antitank weapons such as the Russian 40-mm Antitank Grenade Launcher RPG-7V, the utility of shoulder-fired weapons has expanded to include multi-purpose systems such as the Swedish 84-mm Recoilless Rifle Carl Gustaf M2, and many other systems. This field of weapons is often labeled “antitank” and also includes “bunker-buster” warheads, and weapons which can be fired from within confined spaces such as the German 67-mm Disposable Antitank Grenade Launcher (Armbrust) due to no or minimal back blasts. New, disposable launcher Tier 1 anti-armor systems such as the RPG-28, 32 and 30 have also been added. The RPG-30, in particular, is designed to defeat both Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) and Active Protective Systems (APS) via a sub-caliber device that upon firing reaches the target milli-seconds before the main 105mm HEAT tandem warhead rocket. The RPG 28 is a heavy, 125mm tandem warhead weapon that will penetrate in excess of 1000mm of rolled, homogenous armor (RHG), after defeating ERA. Both are formidable anti-armor systems, which can be easily employed by the individual Soldier or insurgent.

An enduring battle-tested, lethal, shoulder-fired weapon is the Russian Infantry Rocket Flame Weapon RPO-A Series (RPO-A/D/Z) capable of firing either a smoke, incendiary, or a thermobaric warhead to 600 meters. At 200 meters it is accurate to 0.5 m2. The thermobaric warhead has a blast effect corresponding to a round of 122-mm HE artillery. Due to the relative low cost, availability, versatility, transportability, trainability, and lethality of this category of infantry weapons, trainers should expect to encounter these systems in larger numbers with increasing levels of lethality, penetration, and utility.

Updates and changes also include the following:  the SMLE and Moisan-Nagant bolt action rifles have been deleted from the WEG.  The Heckler and Koch G3 and Fabrique Nationale FN battle rifles have been added due to their proliferation throughout parts of Africa, South America, and the Indian sub-continent.  Additionally, the Chinese bull pup assault rifle QBZ-95 has been added along with the Russian Federation’s SV-98 sniper rifle.

Crew-served infantry weapons which require a vehicle, or which limit mobility, have been moved to the Antitank and Anti-Armor chapter (6). Questions and comments on data listed in this chapter should be addressed to:

Mr. Mike Spight

DSN: 552-7974 Commercial (913) 684-7974

E-mail address: michael.g.spight.ctr@mail.mil

Chapter 3: Infantry Vehicles

Infantry vehicles include all military vehicles designed for use by infantry and other tactical units. They vary from unarmored multi-role vehicles to specialized armored vehicles. Mechanized infantry units often use light armored fighting vehicles (LAFV) designed as infantry squad carriers. Infantry units use large numbers of vehicles, armored and unarmored, for support missions. Due to budgetary constraints, some forces also use commercial vehicles or military vehicles considered obsolete by other militaries. The US Army will likely encounter infantry forces with a mix of older, newer, and upgraded infantry vehicles in their next battle.

Vehicle Classification: The infantry can use LAFVs, multi-purpose support vehicles, specialized vehicles or commercial vehicles to transport soldiers. In wartime, the OPFOR will use all systems available to execute the mission. This chapter is divided into three sections: armored infantry carriers, fire support vehicles (FSV), and combat support vehicles (CSV).

Armored infantry carriers, also known as armored fighting vehicles (AFV) are normally divided into two types: armored personnel carriers (APC) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). In both types, a small crew of two or three soldiers stay with the AFV while a dismount team of five or more soldiers can conduct missions on foot. Normally, most AFVs carry a total of ten soldiers, but some AFVs can carry more while others less. The difference between the APC and the IFV is the APC is a “battle taxi” that dismounts the soldiers outside of direct fire range while the IFV is designed to fight with soldiers onboard to and through the objective. To qualify as an IFV, the vehicle must be able to carry a team or squad; contain enough armor to protect the occupants from light machine guns; feature a medium cannon or automatic grenade launcher (AGL) that can defeat enemy armor vehicles; shoot on the move; possess the mobility to stay with tanks while traveling on roads or across country. Many manufacturers call their vehicles various names to make them sound like an IFV, but are not. The addition of a medium cannon to an APC does not make it an AFV unless it possesses the other characteristics. Some AFVs may be dropped from the air to be used by paratroopers on the ground. Some sources will describe a vehicle as a medium armored vehicle (MAV) or a heavy armored vehicle (HAV). The term MAV will not be used in this chapter and HAVs are often AFVs built on the same track system as a tank so they can stay up with the armor. The term heavy infantry fighting vehicle (HIFV) or heavy armored personnel carrier (HAPC) refers to the vehicles protection capability, not the vehicle’s weight. For information on HAVs mounted with some type of cannon, see Chapter 4.

AFVs normally are differentiated based on three categories: mobility, survivability, and lethality. Some AFVs travel on wheels while others travel on tracks. While not a necessity, most IFVs operate on tracks in order to travel the same terrain as tanks as the tracks more evenly distribute the vehicle’s weight. Wheeled vehicles are more likely to succumb to mobility kills than tracked vehicles as tires are susceptible to punctures. Two flat tires on the same side of the vehicle may bring the vehicle to a complete stop. Survivability is the ability of the vehicle to protect its occupants and remain operational. Survivability is based on the vehicle’s armor thickness, type (modern such as reactive armor), and style (slope). Adding armor to an AFV may reduce its mobility and creates a dilemma between survivability versus mobility. Lethality is based upon the AFV’s weapon systems and the weapons’ ability to penetrate other vehicles’ armor. Increasing the size of a main gun on a vehicle, however, often reduces its mobility. Some AFVs may feature a turret, 1-man or 2-man, but others will not. AFVs often operate auxiliary weapons such as coaxial mounted machine guns (fire in the same direction as the main gun), turret-mounted machine guns, AD machine guns, or an AGL.

Many infantry units also field FSVs featuring air defense (AD), anti-tank (AT) weapons, or mortars to guard their formations against aerial or armor threats. These vehicles may be used by chemical detection teams, field artillery forward observer teams, or Many of the AT systems are discussed in Chapter 5. The OPFOR may use civilian four-wheeled drive vehicles, sport utility vehicles, or commercial vans adapted for military roles. This chapter has been reordered to put vehicles with similar characteristics together.

Selection Matrix for Infantry Carriers in a Military Force: Facts which impact the selection of the right vehicle for use in a military force may vary based on budget constraints, industrial base limitations, or political-military-industrial alliances. The following table offers engineering and employment considerations for use in selecting vehicles. An OPFOR squad is 9 to 10 personnel, counting the vehicle crew. Team size is 3 to 4, counting the vehicle crew. Infantry in this context includes SOF, insurgents, criminals and any other maneuver forces.

Factor	Tracked IFV	Wheeled IFV	Tracked APC	Wheeled APC	Light Wheeled APC	Armored Tactical Utility Vehicle	Light Strike Vehicle
Role	Fight with Squad onboard/ dismount; provide lethal fires	Fight with Squad onboard/ dismount; provide lethal fires	Carry Squad to dismount point; give covering fire	Carry Squad to dismount point; give covering fire	Carry Squad to dismount point; provide fire protection	Team carrier and multi-role functions; fire protection	Team carrier and multi-role functions; fire protection
Costs (1-10 with 10 being high)	9 to 10	8 to 10	3 to 5	4 to 7	1 to 3	1 to 3	1 to 3
Weight (mt)	@ 20 to 35	@ 20 to 25	@ 11 to 13	@ 10 to 15	@ 6 to 8	@ 4	@ 1.5
Time Deploy & Movement	Fast dash; slow over distance	Slow dash; fast over distance	Fast dash, slow over distance	Medium dash; fast over distance	Medium dash; fast over distance	Medium dash; fast over distance	Fast dash; fast over distance
Terrain	Good off- road; most swim	Poor off- road; some swim	Good off- road; all swim	Fair off- road; all swim	Medium off-road; most swim	Good off- road; most swim/high ford	Good off- road; most high ford
Threat to Vehicle (Frontal Protection)	Aircraft, AFV, AT weapon, mine/IED, artillery, flame, some obstacles 20 mm rd	Same as left; 5.56+mm MG to tires, obstacles 14.5 mm rd	Same as left; some obstacles 12.7 mm rd	Same as left; 5.56+ mm MG to tires; many obstacles 12.7 mm rd	Same as left, some obstacles 7.62 mm rd	Same as left; a few obstacles 7.62 mm rd	Same as left; almost no obstacles 5.56 mm rd
Targets for On-Board Weapons	All targets; 30-mm gun; ATGM; AGL; MG	All targets; 30-mm gun; ATGM; AGL; MG	Aircraft; LAV; 12.7 to 30 mm gun; MG; personnel	Aircraft; LAV; 12.7 to 30 mm gun; MG; personnel	Aircraft; LAV; 12.7 gun; MG; personnel	Aircraft; LAV; 7.62 to 12.7 gun; MG; personnel	Aircraft; LAV; 7.62 to 12.7 gun; MG; personnel
Support Required	High fuel use; load limits for aircraft	Medium fuel use; load limits for aircraft	Low fuel use; most aircraft loadable	Low fuel use; most aircraft loadable	Low fuel use; most aircraft loadable	Low fuel use; most aircraft loadable	Low fuel use; most aircraft loadable
Social Impact	Road size; noise; maneuver damage	Road size; block traffic if stuck	Road size; road noise	Road size; block traffic if stuck	No major	No major	No major
Example	BMP-2M	BTR-90M	Type 85	BTR-80A	Otokar Cobra	VBL	Spider

Chapter 4: Main Battle Tanks

This chapter  contains  a representative  open  source sample  of  main battle  tanks  (MBTs) in regions

covered by US combatant commands. This MBT selection is not comprehensive; however, the capabilities of vintage and modern tanks are significant indicators of organizational capabilities that adversaries can array against the United States.

A unit commander, scenario developer, curriculum developer, and/or other leader can use the WEG to configure a required level of Threat capability in an opposing force (OPFOR) as described in US Amy Regulation 350-2, Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program (2015). Practical application includes U.S. Army training, professional education, and leader development. The spectrum of WEG characteristics is descriptive―not prescriptive―and facilitates creating robust, realistic, and relevant Threat conditions in U.S. Army learning and capabilities development (CD) initiatives.

Many modern MBTs have a four-person crew of tank commander, gunner, loader, and driver. When an autoloader is part of the main gun system, the MBT has a three-person crew of tank commander, gunner-loader, and driver. Most modern MBTs mount a 105-mm to 125-mm main smoothbore gun, although limited types of MBT mount a rifled gun rather than smoothbore gun. Some MBT also have the capability to launch antitank guided missiles from their gun. Most tanks can typically stow at least 40 main gun rounds in the tank. Those tanks with an autoloader allow for immediate automatic loading of about half of the on-board ammunition.

As an integrated system of systems, evaluation of a main battle tank [some professional descriptions compare and contrast tanks as medium tank or main battle tank based on tonnage] analyzes efficiency and effectiveness from a holistic perspective. Capability and vulnerability can be evaluated in several ways depending on context and intended purpose. The WEG descriptions employ three functional categories of major subsystems to gauge overall MBT effectiveness:

• Mobility.
• Survivability.
• Lethality.

Mobility considers the relationship between improved automotive performance efficiency and the combat-load weight of a MBT. Vehicle fuel cell capacity and the type of terrain traversed affect expected norms for cruising range. MBT with on-board fuel cells can typically run for distances between 450 and 600 kilometers (km). Diesel is the norm for engine fuel among modern MBT; however; some tanks have a multi-fuel engine which can run on kerosene, diesel, and/or specific types of benzene. Vehicles with an auxiliary power unit (APU) improve MBT fuel economy during temporary halts or operating in stationary positions. Improved diagnostic upgrades alert the crew for corrective actions needed to sustain availability of an MBT subsystems.

Vehicle weight for an MBT can range from 40 to 70 tons. Several tanks described at times as medium tanks are included in this sample as main battle tanks. For example, the T90A is approximately 47 tons, the Leopard 2A6 is approximately 55 tons, and the Challenger 2 approaches 70 tons. Improvements to suspension systems, transmissions, and tracks complement automotive performance. Upgrading systems with modular components reduces inoperative time for repair and maintenance.

Survivability combines functional improvements to composite or spaced tank hull armor that include mine-protection appliqué, active-reactive and/or passive appliqué armor for the turret, glacis, flanks, and rear, and various forms of stand-off caging or mesh screens that degrade the effect of antitank weapon hits and armor penetration. Appliqué armor and explosive reactive armor (ERA), now a norm  for improving protection, substantially increases vehicle weight.

Camouflage systems include methods for reducing detection by optical, infrared, and radar  technologies. On-board sensors can include mine detection and laser or radar acquisition warning receivers that automatically activate MBT defense and/or interception systems. Some MBTs mount  television cameras for crew 360-degree visual awareness of near surroundings and enhance local security.

A pressurized nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) system provides crew protection in upgraded tanks for the modern NBC-contaminated battlefield. Air conditioning in some MBTs enhance systems readiness and sustainment of crew readiness in heat-extreme climates.

Other survivability enhancements can include entrenching blades for MBT self-emplacement in defensive positions, mine-clearing plows and rollers, vehicle smoke emission systems, and aerosol or smoke-obscurant grenade launcher systems. Tank survivability considers the context of operating as a combined arms team. Some upgrade suites include an external intercommunication telephone on the MBT’s exterior for coordinating with infantry operating alongside the MBT. Armor and infantry typically operate as a team to optimize the tactical advantages that each element provides the other team member.

Lethality considers more than the main gun and auxiliary weapons systems. In addition to weapon efficiency, lethality is related to the MBT’s ability to acquire and track a target, its weapon system effective engagement range, and crew situational awareness of multiple concurrent targets available for engagement. Improved command and fire control systems can include integrated thermal viewfinders for tank commander and gunner, laser rangefinders, and digital communications. Integrated command and control interconnects a network of sensors, imagery, navigation, and information systems that facilitate situational awareness and tactical understanding of an operational environment (OE).

Upgrades to lethality can include main gun and/or gun-missile capabilities, improved stabilization and fire control systems, and improved ammunition effects. Critical considerations to these upgrades include linking fire-on-the-move capability to MBT stabilization systems, rate of fire, integrated sights, target acquisition ranges, and weapons ranges to include maximum effective and maximum ranges. Lethality incorporates factors relevant to gun sights, gun precision, type of gun mount, and specific round caliber ballistics as components of maximum aimed range and maximum effective range.

Improved main gun munitions addressed in the WEG incorporate ongoing research and development of kinetic energy (KE) rounds with a dart-like penetrator (armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSDS) and/or high-explosive antitank (HEAT) multi-purpose rounds that use a shaped-charge for armor penetration. The WEG reflects a variety of ammunition capabilities, such as electronically-fuzed rounds for use against helicopters, or canister rounds for use in close combat. HEAT-multipurpose (MP) rounds can also be used against anti-materiel and antipersonnel (AP) targets. In comparing tank-on-  tank main gun ammunition lethality, kinetic energy rounds are more lethal against composite or spaced armor than high-explosive antitank rounds gauged at the same penetration value. Ammunition upgrades are trending toward more efficient propellants with improved effects and armor penetration.

In terminology, ready rounds are stored for easy retrieval either inside the turret or in bustle compartments, to sustain a consistent rate of main gun fire. In listing available ready-rounds in the tank turret, the number of rounds does not typically include the ability to add an additional round in the breach. Stowed rounds are rounds that are either outside the tank's autoloader, or in compartments  that preclude immediate retrieval during a main gun engagement. For an OPFOR MBT, the typical mix of main gun rounds on board a tank is 50% antitank and 50% for use against other targets. The OPFOR ammunition unit basic load and ammunition combat load will vary based on tactical and operational considerations of a particular training, education, or leader development condition.

A heavy machinegun auxiliary weapon in or on the tank turret trends toward a remote-controlled weapon station (RCWS) configuration to provide the ability to fire the weapon while the crewman remains protected inside the turret. Auxiliary weapon mounts often allow high-angle fire for air defense and use in built-up urban areas and/or highly inclined slopes in rural terrain. Armor shielding for the loader’s machinegun, when mounted on the turret, improves protection when the machinegunner is exposed outside a turret hatch.

Summary. Improvements in MBT capabilities are typically upgrade packages rather than new tank models for production. Current evidence underscores increasing fiscal costs for research and development, testing, and production of MBT systems. Visual identification of MBT capabilities is often difficult due to the variance in upgrades to internal systems of an MBT. However, a significant decision  in obvious MBT development is the ongoing field trials of the Russian Federation Armata family of armored chassis vehicles. The T-14 MBT within this modernization initiative provides major improvements to MBT capabilities that were constrained previously due to the vintage T-72 series hull, turret, automotive, and weapon system configurations. Professional observers in the near future will witness if the Russian Federation fields a T-14 fleet as a significant main battle tank adversary.  The principle states with major indigenous tank production industry are analyzing how a fielded T-14 fleet affects their future research and development for MBT upgrade programs to counter such a threat.

The MBT WEG tier tables present examples of state-of-the art to vintage MBTs with capabilities and vulnerabilities based on upgrades to basic tank model functions of mobility, survivability, and lethality. For example, selective main gun capabilities in some models can be augmented with an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) capability to achieve extended range and effects beyond the main gun effective range.

Leaders adapt data in the WEG to tailor an OPFOR with robust, realistic, and relevant Threat conditions for  a challenging environment to U.S. Army learning and capabilities development (CD) initiatives. Address questions and comments on data listed in this chapter to:

Jon H. Moilanen

DSN: 552-7928 Commercial (913) 684-7928

e-mail address: [[2]]

Chapter 5: Anti-tank and Anti-Armor Systems

As armored combat vehicles added more protection and ascended in importance on the battlefield, so

did systems designed to stop them gain importance. The umbrella term antitank (AT) originally denoted systems specifically designed to destroy tanks. Today it is more broadly constructed. Modern combat is combined arms combat. Mechanized forces include other armored combat vehicles, such as armored reconnaissance vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, etc. In order to address the whole spectrum of threats on the modern battlefield, new systems are being developed and older systems redesigned. Examples are heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs) and heavy combat support vehicles.

Tank armor protection continues to increase, but another way to defeat them is to defeat associated systems. Tanks cannot survive or achieve their tactical objectives without support from other armored systems. The more recent term anti-armor may supplant the current term because antitank weapons which cannot penetrate tank armor can still be effective threats to defeat or damage more lightly armored fighting vehicles. With upgrades and innovative tactics, even older, seemingly obsolete weapons can be used as opposing force (OPFOR) anti-armor weapons.

The OPFOR places a high priority on destroying enemy vehicles. It will use all available assets (organic and improvised) for the effort. The spectrum of AT and anti-armor weapons includes aircraft, artillery, NBC assets, sniper rifles, and air defense systems. Many OPFOR countries employ antitank weapons for roles other than antitank, including AT guns against personnel and soft targets, and ATGMs against personnel and rotary-wing aircraft.

Critical factors for destroying vehicles are abilities to slow, canalize, and stop them by engaging them with lethal fires and ambushes. Mines, explosives, IEDs, other obstacle systems, and terrain restrictions can be used in concert with AT weapons.

Antitank guns (AT guns) include towed and self-propelled AT guns (aka SPAT or tank destroyers). A number of guns were designed as field guns, with multi-role capability as both artillery and antitank guns. The modern focus on maneuver warfare has brought a slight decline in development of uniquely antitank guns. Thus, the 85-mm D-44 gun, which can be used as artillery, is effective for use in an antitank role. Although recent systems have been developed, the number fielded has not kept pace with production of armored combat vehicles. Nevertheless, their effectiveness and selected armies' continued reliance on linear positional battles and protracted defenses have kept a large number of these systems in inventories. Based on numbers fielded and likelihood of their threat to US forces, only towed antitank guns were included.

Upgrades for towed guns are available. These include night sights, such as passive image intensifier sights and thermal sights for the Russian 100-mm MT-12. This is a robust antitank weapon with a high rate of fire and rapid mobility. Note the Russian innovation in the MT-12R AT gun with a radar-directed all- weather fire control system. Improved ammunition is critical for continued effectiveness of antitank weapons. The MT-12 and its variants can fire a variety of modern ammunition, including the Russian gun- launched antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), Kastet and Arkan.

The ATGM is the singular greatest threat to tanks today. These systems are distinguished from other antitank weapons in that they are guided to the target. Most employ SACLOS guidance (see Glossary). An operator holds crosshairs on the target, and the missile tracker directs the missile to that point. There are a wide variety of countermeasures (such as smoke and counter-fire, due to long flight time and operator vulnerability) for use against ATGMs. Thus, a 90% probability of hit is a technical figure, and does not mean a 90% probability of success. On the other hand, there are a variety of counter-countermeasures which the ATGMs, launchers, and operators can use to increase the chance for success. Tactics, techniques, and procedures in the antitank arena are critical to mission success.

Armor protection for many modern tanks has outpaced some older AT weapons. However, ATGMs offer improved size, range, and warhead configurations to destroy even the heaviest tanks. Notable trends include increased proliferation and variety of man-portable and portable ATGM launchers. These include shoulder-launched, short-range systems, such as the French Eryx, and copies of former Soviet systems, such as the AT-3/Malyutka ("Suitcase” SAGGER). Some so-called portable launchers (AT-4/5, TOW, and HOT) have outgrown portability weight limits, and must be carried in vehicles and only dismounted short distances from carriers. But newer compact systems are being fielded, e.g., Spike-MR and Kornet-MR.

Although there are special-built ATGM launcher vehicles, the most numerous launcher vehicles are common chassis adapted by adding a pintle mounted, manually loaded and launched ATGM. Adaptation is simple, so they are not described here. Nearly all ATGM launchers are high-level threats to vehicles and rotary-wing aircraft in the US Army. They can also be used against personnel and materiel targets. The variety of launch platforms is increasing. UAVs are being adapted to launch ATGMs for responsive attacks against NLOS/BLOS targets.

Recent trends include new ATGM technologies for increased range and lethality. The most common type of lethality upgrade is the addition of a nose precursor or tandem warhead. Recent options include missiles for wider battlefield lethality—BLOS/NLOS systems, and long-range ATGMs to attack targets previously considered invulnerable. NLOS guidance technologies include fiber optics (to see through the missile eye BLOS) and semi-active laser homing (for dismounted soldier/vehicle/aircraft/UAV-mounted laser target designators to select targets). Others have "fly-over, shoot-down" mode to fly behind a hill and fire an explosive-formed penetrator (EFP, in the shape of a cannon kinetic-energy penetrator round) downward through the relatively soft top of armored vehicles. Improvements include improved guidance, resistance to countermeasures, reduced smoke/noise signatures, and increased range. Night sights are common, including thermal sights. Many countries are looking at active protection system (APS) CM systems. Already, some ATGM have counter-countermeasures to defeat all APS.

The chapter groups systems in order of mobility and unit level, from dismounted or man-portable weapons, to ground-mounted or towed weapons, to tracked or wheeled vehicle-mounted weapons. Weapon systems in this chapter represent likely or possible threats against US Army forces. Questions and comments should be addressed to:

Jon H. Moilanen

DSN: 552-7928 Commercial (913) 684-7928

e-mail address: [[3]]

Antitank and Anti-Armor Systems:  Key Technology Trends

Military forces worldwide continue to field new anti-armor systems and upgrade legacy systems. Modern tanks can be fitted with increased armor protection, countermeasure systems, and survivability support systems. Thus new antitank systems and upgrades are being fielded to challenge those protection upgrades. Most weapons on the battlefield have some anti-armor capability. A variety of multi-role (MR) weapons have been fielded with lethal AT capability. Similarly, many AT weapons are used to defeat other targets.

System Category	Technology Trend	System Example
Recoilless Weapons	Electro-Optical LRF fire control system (FCS) with II/thermal sight Precision munitions and missiles for recoilless crewed weapons New munitions (tandem HEAT, longer range, multi-purpose use) Small light launch tubes and disposable canisters to extend length Rapid disassembly into components for dismount team portability	Simrad  LP101 M40 with LAHAT SPG-9M Rcllss gun RPG-29 Mtd ATGL M79 Rcllss gun
AT Guns	New FCS can include radar-directed fire control New munitions include homing round and gun-launched ATGMs Auxiliary propulsion units for local moves Increased protection for AT gun vehicles (see HACVs) HACVs with similar weapons lethality to tanks	MT-12R AT gun 2S25 AT gun MT-12/MT-12R Type 63A light tank 2S25 SPAT gun
ATGMs	EO/thermal FCS with LRF and encoded beacon to counter jammers Missiles include thermobaric multi-use, improved tandem, top attack New guidance modes extend range for missiles to BLOS and NLOS Back-blast reduction for use in confined spaces KE missiles/rounds with short time-of-flight to defeat active protection Light man-portable medium-range high-lethality ATGMs Remote add-on vehicle turrets with EO optics and multi-launchers	Konkurs-M (AT-5B) AT-13 Spike-LR Eryx Starstreak MILAN-ADT VBL-Kornet
Multi-role Weapons	Multi-role systems and munitions in other units to defeat armor Multi-role (AD/AT) missiles for air defense and anti-armor use Multi-role missile vehicles for AD,  AT, and infantry units Multi-role gun/missile systems and heavy combat support vehicles	Strix IR Mortar rd Starstreak BMP/Kliver BMPT
Other AT Weapons	Mines and IEDs include remote controlled and scatter mine systems Flame weapons for use against armor and vehicle subsystems Improvised weapons for use against vehicles and personnel Wide variety of weapons to defeat wheels on armored vehicles	RPO-A grenade Molotov Cocktail PKM machinegun UMZ Mine scatter

Spectrum of Weapons and Munitions Effective Against Armored Vehicles

Military forces will use a wide variety of weapons to defeat armored systems and degrade their operations. The WEG describes MR weapons in various locations. Common weapons in combat units will engage various targets, including armored vehicles. With emphasis resulting from modern urban combat; demand for improved weapons and munitions against armored vehicles is increasing.

The challenge in defeating modern tanks is extremely difficult, with their high amount of armor protection and high mobility. Antitank subunits/units are found in infantry and armor battalions, brigades, and divisions, and in other combat units as needed. AT units are specially designed to support infantry, armor, and other units in combat, and are often task organized in combined arms groups. With limited armor protection and vulnerability to ground weapons, AT systems do not separate from supported maneuver units. AT unit weapons include the following:

• Crewed recoilless guns and launchers
• Towed AT guns
• HACVs (aka SPAT, etc.)
• Man-portable and shoulder launch ATGMs
• Portable and ground mount ATGMs
• ATGM launcher vehicles, and
• NLOS ATGM launcher vehicles

The most prolific anti-armor and antitank systems are in units other than AT units. By number, most are found in infantry, mechanized infantry, tank units, and in special purpose forces units, but can also be in irregular and hybrid forces. They include the following assets.

Branch	System Type	Example	Lethality D/K if hit*	Remarks
Infantry,	ATGL	Pzf 3-IT600	Tk and LAV=K	Tandem HEAT, HE, Bunker-B
SOF, etc.				Tandem HEAT
(Also irregular or, hybrid	ATDL Shoulder ATGM	RPG-27 Eryx	Tk and LAV=K Tk and LAV=K	Tandem HEAT, HE IR/seismic sensor, RF/wire
forces)	ATGL/IED remote fuze	SIRA sensor,	LAV=K, Tk=K	cmd
		Salamander
Infantry Vehicles and other	IFV main gun and ATGM	AMX-10P/MILAN	LAV=K, Tk=K	APDS round, ATGM Tandem
LAVs	Infantry fire spt	BMP/Kliver	LAV=K, Tk=K	Gun, ATGM, MANPADS
	vehicle	BMP-3M	LAV=K, Tk=K	See also HCSV
	Heavy IFV/IFSV
Tanks	Main Gun and ATGM	T-90S	LAV=K, Tk=K	Rounds and ATGM

Maneuver units receive support for various combat missions and phases. ATDLs are treated as ordnance stored with other ammunition, then disseminated as needed to infantry and other users depending on mission and battle conditions. Engineer assets and units will support maneuver units in the defense and conducting ambushes (by delivering or laying mines to slow or stop enemy forces, so that they can be engaged with AT/anti-armor weapons). Infantry companies and battalions may have organic weapons platoons for AT/anti-armor fire support. Combat units can call for AT unit support, anti-armor mortar/artillery fires, and aircraft strikes.

A shift to using more light armored vehicles (LAVs) has led to production and deployment of a wide array of anti-armor and multi-role weapon systems for use against LAVs. Threats to mobility are also greater with wheeled LAVs. The table on the next pages shows some of these.

Multi-Role (MR) and Anti-Armor Weapons and Munitions to Counter Armored Vehicles

Branch	System Type	Example	Lethality D/K if hit*	Remarks
Infantry, SOF, etc. (also irregular and hybrid forces)	Rifle, Machinegun Hand grenade Grenade Launcher Anti-materiel rifle MR ATGL/ATDL Flamethrower/FAE Air-to-Surface rkt lchr Improvised explosives Multi-role missile	SVD with AP rd Molotov cocktail QLZ-89 with DP Barrett M2A1A PF-89A Shmel-M reusable lchr C-5K (S-5K hand lchr) IED, “sticky bombs” Starstreak	LAV=D, Tk=D LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K LAV=D, Tk=D LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=D LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=D Heli, LAV=K	Vs tires, optics, engine, etc. Blind optics, secondary blast Penetrate/damage tires/wheels Calibers from .338 to 23 mm HE or thermo with penetrator RPO for napalm, RPO-A FAE Improvised and shop-made Designs and fuzing vary widely Infantry Bn, also AT, AD units
Support Vehicles	AD/AT fire spt vehicle Combat recon vehicle Flame unit spt vehicle ASR launcher vehicle	Armored Starstreak BRM-3K BMO-1 with 30 RPO-A BMD/Aviaagregat S5K	LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=D LAV=K, Tk=D	Weapon priority - self- defense Also BMO-T on tank chassis RS, 12x rkts, poss SAL PGM
Artillery/Mortars	Frag/HE round/rkt Flame/FAE rocket Dual-Purpose ICM SAL-homing rd/rkt IR fuzed/homing rd/rkt MMW-homing rd/rkt Scatter mine rockets/rds Jammer rockets/rds	152/155mm and others 9A152 FAE rocket 152/155 mm and others 120-mm Kitolov-2 Motiv-3M/others Universal sub/others 122-mm 9M28K 122-mm 9M519	LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=D Effectiveness K	Near miss or hit can destroy More heavy MRLs have FAE. Top atk, duds vs tracks/wheels Cannon, mortars, MRLs, others 120 mm mrtr, 122 mm MRL 120 mm mrtr122/220/300 MRL For BM-21 MRL For BM-21 MRL
Engineers	Mines/IEDs Side-attack mine Mine scatter vehicle Line-charge vehicle Other obstacles	Controlled minefield esp. TM-83 fuzed plate mine UMZ vehicle or pods MTK-2, ZRP-2 dismount Concertina, trenches, etc.	LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K Tk=D Effectiveness K	Large IED EFP, etc. Also TEMP-10 top attack PKM for dismounts, 1/7-29 Cmd det, belly attack, esp whls To stop, slow, divert vehicles
Flame Weapons	Flame/FAE launch veh Incendiary rounds See Artillery/Mortars	TOS-1 with FAE rocket API-T, thermobarics	LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K	Stationary targets behind cover Ignite fuel tanks, engine, etc.
Aircraft	Cluster bomb DPICM /napalm bomb SAL/TV guided bomb SAL rocket IR fuzed/cluster bomb Air-launched missile Aircraft guns to 30-mm Mine scatter pod	RBK-250/PTAB-2.5KO ODAB-500PM FAE KAB-500L, -500Kr S-13Cor 122 mm RBK-500U/SPBE-D Kh-25 series Fixed, pod, and turret KMGU	LAV=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=D LAV=K, Tk=D	Also RBK-500U/PTAB Also ZAB-500 napalm 195 kg explosive area charge Also 57/68/80/240/320 mm EFP top attack submunitions Guidance TV, SAL, IR Twin and Vulcan auto- cannon Or mine ladders for TM-62
UAVs	Attack UAV UCAV UAVs for attack Spt	Harpy/CUTLASS Hermes 450S/Mikholit Camcopter S-100	LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K	Can also be a cruise missile Guns, grenades, and ATGMs LTD for gun rds, rkts, ATGMs
Theater Missiles	Theater ballistic missile Cruise missile	Iskander Harpy/CUTLASS	LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K	ICM= large APAM with Frag UAV camera or GPS guidance
Air Defense	AD guns and cannon AD missile Multi-role missile	57-mm S-60 Pantsir-S1-0 (SA-22) Starstreak/Starstreak II	LAV=K, Tk=D LAV=K, Tk=D LAV=K	All can target ground vehicles. 2S6, Sosna, SA-11 FO also Outfly/outshoot target, no CM
Others	Heavy multi-role missiles Naval gun rounds/rkts Coastal gun SAL-H Underwater mines	Hermes-A AK-130 130-mm guns Firn-1 130-mm round KPDM-4 anti-landing sys	LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K LAV=K, Tk=K	UAV designates, SAL, IR Can fire SAL-H vs shore targets Bereg, also on ships (above) Magnetic fuzed wide area mine

• FAE (fuel-air-explosive) includes thermobaric HE, with high heat and overpressure effects similar to FAE.
• ICM (improved conventional munitions are canistered submunitions. DPICM are ICM with AT shaped charge and Frag-HE effects.
• SAL= semi-active laser-homing, guided round using a laser target designator operated by a dismount, or on a vehicle, RW, or UAV.
• IR fuzed rounds hold sensor-fuzed submunitions which can disperse, each aiming at a vehicle, and firing EFPs into the vehicle tops.
• IR homing munitions can lock onto vehicle hot areas to home in for top attack with a HEAT or large HE warhead.

Threats to Vehicle Mobility

Below is an unclassified listing of example organizations, weapons, and TTP which can be used to immobilize, disable, and destroy military vehicles. They can range from older, less effective systems, to modern Tier 1 or Near Term systems noted as upper range. Additional pertinent information is contained in other locations of the WEG, Ground Systems, Volume I:

• “APC and IFV Trends”
• “Kinetic Energy Threats to Light Armored Vehicles”
• “Multi-role Weapons and Munitions Against Armored Vehicles”
• “Emerging Technology Trends”

Enemy exploitation of tactical vehicle mobility limitations

The enemy will continue to capitalize on the single greatest vulnerability of most combat vehicles. That is limitations on their ability to transit terrain other than on hard surfaces (like a parking lot or road) and on other improved surfaces. That vulnerability and its cascading effects costs lives. Technical decisions in vehicle design may dictate weapons operability (shoot on move ability and speed), off-road speed, water crossing capability, and even weather considerations in mobility. Tactical decisions in using vehicles with limited road, urban, or off-road mobility can affect success and lives. A rational innovative enemy can be sufficiently informed to combine local knowledge with understanding of tactical and technical vulnerabilities for successful and lethal TTP.

Contrary to accepted beliefs, the inability of the vehicles to protect their occupants is not the primary cause of these deaths. Any protection, including any amount of armor, can be breached, bypassed, neutralized, destroyed, or otherwise mitigated. The greatest vulnerability is the ability of an enemy to determine the exact route troops will travel, define when it will travel, how it will travel, how fast it will travel, etc. This ability to define who, what, why, and where to attack provides the enemy enormous tactical advantages which are magnified in complex terrain. It not only allows an enemy to control the tempo and all aspects of attack, it allows them to attack at their own convenience. The analytical sophistication required to achieve this massive advantage is analogous to determining which route a train will take.

The primary purpose of a vehicle, any vehicle, is to transport something from point A to point B, when and where you need to. The primary purpose should never be to only protect. That’s not the reason for having a vehicle—mobility is. Previously the term “tactical” or “combat” was used only to describe vehicles designed to and capable of operating off-road and transiting cross-terrain under combat conditions. Obviously neither term is appropriate for accurately describing the current class of vehicles used by many modern forces today.

Weapons

• Machinegun (12.7 mm and up will penetrate many light armored vehicles above, and below, wheel wells, 7.624R/51 mm below wheel wells and wheels)
• Machineguns can puncture vehicle tires (even those with run-flat) to immobilize or slow them. Most armored vehicles require repair with 2 or more tire hits per vehicle side.
• Anti-materiel weapons (12.7 – 20-mm HE), ballistic computers (w/laser rangefinder), advanced thermal optics, 1-shot 1-kill capability (12.7 mm range 2,500+ m, 14.5-mm and 20-mm range 2,000+m).
• Automatic Grenade Launchers 30/-35/40-mm. Ballistic computer, electronic fuzed air-burst munitions (ABM). Precise DP/HEAT fires out to 2500+ m. 35-mm Chinese QLZ-87 can penetrate 80 mm (3.2 inch) armor. HEAT round defeats 200+ mm armor. Delivers UGS, multi-spectral smoke, comms jamming grenades, robot option. Radar guidance linked (Fara-2 radar). Perfect weapon for neutralizing dismounted troops, which are especially vulnerable when dismounting from vehicles.

• Most anti-armor weapons can disable/destroy most light armored vehicles. In use by over 25 countries, standoff 100m+, penetration 950mm+, IR sensor activation and detonation.

• Off-route mines/Side-attack mines (AT or anti-vehicle). Panzerfaust-3T tandem, (penetrates 800mm+ at 400m+), w/SIRA sensor package w/fusing (acoustic/IR), Fire Salamander has 4 x Pzf- 3 series launchers on tripod with remote controlled TV camera and other sensors, also auto- launch. Others TM-83, TEMP-30 sensor-fuzed mine.

• Ubiquitous shoulder-fired antitank grenade launcher /AT systems up to 125-mm, tandem-HEAT, Dual purpose, RPG-7V/Type 69, RPG-18/22/26/27/28/29/Hashim, CH PF-89/98, (from 300-mm to 1,100mm+ penetration-ranges from 200m - 800m),

• Antitank Grenade Launcher (Long Range), 125-mm tandem HEAT 1000 m, 1,300+armor penetration, TV/thermal sights, laser designator 5 km range, GPS corrected rounds.

• ATGM. Any antitank guided missile will destroy light armored vehicles - some from 8,000 meters out (AT-14 Kornet-E 5,500 to meters with 1,200-mm) and Starstreak II (dual-role

MANPADS/anti-armor system with hypervelocity, laser beam-rider guidance, auto-tracker, very high Ph, armor penetration to 120-mm + for all LAVs, out to 8,000 meters). The other end of the spectrum is the (infantry) light-weight (14 kg) shoulder-fired ATGM Eryx with a range of 600 meters and penetration of 900 mm.

• Recoilless-rifles will destroy most light armored vehicles. Carl Gustaf M2/M3 84-mm, Type 65/65-1, M67 90-mm, B-10 82-mm, B-11 107-mm, Chinese PF-98 120-mm, M40 106-mm with tandem HEAT, ballistic computer sight, range to 2,000+ m, armor penetration 700+ mm, upgrades in progress. High PH/PK. R&D to add ATGM capability.

• Antitank Disposable Grenade Launchers 67 - 80mm HEAT to 300 m and 630 mm armor, HE anti- personnel effects. Some low signature, no smoke/flash, fire from enclosed spaces (rooms, sewers, etc). To 125-mm tandem HEAT 350m range, 1000+ mm tandem HEAT.

• Multi-purpose and/or bunker buster weapons will destroy most vehicles. PF-89A, SMAW HEPD, AT8 Bunker Buster, C90-CR-BM (M3), TBG-7V, BASTEG, Carl Gustaf.

• Any anti-tank hand-grenade has the capability to immobilize or destroy light armored vehicles. It is dependent of placement and angle of attack of the grenade.

• Improvised Multi-role Man-portable Rocket Launcher (AD/Anti-armor). Improvised 57-mm air- to-surface high velocity rockets (formerly aircraft rocket pods). Range 1,500m+ 400mm armor penetration, proximity fuze, and 20m lethal radius.

• Robotic weapons platforms and tracked grenade launchers and ATGM launchers

• Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

• CBRN attack. Some vehicles use collective protection, whereas others require masks.

• Thermobaric systems or warheads. Any hit by one of these warheads can disable or destroy a vehicle. The thermobaric warhead on RPO-A, RShG-2, WPF-89-1 and 2, Shmel-M, or TBG warhead on RPG-7V and RPG-29 have demolition effect equal to a round of 122-mm or higher HE artillery. The complex blast/ overpressure is particularly lethal in enclosed spaces such as building, tunnels, sewers, and even vehicles with hatch open (or other blast access), etc. The GM-94 is a smaller hand-held thermobaric launcher. Some mine-clearing systems (UR-77) use thermobarics for clearing lanes and are particularly effective in clearing streets (of enemy) in urban areas. The use of thermobaric warheads is proliferating and has expanded into rockets and artillery.

• Flame/napalm and other incendiaries. The trend is away from flame throwers to encapsulated weapons, bombs, bomblets, etc. RPO-Z, RPO. At a very minimum these weapons will disable sensors, optics etc externally mounted on the vehicle. Any flammable material, POL, packs, fuel lines, ammo on a vehicle exterior may cause it to catch fire. Field expedients are very easy to manufacture and use, such as fougasse.

• Lasers to blind/damage both vehicle (electronic optics, and sensors) and crews (eyes).

• Use of robotics and other remote-operated platforms proliferates significantly by 2015.

• Corrosive cloud or micro-fiber cloud munitions can corrupt and damage vehicle engines.

Obstacles

• The greatest obstacles remain natural and man-made terrain features. Their impact is also compounded by weather effects. Thus rain can turn a field impassible to wheeled vehicle units and mud can immobilize tracked vehicles with high ground pressure.
• Conventional mines, controlled minefields, IEDs, and other explosive devices. They include mines, EFP, and sensor fuzes, also undetectable materials (e.g., plastic/alloys).
• Multi-spectral smoke/obscurants (e.g., Russian ZD-6 grenade), dust from HE fires, etc.
• Some examples of adaptive obstacles are:
  • Communications (or other electric) wire and concertina as an expedient obstacle. Both hinder or stop wheeled and tracked vehicles by wrapping around axles and tangling up tracks and road wheels. Det cord is also very effective. Once it wraps around portions of the vehicle, it is then detonated.
  • Improvised obscurants (grass, trees, POL, buildings) smoke can screen the enemy and defeat or degrade vehicle sights.
  • Local population as civilian shields to hide infiltrators, attackers, or just to swarm U.S. units looking for water, medicine, or food, etc. and slow movement.
  • Improvised mobility obstacles. Rubble, civilians, holes, disabled vehicles.
  • Defilade and side slope restrictions as sites for front/rear vehicle attack, or to utilize non- lethal slippage measures (grease, oil residue or mud troughs), and ambush attack.
  • IED or body decoys to slow unit and conduct ambush.
  • Flooding or alter the flow of water (rivers, dams, etc.), open fire hydrants etc.
  • Punji stakes (innovation--place punji stakes and/or det cord in a ditch. When the enemy arrives ambush them from the same side of the road/trail. The enemy will turn towards the fire and jump into the ditch to return fire. When they enter the ditch and land on the stakes, blow the det cord). Boulders rolled or blown into valleys.
  • Abatis (fallen trees, telephone poles, wrecks, etc.).
  • Debris (vehicles, rubble).
  • Trenches, craters, or ditches (dug by hand or blown by demolitions).
  • Blow (or cut) a hole in a frozen river. Put tree logs in the water, cover with sticks and tarp and camouflage (snow). The logs continually agitate the water to keep it from freezing.
  • Armored vehicles drive across the frozen river and fall in the ice hole.
  • Prepare (and camouflage) the frozen river with demolitions prior to the arrival of the enemy armored column. Detonate when the armored vehicles are in midstream. Artillery targeting with MRLs will have the same effect (or use both).
  • Induce avalanches in snow covered passes.
  • In extreme cold, put water on dangerous portions (or steep grades) of mountain roads.

For information on conventional or generic obstacles see FM 90-7, “Combined Arms Obstacle Integration,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-7/index.html and FM 90-7 (Army Field Manual), Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (10 Apr 2003) (Change 1) or http://www.everyspec.com/ARMY/FM+-+Field+Manual/ FM_90-7_14502/.

RISTA (UAV/UCAV, Robotic radars and camera, UGS, Manned FOs, and SOF)

• RISTA selects ambush/obstacle sites, target tracking and selection, priority target attack.
• Target acquisition and links to Integrated Fires Command, direct/indirect fires, ATGMs.
• SOF/UAV/FOs with NAI/TAIs and sensor-shooter links to artillery, mortars, ATGMs.
• Laser designators guide artillery, naval, aerial, ATGM, mortar rounds to moving targets.
• Direct attack by attack UAV/UCAV w/ATGM or precision homing submunitions.
• The ease of operation, size, and simple design of tactical UAVs lends itself to field expedient modification. Converting this UAV into a munitions delivery system (improvised attack UAV) is not difficult and offers several tactical advantages.
• Improvised (remote control aircraft-based) attack UAVs, with IED/munition attached.
• Robotic cameras locate close to mine/IED detonation points to precisely trigger them.

Information Warfare

For additional information see Chapter 10 and TC 7-100.2

• Information Attack. Alter or deny key information, Data manipulation (navigation, tracking, weapons, sensors, timing, etc). Disinformation.
• Computer Warfare: Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s computer networks and information flow. Hacking, denial of service, malicious software (including adjusting clocks), etc. Insert viruses, spurious digital data, or hacking to manipulate computer information.
• Exploit reliance on extended communications and data links. Disrupt communications and data links (LIWA). Jamming communications connectivity (input and output).
• Electronic Warfare
  • Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum, especially C2 and RISTA. Wide area radar jammers.
  • GPS jamming. A 4-25 W power portable jammer has a 200-km radius. Can be delivered by artillery and/or mounted on UAV, civilian vehicles, or virtually anywhere including people, and/or farm animals.
  • Communications and data link jamming. Artillery and mortar rounds for local jamming. Wide area comms jammers.
  • Electronics vulnerable to “smart dust” which destroys electronic circuitry (computers, C2, sensors, navigations, etc.) by airborne penetration and short-circuiting the system. Delivered by rocket, UAV, other aircraft, possibly artillery. Access through computer cooling system.
  • Graphite Munitions and “blackout bombs.” 400-500 kg cluster bombs/warheads with graphite strands to short out transmission stations and power grids. Can be delivered by UAVs, aircraft, rockets, and cruise missiles.

EMP and High Power Microwave.

• Use EMP (esp. non-nuclear) and High Energy High Radio Frequency Weapons (HERT) to target circuit boards. Circuit boards are the most vulnerable component of modern electronics.

• EMP/HPM. Missile, artillery, and UAV delivered EMP. This is will destroy all intravehicular electronics and battlefield digitization functionality in vehicular weapons. The specific target is circuit board systems, the internal connections of which require little EMP to disrupt and/or destroy. Electrical power is shared among propulsion, survivability, lethality, and auxiliary systems, along with multipurpose sensors, and all fusion and integration functions of each type of system.

• Tactical EMP. Enhanced warhead consisting of a hybrid EMP/HEAT warhead employed on ATGM, 70-mm rockets, and MRL rockets. This hybrid warhead will knock out a tank even if it does not penetrate armor, ignition, communications, or other electronics. Power output will be measured in hundreds of megawatts for microseconds. The e-warhead would also knock out other electronic systems. Applications may extend into infantry shoulder-fired rockets that could cause an electronic “soft kill” of armored vehicles.

Enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures

To degrade vehicle mobility, the enemy will:

• Always use (appropriate) portions of several basic principles. 1. Quick concentration (dispersed to avoid detection then come together for the attack, 2. Surprise, 3. Violent attack, often only three to four minutes, 4. Quick clearing and securing, 5. Quick withdrawal/dispersion, often disappearing back into the population from which they came.
• Attack with numerous hunter-killers teams (up to 10 per vehicle), approximately 4-5 persons per team armed with 1 or more AT/Antiarmor weapons, sniper rifle, 7.62-mm GPMG, RPO-A/TBG- 7V (thermobaric and/or flame weapons), AT grenades, assault rifles.
• Attack fixed sites prior and set ambushes (often complex) along the relief (quick reaction) force’s likely avenues of approach.
• Attack units when they temporarily halt to refuel or conduct other activities. Attack tactical refueling operations whenever possible. The optimal attack occurs during transfer of fuel from tankers/refuelers to vehicles. This may set fire to both the tanker and the combat vehicle, also catching the combat crew outside their vehicle. Attack as units (squad and above) return to garrison, as they will be short of fuel and ammo, the troops lax, tired, and complacent after days or weeks of searching for, and not finding, the enemy.

• Use other “swarming” attacks (often involving civilians timed with complex attack).
• Halt or slow movement (obstacles, decoys, feints, remote weapon) to facilitate attacks.
• Use snipers to force crew members to operate “buttoned-up”, instill tenacity, and impede mobility while dismounted.
• Whenever possible use complex attack composed of several synchronized elements. Example is anti-armor (ATGM and/or AT guns) ambush in conjunction with mines, artillery, and small arms fires.
• Converge attacks, probes; events from multiple directions, and possibly multiple dimensions, by numerous elements on a single target (and/or location or sensor) overwhelm the sensors ability to provide accurate data.
• Create conditions forcing vehicle troops to dismount prematurely, into infantry ambush.
• Attack vehicle beneath, above, or beyond weapons’ platform ability to elevate or depress (high or close-in). CQ swarming effective and lethal.
• Exploit the high (elevation), low (close-in, depression), and rear “dead” spaces of the vehicle. These are areas that either cannot be observed, and/or, fired upon by the crew. Examples of the high dead space is the inability of the crew to view and/or bring fire on the higher floors of a building, or the enemy firing from the high sides of valley walls, enemy attacking from the rear of the vehicle.
• Focus light weapons attacks on most vulnerable areas of vehicle, rear, tires and very light armor below wheel wells and between tires, lightly armored top. Wheels are extremely vulnerable and
• easy to damage/disable. Without the wheels (especially the front steering wheels) the vehicle is disabled. External fuel tanks, flammables, ammo are vulnerable.
• Attack logistic supplies and support elements critical to operation of the vehicle (class IX parts, Fuel delivery means, vehicle mechanics and technicians, etc.)
• Kill/attack contractors maintaining/servicing/fueling vehicles or disrupt their operations
• Target power generation systems supporting all C4I systems, forcing operations in a degraded mode, and challenging analog backup skills.
• Manufacture events, riots, or demonstrations staged to block or impede vehicles used in (medical) evacuation or redirect response forces.
• Capture vehicles to exploit situational awareness through tactical internet intrusion.
• Use night vision devices, flares, and IR screens to offset enemy night vision advantage.
• Utilize poor visibility (smoke, sand, weather) conditions to offset superior vehicle optics.
• Change the nature of the conflict. Prime example is from political to religious.
• Hug enemy forces to offset their indirect fire and precision strike advantage.
• Create shortages or overloads by continual attacks on convoys, LOCs, MEDVAC, etc. and/or planting mines. All of these must then be secured by escorting units.
• Neutralize or destroy external antennas, optics, and sensors.
• Numerous synchronized attacks designed to overwhelm or over-saturate the enemy’s ability to successfully deal with the attack.
• Prioritize targeting of low density specialty vehicles such as ambulances, mine- and/or route clearing and water/gap crossing (mobility/counter-mobility), POL vehicles fire support, etc. The elimination of these impacts the entire unit capability.
• Mimic Battlefield Combat Identification Systems to find, fix, close with, and destroy vehicles. Same with “friendly markings.”
• Exploit the vehicle inability to traverse obstacles, roadblocks, rubble piles, holes, ditches, wrecked vehicles, and mines.
• Exploit vehicle inability to self-extract or to reposition other U.S. vehicles off the route.
• Exploit the large turning radius of the vehicle. This facilitates successful rear and rear-oblique attacks as well as trapping two or more vehicles together.
• Use multi-spectral smoke, especially in difficult terrain with poor road, surfaces, recognizable terrain, or in target rear areas during onset of attack.

Vehicle considerations which translate directly into either tactical strengths or weakness.

• Most considerations relate to mobility subsystems, apart from other subsystems. Mobility includes many specific automotive capabilities, e.g., road speed, cruising range, and swim capability. Stopping in high threat areas means increased P-hit, and likely troops dismount. One hit means more strikes follow; so mobility is critical, and speed is critical. Acceleration ability permits a vehicle to react to perceived threats, especially in close terrain (e.g., urban). High road speed can permit vehicles to emplace before threats appear.
• Navigation ability facilitates choice of fastest, most open, and safest route.
• Ability to operate in multiple differing physical combat environments. Turbine engine operates better in temperate-cold terrains. Diesel is better in temperate-hot. Turbine engine has problems with sand clogs, and requires more fuel. Diesel fuel is less flammable. Some engines are designed to accept varying grades and types of fuel.
• Military forces must be able to operate effectively in rivers, swamps, hilly terrain, snow, and coastal areas which fall into its area of operations. Ground pressure is less important on paved roads; but low ground pressure is critical for trafficability on wet, icy, or loose soil and uneven terrain. Tracks have lower ground pressure than wheels. More wheels mean less ground pressure (e.g., 10x10 vs 4x4). For tracked vehicles, six road wheels mean less than 5. Wider tracks reduce ground pressure. Some vehicles can lower auxiliary wheels (BRDM-2). Others can add rubber tracks for periods of off-road use.
• Wheeled vehicles with armor have higher ground pressure. They are limited in off-road capability and speed, and in soil composition usage. They are more subject to failure on tire loss, or in uneven terrain with ditches or bumps. They are more limited in soft soil, such as areas where vehicles have preceded them.
• Front/rear tire track too wide (wide track). While a wide tire track is efficient in desert and in other open terrain, it is not suitable in areas that are terraced for farming or have dikes, etc. For example, HUMVEEs do not work off-road in terrain such as South Korea/South East Asia/Philippines, agricultural regions, etc. The tire track is too wide causing the vehicle to slide off the side of the paddy path/road or to bottom out. These “wide “vehicles are virtually useless in some areas of the world such as some forests of Europe, jungles, and other close terrain areas.
• Factors such as side slope, gap crossing capability, etc. may seem esoteric; but those limitations cause accidents that kill and injure soldiers when moving off-road around hills and across ditches and rubble, trees, disabled vehicles, etc., and on roads as well. Limitations deny movement areas or slow movement and increase vulnerability time.
• Side-slope angle capability (reduces roll-over). This threat limits movement and may kill crew members. Factors for high slide slope capability include a low profile and low roll center (pivot point between the wheels), low center of mass (usually dictated by the height of the armor on the vehicle), wheel/track width of the vehicle, and tire characteristics. If the center of mass is much higher than the roll center, the vehicle can roll more easily if the vehicle slips to road shoulders, ditches, or holes. If the vehicle is wider, roll is less likely. Wheeled vehicles are generally higher than tracked counterparts, more limited in side-slope capability, and more subject to tipping or roll-over when off-road. Stiff, higher pressure, low profile tires offer roll resistance. Vehicles with heavy high turrets, like many western main battle tanks, have poorer side slope capability. Older low profile tanks have superior capability.
• Tracked vehicles, especially smaller ones, are more suitable on forest trails.
• Self-extraction, with winches facilitates greater use in areas with rubble and streams.
• Lighter vehicles are more deployable, for air insertion and water transport closer to their destination, limiting surface travel distance and the associated vulnerability to threats. Vehicle height and width are critical functions for moving rapidly and safely through urban areas, forests, jungles, and through tunnels. Dimensions and weight must be considered in crossing bridges, and for air deployability. Wheeled vehicles are generally higher than comparable tracked vehicles. They may have higher ground to hull clearance for mine resistance, and higher freeboard for swim capability. Also, wheeled vehicles may be lighter, which permits operability over bridges with weight restrictions.
• Tire vulnerability, especially steering tires, to small arms, ditches, det cord, etc. Avoid overloading with too much added armor, ammunition, etc., which reduces mobility.
• For fording operations, amphibious tracked vehicles are generally better-suited in conditions of high water speed and uneven surface. Some vehicles have high-ford design for deep-fording, even underwater. Some vehicles have winches to assist in fording.
• Wheeled vehicles with central tire inflation system (CTIS) operate better off-road. Vehicles with run-flat tires plus CTIS may puncture tires from inside when hitting bumps.
• Turning radius, (high radius requires backing). Tracked vehicles can pivot on one track, for vehicle-length turning radius, even in defilade areas.
• Wheeled vehicles may be able to swim in areas where tracked vehicles cannot. But they may be challenged in entering and exiting water, due to lack of traction in low water and wet/muddy shores. Vehicles with hydro-jets swim at higher speed. A few vehicles with bowplanes and hydrajets can hydroplane at high-speed in amphibious landings.
• 360 degree 3-dimensional visual and/or electronic (rear TV, etc.) observation. Inability to see 360, especially rear view (for high speed backing/and threat) can challenge movement and limit situational awareness in. Optics must elevate declinate sufficiently close-in and distant awareness. They must also be able to operate in obscurant conditions.
• Reduced movement noise (especially engine and tracks) reduces warning time for threats. This factor is less significant in open terrain, more in closed (e.g., cities and defilade).
• Reduced visual/IR signature during movement (conformal nets, side skirts, screens, etc.), will reduce detectability and vulnerability to weapons in open terrain.
• Power/battery augmentation aids stops and moves. Solar or auxiliary power units add power for less noise and IR signature. Hybrid drive adds power and rapid acceleration.
• Weapons elevate and depress sufficiently to handle targets four stories high and very close-in enemy. If they cannot they may move behind infantry during movement.
• Communications compatibility (host country, digital vs. analog, frequency management).
• Collision and fratricide avoidance require IR marker lights and paint, and BCIS networks.
• CBRN protection system (Overpressure, vehicle mask system, or individual masks).
• Mine-clearing or neutralizing capability can cause speed reductions or stops enroute. Advance clearing requires electro-magnetic decoys, unmanned vehicles, and engineer assets.

Kinetic Energy Threats to Light Armored Vehicles

Summary

Military forces worldwide generally recognize that LAVs are increasingly being used not only as armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, but as chassis for expensive and specialized systems critical to success of the mechanized ground force. Despite a variety of efforts to increase armor protection and adapt countermeasure systems for LAVs, most munitions considered to have anti-armor effects will continue to be able to defeat light armor. Recent developments in guns, munitions, and mounts add new weapons and upgrade capabilities of older weapons to challenge LAV protection.

LAV vulnerabilities

All armored vehicle designs, light or heavy, are compromises among competing requirements for mobility, survivability, and lethality. Designers of LAVs must accept armor protection limitations further than with heavy armored vehicles to meet additional requirements such as reduced cost, swim capability, and light weight for air deployability. From their inception, LAVs have been vulnerable to a wide array of munitions from antitank weapons to aerial munitions, artillery Frag-HE rounds, vehicle main gun/machineguns, mines, air defense munitions, and infantry munitions.

In the last decade, a variety of countries including the U.S. have redesigned LAV armor packages to  resist shaped charge and high-explosive threats. But such measures exact a high cost in weight and at best only reduce the chances of penetration and vehicle system kill. These munitions (especially mines and improved shaped-charges) remain a threat to LAVs. The single munition type that is most effective against LAVs will continue to be High-Explosive (HE); because that term is generally shorthand for Fragmentation-High-Explosive (Frag-HE). Most Frag-HE and HE artillery, mortar, and heavy gun rounds have sufficient fragmentation to damage a tank or destroy most LAVs with a near miss. It is generally expected that in a Frag- HE near miss of an IFV, fragmentation effects will cause some type of kill (firepower, mobility, or catastrophic). That same near miss will usually destroy a lighter APC.

Energetic armors (such as ERA), and countermeasure systems have less effect against kinetic energy munitions. The best counter continues to be more armor, and the weight constraint  limits protection. All LAVs have surfaces that can be penetrated by 12.7 -mm rounds, and all have equipment  vulnerable even to  infantry small arms.

A general rule on the battlefield is that a stopped vehicle in close combat has a short lifespan. The greater the vehicle mobility, the better chance it has to escape a kill  zone .  Adversaries train  to target armored vehicle engine locations. Well-aimed fires can damage the engine from side or rear, for a  mobility kill, and initiate fires and secondary  explosions .

A recent shift toward wheeled LAVs exposes the vulnerability of wheels . Tires of wheeled vehicles are vulnerable to all weapons, from rifles to fragmentation. Tires can be penetrated by any small arms.  Rubble,  abatis, and  other loose  materials  can  halt  wheeled  vehicles,  as  Russian  BTR -80s

experienced in Chechnya. Trenches, scattered nails, caltrops, spike strips, etc. can initiate KE tire blow-outs. Run-flat tires and added wheels (6x6, 8x8, and 10x10) can reduce but not eliminate mobility problems. Tires on steering wheels are critical; one or  two penetrations can slow or  stop the most modern vehicle, especially off-road. Rounds aimed at wheels can be effective even when they miss. Wheel well areas expose crews and passengers, and are rarely protected beyond 7.62 - mm rounds.

Military forces worldwide recognize the difficulty in directly engaging heavy armored vehicles, and the risk in exposing themselves to obtain a catastrophic kill. An increasing variety of weapons for dismounted infantry and vehicles use KE munitions to penetrate the armor of LAVs. New specially designed weapons are being developed to attain lesser kills (mobility, firepower, communications, and function) to degrade effectiveness of the vehicle as a "system of systems". Due to limited room, much of the crew's gear may be stowed on the outside of the vehicle, and is vulnerable to fires. A favorite tactic is to attack sensors (sights, remote sensors, radar, or links to them). Remote weapons and external boxes are vulnerable to a variety of fires. Sniper fires and even rocks can damage sights to blind weapons of the most modern LAFVs.

Another vulnerable part of the LAV system is personnel. Personnel may ride outside of the vehicle, where they are exposed and vulnerable to all weapons. Drivers and personnel operating open weapons can be targeted, especially from higher angles. Concussion from munitions impacting on vehicles may not seriously damage the vehicle; but they can cause armor pieces or mounted equipment to rebound inside and kill or injure personnel. Blasts underneath vehicles can transfer shock through floor-bolted seats and break the backs of crew and passengers. Therefore, a critical part of vehicle design is in securing seats and materiel in vehicles. Also KE hits to ammo compartments and external tanks may not penetrate hull armor, but can start catastrophic fires. Hard jolts can injure soldiers inside. Thus, concealed trenches, slides from "non-lethal" road slimes, or deliberate collisions are kinetic energy threats to personnel in LAVs.

Weapons for dismounted infantry

They include sniper rifles and machine guns (7.62 mm and 12.7 mm). Machine guns and sniper rifles can be used with obstacles to slow the vehicles and deliver sufficient fires to vulnerable areas to obtain a kill (mobility, firepower, or catastrophic), or to kill crewmen and degrade its effectiveness. A variety of general-purpose machine guns can be dismounted and can penetrate some armors, tires, and exterior materials on LAVs. Mini-guns, such as 7.62-mm man-portable type, can swarm rounds at 1,200 rounds per minute. New ammunition includes sub-caliber sabot rounds for 7.62 and 12.7- mm weapons (such as the .50-cal SLAP), and improved armor-piercing rounds such as the Chinese tungsten alloy-core round. These traditional technologies defeat all current active protection systems.

Anti-materiel sniper rifles (12.7 mm or .50 cal). These rifles are integral to any modern battlefield. Although often categorized as sniper rifles (and capable of being used against personnel), they are generally employed as anti-materiel rifles. The most widely proliferated of these rifles are: the U.S. Barrett M82A1/M95 .50 cal semi-automatic rifle, the Croatian MACS M2-1/M3 (12.7-mm bolt action), and the Russian V-94 (12.7-mm semi-auto). The Barrett M82A1 is employed by all U.S. military forces as well as forces of 27 other countries, including Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and UK. The Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) round fired from the M82A1 can penetrate 19 mm (.75 in) of armor @ 1,500 m. It can also fire a multi-purpose round (See M82A1 data sheet). Approximately 25 variants of 12.7-mm sniper/anti-materiel rifles are available.

Larger-caliber Anti-materiel Rifles (14.5 to 20-mm). A trend in the past ten years has been towards larger- caliber anti-materiel rifles. The Croatian RT20 20-mm “hand cannon” is the most prevalent (range 1,800 m). It can chamber either an HE or API round. The RT20 was developed primarily to penetrate the armored casing around the thermal sight head on M84 tanks (a 20-mm round was the smallest caliber that could penetrate the casing). During the war in the former Yugoslavia, M84s were frequently deployed to detect Croatian infantry moving at night, so a method of removing their night-vision capability was found with this RT20 “hand cannon”.

Other anti-materiel rifles readily available are:

• US M98 cal .338 Lapua Magnum (1,400 m and twice the penetration of 7.62-mm)
• NTW 14.5-mm (range 2,300 m)
• Hungarian Gepard M3 14.5-mm (range 1,000 m)
• Austrian Steyr IWS 2000 15.2-mm (range 1,000 m, 19 gram tungsten carbide dart)
• South African NTW 20-mm (range 1,500 m)
• Finnish Helenius APH RK20 20-mm bolt-action gun

Guns for light vehicle applications (7.62 mm to 23 mm)

Several countries mount guns on light carriers, such as motorcycles, fast-attack vehicles, and light utility vehicles such as HMMWVs, UAZ-467, and Land Rover. The Russians advertise the Gear-Up motorcycle with mounts for a variety of auto grenade launchers and machineguns. Several combat support vehicles for military security patrols have weapons mounted on light mounts, such as a pick-up truck or a possible towed or ground mount. Guns ranging to

14.5 mm (such as Russian Arzamas GAZ-53971 van for use of internal and other security forces) may also be mounted.

Recently China displayed a "dune buggy" with a 23-mm chain gun mounted to the overhead roll bar, for manual aiming and operation. The gun fires standard antiaircraft ammunition and recent APDS rounds, and has a thermal night sight. This gun could also mount on remote vehicle turrets, for use against air and ground targets. Oerlikon went one step farther with an infantry application for the KBB 25-mm auto- cannon. The break-apart mount actually permits infantry pack carry. It did not catch on. However, the very low profile weapon can also be towed, carried in an all-terrain vehicle, or off-loaded for ground mount. The profile is so low that the firer should dig a pit to operate it. This is a developed potential threat to all LAVs.

LAV main guns

Armored personnel carriers and combat support vehicles (7.62-mm to 30-mm). There is an increasing variety of APCs with 7.62-mm, 12.7-mm, and 14.5-mm guns, designed for the traditional "battle taxi" role. A parallel trend is for the increased use of wheels vs tracks. But on selected APCs and on combat support variants, many countries are replacing those guns with 20, 23, 25, or 30-mm guns; and the number of drop-in turrets available has exploded. Improved Oerlikon APDS and APFSDS ammunition has extended the life of 20-mm and 23-mm gun applications. The Vulcan mini-gun and modern auto- cannons in 20-mm can overwhelm a specific area of LAV armor at a high rate of fire. Multi-barrel 23-mm cannons can do the same thing. New cannon for 30-mm rounds (in several round designs) include the Ukrainian KBA-2, Russian 2A72, and Bushmaster II. Improved 30-mm rounds offer 100+ mm penetration at 1000 m (120 mm for 8-rd burst). Recently German Mauser displayed the RMK-30 recoilless gun. The light recoil gun permits accurate high-rate aimed fire to a range of 3,000 m, with a variety of ammunition including APDS and APFSDS on very light vehicle mounts.

Infantry fighting vehicles, Tanks, and fire support vehicles (20+ mm). Most IFVs feature auto-cannons in the 20-30 mm range, with a rate of fire of 500-700 rd/min, but a practical rate of fire of 100-250 rd/min. Aimed fire is generally confined to bursts, with a substantial dispersion. As armors have increased, the current trend is a shift in gun size toward 30-50 mm. A number of 35 mm guns, including the South African EMAK auto-cannon or Swiss Oerlikon 35/1000 revolver cannon (1,000+ rd/min rate of fire) have been offered for use in IFV upgrade turrets.

A 35-mm round doubles the penetration of 30-mm rounds. Swedish Hagglunds went a step farther with the 40-mm cannon on the CV9040 IFV. Italian Otobreda offers the T60/70A 60-mm gun turret for the Dardo IFV. The cannon features precision semi-automatic fires rather than automatic, but fires as rapidly as the target can be acquired. Penetration is well over 150 mm at 2000 m. The next trend (by around 2010) is cased-telescoped ammunition (CTA), which permits a 30-mm gun to achieve KE effects comparable to that of a 35-mm or 40-mm gun.

Tanks and heavy armored combat vehicles (HACVs)

Any KE round of a 57+mm gun will damage and probably destroy a LAV. Canister and APERS (anti-personnel) rounds fired from tank guns, antitank guns, or HACVs guns can damage or destroy LAVs.

Other KE threats

Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Belly attack mines can include kinetic energy penetrator mines, which defeat even mine-resistant vehicles. Side-attack sensor-fuzed mines include Russian plate mines with aimed directional fragmentation. Other mines and IEDs have warheads which produce an explosively formed penetrator (EFP, shaped like a sabot penetrator), to defeat light to heavy armor, depending on design. Such mines include the Russian TM-83 and TEMP-30 sensor-fuzed mine. Other mines and IEDs (e.g., PD Mi-Pk) can produce multiple EFPs. Even blast effects from mines and IEDs can cause severe kinetic energy damage by flipping over vehicles, causing material to toss about inside and killing or injuring personnel.

Frangible rounds. The frangible armor-piercing discarding sabot (FAPDS) round design uses a brittle rod which can penetrate armor, then shatter after penetration, to spread varying sized fragments within the target. It flies with similar ballistics (including range and high velocity) to a KE round, but with effects of a Frag-HE round. Although most are currently designed for anti-aircraft use against thin armors, some are effective (with tailored brittleness, size, and design) for use against improved LAVs, such as IFVs.

Programmable fuze rounds. The Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm AHEAD round for use against aircraft uses an electronic fuze that is calibrated by a laser rangefinder, the fire control computer, and an electronic setter within the gun. At the pre-set time, the round fires a volley of KE sub projectiles forward (in the manner of 00 buckshot), with overall range to 5,000 m. Technology variants are being tested against ground vehicles. The AHEAD technology is available with other sizes of rounds, such as 30-mm PMC308. Russian HEF rounds for BMP-3M (100-mm) and T-80K tank (125 mm) employ the same technology, with range to more than 7,000 m. Russian rounds also permit an adjusted trajectory, in which they over-fly the vehicle and blast fragments outward and downward against the thin top armor of armored vehicles.

Artillery-delivered KE munitions. Artillery rounds include Russian 122-mm and 152-mm cannon rounds with  top-attack flechettes, which  can cover a wide  area.  They can damage  and penetrate most LAVs.

Sensor-fuzed artillery rounds, e.g., Russian Motiv-M, German SMART-155, and US SADARM can fire an EFP into the vehicle top for a sure penetration and kill.

Kinetic energy missiles. Prototype KE ATGMs are in various stages of development. High-velocity missiles (HVMs) offer a heavy armor overmatch against the heaviest armors with long range (5-7 km) and short flight times (4 km in 1-2 seconds). One HVM system that is a current threat to LAVs is, in fact, Starstreak (MANPADS and multi-role missile, page 5-52 below). Starstreak uses laser-beam rider (LBR) guidance and shoulder, vehicle, or helicopter launch. Lethal mechanism is 3 darts - each a LBR Mach 4 HVM with high- penetration (125 mm) and HE blast. These can slam a helicopter target out to 7 km in 2-7 seconds, and have been successfully tested against light armored vehicle targets. A vehicle launcher version, Armored Starstreak, uses the Alvis Stormer LAV chassis and 8 launchers. Any Starstreak launcher is a threat to LAVs. The missile defeats almost all known countermeasures, including APS.

Future Developments in KE Attack

For the 40-mm CTA gun on the aborted US FSCS/ British TRACER programs, there was a proposal to modify the Starstreak dart into a KE missile round to fit in the autoloader, as an ATGM for use against LAVs and aircraft. The gun is fitted on the recently displayed Lancer proposed for reconnaissance vehicle and IFV and designs.

ATGMs exist with fly-over top-attack mode and EFP for target kill. The US Javelin is a successful fielded example. Other fly-over (Swedish Bill, Bill-2) ATGMs and top-attack (Israeli Spike/Gill) ATGMs with shaped- charge warheads have been fielded. The British fly-over sensor fuzed MBT-LAW ATGL employs a HEAT warhead. These designs are steps toward future soldier systems with fly-over EFP warheads for KE attack.

Attack UAVs and Micro-UAVs are being developed. A French proposal for Leclerc 2015 includes tank- launched attack micro-UAVs. The UAV kill mechanism is a top-attack EFP, which would easily penetrate LAV top armor.

Conclusions

Fighting vehicle developers have found a variety of upgrades to improve light armored vehicles. However, they are more useful in protecting the vehicle during travel to the combat zone. All of these innovations offer marginal increase in protection against modern anti-armor weapons in close combat. Even expensive high-technology approaches, such as active protection systems, will not protect against many KE munitions which threaten LAVs. In close terrain, high defilade and urban areas, combat vehicles (including tanks and LAVs) are very vulnerable on their flanks and rear. Many modern IFVs have lost their firing ports and have limited awareness or firepower to address those directions.

Technical Implications: The vehicles need weapons and sensors to address all threats for 360°, and at high and low angles of fire. Remote weapon stations and periscopes for the dismountable infantry can be added. Additional protection can be added, for use against selected high lethality weapons, such as antitank grenade launchers. Other assets are gun shields for crewmen which are partially out of vehicles, or remote fire control systems which can be operated from the inside. Side skirts and better mine/wheel well protection are needed.

Tactical Implications: Technical AT considerations may force changes in tactics for mechanized infantry and crews of combat support systems. Tactics must exploit firepower, integration, and protection in the combined arms force as well as adaptive use of cover, concealment, and deception. Assaults across open areas against light forces can lead to disaster. Movement must employ speed, cover/concealment, and mutually supporting fires. Once a squad dismounts, it may have to precede the vehicle to protect it from

anti-armor weapons, not follow and use it for protection. Although some tacticians differentiate IFVs from APCs, claiming that IFV squads can fight from the vehicle, that distinction is insignificant in close terrain, and in the face of modern AT weapons. These are only some of the responses to the spectrum of threats to light armored vehicles today. See Chapter 15, Upgrades, for additional responses.

Recoilless Weapons for Modern Warfare

In past decades, recoilless weapons were considered lethal and formidable antitank assets. Recoilless antitank grenade launchers (ATGLs) for squads have seen tremendous improvements (see Chapter 1). But, as tank armor has improved, most of the crewed systems for use by AT teams operating above squad level have seen fewer upgrades. Today, many of those crewed AT weapons are considered obsolescent. However, upgrades are available; and new weapons are now fielded. With more changes, crewed recoilless weapons can be effective.

One advantage of recoilless systems is their utility. They offer a variety of munitions, including HEAT, HE, flechette, and others, to service most battlefield targets. Some recoilless launchers (aka, recoilless guns or rifles, or mounted grenade launchers) are light enough for easy transport in light vehicles, with ability against infantry while outranging most infantry weapons. A well-proliferated example is the SPG-9/9M, with HE range beyond 4,000 m.

Recoilless weapons are limited by certain design and operational considerations. The bore size limits size of rounds and their ability to penetrate modern tank armor. However, many offer sufficient penetration to defeat other armored and unarmored vehicles (which outnumber tanks on the battlefield). Those systems are best used to augment other forces in a fight.

A key value is in their general lethality. With a higher rate of fire than most antitank guided missile (ATGM) launchers at 5 or more rounds per minute, they are useful as a fire support asset that can augment fires of other weapons against various targets. Most lack the range of ATGMs. All lack the precision. But these multi-role systems can digest various rounds to defeat vehicles, then kill exiting personnel with large HE blast munitions. In a close fight or ambush, many of these weapons can kill any vehicle other than a main battle tank (MBT) from any aspect. Some can also damage or kill MBTs from the side or rear. As we have noted for infantry antitank grenade launchers (ATDLs), crewed weapons include new ones, and upgraded munitions with tandem HEAT warheads which can kill all tanks from the side or rear (see table).

A number of features have improved precision of these weapons. A variety of electro-optical sights can be mounted on these weapons. SPG-9M and SPG-29 Mounted can use the Russian 2Ts35 laser- rangefinder sight or a widely marketed lightweight ballistic computer sight such as the Simrad IS2000. Adaptable night sights include II sights like Simrad KN250F, and various compact thermal sights. A challenge to all grenades is their relatively slow velocity, which reduces hit probability (Ph) against moving vehicles. Some have high velocity (600 m/s for Italian Folgore, 700 for SPG-9) and flat trajectories to increase Ph vs movers.

A few manufacturers are looking for improved accuracy munitions. The ultimate solution is to add ATGM launch capability to recoilless launchers. Israeli IAI has offered to produce a version of the LAHAT for use in the 90 mm M40 recoilless rifle. Even the best recoilless round cannot kill a modern tank from the frontal aspect. Any ATGM exiting a bore of <150 mm has a low probability to defeat MBT front armor. But a top- attack tandem warhead missile,  e.g., a 90 mm version of LAHAT  for the M40  launcher offers  probable

major damage (or catastrophic kill) against an MBT turret or hull. Other vehicles would expect a catastrophic kill. Israeli IAI has offered development of the ATGM variant. In a beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) environment, ATGM capability dramatically increases effectiveness of this type of weapon.

Another limitation for recoilless weapons is their detectability. Most have high smoke and noise signatures in the backblast. Most are fairly tall and must be hand-loaded from a standing or kneeling position, which exposes the team to counter-fires. Older weapons are heavy enough to require breaking down and loading into vehicles for moves, limiting their ability to shoot and move quickly. One example of poor mobility is the old Russian B-10 (at 85 kg towed carriage, 72 without). With an anti-armor range of 400- 1,000 m, the first shot had better be accurate and lethal, or the crew is in serious trouble. Thus many users only employ these older weapons in combined arms defenses and ambushes, to augment other fires.

Some old launchers have been modified to reduce weight, plus break down into components for dismounted moves. The Chinese Type 65 is a lighter weight version of B-10, at 28 kg, and uses improved ammunition. The Serbian M79 variant also weighs less than 30 kg. With improved sights, it has an anti- armor range of 670-1,000 m. Better range aids survivability.

Several newer recoilless weapons have been designed for reduced weight, lower operating profile, and reduced move and setup times. Examples include RPG-29 Mounted (next page) and the Serbian M90. The best of the modern lightweight crewed launchers may be the Chinese 120-mm PF-98. Although it operationally resembles RPG-29, it is actually an amalgam of features from a variety of modern systems. Like the RPG-29, it comes in shoulder-launch version or tripod-mount crewed version. The launcher appears to be directly derived from the Montenegro/Serbian 120-mm M90. However, they followed the Russian design by adding a lightweight tripod, and a canistered grenade which attaches to the launcher to extend its length. The ammunition is another amalgam, with warheads which could be derived from recent Carl Gustaf rounds, and a rocket motor that resembles a scaled up RPG-29 motor. The sight is a modern EO/LRF ballistic computer sight. The result is a state-of-the-art launcher with 800/2,000 m range, 800+ mm penetration, light weight (<18 kg loaded), and competitive precision.

Rapid mobility, as noted earlier, is a critical factor for survivability and utility of these weapons. Since most legacy systems cannot be easily adapted for mobility, an alternative use is to mount them on vehicles. They offer good lethality to protect vehicles; and the vehicles facilitate launch-and-move operations, without downtime for disassembly. Examples include fire support versions of BTR-50 and Czech OT-21 APCs, and various weapons on the BTR-152 armored transporter. They have also been fitted on a motorcycle and on boats.

A good weapon for ground and vehicle mounts is the Russian SPG-9, which has been seen pintle-mounted on a UAZ-469 TUV. The launcher is well proliferated, and seen several upgrades. On the SPG-9M upgrade, 2Ts35 or other more modern LRF ballistic sights are available. AT ranges are 1,300 m for improved HEAT, and 1,000 for tandem HEAT. The best of these weapons for vehicle mount is the US M40 106 mm recoilless rifle. The Bofors Retrofit Kit updates it into a modern and effective fire support weapon. Sights include the CLASS laser sight, and others. Munitions include flechette, HEP-T, and tandem HEAT. Addition of the LAHAT ATGM (above) would greatly expand its lethality. With these and other expected upgrades, and with new designs in production, we can expect to see recoilless weapons employed against U.S. forces for many more years.