Chapter 6: Hybrid Threat Organizations

The Hybrid Threat (HT) tailors its organizations to the required missions and functions. It determines the functions that must be performed in order to successfully accomplish its goals. Then it builds teams and organizations to execute those functions without regard to traditional military hierarchy, the law of war, or rules of engagement.

Task-organizing

The HT will task-organize forces in a fashion that matches its available resources to its goals. Task organizations will often include more than purely military formations. The HT’s regular military and irre- gular components are tailored forces depending on training requirements. FM 7-100.4 provides a baseline of organizational size, equipment, and weapons. Its organizational directories provide a very detailed list- ing of personnel and equipment. For some training requirements, the opposing force (OPFOR) order of battle (OB) might not need to include personnel numbers. Trainers and exercise planners can extract the appropriate pages from the organizational directories and tailor them by eliminating the detail they do not need and adding the necessary units from other pages to develop the required task organization. For more detail on organizations, see FM 7-100.4, which introduces baseline organizational structures of a flexible, thinking, and adaptive OPFOR.

The baseline organizations presented in the organizational directories of FM 7-100.4 are intended to be tailored and task-organized in a manner that is appropriate for the training objectives. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of- the-art, relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of these categories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.

Military Organizations

Regular military organizations of the HT will present conventional and unconventional capabilities. This TC is part of the TC 7-100 series, which includes OPFOR doctrine, organization, and equipment for trainers and educators to tailor specified threats for U.S. Army training requirements.

In the regular military forces of a nation-state that is part of the HT, six services generally comprise the armed forces. These include the Army, Navy, Air Force (which includes the national-level Air Defense Forces), Strategic Forces (with long-range rockets and missiles), Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Command, and Internal Security Forces. The Internal Security Forces may be subordinate to the Ministry of the Inte- rior rather than to the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces field some reserve component forces in all services, but most reserve forces are Army forces. In time of war, command and control relationships among state ministries may be consolidated for regular, reserve, militia, and other paramilitary-type armed forces, all under the Supreme High Command (SHC).

Baseline OPFOR organizations described in FM 7-100.4 do not constitute an OPFOR OB. Rather, they provide a framework from which trainers can develop a specific OPFOR OB appropriate for their par- ticular training requirements. Within this framework, training scenario writers and exercise designers have considerable flexibility in determining what the OPFOR actually has in capabilities or limitations at a given point in time or a given location. In some cases, an organization taken straight from the OPFOR adminis- trative force structure (AFS) in FM 7-100.4 may meet the requirements for a particular U.S. Army training environment. In most cases, however, task-organizing an OPFOR organization is appropriate in order to portray the correct array of OPFOR units and equipment for stressing the mission essential task list (METL) of U.S. units in a particular training environment.

Special-purpose Forces Command

As part of an OPFOR, the SPF Command includes both SPF units and elite commando units. Four of the five other service components of the armed forces also have their own SPF. There are Army, Navy, and Air Force SPF. The Internal Security Forces also have their own SPF units. These service SPF normally remain under the control of their respective services or a joint operational or theater command. However, SPF from any of these service components could become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level requirements. The SPF Command has the means to control joint SPF operations as required.

Any SPF units from the SPF Command or from other service components’ SPF that have reconnaissance or direct action missions supporting strategic-level objectives or intelligence requirements would normally be under the direct control of the SHC or under the control of the SPF Command, which reports directly to the SHC. Also, any service SPF units assigned to joint SPF operations would temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or perhaps the SHC. Most of the service SPF units are intended for use at the operational level. Thus, they can be subordinate to operational-level commands even in the AFS. In peacetime and in garrisons, SPF of both the SPF Command and other services are organized administratively into SPF companies, battalions and brigades.

In time of war, some SPF units from the SPF Command or from the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Internal Security Forces SPF may remain under the command and control of their respective service head- quarters. However, some SPF units also might be allocated to operational or even tactical level commands during the task-organizing process. (See FM 7-100.4 for additional discussion on the strategic to tactical levels of SPF.)

Regardless of the parent organization in the AFS, SPF normally infiltrate and operate as small teams. When deployed, these teams may operate individually, or they may be task-organized into detachments. The terms team and detachment indicate the temporary nature of the groupings. In the course of an operation, teams can leave a detachment and join it again. Each team may in turn break up into smaller teams (of as few as two men) or, conversely, come together with other teams to form a larger team, depending on the mission. At a designated time, teams can join up and form a detachment (for example, to conduct a raid), which can at any moment split up again. This whole process can be planned before the operation begins, or it can evolve during the course of an operation.

Internal Security Forces

Internal security forces are part of an OPFOR structure for operations against internal threats to the state. In peacetime, the Chief of Internal Security heads the forces within the Ministry of the Interior that fall under the general label of “internal security forces.” Most of the internal security forces are uniformed and use military ranks and insignia similar to those of the other services of the nation-state armed forces. Among the internal security forces, border guard, security, and SPF units most closely resemble regular military units of other services of the armed forces. However, units from the General Police directorate and Civil Defense Directorate can also perform military-like roles.

During wartime, some or all of the internal security forces from the Ministry of the Interior may be- come a sixth service component of the Armed Forces, with the formal name “Internal Security Forces.” Internal Security Forces can be allocated to a theater command or to a task-organized operational or tactical level military command that is capable of controlling joint or interagency operations. In such command relationships or when missions share a common area of responsibility (AOR) with a military organization, units of the Internal Security Forces send liaison teams to represent them in the military organization’s staff.

Various types on non-state actors might be part of the HT, affiliated with it, or support it in some manner. Even those internal security forces that do not belong to the HT, or support it directly or willingly, could be exploited or manipulated by the HT to support its objectives.

General Police Directorate

The General Police Directorate has responsibility for national, district, and local police. In some circumstances, police forces at all three levels operate as paramilitary forces. They can use military-type tactics, weapons, and equipment. National Police forces include paramilitary tactical units that are equipped for combat, if necessary. These uniformed forces may represent the equivalent of an infantry organization in the regular armed forces.

Within the various national- and district-level police organizations, the special police are the forces that most resemble regular armed forces in their organization, equipment, training, and missions. Because some special police units are equipped with heavy weapons and armored vehicles, they can provide combat potential to conduct defensive operations if required. Special police units could be expected to supplement the armed forces.

Civil Defense Directorate

The Civil Defense Directorate comprises a variety of paramilitary and nonmilitary units. While the majority of Civil Defense personnel are civilians, members of paramilitary units and some staff elements at the national and district levels hold military ranks. Civil Defense paramilitary units are responsible for the protection and defense of the area or installation where they are located. Even the nonmilitary, civil engineering units can supplement the combat engineers of the armed forces by conducting engineer reconnaissance, conducting explosive ordnance disposal, and providing force-protection construction support and logistics enhancements required to sustain military operations.

Reserves and Militia

Although all six services can field some reserve forces, most of the reserve forces are Army forces. All militia forces belong to the Army component. Overall planning for mobilization of reserves and militia is the responsibility of the state and its Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff. Each service component headquarters would have a similar directorate responsible for mobilization of forces within that service. Major geographical commands (and other administrative commands at the operational level and higher) serve as a framework for mobilization of reserve and militia forces.

During mobilization, some reserve personnel serve as individual replacements for combat losses in active units. Others fill positions, including professional and technical specialists, that were left vacant in peacetime in deference to requirements of the civilian sector. However, reservists also man reserve units that are mobilized as units to replace other units that have become combat-ineffective or to provide additional units necessary for large, sustained operations.

Like active force units, most mobilized reserve and militia units do not necessarily go to war under the same administrative headquarters that controlled them in peacetime. Rather, they typically become part of a task-organized operational- or tactical-level fighting command tailored for a particular mission. In most cases, the mobilized reserve units would be integrated with regular military units in such a fighting command. In rare cases, however, a reserve command at division level or higher might become a fighting command or serve as the basis for forming a fighting command based partially or entirely on reserve forces.

Insurgent Organizations

Insurgent organizations have no regular, fixed table of organization and equipment structure. The mission, environment, geographic factors, and many other variables determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization and its subordinate cells. Their composition varies from organization to organization, mission to mission, environment to environment. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements, as does the size, specialty, number, and type of subordinates.

There are several factors that differentiate the structure and capability of an insurgent organization from the structure and capability of a guerrilla organization. Since the insurgent organization is primarily a covert organization, it typically has a cellular, networked structure. By comparison, guerrilla organizations often reflect a military structure such as battalion, company, platoon, or squad.

Insurgent organizations generally do not have some of the heavier and more sophisticated equipment that guerrilla organizations can possess. Weapons of the insurgents are generally limited to small arms, antitank grenade launchers, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There may be some crew-served weapons such the 82-mm mortar or 107-mm single-tube rocket launcher. In the event the insurgents require heavier weapons or capabilities, they might obtain them from guerrillas, or the guerrilla organization might provide its services depending on the relationship between the two organizations at the time.

Insurgent organizations are irregular forces. The baseline insurgent organizations in the FM 7-100.4 organizational directories represent the default setting for a typical insurgent organization. If an OPFOR OB has more than one local insurgent organization, no two insurgent organizations should look exactly alike. Trainers and training planners should vary the types and numbers of cells to reflect the irregular nature of such organizations. The FM 7-100.4 baseline array of possible cells for various functions is arranged in a line-and-block chart for convenience. However, they would typically be task-organized in a network-type structure, as shown in the example of a local insurgent organization in figure 6-1.

Local insurgent organization (example)

In FM 7-100.4, the baseline organization charts and equipment lists for individual cells include many notes on possible variations in organization or in numbers of people or equipment within a given organization. When developing an OB for a specific insurgent organization for use in training, users may exercise some latitude in the construction of cells. Some cells might need to be larger or smaller than the “default” setting found in the organizational directories. Some entire cells might not be required, and some functional cells might be combined into a single cell performing multiple functions. However, trainers and training planners would need to take several things into consideration in modifying the “default” cell structures:

• What functions the insurgents need to be able to perform.
• What equipment is needed to perform those functions.
• How many people are required to employ the required equipment.
• The number of vehicles in relation to the people needed to drive them or the people and equipment that must be transported.
• Equipment associated with other equipment (for example, an aiming circle/goniometer used with a mortar or a day/night observation scope used with a sniper rifle).

Any relationship of independent local insurgent organizations to regional or national insurgent structures may be one of affiliation or dependent upon a single shared or similar goal. These relationships are generally fluctuating and may be fleeting, mission-dependant, or event- or agenda-oriented. Such relationships can arise and cease due to a variety of reasons or motivations.

When task-organizing insurgent organizations, guerrilla units might be subordinate to a larger insurgent organization. However, they might be only loosely affiliated with an insurgent organization of which they are not a part. A guerrilla unit or other insurgent organization might be affiliated with a regular military organization. A guerrilla unit might also become a subordinate part of an OPFOR task organization based on a regular military unit.

Guerrilla Organizations

Guerrilla organizations may be as large as several brigades or as small as a platoon or independent hunter-killer (HK) teams. Even in the AFS organizational directories, some guerrilla units were already reconfigured as HK units. In the fighting force structure represented in an OPFOR OB, some additional guerrilla units may become task-organized in that manner.

The structure of a guerrilla organization depends on several factors. These might include the physical environment, sociological demographics and relationships, economics, and/or support available from external organizations and countries. A guerrilla organization might be affiliated with forces from countries other than the state with which it is in conflict or other organizations external to the state sovereignty in contest. Some guerrilla organizations may constitute a paramilitary arm of an insurgent movement, while others may pursue guerrilla warfare independently from or loosely affiliated with an insurgent organization. Figure 6-2 on page 6-6 shows the baseline organization for guerrilla HK company as an example.

Guerrilla hunter-killer company (example)

Compared to insurgent organizations as a whole, guerrilla organizations have a more military-like structure. Within this structure, guerrilla organizations have some of the same types of weapons as a regular military force. The guerrilla organization contains weapons up to and including 120-mm mortars, anti- tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and can conduct limited mine warfare and sapper attacks. Other examples of equipment and capability the guerrillas have in their organizations that the insurgents generally do not have are—

• 12.7-mm heavy machineguns.
• .50-cal antimateriel rifles.
• 73-, 82-, and 84-mm recoilless guns.
• 100-mm and 120-mm mortars.
• 107-mm multiple rocket launchers.
• 122-mm rocket launchers.
• Global positioning system (GPS) jammers.
• Signals reconnaissance capabilities.

Criminal Organizations

Criminal organizations are normally independent of nation-state control, and large-scale organizations often extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide. Individual criminals or small-scale criminal organizations do not have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, large-scale criminal organizations do. The weapons and equipment mix varies based on type and scale of criminal activity. Criminal organizations can appear similar to the characteristics of a paramilitary organization. Figure 6-3 shows an example of a large-scale criminal organization.

Large-scale criminal organization (example)

By mutual agreement, or when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated with other actors, such as insurgent or guerrilla forces. Insurgents or guerrillas controlling or operating in the same area can provide security and protection to the criminal organization’s activities in exchange for financial assistance, arms and materiel, or general logistical support. On behalf of the criminal organiza- tion, guerrilla or insurgent organizations can conduct—

• Diversionary actions.
• Reconnaissance and early warning.
• Money laundering, smuggling, or transportation.
• Civic actions.

Their mutual interests can include preventing U.S. or local government forces from interfering in their respective activities.

At times, criminal organizations might also be affiliated with nation-state military and/or paramilitary actors. In time of war, for instance, the state can encourage and materially support criminal organizations to commit actions that contribute to the breakdown of civil control in a neighboring country.

Criminal organizations may employ criminal actions, terror tactics, and militarily unconventional methods to achieve their goals. They may have the best technology, equipment, and weapons available, simply because they have the money to buy them. Criminal organizations may not change their structure in wartime, unless wartime conditions favor or dictate different types of criminal action or support activities.

Criminal organizations may conduct civic actions to gain and maintain support of the populace. A grateful public can provide valuable security and support functions. The local citizenry may willingly provide ample intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and security support. Intelligence and security can also be the result of bribery, extortion, or coercion.

Hybrid Relationships

The HT is a composite of many different groups. These groups will often have no standard, readily identifiable organizational relationship. What brings together the capabilities and intent of the components of the HT is a common purpose, typically opposition to U.S. goals. This unity of purpose can even bring together groups that normally would be fighting among themselves.

Affiliated organizations are cooperating toward a common goal despite having no formal command or organizational relationship. Affiliated organizations are typically nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal cartels, insurgencies, terrorist cells, or mercenaries.

Those irregular forces operating in a military unit’s AOR that the unit may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it for a limited time are affiliated forces. No “command relationship” exists between an affiliated organization and the unit in whose AOR it operates. In some cases, affiliated forces may receive support from the military unit as part of the agreement under which they cooperate.