Information: Kujenga
This page is a section of Kujenga.
The Kujenga information environment is somewhat dated with limited availability of Internet, mobile phone, and television access. The government is investing in projects to expand the internet backbone and circuits but general public access is still in the future. While it does have a mix of public and private media available, the government controls the media programs available to the public. Kujenga’s information operations capabilities focus mostly on less technical approaches with selected niche capabilities. As a less technically oriented country with narrowly focused modernization goals the media and information flow remain concentrated on widely available systems. Radio and print media continue to dominate the Kujenga information sphere with limited in-roads by modern media systems. As a country with limited technical information systems it is significantly less susceptible to cyber-attacks and information manipulation. The Kujenga government seeks to maintain the static state of media capability for the population with programs to increase government use of new technology to maintain control of the country.
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Satellite Telecommunications
Satellite telecommunication capabilities are currently limited to products purchased from commercial vendors. Kujenga entered into contracts with a company from Torrika to provide a turn-key solution for micro-satellites. Kujenga’s goals are to not only enhance telecommunications services but also to establish satellite-based SIGINT and IMINT capabilities by mid-2019. The contract specifies construction of the satellite platforms to Kujenga specifications, launch, and a ground-control complex. Once operational, the satellites will provide Tier-1 command and control communications, signals intercept, and imagery.
Government and military forces have access to GPS guidance for critical command and control systems and weapons platforms. The limited availability causes Kujenga forces to continue to rely on proven manual navigation techniques that do not rely on technical systems. As forces are typically posted on a regional basis for prolonged periods they are very familiar with the terrain and its characteristics.
Public Communications Media
Communication networks in Kujenga are controlled by a government monopoly managed by Kujenga Telecommunications (KT). Private investors can purchase franchises through KT to open businesses providing radio, television, and both wired and wireless Internet services. KT provides radio and television and also franchises private broadcast services. Contribution of the communication sector to the Kujenga economy is currently only at 2% compared to 4% or higher found in other countries in the eastern region. The government, realizing the potential positive impact on the economy, has instituted a strategy to expand services available to the public. The strategy maintains a central requirement to monitor and control the information flow to the country.
The government intercepts and monitors private message traffic of the population for all information systems. It conducts active suppression of media reports critical of the government using network filtering as well as jamming or interruption of service for the targeted broadcast system. The anti-government activities in the Tanga and southwest region caused the government to use active measures to disrupt or restrict information flow. The government uses jamming, Internet filtering, and destruction of print media in both regions in efforts to suppress the information campaigns of insurgent groups.
Internet
Internet access continues to grow as the government invests in expansion of the network backbone available in Kujenga. Consistent access is limited to those institutions and organizations that need it for modern business. The ruling group has Internet and mostly unrestricted access while the general public is only beginning to find access more available.
Television
Television is found in most cities and urban areas among as Kujenga is at the lower end of the scale of households with television. While slowly growing, televisions per household currently stands at just over 9% with a projected growth rate of .5% per year. Any television found in rural areas tends to be a shared family/tribe asset used by the group. Some groups provide television access and programming to support their media strategy as they provide not only programming of interest but also messages supporting their cause.
TV stations are also both public and private with the government controlling approval of program content suitable for public access. Broadcast programming comes from the Kujenga Broadcasting Network (KBN) and provides a variety of entertainment, news, sports, and pro-government political commentary. There are recent additions of government approved private broadcasters that reach local or regional audiences broadcasting primarily religious programming. The focus of these broadcasts is to reach the poor and rural population with positive and encouraging media.
The program recently caused a back-lash from the Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) who seized a broadcast station in the vicinity of Mbeya to broadcast their own message. The AJP held the station and broadcast negative government messages until overwhelmed by government forces. AJP media forces filmed the brutal and overwhelming government response and created propaganda supporting its media operations and strategy. The AJP continues to use all available media resources to carry its message to the Kujengan people.
Radio
Public and private radio are the most ubiquitous information source available to the general public. By controlling the broadcast towers and monitoring program content the government seeks to ensure a consistently positive government message. Deviations from the approved government content by private stations results in suspension of operating licenses for undetermined periods of time. The Free Tanga Youth Movement (FTYM) and Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) both resort to pirate radio in their respective regions to broadcast their anti-government message to the population. The government response is blanket jamming of the station signal and direction finding units to pinpoint the transmitter locations in order to permanently destroy the broadcast sources. Faced with this threat from government forces the groups maintain multiple mobile transmitters with limited broadcast range.
Print Media
After the election of mildly reformist politicians in the late 1990s, the privately-owned Arianian print media began to flourish. Since the return of the conservatives to power, the Arianian government has adopted aggressive state censorship that bans many reformist newspapers and their employees from the field.
Telephone
If a Kujengan has a phone it is a mobile phone. As with many other countries in Africa, the population generally bypassed fixed landline phones. Comparison of landline to mobile subscribers sees 1% and 44% per 100 citizens respectively. Mobile subscribers are mostly in the ruling elite, business leaders, and military leadership which form the largest groups. Coverage is localized around the major cities and urban areas. Private satellite phones are prohibited by law and are confiscated at all entry points to the country.
Kujengans are aware of the technological advancements in communication technology but, until recently, the government had controlled the expansion of the mobile phone networks available. Mobile phone technology is viewed by the government as a threat to its control and direction of the population. It views outside attempts by its regional neighbor to the north to pass technology and information to the population as a direct threat to its control and power. Mobile telephone technology is limited to those in the government ruling party and to those members of the population in power.
Postal/Courier
Ariana Postal Service (APS) and other private courier services within Ariana transport mail, packages, and other documents. The private couriers’ importance continues to decrease as business activity restrictions by the Arianian military and international economic sanctions make it progressively more difficult to operate within Ariana. APS offers domestic and international service as it attempts to upgrade its postal system to international standards.
Word of Mouth
Word of mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Ariana. Because of the political situation, political or religious speech not specifically approved by the government is dangerous, so trust relationships are even more important than in most neighboring countries. The Arianian government often disseminates new policy through religious authorities to give government pronouncements the veneer of religious sanction.
Information Control
The government effectively controls all major media outlets and effectively muzzles dissent except on the Internet, where reformers operate with great difficulty. For over 30 years, Ariana’s government has maintained a massive anti-US INFOWAR campaign that is remarkable mostly for its ineffectiveness with both its own population and wider regional and international audiences. On the other hand, Ariana’s Persian ethnic majority warmly receives any perception management-driven messages of Persian “greatness” or “uniqueness.”
INFOWAR
INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.
Electronic Warfare
Ariana maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from 1970s Western equipment to international arms market purchases to domestically produced items. While still capable against regional foes, the Arianian electronic warfare (EW) capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with modern Arianian equipment. Arianian EW doctrine remains in a state of flux as the Arianian military struggles with slow abandonment of Western practices and adoption of more non-Western asymmetric practices.
Computer Attack
Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful they could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, the Arianians possess significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.
Information Attack
Ariana also possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia, even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force, and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Arianian IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies.
Deception
Deception remains a hallmark of Arianian military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. Arianians particularly focus on deception to mask operations and allow Arianian forces to close the gap with the US and other adversarial countries, which Arianians believe maintain an unbridgeable arms overmatch. Arianians will likely use a variety of ruses, such as wearing US-style or other countries’ military uniforms, to mask their involvement in military operations.
Physical Destruction
Ariana knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other high-end opponents is extremely limited. Ariana will probably only attack sensors as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. Ariana highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon.
Protection and Security Measures
Recently, Ariana made international news for being unable to protect its nuclear power SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks from malware. While significant damage occurred from this incident, the Arianians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Ariana uses both internally produced and commercial off-the- shelf network protection software.
Perception Management
Traditionally, Ariana attempts to craft a complete anti-Western, Revolutionary Islam message for both external and internal consumption. The Arianian government uses local proxies to downplay the “Persian” and Shia origins of its message in non-Shia countries while consistently supporting world-wide communications that “Islam is the Answer” to the Muslim world’s problems. This idea of Revolutionary Islam’s value itself is an Arianian Islamic Republic message. Internally, the government conveys that the Arianian Islamic Republic is the primary Shia Islam defender. The Arianian government consistently references the Martyrdom of Hussein, a prime element of Shia, to rally populous support from the rural, religiously conservative Shia. Additionally, INFOWAR messages merge perceived threats (such as Western cultural imperialism/pollution) with the Islamic Republic as a threat against Ariana itself. This rallying cry to defend the Arianian nation resonates with all levels of Arianian society.
Regionally, Arianians attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against aggressive outside forces. In government and population discussions, Arianians stress their shared religious beliefs and play up the Atropian minority population’s integration within Ariana. Arianians also continue to strengthen their relations with Limaria, stressing common commercial interests. Arianians will likely attempt to portray Gorgans as “puppets” of the West. Despite their historical and political status as the “odd man out” of the Caucasus region, the Arianians will deftly play up elements of political, social, religious, or economic commonality with other nations.
Intelligence
Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe Ariana to be the second most capable space power in the region as it has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, Ariana has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian- produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.
Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.
Human Intelligence
Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the Arianian military’s World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.
Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the “Persian” and “Shia” origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.
Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers and Arianian military’s associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.
Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.
The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.
Open Source Intelligence
Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.
Signals Intelligence
Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.
Imagery Intelligence
Arianian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Ariana has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped to a ground station located somewhere in Ariana. To further supplement its IMINT requirements, the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open- source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.
Summary
Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future.