Information: Kujenga
This page is a section of Kujenga.
Kujenga information environment is somewhat dated with limited availability of Internet, mobile phone, and television access. The government is investing in projects to expand the internet backbone and circuits but general public access is still in the future. While it does have a mix of public and private media available, the government controls the media programs available to the public. Kujenga’s information operations capabilities focus mostly on less technical approaches with selected niche capabilities. As a less technically oriented country with narrowly focused modernization goals the media and information flow remain concentrated on widely available systems. Radio and print media continue to dominate the Kujenga information sphere with limited in-roads by modern media systems. As a country with limited technical information systems it is significantly less susceptible to cyber-attacks and information manipulation. The Kujenga government seeks to maintain its dominance of the information sector to control the flow of information to the population. To maintain that dominance, the government plans to increase use of new technology and meter its release to the population.
Contents
Satellite Telecommunications
Satellite telecommunication capabilities are currently limited to products purchased from commercial vendors. Kujenga entered into contracts with a company from Torrika to provide a turn-key solution for micro-satellites. Kujenga’s goals are to not only enhance telecommunications services but also to establish satellite-based SIGINT and IMINT capabilities by mid-2019. The contract specifies construction of the satellite platforms to Kujenga specifications, launch, and a ground-control complex. Once operational, the satellites will provide Tier-1 command and control communications, signals intercept, and imagery.
Government and military forces have access to GPS guidance for critical command and control systems and weapons platforms. The limited availability causes Kujenga forces to continue to rely on proven manual navigation techniques that do not rely on technical systems. As forces are typically posted on a regional basis for prolonged periods they are very familiar with the terrain and its characteristics.
Public Communications Media
Communication networks in Kujenga are controlled by a government monopoly managed by Kujenga Telecommunications (KT). Private investors can purchase franchises through KT to open businesses providing radio, television, and both wired and wireless Internet services. KT provides radio and television and also franchises private broadcast services. Contribution of the communication sector to the Kujenga economy is currently only at 2% compared to 4% or higher found in other countries in the eastern region. The government, realizing the potential positive impact on the economy, has instituted a strategy to expand services available to the public. The strategy maintains a central requirement to monitor and control the information flow to the country.
The government intercepts and monitors private message traffic of the population for all information systems. It conducts active suppression of media reports critical of the government using network filtering as well as jamming or interruption of service for the targeted broadcast system. The anti-government activities in the Tanga and southwest region caused the government to use active measures to disrupt or restrict information flow. The government uses jamming, Internet filtering, and destruction of print media in both regions in efforts to suppress the information campaigns of insurgent groups.
Internet
Kujenga’s general population is not technically adept but has a growing interest in the capabilities offered by the Internet. At 12% penetration, Kujenga has one of the lowest teledensities in the world, largely based on government access restrictions. To maintain control of public information flow, the government is methodically working to expand availability of Internet access. The government is investing in expansion of the network backbone available in Kujenga. Consistent access is limited to those institutions and organizations that need it for modern business. The ruling group has Internet and mostly unrestricted access while the public is only beginning to find access more available. Internet availability for the public is in the major cities with individual access being expensive for the average Kujengan. KT is laying the groundwork necessary to allow continued monitoring and control of the population’s use of the Internet. To facilitate the control of the Internet information medium, the government established the Network Security Agency (NSA) in 2011. The NSA not only issues nation Internet policies and guidance but also develops the means to penetrate or block Internet communication. The agency restricts targeted Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or domain names. It also uses deep-packet inspection (DPI) to identify email traffic deemed contrary to the governments’ interests.
The Kujenga government is widely known for its pervasive surveillance of online and mobile phone communications. A 2014 Human Rights Watch report accused the Kujenga government of using cyber-attack methods to monitor and arrest citizens it deemed a threat. Human Rights Watch has accused the government of using a monitoring system from the telecommunications firm ZTE (ZXMT) to monitor various communications platforms, including phone and Internet networks. ZXMT permits deep-packet inspection and the interception of emails on Kujenga-Telecom's telecommunications network. Kujenga-Telecom has also used ZSmart, a customer management database that provides the monitor with users' personal information, SMS text messages, and the ability to record phone conversations. The ZSmart program has the ability to geolocate a user's position by tracking mobile cellular devices. The full extent of the government's use of these technologies is unclear; however, the government has produced emails, text messages, and phone calls as evidence during legal proceedings against bloggers and journalists.
Television
The greatest availability of television for the population is in most cities and urban areas. Kujenga is at the lower end of the scale of households with televisions. While slowly growing, the number of households with television currently stands at just over 9% with a projected growth rate of .5% per year. Any television found in rural areas tends to be a shared family or tribe asset used by the group. Some groups provide television access and programming to support their media strategy, as they provide not only programming of interest but also messages supporting their cause.
TV stations are also both public and government granted private franchises with the government controlling approval of program content suitable for public access. Broadcast programming comes from KT and provides a variety of entertainment, news, sports, and pro-government political commentary. The recent government addition of approved private broadcasters that provide primarily religious programming are reaching local and regional audiences. The focus of these broadcasts is to reach the poor and rural population with positive and encouraging programming.
The religious programs recently caused a backlash from the Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) who seized a television station at Mbeya to broadcast their own message. The AJP stated that the government and private programs were an attempt to coopt and dilute their message. They held the station and broadcast negative government messages until overwhelmed by government forces. AJP media elements filmed the brutal and overwhelming government response and created propaganda supporting its media message. The AJP continues to use all available media resources to carry its message to the Kujengan people.
Radio
Until recently, the government monopolized the radio media environment in Kujenga. The public had no other conduits to get independent news or other programming. The advent of pirate radio stations and powerful broadcasts by stations located in bordering countries expanded the public’s knowledge of differing views and perspectives on activities in Kujenga. Recognizing the growing public dissatisfaction with the media status-quo, the government initiated programs to license private radio broadcasts. The result of the program was an expansion from the single government radio network to the current 22 private broadcasters. The licensed private broadcast networks must follow stringent government controls and oversight but the expansion is fueling growing public demands for unbiased and differing perspectives for news, sports, entertainment, and politics.
Public and private radio is the most ubiquitous information source available to the public. The government follows the same process with radio as it does with television. KT issues franchises for radio broadcast licenses and approves all programming content. By controlling the broadcast towers and monitoring program content, the government seeks to ensure a consistently positive government message. Deviations from the approved government content by private stations results in suspension of operating licenses for undetermined periods.
The Free Tanga Youth Movement (FTYM) and Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) both resort to pirate radio in their respective regions to broadcast their anti-government message to the population. The government response is blanket jamming of the station signal and direction-finding units to pinpoint the transmitter locations in order to permanently destroy the broadcast sources. Faced with this threat from government forces the groups maintain multiple mobile transmitters with limited broadcast range.
Print Media
Population literacy stands at over 60% so print media holds a very strong position in public information flow. As with the other information mediums, print media must conform to government censorship and monitoring. Of the 12 daily, 13 weekly newspapers, and 17 national magazines, it is almost certain that one or more of them will be in conflict with the government at any given time.
Print media is generally safe from government reaction when they run stories or reports of bureaucratic mismanagement or inefficiencies. However, reports of suspected corruption by specific ministers or senior leadership often results in shuttered offices for an indeterminate time. Once public attention has died down the government authorities allow the offending newspaper or periodical to resume operation. Recalcitrant journalists that fail to conform to government guidelines find themselves jailed under some, often obscure, aspect of the law. The Press Law of 1987 allows the government to suppress news reports or stories that are detrimental to national status and country’s best interests modifying the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.
The growth of the Internet and social media is also pressuring physical print media businesses. Growth projections for mobile phones and Internet access of approximately 50% are driving the print media businesses and groups to expand their reach into the social media sphere. Printers are seeking additional markets to remain viable in the changing environment. Many are transferring their knowledge and skill in developing meaningful message products to the new information media. Government opposition groups are currently the most active users of social media. They use it to send handbills and infographic bulletins to followers and sympathizers in Kujenga, neighboring countries, and expatriates. To develop successful messages, the groups are working with print media companies to produce professional products.
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Telephone
If a Kujengan has a phone, it is a mobile phone. As with many other countries in Africa, the population generally bypassed fixed landline phones. Comparison of landline to mobile subscribers sees 1% and 25% per 100 citizens, respectively. Mobile subscribers are mostly the ruling elite, business leaders, and military leadership that form the largest groups. The major cities and urban areas have the greatest concentrations of mobile phone coverage with some limited coverage along the main roads between cities. The law prohibits private satellite phones and government customs officers confiscate them at all entry points.
Kujengans are aware of the technological advancements in communication technology but, until recently, the government had limited the expansion of the mobile phone networks available. The government views mobile technology as a threat to its control and direction of the population. It views outside attempts by groups in Amari and Ziwa to extend technology and information to the Kujenga population as a direct threat to its control and power.
Reports and studies show that mobile phone and Internet access in African countries stands at over 1 billion and projections are that it will jump to 1.4 billion subscribers in the next 5 years. This leads the government to conclude that expansion is inevitable. That perceived inevitability is driving the government to take proactive steps to expand the mobile phone network while it can still control that expansion.
Current subscriber levels are approximately 25%, which puts Kujenga a distant third behind Ziwa and Amari in mobile phone penetration of the population. The predicted availability of low-cost mobile phones, data packages, and the government expansion of available mobile networks creates the conditions for the subscriber population to exceed 50% by 2022. The government is not only expanding the mobile networks but also its capability to monitor and track citizen activities using COTS software and hardware.
Postal/Courier
Kujenga Post (KP) is one of the most reliable and successful government agencies in the country. A total of 1530 KP offices are located throughout the country and provide several government services. Services range from typical delivery of letters and packages to operation of government funded public transit known as the Dalla Dalla. Post offices are both permanent government facilities as well as franchises found throughout the country. In cities and small towns, each office provides a full range of services including, post of letters and parcels, financial services, express mail, official notary known as mthibitishaji, wholesale and retail offering of SIM and voucher cards, direct advertisement through post boxes, and public transport terminals.
Financial services provided are extensive and go beyond those normally found in western postal systems. The KP offices conduct money transfers using phone, fax, Hawala, local and international money orders. As an official government record office the KP also makes pension payments, tax collection, and issuance of duty stamps. Incursion of electronic fund transfers using private cell phones threatens this government-controlled system creating another motivation for the government to control introduction of widely available cell service and the Internet for the public.
The current services provided by the KP provide supply the government with a means of monitoring a broad portion of public activities. Using the KP to track individual movement using the Dalla Dalla or monitoring the movement of funds internally and internationally facilitates government monitoring. This condition motivated the government to maintain the capability by instituting upgrades and expansion of services to include sale of SIM chips for cell phones and Internet access.
Awareness of the government’s use of the postal system for monitoring the population activities in the Kasama area of the country caused the AJP to interdict the KP. The group waylaid Dalla Dallas enroute between towns and cities in the southwest region to destroy the buses, kidnap the drivers and passengers, and take any cargoes as duties for transit of AJP controlled areas. Asari-Dokubo claims the interruption of government postal services is an element of AJP’s media campaign so the group routinely films the events and publishes pleas for help from those kidnapped.
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Word of Mouth
As with many African cultures, word of mouth (WoM) is a mainstay of government, civil, and military operations. It maintains an automatic credibility in all family and tribal interactions and associations. There are strong WoM message conduits found throughout most of the country but are the strongest in the Kasama and Tanga regions.
Education, by law, is available to every Kujenga citizen. The reality is that the poor often cannot afford the fees, uniforms, and travel costs for children to attend schools. In addition, the cultural bias towards education of males over females continues as part of the education environment.
For those students fortunate enough to make their way through the educational system there are fully accredited schools and higher-level institutions available. The 23 colleges and universities in Kujenga cover a range of advanced education focused on science, technology, religion, philosophy, medicine and other typical academic studies.
Student bodies of higher-level education institutions are also often the source of social activists. These students and activist groups use word of mouth during rallies, social and print media to deliver their message to the population. As noted earlier, groups have used pirate radio to broadcast their messages in some regions with the government responding by using all available resources to silence them.
Religious schools are widely available and popular with the population in the Mbeya area of the country. These schools actively include anti-colonial and pro-independence content in their curriculum that supports the AJP. Students are encouraged to support the AJP movement with acts of civil disobedience and resistance to government oppression.
Information Control
The Kujenga government justifies its control of the media and restriction of freedom of expression as necessary to ensure national security. The Anti-Terrorism law passed in 2009 contained very broad definitions of terrorism and of support to terrorist groups. The Law’s vague language granted the government the ability to prosecute individuals and groups publishing anti-government messages. The government continues to expand its use of the law to counter emerging rights advocates groups. Using the Law’s authority, the government employs security and military forces to track and arrest opposing individuals and groups.
INFOWAR
The Kujenga Intelligence Service (KIS) controls and directs INFOWAR (IW) at the national level. Based on the Presidents direction to the National Defense Council, the KIS plans, organizes and conducts INFOWAR operations to support both national objectives as well as providing support to military operations.
Kujengan National Army (KNA) Directorate of Ground Intelligence coordinates and manages KIS assets once assigned. Assets, primarily from the Signal Reconnaissance Brigade (SRB), deploy on an area support basis or are task organized with maneuver forces as needed. Typically, each of the maneuver divisions will have an INFOWAR battalion included in their task organizational structure sourced from the SRB. The Kujenga Air Force (KNAF) also receives support from the KIS in the form of a Signals and Imagery Squadron. The Kujenga Navy (KNAV), as a brown-water force, does not have organic INFOWAR capability nor does it typically receive support from KIS assets. KIS forces field older IW systems in support of military and police operations in country. The Signal Reconnaissance Brigade encompasses the main INFOWAR capability of the military. A small company-sized element in the Kujengan Security Corps' (KSEC) Special Reaction Division (SRD) has advanced INFORWAR capability that rises to the Tier 1 level.
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) capabilities consist mostly of intercept, jamming and direction finding to disrupt radio and television signals. For military operations, the EW systems provide targeting information of threat command and control nodes for targeting and physical destruction. The Signal Reconnaissance Brigade supports military operations with reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
The KNA employs its direction finding and broadband jamming in the Tanga region to disrupt radio broadcasts from the FYTM and Amari. The Information Warfare Battalion supporting the Brigade in the Upper Defense Region passes targeting information for pirate radio transmitters to support the mission of maneuver elements in the capture of Tanga radicals.
Computer Attack
Kujenga’s focus on computer attack capabilities was limited until recent international attacks on financial institutions in the country. After the attack, authorities reported estimated losses totaling as much as $85 million. Even though Kujenga’s Internet use is limited, that use is concentrated in the government, military, and financial sectors. The situation provided strong motivation for the government to create the Kujenga Network Security Authority (KNSA) and pass the Information System Security Law (ISSL). The KNSA oversees the expansion of information networks within Kujenga including setting and enforcing security standards.
The KNSA launched a program to create a rapid increase in cyber-attack capabilities. With annual financial losses in East Africa expected to top $2 billion a year in the financial sector alone, the government is going on the cyber offensive. Using the theory that to catch a thief you must think like a thief, the government enlisted the aid of Cyber-Troll, cyber security contractors from Nyumba. Little open source information is available about the group other than its main office is located in Nyumba and its web presence offers complete cyber security services for governments and large institutions. Unconfirmed reports are that the government plans to recoup the financial losses by conducting cyber-attacks of Kujenga’s regional competitors.
Information Attack
The Kujenga government is widely known for its pervasive surveillance of online and mobile phone communications. A 2014 Human Rights Watch report accused the Kujenga government of using cyber-attack methods to monitor and arrest citizens it deemed a threat. Human Rights Watch has accused the government of using a monitoring system from the telecommunications firm ZTE (ZXMT) to monitor various communications platforms, including phone and Internet networks. ZXMT permits deep-packet inspection and the interception of emails on Kujenga-Telecom's telecommunications network. Kujenga-Telecom has also used ZSmart, a customer management database that provides the monitor with users' personal information, SMS text messages, and the ability to record phone conversations. The ZSmart program has the ability to geolocate a user's position by tracking mobile cellular devices. The full extent of the government's use of these technologies is unclear; however, the government has produced emails, text messages, and phone calls as evidence during legal proceedings against bloggers and journalists.
Deception
The KNA uses physical deception measures; active camouflage, concealed forces in structures, and misdirection of observation by using decoys. Faced with primarily internal threats, Kujenga forces do not employ extensive deception during their deployments in support of internal security operations.
The Kujengan Security Corps (KSEC) conducts extensive deception during rural border enforcement missions. KSEC assigns internal units or requests additional forces from the KNA to be able to portray the desired appearance in their efforts to entrap FTYM or AJP elements. The deception traps include small convoys, isolated checkpoints, or command and control headquarters to present the appearance of lucrative targets for insurgents. These deception units receive support from aviation assets, indirect fire, and/or mobile quick reaction forces.
Physical Destruction
Kujengan forces follow a guiding doctrine of targeting the information systems of the opposition. As computers and communication networks are key elements of international business and government, Kujenga uses either internal capabilities or contracted services to conduct physical attacks. Physical attacks to disrupt or destroy information systems remains the primary means it uses against threat information systems because computer and information attack capabilities are not well developed. Targets include computer operations centers, data storage facilities, network control centers, and other information systems.
Protection and Security Measures
The leadership of Kujenga, recognizing the cyber threat, instituted in-depth security procedures to protect government, military, and financial systems. The government instituted mandatory training and rapid application of software patches, network firmware, and other security measures to protect Kujenga information assets. The limited size of the Kujenga information network worked in the countries favor as it was simpler to emplace and enforce network security procedures. As the population is relatively new to social media and has not widely adopted it they are not as susceptible to phishing and other forms of information attack.
The newly created KNSA oversees the government’s expansion of the information network and public Internet access. The KNSA charter tasks it to take all measures necessary to protect the nation’s network systems. The Information System Security Law (ISSL) that directed the creation of the KNSA instituted nation-wide cyber security policy. The ISSL directs mandatory security rules that all service providers and users must follow. Under the law, the KNSA has the authority to charge offenders under the Penal Code and levy punishments ranging from fines up to imprisonment.
The KNSA is also responsible for developing cyber-attack and defense capabilities for Kujenga. In this financial year, the government allocated 87 million Euros to support technological advancements. The KNSA applied a significant portion of that budget towards development of artificial intelligence capability to improve network protection and security measures.
The KNSA is also responsible for ensuring the security of military computer systems and networks. KNSA inspectors monitor military compliance with cyber security measures. The governments focus on compliance with security procedures resulted in removal of several mid-level and one senior officer for failure to follow security requirements.
Perception Management
Kujenga’s continuing policy of information control supports its ability to control the perceptions of the population. The intent of the policy is to control the information available to the public and present only the government’s message. Pirate radio broadcasts, increasing availability of satellite television, and increased public access to the Internet are challenging the government’s ability to control the flow of information and the resulting population perceptions. As necessary, the government uses disinformation or discrediting of sources to invalidate news reports contrary to the government’s interests.
Intelligence
Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe Ariana to be the second most capable space power in the region as it has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, Ariana has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian- produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.
Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.
Human Intelligence
Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the Arianian military’s World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.
Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the “Persian” and “Shia” origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.
Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers and Arianian military’s associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.
Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.
The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.
Open Source Intelligence
Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.
Signals Intelligence
Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.
Imagery Intelligence
Arianian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Ariana has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped to a ground station located somewhere in Ariana. To further supplement its IMINT requirements, the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open- source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.
Summary
Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future.