71-CO-8517 OPFOR Crime
Status | Approved 20 Jan 2017 |
---|---|
Effective Date: | 20 Jan 2017 |
Task Number: | 71-CO-8517 |
Task Title: | OPFOR Crime |
Distribution Restriction: | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
Destruction Notice: | None |
Foreign Disclosure: FD1 - |
This training product has been reviewed by the training developers in coordination with the HQS TRADOC DCS G2 FDO foreign disclosure officer. This training product can be used to instruct international military students from all approved countries without restrictions. |
Contents
Conditions
A crime is an action or omission that constitutes an offense that may be prosecuted by the state and is punishable by law. For the purposes of articulating crime as an opposing force task, it can be divided into two broad categories: organized crime and street crime. Both manifestations of crime and criminality can be analyzed through the use of functional analysis despite the latter s inherently amorphous nature. That is to say that regardless of the type of criminal group, or the individual criminal, certain functions must be performed to bring about the accomplishment of a criminal act. For example, the same methodology or technique used by an insurgent force to emplace and explode an improvised explosive device along a convoy route can be used by a street gang to distribute drugs. These functions can be broadly categorized as action, enabling, fixing, and security.
Crime differentiates itself from other opposing force tactics and techniques in that it:
- Is motivated by power and profit
- It is executed by groups or individuals who go to great lengths to conceal their activities and identities
- Seeks to foment public unrest and social disorder, as well as engender fear within the relevant population as methods of enabling criminal activity
- Leverages corruption, impunity, anonymity, and safe haven to ensure battlefield survivability and create operational time and space
- Should be observed as an operational environment condition just as much as it is a violation of the law
- Is predominately a local, urban phenomenon because urban environments provide large numbers of opportunities for offenders and targets to come together in time and space
- Is highly concentrated on particular people, places, and things
- Is inherently nebulous in nature at lower, more unorganized levels
Criminal elements of the OPFOR are conducting operations independently or temporarily in concert with a larger element or force and receives a directive to execute a criminal activity at a specific location and time and/or saturate a geographic space with unorganized street crime. Task organization provides the resource capabilities to accomplish the task. More organized criminal elements of the OPFOR may have communications with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting elements. Friendly forces, security forces, noncombatants, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and local and international media may be in the operational environment (OE). Criminal elements of the OPFOR are not constrained by standardized Rules of Engagement (ROE) and do not necessarily comply with international conventions or agreements on the conduct of warfare. Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP 4. This task should be trained under IED Threat conditions.
Standards
Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, lists 22 criminal activities that opposing force criminals are capable of executing. They are:
- Arson
- Assassination
- Bribery
- Civic Actions
- Cyber Crime
- Extortion
- Fraud
- Gambling
- Hijacking
- Hostage-Taking
- Information Warfare
- Kidnapping
- Maiming
- Money Laundering
- Murder
- Prostitution
- Racketeering
- Security
- Smuggling
- Terrorism
- Theft
- Trafficking
The endless variations and combinations of these criminal activities would make replicating the singular, broad-based task of crime in a virtual reality or at a combat training center a near impossibility. Therefore, crime as an opposing force task will seek to identify and articulate baseline functions separate from kinetic tasks such as ambush or raid, which can cover criminal activities like assassination, kidnapping, murder, burglary, or theft that have broad application.
The OPFOR conducts criminal activities in accordance with (IAW) TC 7-100.2 and/or TC 7-100.3 and current criminal techniques. When considering which criminal activities to conduct, the OPFOR seeks to capitalize on opportunities within an operational environment, maximize power and profit, and create/foster conditions that enable their continued operations. The OPFOR displaces (temporally and spatially), reorients (victims, locations, and things), and adapts criminal activity based on learning and changes within the operational environment.
NOTE
TADSS and Materiel Items quantities are provided as an example only. Adjust as needed based on force size and type of unit used to replicate the OPFOR.
NOTE
The Objective Task Evaluation Criteria Matrix is provided for reference only. Operational and Training Environments will be IAW the BLUFOR Commanders training plan and guidance.
NOTE
Access the Virtual OPFOR Academy at https://tbr.army.mil for electronic copies of OPFOR doctrine, references, Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), and instructional and immersive videos on conducting this task.
Live Fire Required
No
Objective Task Evaluation Criteria Matrix
Plan and Prepare | Execute | Assess | |||||||
Operational Environment |
Training Environment (L/V/C) |
% of Leaders Present at Training/Authorized |
% of Soldiers Present at | External Eval |
% Performance Measures 'GO' |
% Critical Performance Measures 'GO' | % Leader Performance Measures 'GO' |
Task Assessment | |
BDE & Above |
|||||||||
Dynamic and Complex (All OE Variables and Hybrid Threat) |
Night |
Operational Environment variables and OPFOR use of L/V/C are executed IAW BLUFOR |
>=85% |
>=80% |
Yes |
>=91% |
All |
>=90% |
T |
75-84% |
80-90% |
80-89% |
T- | ||||||
Dynamic and Complex (All OE Variables and Single Threat) |
65-74% |
75-79% |
No |
65-79% |
P | ||||
Day |
60-64% |
60-74% |
51-64% |
<All |
<=79% |
P- | |||
Dynamic and Complex (<All OE Variables and Single Threat) |
<=59% |
<=59% |
<=50% |
U |
Remarks
None
Notes
None
Safety Risk
Medium
Task Statements
Cue
None
DANGER:
Safety briefings should alert users to the possibility of personal injury or damage to equipment that may result from long-term failure to follow correct procedures. |
---|
WARNING:
Safety briefings should alert users to the possibility of immediate personal injury or damage to equipment. |
CAUTION:
None |
Performance Steps and Measures
NOTE: Assess task proficiency using the task evaluation criteria matrix.
NOTE: Asterisks (*) indicate leader steps; plus signs (+) indicate critical steps.
STEP/MEASURE | GO | NO-GO | N/A |
+ 1. Protect | |||
+ a. Take all necessary active and passive security measures to maintain informational and operational security. | |||
+ b. Build, maintain, and leverage expansive informant and patronage networks via quid-pro-quo relationships with the population, corrupt security forces and government officials, and armed actors (both friendly and security forces) within the operational environment to ensure anonymity and impunity. This may also be achieved via cooption or coercion. | |||
+ c. Protect criminals and/or criminal groups with continual improvement of complex terrain, survivability measures, and camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D). | |||
+ d. Emplace obstacles (both virtual and physical) in defense of safe haven to reinforce terrain and deceive, disrupt, block, fix, or otherwise shape the area of operation and probable-possible security force actions. | |||
+ e. Establish caches and transshipment points in or near the safe haven with redundant sustainment capabilities and robust road networks. | |||
+ f. As necessary, coordinate with friendly and/or neutral elements-forces within the operational environment capable of support assistance in contingencies. | |||
+ g. Confirm redundant command and control (C2) communications. | |||
+ h. Execute information warfare (INFOWAR) in support of criminal activities to intimidate the relevant population, the media, security forces, and government officials. | |||
+ i. Improve safe haven with continuous review of C3D measures. | |||
+ 2. Plan | |||
+ a. Use the acronym MOM: motive, opportunity, means—to identify and prioritize types of criminal activities, create and/or exploit opportunity, and allocate personnel and resources. | |||
+ b. Collect and analyze current information on locations, goods/commodities, victims, and vulnerable populations that can be targeted by criminal activity. | |||
+ c. Collect and analyze current information on security force capabilities, limitations, and disposition and operational environment information. | |||
+ d. Identify the need for temporary relationships with affiliated forces such as insurgent organizations, guerilla units, adjacent criminals and/or criminal groups, and a coerced or willing relevant population. | |||
+ e. Analyze action and enabling functions that must be performed to achieve mission success such as tasks to deceive, defend, disrupt, fix, contain, and/or neutralize. | |||
+ f. Determine the functional tactics to be applied by action, enabling, and support elements. | |||
+ g. Identify task organization requirements for elements-forces by function IAW TC 7-100.2/TC 7- 100.3. | |||
+ 3. Prepare | |||
+ a. Evaluate ongoing surveillance to provide situational understanding of security forces and the operational environment required for criminal activity success. | |||
+ b. Coordinate the activities of logistics support elements and identify logistics linkup points. | |||
+ c. Assess current counter-surveillance actions to prevent security forces from obtaining situational understanding of criminal intentions and/or criminal activities. | |||
+ d. Conduct limited mission and task rehearsals of action and enabling elements-forces. | |||
+ e. Confirm communications requirements and capabilities. | |||
+ f. Execute information warfare (INFOWAR) in support of the criminal activity such as fomenting public unrest by sensationalizing the acute or chronic grievances of the relevant population. | |||
+ g. Conduct reconnaissance of withdrawal routes and/or exfiltration routes if a mission condition requires friendly elements-forces to vacate safe haven or abandoned the desired course of action. | |||
+ 4. Execute | |||
+ a. Activate expansive informant network and surveillance capabilities to inform decision making. | |||
+ b. Fix, isolate, and deceive security forces as necessary with kinetic means such as drive-by shootings or grenade attacks, or non-kinetic means such as riots or mass demonstrations. | |||
+ c. Conduct criminal activities consistent with current techniques and through the application of functional tactics. | |||
+ d. Exploit gaps within the legal system and security force capabilities such as agency jurisdiction, the use of force continuum, and illegal search and seizure technicalities. | |||
+ e. Execute information warfare (INFOWAR) technical and psychological capabilities to deceive, deter, and/or dissuade behavior that is disadvantageous and encourage behavior that is advantageous. | |||
+ f. Minimize forensics and biometrics modality signatures to counter evidence collection and exploitation (e.g. sterilize a firearm of latent prints after its use in a murder or wear a balaclava when committing a crime in an area covered by a CCTV system to counter facial recognition software). | |||
+ 5. Assess |
+ a. Displace (temporally and spatially), reorient (victims, locations, and things), and adapt criminal activities based on learning and changes within the operational environment, to include increased security force presence and/or targeting, changes in crime opportunities, and the sentiment of the relevant population. | |||
+ b. Employ continuous surveillance to achieve situational awareness and understanding and provide early warning of security force activities that can influence criminal activities and safe haven. | |||
+ c. Surveillance and informant networks effective - (Yes/No) | |||
+ d. Key operational environment information obtained - (Yes/No) | |||
+ e. Security operations enable maintaining safe haven - (Yes/No) | |||
+ f. Camouflage, cover, concealment, effective - (Yes/No) | |||
+ g. Deception actions effective - (Yes/No) | |||
+ h. Information warfare (INFOWAR) effective - (Yes/No) | |||
+ i. Report security force actions and disposition - (Yes/No) | |||
+ j. Operational environmental conditions conducive to criminal activity -(Yes/No) | |||
+ k. Criminal activities successful - (Percent) | |||
+ l. Criminal activities interdicted by security forces - (Percent) | |||
+ m. Criminal groups and/or individuals available to continue mission - (Percent) | |||
+ n. Citizenry enables criminal activity - (Percent) |
TASK PERFORMANCE / EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK | |||||||
ITERATION | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | M | TOTAL |
TOTAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES EVALUATED | |||||||
TOTAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO | |||||||
TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO |
ITERATION
1 2 3 4 5 M
COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT
T P U
Mission(s) supported:
None
MOPP 4
Sometimes
MOPP 4 Statement
OPFOR will conduct operations in an NBC environment based on the training objectives established by the BLUFOR Commander.
NVG
Sometimes
NVG Statement
OPFOR will conduct night time operations based on the training objectives established by the BLUFOR Commander.
Prerequisite Collective Task(s)
None
Supporting Collective Task(s)
None
OPFOR Task(s)
None
Supporting Individual Task(s)
None
Supporting Drill(s)
None
Supported AUTL/UJTL Task(s)
Task ID | Title |
ART 5.0 | Conduct Mission Command |
TADSS
TADSS ID | Title | Product Type | Quantity |
T 07-117 | Pistol, Tokarev | DVC | 2 |
T 20-005 | RPG7 Anti Grenade Launcher with Round | DVC | 6 |
T 20-006 | AK-47 Assault Rifle Model | DVC | 11 |
23-85 | Soft Cap Man Worn Laser Detector (MWLD) (MILES) PR0 Model | DVC | 54 |
T 20-018 | SVD Sniper Rifle | DVC | 2 |
T 07-115 | Machine Gun, PKM | DVC | 11 |
GTA 08-11-014 | Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) Casualty Cards | GTA | 2 |
T 20-007 | RPK Squad Machine Gun | DVC | 5 |
23-23 | M2K Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 2000 (MILES 2000) M24/M40 Sniper Weapon System Kit | DVC | 2 |
T 07-116 | Pistol, Makarov, Plastic | DVC | 11 |
T 20-008 | PM-50 Pistol | DVC | 2 |
23-67 | Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System Individual Weapons System (MILES IWS) M16/M4 Rifle Kit, Instrumental | DVC | 54 |
23-102/B | Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), (SLM), RPG7 VISMOD | DVC | 6 |
Equipment (LIN)
LIN | Nomenclature | Qty |
No equipment specified |
Materiel Items (NSN)
NSN | LIN | Title | Qty |
1005-00-118-6192 | Firing Attachment, Blank Ammunition: Rifle, 5.56 MM, M16, M16A1 | 48 | |
1305-00-005-8005 | Cartridge, 5.56 Millimeter Blank, Single Round: M200 (DODIC:A080) | 4200 | |
1370-00-752-8124 | T56265 | Simulator, Hand Grenade: M116A1 (DODIC:L601) | 20 |
1305-00-008-8894 | Cartridge, 7.62 Millimeter Blank, Single Round: M82 (DODIC:A112) | 1000 | |
1005-00-893-0902 | Firing Attachment, Blank Ammunition, M14 Rifle | 6 |
Environment
Environmental protection is not just the law but the right thing to do. It is a continual process and starts with deliberate planning. Always be alert to ways to protect our environment during training and missions. In doing so, you will contribute to the sustainment of our training resources while protecting people and the environment from harmful effects. Refer to the current Environmental Considerations manual and the current GTA Environmental-related Risk Assessment card. Consult range control office for specific environmental considerations for the training area(s) being used.
Safety
In a training environment, leaders must perform a risk assessment in accordance with ATP 5-19, Risk Management. Leaders will complete the current Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet in accordance with the TRADOC Safety Officer during the planning and completion of each task and sub-task by assessing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations, (METT-TC). Note: During MOPP training, leaders must ensure personnel are monitored for potential heat injury. Local policies and procedures must be followed during times of increased heat category in order to avoid heat related injury. Consider the MOPP work/rest cycles and water replacement guidelines IAW FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination.
Supporting References
Step Number | Reference ID | Reference Name | Required | Primary |
TC 7-100 | Hybrid Threat | Yes | Yes | |
TC 7-100.2 | Opposing Force Tactics | Yes | Yes | |
TC 7-100.3 | Irregular Opposing Forces https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/d r_aa/pdf/tc7_100x3.pdf | Yes | Yes | |
TC 7-100.4 | Hybrid Threat Force Structure Organization Guide | Yes | Yes | |
TC 7-101 | Exercise Design | Yes | Yes |