Chapter 3: Operational Variables

Definition: Describes forces or groups that are distinct from regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, training, or mission (JP 1-02 and FM 3-07). These forces or groups may also operate in a combination of two or more of the subvariable settings below. (Not government forces.)
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Insurgent Forces	An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 3-05) Insurgent forces are groups that conduct irregu­ lar or unconventional warfare within the borders of their country in order to undermine or overthrow a constituted government or civil authority.	The distinction between terrorists and insur­ gents is often blurred because of the tactics employed by each. Some terrorists groups have become insurgent organizations, while insurgent organizations have used terror tactics. An insur­ gent organization may use more than one form of tactics and, based on its strategy, its actions could cut across the entire spectrum of war­ fare—employing terror, guerrilla, and conven­ tional military tactics to achieve its goals. Typi­ cally, most insurgent groups use the first two.
Guerrilla Forces	A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and pa­ ramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)	Some guerrilla organizations may constitute a paramilitary arm of an insurgent movement, while others may pursue guerrilla warfare inde­ pendently from or loosely affiliated with an in­ surgent organization. Compared to insurgent organizations as a whole, guerrilla organizations have a more military-like structure. (FM 7-100.4)
Criminal	Criminal    organizations    are    non-ideological	Criminal  organizations  may  employ  criminal
Organizations	groups of people organized for the purpose of acquiring money by illegal means.	actions, terror tactics, and militarily unconven­ tional methods to achieve their goals. When mutual interests exist, criminal organizations may combine efforts with insurgent and/or guer­ rilla organizations controlling or operating in the same area. A congruence of interests can also result in criminal organizations having a close relationship with an established government. (FM 7-100.4)

Definition: Describes forces or groups that are distinct from regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, training, or mission (JP 1-02 and FM 3-07). These forces or groups may also operate in a combination of two or more of the subvariable settings below. (Not government forces.)
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Insurgent Forces	An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 3-05) Insurgent forces are groups that conduct irregu­ lar or unconventional warfare within the borders of their country in order to undermine or overthrow a constituted government or civil authority.	The distinction between terrorists and insur­ gents is often blurred because of the tactics employed by each. Some terrorists groups have become insurgent organizations, while insurgent organizations have used terror tactics. An insur­ gent organization may use more than one form of tactics and, based on its strategy, its actions could cut across the entire spectrum of war­ fare—employing terror, guerrilla, and conven­ tional military tactics to achieve its goals. Typi­ cally, most insurgent groups use the first two.
Guerrilla Forces	A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and pa­ ramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)	Some guerrilla organizations may constitute a paramilitary arm of an insurgent movement, while others may pursue guerrilla warfare inde­ pendently from or loosely affiliated with an in­ surgent organization. Compared to insurgent organizations as a whole, guerrilla organizations have a more military-like structure. (FM 7-100.4)
Criminal	Criminal    organizations    are    non-ideological	Criminal  organizations  may  employ  criminal
Organizations	groups of people organized for the purpose of acquiring money by illegal means.	actions, terror tactics, and militarily unconven­ tional methods to achieve their goals. When mutual interests exist, criminal organizations may combine efforts with insurgent and/or guer­ rilla organizations controlling or operating in the same area. A congruence of interests can also result in criminal organizations having a close relationship with an established government. (FM 7-100.4)

As discussed in chapter 2, the operational variables provide key design considerations for the exercise planner. Together, these variables comprise all the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect any military operation or any training exercise. They provide a comprehensive view of an operational environment (OE), real or simulated, that realistically challenges the training unit, its leaders, and Soldiers in the execution of their missions and tasks. This chapter describes the variables, subvariables, and linkages that can be used to develop comprehensive OE conditions for training exercises.

Operational Environment

An OE is the complete set of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the decisions of the unit commander and the deployment and employment of military forces, as well as other instruments of national power. It encompasses all the variables that affect where Soldiers will train or fight.

The OE represented in a training event must be appropriate for the training objectives. What constitutes a realistic and relevant OE for a particular training event depends on how much the unit knows about where it can expect to be deployed. On the one hand, the unit may know the specific area of operations (AO) where it will deploy or be able to anticipate such a specific deployment. In that case, the goal should be to create training conditions that replicate as closely as possible the actual conditions of the specific OE associated with that AO. On the other hand, the unit may need to train to accomplish its core capabilities in any of a number of possible OEs. In that case, it is appropriate to design an OE that represents a composite of the types of conditions that might exist in a number of actual OEs in which the unit might find itself involved in full spectrum operations.

In either case, the design and structure of the OE for any training event consists of three main components: actual data, projected data, and intelligent compromise. All that differs is the proportion of each. The term for this combination of actual data, intelligent compromise, and projected information that creates the conditions for any training event is the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). The COE is the collective set of conditions, derived from a composite of actual worldwide conditions, that pose realistic challenges for training, leader development, and capabilities development for Army forces and their joint, intergovernmental, interagency and multinational partners. The COE is a collective term for the relevant aspects of contemporary OEs that exist or could exist today or in the, near- and mid- term future (next 10 years). It is a composite of all the operational variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influence that can affect military operations—and therefore serve as the conditions necessary for training and leader development. Most importantly, it is not a totally artificial construct created for training; rather, it is a representative composite based on the characteristics of one or more actual OEs in this contemporary timeframe.

Variables, Subvariables, AND Settings

The foundation of the exercise planner’s development of the appropriate OE for a training exercise is the eight operational variables that reside in all OEs and have the greatest impact on military forces. The strength of these variables is that they are flexible and scalable, capable of replicating any OE that U.S. forces might encounter along the full spectrum of conflict. These variables are Political, Military, Econom- ic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT). The variables relate to specific situations as well as threat capabilities. They are relevant to every echelon of command and every military mission. While individual variables do not dominate every environment, they are all present and require careful consideration. Ignoring one or more of these variables can negatively impact military missions and the realism of training conditions in an exercise.

The taxonomy of categorizing the components of any OE begins with the eight PMESII-PT. The next level down from the variables is the associated subvariables, which show either a menu or a range of choices called subvariable settings. In a few cases, a subvariable may break down into another level of specificity, called sub-subvariables, which have their own choices of settings. Each variable, associated subvariables and sub-subvariables, and their settings have specific definitions to assist the planner in building the desired OE.

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Note. The listed subvariables and associated settings are not necessarily all inclusive. As events, technology, and time change, existing subvariables may need to be modified or new ones added. Even in conducting an operational environment assessment (OEA) for an actual OE, additional subvariables may be necessary. The intent in this TC is to provide a basic guideline of areas that are important and may need to be considered in designing a training exercise.

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The remaining portion of this chapter will provide a detailed breakdown of each operational variable and their associated components in the order of the memory aid PMESII-PT. The entry for each variable begins with the definition of that variable. Then, for each variable, there is an initial table providing an overview of the associated subvariables and subvariable settings. This is followed by individual tables for each subvariable, providing the subvariable definition and definitions of possible subvariable settings. The subvariable tables also include “considerations and additional notes” usually pertaining to individual set- tings. Finally, the subvariable tables list other variables and subvariables whose settings would most likely be linked to the subvariable described in the table. However, these are not the only possible links that may exist.

Exercise planners should use these tables as a tool to select the subvariable or sub-subvariable settings that create the appropriate conditions for their specific exercise. These specific conditions, along with scenarios and road to war, are based upon approved training objectives, the training unit’s METL, and de- sired exercise-training outcomes. When training for an actual OE in a specific geographical area, the exercise planner can use a TRISA-produced OEA that indicates the settings required to replicate that particular OE (see chapter 2).

The impacts of the PMESII-PT variables on exercise design are significant. As discussed in chapter 2, the PMESII-PT variables and their subvariable and sub-subvariable settings provide a comprehensive framework to determine the training conditions within an OE. These conditions can affect the training unit and OPFOR positively and negatively across the full spectrum of operations as well as at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Using these variables assists the commander in training his unit in a realistic and challenging environment.

Political Variable

The Political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal political powers. The political variable includes influential political groups and the collective attitude of the population towards the U.S. The specific Political subvariables and their settings are depicted in table 3-1. Their associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-2 through 3-6.

Table 3-1. Political variable and subvariable settings

Variable	Political
Subvariable	Attitude toward the United States	Centers of Political Power	Type of Government	Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy	Influential Political Groups
Subvariable Settings	Friendly	Tribal	Dictatorship/ Authoritarian	Effective: Stable	Pro- Government
	Neutral/ Ambivalent	Town/District	Theocracy	Vulnerable: Recovering	Opposition
	Hostile	Provincial	Representative Government	Vulnerable: Failing	Coalition
		National/ Regional	Anarchy	Crisis: Failing
				Crisis: Failed

Table 3-2. Political: attitude toward the United States

Definition: Describes the attitude of the government toward the United States and specifically toward the presence and actions of U.S. and/or coalition forces. (Once established, this subvariable manifests itself in the scenario in the form of role player instructions or combat instructions to the OPFOR.)
Subvariable Setting	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Friendly	Describes an overall favorable, positive recep­ tion of the U.S. and/or coalition forces activities, presence, and initiatives.	Role-player sub-instructions limited to 20% of subversive activities against the training unit's intentions. Takes the form of infiltration, over­ looking of criminal activities, active support of OPFOR. Also necessitates 20% of role-player support in the form of tips. Limits infiltration and scripted sabotage against the training unit’s actions. High level of tips (4 to 5 per day) and populace cooperation against OPFOR activities.
Neutral/Ambivalent	Describes an undecided reception of the U.S. and/or coalition forces’ activities, presence, and initiatives.	Role-player sub-instructions limited to 30% of the scenario population engaged in some form of subversive activities against the training unit's intentions. Takes the form of infiltration, over­ looking of criminal activities, and active support of OPFOR. Also necessitates 15% of role-player support in the form of tips. Increased infiltration and scripted sabotage against the training unit's actions. Moderate level of tips, (2 to 3 per day) and populace cooperation against OPFOR ac­ tivities.
Hostile	Describes an unfavorable, negative reaction to the U.S. and/or coalition forces’ activities, pres­ ence, and initiatives.	Role-player sub-instructions limited to 40% of the scenario population engaged in some form of subversive activities against the training unit's intentions. Takes the form of infiltration, over­ looking of criminal activities, and active support of OPFOR. Heavy infiltration and scripted sabo­ tage against the training unit's actions. Low level of tips (1 to 2 per day) and populace coopera­ tion against OPFOR activities.
Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Social: Education Level; Economic: Employment Status.

Table 3-3. Political: centers of political power

Definition: Determines the types of bureaucratic divisions and/or centers of power within a government. Also includes the level of governmental span of control from tribal to regional/national level. An example would be tribal and town/district, with a primary focus on town/district matters.
Subvariable Setting	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Tribal	Tribal focus, limited government or government of limited influence. Characterized by tribal eld­ ers, religious figureheads.	Requires tribal elders, some town element man­ ning, and portions of the other role-playing re­ quirements element (such as NGOs, and host or allied nation military presence).
Town/District	Town and some district focus in the government day-to-day operations.	Requires district and town elements.
Provincial	Provincial and minimal cross-border focus by the local and provincial government.	Some regional (international) elements and story themes present in the scenario. Govern­ ment role-players adopt a national focus at the expense of local and tribal needs. Depending upon the government type and status, up to one full role-player provincial government, district, town, and other group will be required to fully replicate the level of government specified.
National/Regional	International and cross-border focus based on the existence of multiple regions or national borders in the scenario OE.	Also  requires  provincial,  district,  town,  other elements (manned at some level of capacity).
Subvariable Links: Political: Type of Government; Social: Education level, Ethnic Diversity: Infrastructure: Transportation.

Table 3-4. Political: type of government

Definition: Determines the type of government structure and associated behaviors encountered.
Subvariable Setting	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Dictatorship/Authoritarian	A mode of government characterized by the existence of a single ruler or group who arro­ gate to themselves and monopolize power in the state, exercising it without restraint.	For live training requires robust domestic security apparatus, bureaucratic institutions, and bloated role-player government structure (1.5 normal manning).
Theocracy	A government ruled by or subject to religious authority. A system of government in which God or a deity is held to be the civil ruler.	Can only occur in the first two categories of social religious diversity.
Representative	A representative form of government—either	Requires   specific,   prominent   influencers,
Government	democratic,   republic,   or   parliamentary   in form—with elected representatives and ex­ ecutives. All politics are governed by will of people and government has limited, defined powers over the population.	council members be present in the scenario (in addition to the normal role-player govern­ ment positions).
Anarchy	Absence of any form of political authority. Political disorder and confusion. Absence of any cohesive principle, such as a common standard or purpose.	Tribal and religious role-players present in scenario. Small percentage of disenfran­ chised or former government officials with little influence.
Subvariable Links: Economic: Illegal Economic Activity, Social: Education Level, Religious Diversity, Criminal Activity.

Table 3-5. Political: government effectiveness and legitimacy

Definition: Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to work with society to assure the provision of order and public goods and services. Legitimacy refers to the perception by important segments of society that the government is exer­ cising state power in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole.
Subvariable Setting	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Effective: Stable	The government is able and willing to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of its country’s population. It provides military and police services that secure borders and limit crime, while being reasonable, equitable, and without major violation of human rights. It provides basic services that generally meet demand. Political institutions, processes, norms, and leaders are acceptable to the citizenry and ensure adequate response to citi­ zen needs.	For CTC replication, full complement of all spe­ cified role-player government positions required in the provincial, district and town elements. Government manning determined by the type of government selected. Defined as 60-75% of all government services provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infrastructures present and functioning. Limited civil unrest. Limited gover­ nance issues and themes (no more than three). 1-2 instances of civil unrest or riots as a result of those issues and themes.
Vulnerable:	The government is recovering from crisis and	The government is only partially manned and
Recovering	still either unable or unwilling to provide ade­ quate security and essential services to all of the population. The legitimacy of the central government may still be in question. Limited civil unrest.	capable of administering its area. For CTC rep­ lication, requires 3/4 complement of all specified role-player government positions within the OE. Defined as 40-60% of all government services provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infra­ structures present and functioning. Moderate governance issues and themes (4-6, 2 of which are interrelated). Multiple (3-4) instances of civil unrest or riots as a result of those issues and themes.
Vulnerable: Failing	The government is becoming either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and es­ sential services to significant portions of the population. The legitimacy of the central gov­ ernment is falling into question. Increasing civil unrest.	The government is only partially manned and capable of administering its area. For CTC rep­ lication, requires 3/4 complement of all specified role-player government positions within the OE. Defined as 40-60% of all government services provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infra­ structures present and functioning. Moderate governance issues and themes (4-6, 2 of which are interrelated). Multiple (3-4) instances of civil unrest or riots as a result of those issues and themes.
Crisis: Failing	The central government does not exert effective control over all the country’s territory. It is be­ coming unable or unwilling to provide security and essential services for significant portions of the population. The central government may be weak, nonexistent, or simply unable or unwilling to provide security or basic services. There is great risk of violent internal conflict.	The government is partially manned and mini­ mally capable of administering its area. For CTC replication requires 1/2 or fewer complement of all specified role-player government positions within the OE. Defined as 20-40% of all gov­ ernment services provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infrastructures present and func­ tioning. High level  of  governance issues and themes (8-10, 4 of which are interrelated). Mul­ tiple (5-6) instances of civil unrest or riots as a result of those issues and themes.
Crisis: Failed	The central government does not exert effective control over the country’s territory. It is unable to provide security and essential services for sig­ nificant portions of the population. The central government is weak, nonexistent, or simply unable to provide security or basic services. Violent internal conflict is a reality.	The government is partially manned and largely incapable of administering its area. For CTC replication requires 1/4 or fewer complement of all specified role-player government positions within the OE. Defined as 20-40% of all gov­ ernment services provided throughout the OE, 60-75% of all infrastructures present and func­ tioning. High level  of  governance issues and themes (8-10, 4 of which are interrelated). Mul­ tiple (5-6) instances of civil unrest or riots as a result of those issues and themes.
Subvariable Links: Political: Governance, Stability; Infrastructure: Utilities Present, Services Level.

Table 3-6. Political: influential political groups

Definition: Describes the number and specifies the interaction and influence of various political groups within the country, region, province, district, or town. Helps define the level of government cohesion and strife within the government.
Subvariable Setting	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Pro-Government	Major political parties generally support the government in power. Minimal dissent and is­ sues of contention.	Presented and manifested in OE through script­ ing and role-player sub-instructions. If desired, minor issues may result in slight disruption of essential government functions if unaddressed or not resolved by the training unit.
Coalitions	Different political groups with competing inter­ ests and vary in their support of the government. Establishes conditions for moderate disruption of essential government functions and social volatility.	Requires the establishment of up to three differ­ ent political groups with at least two competing interests to be written into the scenario key events, back-stories, and role-player sub- instructions. Conflicts should be executed or presented during the training exercise, using power bases and role-player influencers. Issues should result in the moderate disruption of es­ sential government functions if unaddressed or not resolved by the training unit.
Opposition	Different political groups are opposed to the government with competing interests. Estab­ lishes conditions for major disruption of essen­ tial government functions and social volaMilitary VariabletiltitaryVariables the establishment of up to three differ­ ent political groups with at least two competing interests to be written into the scenario key events, back-stories, and role-player sub- instructions. Conflicts should be executed or presented during the training exercise, using power bases and role-player influencers. Issues should result in the major disruption of essential government functions if unaddressed or not resolved by the training unit.
Subvariable Links: Social: Social Volatility, Education Level; Economic: Economic Diversity, Employment Status.

Military Variable

The Military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. This includes nonmilitary armed and unarmed combatants. The variable focuses on giving the exercise planner the ability to design appropriate OPFOR units for full spectrum operations. The specific military subvariables and their settings are depicted in table 3-7. Their associated definitions, considerations, additional notes, and external links are listed separately in tables 3-8 through 3-13.

Table 3-7. Military variable and subvariable settings

Variable	Military
Subvariable	Military Forces	Government Military Forces	Non-State Paramilitary Forces	Unarmed Comba­ tants	Nonmilitary Armed Combatants	Military Functions
Subvariable Settings	Predominantly Tank and Mechanized Infantry	Operating Independently	Insurgent Forces	Information Warfare Personnel	Predominantly Neutral	C2
	Predominantly Infantry	Supplementing Regular Military	Guerrilla Forces	Media (Affiliated)	Predominantly Friendly	Maneuver
	None	Operating as Combat Forces	Criminal Organizations	Medical (Affiliated)	Predominantly Hostile and Supporting Enemy	Information Warfare
			Private Security Organizations	Active Sup­ porters	Undetermined	RISTA
				Coerced or Unwitting		Fire Support
				Financiers		Protection
				See complete settings at table 3-11.		Logistics

Table 3-8. Military: military forces

Definition: Specifies the types and sizes of military forces present within an OE.
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Predominantly Tank and Mechanized Infantry	Regular military forces consisting predominantly (at least 40%) of tank and mechanized infantry forces with some infantry (non-mechanized).	For specific tier level weapon systems, refer to Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) available online at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/14751393.
Predominantly Infantry	Regular military forces consisting predominantly (more than 60%) of infantry forces (non­ mechanized) with some tank and mechanized infantry forces.
None	No regular military forces present.
Subvariable Links: Social: Education Level; Economic: Employment Status; Terrain: Landforms.

Table 3-9. Military: government paramilitary forces

Definition: Describes government forces that are distinct from regular armed forces, but resembling them in organization, training, or mission.
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Operating Independently	Not subordinate to or affiliated with regular mili­ tary forces.	May include organizations such as police, bor­ der guards, customs agents, and other internal security forces.
Supplementing Regular Military	Affiliated with or subordinate to regular military forces but performing primarily non-combat roles.	Same as above with the exception that these forces are either part of the military force or can be mobilized to support the military force.
Operating as Combat Forces	Affiliated with or subordinate to regular military forces and performing combat missions. (Units are equipped with light weapons and sometimes heavy weapons and armored vehicles.)	Same as above with the exception that these forces are trained and equipped for combat missions. Depending on the OE, they may be equipped with light or heavy weapon systems.
Subvariable Links: Military: Non-State Paramilitary Forces; Economic: Employment Status.

Table 3-10. Military: non-state paramilitary forces

Definition: Describes forces or groups that are distinct from regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, training, or mission (JP 1-02 and FM 3-07). These forces or groups may also operate in a combination of two or more of the subvariable settings below. (Not government forces.)
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Insurgent Forces	An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 3-05) Insurgent forces are groups that conduct irregu­ lar or unconventional warfare within the borders of their country in order to undermine or overthrow a constituted government or civil authority.	The distinction between terrorists and insur­ gents is often blurred because of the tactics employed by each. Some terrorists groups have become insurgent organizations, while insurgent organizations have used terror tactics. An insur­ gent organization may use more than one form of tactics and, based on its strategy, its actions could cut across the entire spectrum of war­ fare—employing terror, guerrilla, and conven­ tional military tactics to achieve its goals. Typi­ cally, most insurgent groups use the first two.
Guerrilla Forces	A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and pa­ ramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)	Some guerrilla organizations may constitute a paramilitary arm of an insurgent movement, while others may pursue guerrilla warfare inde­ pendently from or loosely affiliated with an in­ surgent organization. Compared to insurgent organizations as a whole, guerrilla organizations have a more military-like structure. (FM 7-100.4)
Criminal	Criminal    organizations    are    non-ideological	Criminal  organizations  may  employ  criminal
Organizations	groups of people organized for the purpose of acquiring money by illegal means.	actions, terror tactics, and militarily unconven­ tional methods to achieve their goals. When mutual interests exist, criminal organizations may combine efforts with insurgent and/or guer­ rilla organizations controlling or operating in the same area. A congruence of interests can also result in criminal organizations having a close relationship with an established government. (FM 7-100.4)

Table 3-11. Military: unarmed combatants

Definition: Specifies the types of unarmed personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely and materially support hostile military or paramilitary forces in ways that do not involve possessing or using weapons. Even unarmed indi­ viduals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do so unwittingly can, in some cases, be categorized as combatants. (FM 7-100.4)
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Information Warfare Personnel	Self-explanatory.	The intent of this subvariable is to provide a menu list from which to select those personnel or activities that provide direct or indirect support to an insurgency or similar activity. Providing these selected settings as part of an insurgency in an OE en­ hances a unit’s training by experiencing a more complete, realistic, and complex environment.
Media (Affiliated)	Self-explanatory.
Medical (Affiliated)	Self-explanatory.
Active Supporters	Self-explanatory.
Coerced, Unwitting Supporters	Self-explanatory.
Financiers	Self-explanatory.
Suppliers	Self-explanatory.
Lookouts	Self-explanatory.
Couriers	Self-explanatory.
IED Factory Workers	Self-explanatory.
Intelligence Collection	Self-explanatory.
Targeting Information	Self-explanatory.
Leaders (Religious, Political, Secular, Tribal, Cultural)	Self-explanatory.
Technicians and Specialists	Self-explanatory.
Criminal (Affiliated)	Self-explanatory.
Transporters	Self-explanatory.
Asylum Providers/Protectors	Self-explanatory.
Recruiters	Self-explanatory.
Camera/Video Operators	Self-explanatory.
IED Trigger Personnel	Self-explanatory.
Other Affiliated Support	Self-explanatory.
None	No unarmed combatants present.
Subvariable Links: Political: Attitude toward the United States; Economic: Economic Activity; Military: Non-State Paramilita­ ry Forces, Military Functions.

Table 3-12. Military: nonmilitary armed combatants

Definition: Describes nonmilitary personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nevertheless, they may be disgruntled and hostile. They may also be neutral or they may support either the enemy or friend­ ly (U.S. or host nation) forces. Any number of catalysts might cause them to pick a side or change sides. Their decision may or may not remain permanent. (FM 7-100.4)
Subvariable Settings	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Predominantly Neutral	At least 50 percent neutral, with the remainder split between friendly, hostile, or undetermined.
Predominantly Friendly	At least 50 percent friendly to U.S. or host na­ tion forces, with the remainder split between neutral, hostile, or undetermined.
Predominantly Hostile and Support­ ing Enemy	At least 50 percent hostile to U.S. or host nation forces or supporting the enemy, with the re­ mainder split between neutral, friendly, or unde­ termined.
Undetermined	Unable to categorize relationship.	This setting may be used to support training objectives related to determining or responding correctly to nonmilitary armed combatants whose affiliation is unknown.
Subvariable Links: Military: Unarmed Combatants; Social: Education Level; Economic: Economic Status.

Table 3-13. Military: military functions

Definition: A military function is a group of related tasks, activities, capabilities, operations, processes, and organizations that fulfill the specific military purpose for which they all exist. When integrated with other such functions, they contribute to the accomplishment of larger missions. The subvariable settings (functions) listed below exist in varying degrees in most military organizations, as well as in some paramilitary organizations. Thus, military functions as sub-subvariables can have settings on a scale of High, Medium, or Low, defined as follows: · High: Can conduct sustained, complex, synchronized tasks of the selected military function; ability to influence friendly forces is not limited to the theater of operations; and/or associated equipment is predominantly Tier 1, as specified in the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG). · Medium: Can conduct limited, complex, synchronized tasks of the selected military function; ability to influence friendly forces is primarily limited to the theater of operations; and/or associated equipment is predominantly Tier 2, as specified in the WEG. · Low: Cannot conduct complex, synchronized tasks of the selected military function; ability to influence friendly forces is limited to local, tactical impact; and/or associated equipment is predominantly Tier 3 and below, as specified in the WEG.
Subvariable Setting	Setting Definition	Considerations and Additional Notes
Command and	Command and control (C2) is the actions of com-
Control	manders, command groups, and staffs of military headquarters to maintain continual combat readi­ ness and combat efficiency of forces, to plan and prepare for combat operations, and to provide leadership and direction during the execution of assigned missions. (FM 7-100.1)
Maneuver	Maneuver is the employment of forces in the oper­ ational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-0) This function includes direct fire, as well as mobility support and countermobility operations.
INFOWAR	Information warfare (INFOWAR) is the specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. (FM 7-100.1)	This function is linked to Information: Informa­ tion Warfare, which addresses each of the seven elements of information warfare.
RISTA	Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) is the combination of capabilities, operations, and activities using all available means to obtain information concerning foreign nations; areas of actual or potential opera­ tions; and/or the strength, capabilities, location, status, nature of operations, and intentions of hos­ tile or potentially hostile forces or elements. It in­ cludes production of intelligence resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of such information. It also includes detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.	RISTA  includes  UAVs used for reconnais­sance. This function is linked to Information: Intelligence.
Fire Support	Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition, indirect fire weapons, aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in support of operational or tactical objectives. (FM 7-100.1)	Includes offensive use of CBRN weapons. This function is linked to the target acquisition portion of the RISTA function (above).
Protection	Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel (combatants and noncomba­ tants), equipment, facilities, information, and infra­ structure against an adversary’s attempts to dam­ age, degrade, or negate them and measures to minimize the effects of such threats. The protec­ tion function includes survivability measures, air and missile defense, and CBRN defense. It also includes information protection and security meas­ ures, which are an element of information warfare	This function is linked to Information: Informa­ tion Warfare: Protection and Security Meas­ ures and, therefore, to the Information War­ fare setting under Military: Military Functions (above). It is also linked to Information Secu­ rity as a subset of Information: Information Management and to the Infrastructure varia­ ble.
Logistics	Logistics is the support activities required to sus­ tain operations. (FM 7-100.1)
Subvariable Links: See notes on individual military functions, above.