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Difference between revisions of "Information: Nyumba"

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''This page is a section of [[Nyumba]].''
 
''This page is a section of [[Nyumba]].''
  
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[[Ariana]] is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. Ariana is one of the most sophisticated nations in the world at information control, utilizing advanced capabilities to monitor and direct communications. Despite this, the fragmented Arianian opposition uses the Internet extensively, though its ultimate effect on the political environment is mixed at best. Ariana’s INFOWAR capability is generally good, with pockets of excellence in a variety of disciplines.
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Nyumba’s population is non-technical with radio and word of mouth (WoM) as their primary information sources. A select segment of the population, (those with money or influence), have access to and use the latest information technologies. The government leadership, social, and financial elite, and military leadership maintains power over the population through control of the media and exploitation of the latest technologies. Those in power use their status to sanction and benefit from the exploitation of information. This includes hosting e-criminal enterprises that seek to exploit regional and international targets. Information systems complement or support other typical criminal activity: smuggling, cyber theft, human trafficking, and hostage data.
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The government controls all media outlets in Nyumba. Television, radio, print, and internet are all under government control or censorship. Even though the laws and constitution of the country stipulate freedom of speech and press, in practice the government restricts private media by failing to issue or suspending any operating licenses. The World Press Freedom ranking for Nyumba is 170<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries. This control typically intensifies just prior to elections or when the government is being criticized by the public. Government intelligence agencies block any access to opposition information and actively work to discredit any sources contrary to the government message.
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The government controls all communication technologies; internet, satellite phones, cell phones, satellite television. Generally, the population does not have access to these technologies due to lack of infrastructure or no economic means to get access. Very limited access to satellite television is available for purchase from both commercial and black market sources but the cost is high and prohibitive for the majority of the population.
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Military information operations are very limited by modern standards. Few electronic warfare assets exist in the Nyumba inventory with only rudimentary radio intercept and direction finding.  Data collection for intelligence focuses on HUMINT and limited IMINT directed at the national level. The government and power elite control intelligence resources to remain in power. Information warfare resources are only allocated to the military to the extent necessary to plan operations.
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Nyumba views their regional neighbors as resources to exploit for revenue generation. Cyber-attacks on financial institutions and relatively rich populations are within Nyumba’s capabilities by hiring hacker services. The government established relationships with hackers and cyber-attack groups from foreign nations who sought a safe-haven for illicit activities. These arrangements included Nyumba support with infrastructure, government legitimacy, security, and financial interest in return for information exploitation services. Basically, Nyumba established and nurtures the “wild west” of information operations both in the region and the world.
  
 
== Satellite Telecommunications ==
 
== Satellite Telecommunications ==
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Ariana’s advancements in satellite communication services are rapidly developing. Presently, Ariana operates one government-owned telecommunication satellite which utilizes Ku-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. When necessary, Ariana contracts with foreign allies to lease satellite communication systems that also operate Ku-band transponders.
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Nyumba contracts with a satellite telecommunications company for broadband data and voice services. The satellite services support use of multiple communications platforms ranging from military radios to machine-to-machine communications. This allows Nyumba access to the most technologically advanced systems while not incurring the costs of a satellite program. Communications security is potentially compromised to a degree by using commercial vendors but use of point of use encryption offsets the vulnerability.
  
 
== Navigation ==
 
== Navigation ==
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Ariana’s military is believed to use commercial L-band receivers that are reciprocal with GPS or GLONASS for navigation. This highlights the significance of dual-use technologies, utilizing technologies designed for the commercial sector yet adaptable to support military objectives.
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Global positioning system (GPS) is in use throughout Nyumba based on systems available commercially. Primarily, the country relies on the GLONASS-M constellation of 24 navigation satellites in medium earth orbit. The satellites transmit L1 FDMA signals at 1,602 MHz and L2 FDMA at 1,246 MHz resulting in 100 meter accuracy for civilian use and 10 to 20 meter for military uses.
  
 
== Public Communications Media ==
 
== Public Communications Media ==
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Ariana’s heavy-handed control of public communications has allowed the country to weather a sustained protest movement and slowly squeeze opposition voices from the public arena—either to internal silence or external exile. All significant public media is not just government-controlled, but the messages are crafted expertly to portray the Arianian government and the Council of Guardians Revolution in the best possible light and to shift the blame for most issues to an implacably hostile West.
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The government continues its control of radio, television and now the Internet through the Nyumba Ministry of Communication and Culture (NMCC). NMCC issues all licenses for television, radio, and internet service providers. It also monitors the activities of foreign journalists to enforce their compliance with restrictive regulations governing the content of articles and news reports.  
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The government through the NMCC pursues a program to develop the Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT) sector with support provided by Olvana. As part of the agreement between the two countries, Olvana is to establish a port facility in the vicinity of Lamu to support its military and commercial operations in the region, in recompense, Olvana will provide significant support to develop Nyumban ICT infrastructure. The ceding of the land for the Olvanan port at Lamu is directly tied to the payments for the ICT expansion. These advances in ICT will expand Nyumban information system capabilities but also increase the ability to support illicit cyber operations of both countries.
  
 
=== Internet ===
 
=== Internet ===
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Internet use in Ariana is blossoming, and the Arianian Internet is a dynamic center for discussing politics, culture, and religion. World Bank economic indicator studies suggest about one-third of Arianians use the Internet.  Arianian Internet usage growth is among if not the fastest in the Caucasus region.
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Nyumba’s general population has no access to internet services and only those sanctioned by the government are allowed routine service.  Internet penetration of the 8.8 million population stands at a low 11% or 950,000 Nyumbans.  
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[[File:Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message.png|thumb|Arianian Reform Movement spreads a multilingual message]]
 
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Despite Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) control of all Ariana Internet service backbones (packet-switching and bandwidth), the government still finds it a challenge to control Internet information. The Internet now serves as the main forum for Ariana’s dissident voices because of its decentralized nature and the fact that most of the infrastructure is outside Ariana’s borders. Broad anti- government protests following recent Arianian presidential elections increased the importance, content, and quantity of Internet blogs.
 
  
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The Arianian government responded to the proliferation of Internet anti-government messages by adopting one of the most sophisticated Internet censorship systems in the world. Officially, the Arianian government introduced Internet filters to block perceived pornographic or immoral material. In practice, it attempts to block sites with political content as it limits access and identifies those who make posts. The Director of the Arianian Communications Technology Network claims Ariana blocks 90% of the more than 10 million sites for “immoral” reasons. The Arianian government made broadband Internet connections for home users illegal to prevent users from downloading Western cultural products like music and films. Many external reports indicate the government bans far more than the 90% of Internet sites it claims.
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Figure 1 Internet penetration is low with little growth prospect.  
  
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Proxy services, usually hosted abroad, responded to the attempted bans by offering a means for many Arianians to circumvent the government bans. Thus, a race continues between the Arianian government and activists as the activists attempt to create and disseminate usable proxy addresses before the Arianian government can detect them and add them to the filter.
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The only expansion projects underway are those the government is funding or has approved. As part of the Olvanan-delivered modernization program, the government is pursuing an expansion of the fiber-optic network to and within Kismaayo.
  
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Due to its technological nature, the Internet lends itself to a more educated and urban population. Since the educated, young, urban population comprises the domestic anti-Arianian movement’s core, the Internet serves as a practical method for support and communication between themselves, Arianian expatriates, and Western sympathizers. Members of Ariana’s anti-government movement have crafted simple, but effective, English messages to speed dissemination to Western media outlets and non-Farsi speaking supporters abroad.
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PLACEHOLDER FOR NYUMBA INTERNET BACKBONE AND COUNTY NETWORK. 
  
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The domestic opposition movement has also distanced itself from any foreign government or the idea of change to the current political structure. Instead, the domestic effort has focused on electoral irregularities. Some analysts suggest the domestic movement does not want to be associated with movements that appear either anti-religious or anti-government.
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Figure 2. Fiber optic backbone limited in Nyumba
  
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Ariana’s government controls several internal Arianian websites. These include over 15 different news and discussion sites that, while appearing to deliver a variety of opinions, are controlled by the Arianian government. Most Arianians, when able, access Western news sites. An important additional source is the Arianian blogosphere, which connects Arianians internationally and domestically and is considered by most to be highly trustworthy.
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Nyumba does host cyber operations from North Torbia as a means of generating revenue and also access to information warfare capabilities. Mutual support agreements are in place that allow the government to gain cutting edge capabilities in exchange for sanctioning the activities of the North Torbia group. This arrangement allows North Torbia cyber operations groups to gain the top-cover necessary to build their portfolio of both legitimate and dark web cyber activities.
  
 
=== Television ===
 
=== Television ===
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The government maintains broadcast control over all television content aired in Ariana. A highly popular media, the US Government estimates that television reaches almost 80% of Arianian households. The country’s five major networks broadcast a combination of news, sports, religious,  and historical programming. All networks are controlled by the Arianian government. Arianians are avid consumers of foreign satellite broadcasts via Very Small Aperture Television (like DIRECTV®). The Arianian government periodically cracks down on unlicensed satellite reception, but the prevalence of satellite dishes prevents such crackdowns from being widespread or persistent.
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Television remains limited throughout Nyumba with service primarily located in the major cities. The general public does not have access to television because of the cost and the broadcast footprint of the government network. The terrestrial-based network is completely state-owned and broadcasts only state approved programming. International news shows are aired along with sporting events and other entertainment that is not critical of the Nyumban leadership.  
  
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The Arianian government has attempted to jam foreign-sourced satellite transmission, especially from the US, UK, and EU. It has also  enlisted foreign allies like Cuba to jam the uplink signal. It is likely the government will continue to aggressively control viewing choices for Arianians.
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NMCC operates the sole terrestrial TV network and approves all programming to ensure it supports government positions.  There are no private TV broadcasts and transmissions of several international broadcasters are available for those that can afford the equipment and service.  
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PLACEHOLDER FOR NYUMBA TELEVISION TOWERS AND NETWORK.  
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Figure 3 Television is not widely available.
  
 
=== Radio ===
 
=== Radio ===
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The Arianian government controls all radio broadcasts originating in the country. In December 2002, the US- funded Radio Safa began regular broadcasts in Farsi on short-wave, medium-wave, and satellite. Major Arianian-controlled radio stations include a government network; foreign broadcasting in multiple languages, including Atropian  and  Limarian; and multiple news, talk, cultural, and youth-oriented networks. Practically all Arianians and most people living within 200 kilometers of the Arianian border have access to this programming.
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The government controls radio, as with television, broadcasting infrastructure with only two domestic radio networks. The networks are located in the major cities of the country, broadcast AM, FM, and SW during the day (7 AM to 5 PM), and only approved programs on FM and SW at night (6 PM to 9 PM). Broadcast equipment is prone to breakdown due to infrequent maintenance and poor technical knowledge of the government staff.
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PLACEHOLDER FOR RADIO BROADCAST INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 4 Radio is more accessible than TV for the Nyumban public. 
  
 
=== Print Media ===
 
=== Print Media ===
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After the election of mildly reformist politicians in the late 1990s, the privately-owned Arianian print media began to flourish. Since the return of the conservatives to power, the Arianian government  has adopted aggressive state censorship that bans many reformist newspapers and their employees from the field.
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The low literacy rate in Nyumba (27%) limits the impact of print media for much of the Nyumba public. Print media does serve the wealthy elite and government workers but provides only articles that have a neutral or positive view of the government.
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Newspapers and handbills are also limited to the official and semi-official languages found predominantly around the major cities. The official language of Nyumba being French finds most of the print media written in that language. Additional print publications are found in Arabic, Amharic, Bantu, and English. These newspapers and other print media have limited readership with circulation under 76,000 countrywide.
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The government continues mixed censorship of the 4 daily newspapers actively printing in Nyumba. Two of the papers are subject to active censorship due to their propensity to publish articles that are controversial and critical of the country’s leaders. The government typically issues a suspension of the newspapers printing rights for a period of time when a critical article appears. Clearing the suspension is either based on a stated amount of time or some arbitrary stipulation issued with the suspension notice.  
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PLACEHOLDER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA FLYER/BULLETIN
  
 
=== Telephone ===
 
=== Telephone ===
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Ariana’s modern telecommunications began in 1971. The Arianian government, under both the Pasha and Islamic Republic, ran the Arianian Telecommunications Company (ATC) as the national telecommunications monopoly. As it did with many other former state enterprises, the Arianian government planned to privatize the ATC. Recently, the Arianian military used a government subsidy to purchase control of the ATC through a shell company, Elburz Enterprises.
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Businesses and private citizens in Nyumba followed the same path as many other countries in Africa and jumped directly to mobile phone service, bypassing landlines as the main communications means. Phone landlines are in a steady decline with only an estimated 121,000 citizens still using the service. Within the limits of the economy, those with resources do have cell phone access using a limited network of cell towers. The network is only found in the main metropolitan centers with no connectivity in the rest of the country. These conditions cause Nyumbans to resort to satellite phones for critical communications. As with most of the economy if an individual has money, then they can get the necessary equipment and connectivity. Very little government regulation of the telephone system; landline, cellular, or satellite phone systems.  
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[[File:Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage.png|thumb|Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Basic Mobile Coverage]]
 
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Currently, Arianian telecommunications operate with a combination of landlines (increasingly fiber optic since 1984, with digital switching since 1989) and mobile services (text messaging remains popular). Ariana operates an estimated 25 million landlines and 43 million mobile lines. Foreign operators plan to provide Third Generation (3G) mobile services, but capital and foreign control issues shifted the new network’s ownership and construction responsibility to various Arianian government agencies.
 
  
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Internationally, the domestic telecommunications network connects to international telecom networks via satellite links (INMARSAT and INTELSAT), high-frequency (HF) radio, and fiber optic cable. The ATC, from its outset in 1971, assumed responsibility for all Arianian telecommunication affairs, and the ATC began the same year to manufacture the network’s required national long- distance equipment. After the first fiber optic cable operational testing at the ATC’s research center in 1984, the government began constructing the Shahid's Voice Communications Company in Esfahan the next year; it became operational in 1989.
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PLACEHOLDER FOR MOBILE PHONE COVERAGE
  
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By the end of the decade, the US government estimated 8.5 million Arianians enjoyed mobile telephone service operated through one heavily-congested mobile network with a long waiting list. In 2005, the Arianian parliament forced the Kalarian company Kalacell to withdraw from a potential mobile phone consortium. The failed business deal damaged Arianian-Kalarian relations despite Ariana’s need for another network. Later that year, South Africa’s Mobile Telephones Network of South Africa accepted Ariana’s stringent licensing conditions and replaced Kalacell in the mobile phone consortium.
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PLACEHOLDER FOR MOBILE PHONE PENETRATION
  
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Additionally, Ariana embarked on a homegrown satellite program to improve its communications network. In February 2009, the Arianians used a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), which weighed about 60 pounds, to launch a first-generation communications satellite into orbit. Ariana can use this or future satellites for communication or possibly for intelligence purposes. Significantly, the launch validated Arianian ballistic missile and rocket capabilities, laying the groundwork for a possible change in the Middle East balance of power.
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Figure 5 Mobile phones use and coverage is limited in Nyumba.
  
 
=== Postal/Courier ===
 
=== Postal/Courier ===
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Ariana Postal Service (APS) and other private courier services within Ariana transport mail, packages, and other documents. The private couriers’ importance continues to decrease as business activity restrictions  by  the Arianian  military  and international  economic  sanctions  make it progressively more difficult to operate within Ariana. APS offers domestic and international service as it attempts to upgrade its postal system to international standards.
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The postal system (Post) in Nyumba is poorly run and very unreliable.  Carrier delivery of mail is unreliable but they do serve as a conduit for WoM communications throughout the country. Carriers are given free passage throughout the country by the tribes and groups to facilitate the flow of news. They also have the reputation for smuggling media and information restricted by the government. Risk is relatively low due to the corruption in the postal system and lax inspection practices by government security.  
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Couriers and freight shippers cater to both legitimate commercial business as well as movement of illicit cargoes. They use the legitimate commercial business as fronts to navigate customs and bypass many inspections designed to intercept illegal shipments. North Torbian, Olvana, and other criminal elements find Nyumban couriers a ready and willing service able to ship any type of illegal or restricted cargoes. Elephant ivory, rhino horn, drugs, guns, fake condoms, and more are acceptable cargoes for Nyumban couriers.  With a 25% HIV rate in the adult population, Nyumba has one of the highest infection rates in the world, and preventing fake condoms in the market place is a critical item of national interest. 
  
 
=== Word of Mouth ===
 
=== Word of Mouth ===
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Word of mouth is an important communications medium, especially in rural Ariana. Because of the political situation, political or religious speech not specifically approved by the government is dangerous, so trust relationships are even more important than in most neighboring countries. The Arianian government often disseminates new policy through religious authorities to give government pronouncements the veneer of religious sanction.
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The low literacy rate ensures that word-of-mouth (WoM) remains a key means of information transfer for the majority of Nyumba’s population. Individuals rely on family and tribal connections to provide access to news and knowledge. Particularly those family members in the diaspora supply reliable news and information from outside the country. 
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WoM creates a very detailed understanding of the clan’s local environment; geography, climate, flora and fauna, and other conditions that impact day-to-day life. Often, those providing the communication put their own slant or interpretation on the news or events.
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Information transmission within a clan follows traditional paths; discussion during meals, folklore, songs, and oral education. The traditional information streams are;
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* Family leaders conveying to the family the laws and opinions of the tribal elders. Elders exchange information with other clans and villages that provides a consistent flow of news and information.
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* Daily activities are the venue for the transmission of information; herding, cooking, collecting water and food, etc.
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* Fathers and men instruct the young men and boys, women teach the young girls and in some aspects young boys.
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Any break in the information conduit caused by death or absence is alleviated to some degree by other family members. Significant losses of clan members because of disease or other calamities within the clan results in knowledge being lost to the group. The clan’s intimate knowledge of the local and regional environment creates a fairly rapid and detailed understanding of any threats or changes that could affect the clan or village. Interception of information transmitted by WoM is only possible by successfully interrogating a clan member. 
  
 
=== Information Control ===
 
=== Information Control ===
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The government effectively controls all major media outlets and effectively muzzles dissent except on the Internet, where reformers operate with great difficulty. For over 30 years, Ariana’s government has maintained a massive anti-US INFOWAR campaign that is remarkable mostly for its ineffectiveness with both its own population and wider regional and international audiences. On the other hand, Ariana’s Persian ethnic majority warmly receives any perception management-driven messages of Persian “greatness” or “uniqueness.”
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The Nyumban government has a good understanding of the threats present in today’s information environment. Exploitation of information control for economic gain is a mainstay of the government’s approach. The government controls the content and messages provided by the media with the main focus of staying in power and reaping the greatest gain possible.  
  
 
== INFOWAR ==
 
== INFOWAR ==
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INFOWAR in the Caucasus region contains a mixture of old and new technology. While older Donovian equipment forms the backbone for much of the region’s INFOWAR warfighting capability, the countries conduct advanced operations with dedicated INFOWAR units. For example, regional perception management activities, often web-based, form the current global state-of-the-art. Internet operations are frequently used as an adjunct to major combat operations. Most countries in the Caucasus focus their INFOWAR on their likely adversaries.
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Nyumba controls and directs INFOWAR (IW) at the national level. The principle objective is to use all available information resources to maintain the leadership’s hold on power and control of the country. In addition to using INFOWAR to maintain national control the government also uses its diplomatic status to cover the cyber activities of foreign companies and government personnel as they support both Nyumba’s requirements as well as those of their parent country.  In many instances, Nyumba learned IW from North Torbia and routinely uses those policies and procedures to advance its interests. 
  
 
=== Electronic Warfare ===
 
=== Electronic Warfare ===
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Ariana maintains an eclectic collection of jamming and sensor capabilities ranging from 1970s Western equipment to international arms market purchases to domestically produced items. While still capable against regional foes, the Arianian electronic warfare (EW) capability will likely prove inadequate against Western opponents or those equipped with modern Arianian equipment. Arianian EW doctrine remains in a state of flux as the Arianian military struggles with slow abandonment of Western practices and adoption of more non-Western asymmetric practices.
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Nyumba holds no organic electronic warfare (EW) capability in its government or military forces. However, other countries established bases to use Nyumban airspace and land installations to monitor and track activities in the region. One of the most recent bases established by Olvana is at the port of Lamu which continues to grow and expand. Costal bases support EW monitoring of the shipping lanes leading to regional ports facilitating tracking of legitimate shipping as well as pirate vessels. The exact agreement between the government of Nyumba and the foreign interests is unclear but sharing of intelligence collected is a distinct possibility.
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The country’s military forces have very limited command and control communications systems. The majority of the equipment, provided through Western aid programs, remains the mainstay of the government’s ability to communicate with forces deployed within Nyumba. As such, security of message traffic relies on manual encryption and brevity codes. 
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Figure 6. National Command Authority Communications Center in Kismaayo.
  
 
=== Computer Attack ===
 
=== Computer Attack ===
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Of the Caucasus countries, Ariana maintains the second most-robust computer attack capability through a large and capable cyber militia. While doubtful they could effectively penetrate major nation state-systems, the Arianians possess significant overmatch to any regional opponent except Donovia, due to their relatively large population of computer experts.
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Nyumba’s government bases its computer attack capabilities on contract services. It tailors purchased services from North Torbia and a European technical services company to match the exact target and outcome desired.  Nyumban government offices, businesses, and private citizens show a strong trend towards using outdated operating systems. Africa-wide 67.5% of users still rely on computer operating systems (OS) that are no longer supported. This condition leaves systems open to exploitation and computer attack. Nyumba’s computer modernization status, or lack thereof, causes the outdated OS to be even higher at an estimated 75% of personal computers. 
  
 
=== Information Attack ===
 
=== Information Attack ===
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Ariana also possesses one of the most-developed information attack (IA) capabilities in the region, second only to Donovia, even though these capabilities may seem rudimentary by global standards. Ariana maintains a large cyber-focused force, and previously attempted to use IA against reformist protesters. These efforts generated limited effects and, while its capabilities continue to improve, Arianian IA will still probably only operate effectively against non-state actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against top-tier nation states and their allies.
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The Nyumba government is deeply concerned over the capability of its adversaries to attack critical databases.  To counter the threat they actively employ cyber capabilities supplied by other countries or criminal syndicates to achieve the capabilities needed to attack the systems of regional and international competitors. Nyumban cyber personnel use the threat intelligence and security procedures produced by the contracted security firms to guide cyber-attack plans.  
  
 
=== Deception ===
 
=== Deception ===
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Deception remains a hallmark of Arianian military operations, and its importance will only increase in the future. Arianians particularly focus on deception to mask operations and allow Arianian forces to close the gap with the US and other adversarial countries, which Arianians believe maintain an unbridgeable arms overmatch. Arianians will likely use a variety of ruses, such as wearing US-style or other countries’ military uniforms, to mask their involvement in military operations.
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The Nyumban government and military use active deception to hide the activities of international cyber groups operating in the country. The government expends a great deal of time, resources, and effort to mask the activities of the North Torbia cyber group operating from Nyumba. This is due to both self-interest as well as being part of the agreement between Nyumba and North Torbia.
  
 
=== Physical Destruction ===
 
=== Physical Destruction ===
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Ariana knows its ability to negate threats from the US, Israel, and other high-end opponents is extremely limited. Ariana will probably only attack sensors as a tactical last resort or where enemy sensors appear poorly defended or unguarded. Any such Arianian attack would require extensive denial and deception techniques to close the distance from launch point to target. Ariana highly respects Israeli and US sensors based on its experiences in Iraq and Lebanon.
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Nyumba does not possess power projection systems that facilitate physical destruction of command and control nodes or networks of opponents. At best, Nyumba is capable of using sabotage to disrupt or destroy the command and control (C2) systems of foreign elements operating in Nyumba. Typically, Nyumban destruction attacks are characterized by asymmetric methods used to target either C2 systems or nodes, or the support services needed to operate them. 
  
 
=== Protection and Security Measures ===
 
=== Protection and Security Measures ===
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Recently, Ariana made international news for being unable to protect its nuclear power SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks from malware. While significant damage occurred from this incident, the Arianians will likely redouble their efforts to secure these networks and other INFOWAR architecture. Ariana uses both internally produced and commercial off-the- shelf network protection software.
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The African cyber market is a lucrative target for e-crime with a projected value of 34.6 billion by 2023. Nyumba plans to exploit that potential target as well as protecting its own assets. Recognizing the cyber threat related to hosting foreign cyber operations, the government entered into a series of contracts for broad cyber protective services. These services include threat intelligence, vulnerability management, and training of government staff supporting cyber operations. 
  
 
=== Perception Management ===
 
=== Perception Management ===
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Traditionally, Ariana attempts to craft a complete anti-Western, Revolutionary Islam message for both external and internal consumption. The Arianian government uses local proxies to downplay  the “Persian” and Shia origins of its message in non-Shia countries while consistently supporting world-wide communications that “Islam is the Answer” to the Muslim world’s problems. This idea of Revolutionary Islam’s value itself is an Arianian Islamic Republic message. Internally, the government conveys that the Arianian Islamic Republic is the primary Shia Islam defender. The Arianian government consistently references the Martyrdom of Hussein, a prime element of Shia, to rally populous support from the rural, religiously conservative Shia. Additionally, INFOWAR messages merge perceived threats (such as Western cultural imperialism/pollution) with the Islamic Republic as a threat against Ariana itself. This rallying cry to defend the Arianian nation resonates with all levels of Arianian society.
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Nyumban leadership’s primary concern is maintaining the public’s perception that it is strong and actively seeking to protect the country’s’ interests. The government maintains strict control of all internal media released to the public through the various media sources.  Simultaneously, the government attempts to present the outward appearance of supporting freedom of speech and free flow of information to the rest of the world. 
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Regionally, Arianians attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam against aggressive outside forces. In government and population discussions, Arianians stress their shared religious beliefs and play up the Atropian minority population’s integration within Ariana. Arianians also continue to strengthen their relations with Limaria, stressing common commercial interests. Arianians will likely attempt to portray Gorgans as “puppets” of the West. Despite their historical and political status as the “odd man out” of the Caucasus region, the Arianians will deftly play up elements of political, social, religious, or economic commonality with other nations.
 
  
 
== Intelligence ==
 
== Intelligence ==
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Ariana has sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Analysts believe Ariana to be the second most capable space power in the region as it has at least one government-owned and -operated satellite that supports intelligence operations. Additionally, Ariana has access to commercial off-the-shelf satellite  imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with Arianian- produced measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Arianian IMINT and MASINT programs will likely continue to operate at a lower development rate than Ariana’s sophisticated and globally capable HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT programs.
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Nyumba maintains a centralized intelligence organization and allocates assets to military, security, or national missions based on analyzed requirements. The government gains a certain amount of intelligence based on agreements with foreign countries and illegal groups stemming from their operations in Nyumba. 
  
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Ariana operates a large, operationally diverse, and highly experienced intelligence organization. Recently, the Arianian military shifted more of its intelligence portfolio from the Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Ariana to the military intelligence apparatus. Arianian intelligence operations are focused on supporting terrorist proxies such as Shia Internationalist Brigades; direct attacks on American, Israeli government, and Jewish targets; and suppressing internal and external political dissent and separatists.
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=== Command and Control Systems ===
  
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=== Human Intelligence ===
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==== Government ====
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Ariana organizes its HUMINT programs into four primary categories: collection and influence, support to foreign militants, support to friendly foreign countries, and direct action. Organizationally, the Arianian military’s World Jihad Force, along with its associated intelligence units, operates as the primary offensive HUMINT asset, especially now that the Arianian intelligence service reportedly lost its previously independent status.
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* Networks – Using donations from international aid programs to field basic C2 capabilities
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* Radar – Systems are limited and controlled at the national level
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* Optical – Currently purchasing required imagery
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* Satellite – Purchased services for communications and imagery
  
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Arianians conduct influence operations throughout the Muslim world but attempt to play down the “Persian” and “Shia” origins of their revolutionary message. Additionally, the Arianian intelligence services use the vast web of interconnected economic, familial, and religious connections (such as the graduates of Arianian religious institutions) for collection and influence. Most likely, Arianian HUMINT operations focus on technology acquisition and sanction circumvention.
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==== Military ====
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* Networks – Basic radio and fixed installation use of fiber-optic
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* Radar – National level air traffic control  
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* Radio – Basic command and control network; HF, UHF, VHF and fiber-optic voice over IP
  
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Ariana maintains a fleet of foreign-origin equipment that is a major component of Arianian conventional combat power. Thus, sustaining weapons systems or acquiring technology to increase Arianian force capabilities probably are a prime HUMINT focus. Faced with UN sanctions that limit external support for Arianian intelligence and nuclear programs, the Arianian military likely will work to bypass these sanctions and secure access to dual-use technology and the international finance network. As a result of Arianian intelligence operations, many Donovian military officers  and Arianian military’s associated business organizations remain under UN and US Treasury sanctions that limit their access to the international financial and business infrastructure. It is likely that Arianian HUMINT operations will continue to focus on workarounds to these sanctions.
+
=== Human Intelligence ===
−
 
+
Human intelligence (HUMINT) is internal to Nyumba with little external capability. The main focus of HUMINT assets within Nyumba is to identify threats to the current regime’s power. Internal intelligence operations center on political groups using covert collection and coercion to gain information from the population. Externally, the government relies on information collection from agents operating in port facility operations, government offices, and financial institutions.  
−
Arianian intelligence previously funded, trained, and enabled insurgent paramilitaries throughout the Middle East. Much of this support activity has been targeted against Coalition forces in both OIF and OEF. Arianian intelligence and the Arianian military developed and trained the Shia Internationalist Brigades in the early 1980s. The Shia Internationalist Brigades provided a vital proxy for Arianian government activities and an excellent training ground to validate Arianian combat TTP. Many reports indicate Arianian military personnel served as trainers in foreign countries and the country’s military trainers also assisted with intelligence collection. In addition to training native Arianians, a number of foreigners (primarily Shia Lebanese, Shia Iraqis, North Africans, Palestinians, and Shia Gulf Arabs) have been trained and operationally attached to the Arianian military, helping to increase the Arianian military’s HUMINT capabilities. The country’s military favors the Shia Internationalist Brigades as a “cut out,” or operational proxy, for Arianian operations. It is unlikely that any third party like Shia Internationalist Brigades would operate without the consent of Arianian intelligence services, and only if the action furthers Arianian objectives.
 
  
−
The US Treasury Department implicated the Arianian intelligence services in counterfeiting, especially against the US. It is presumed that Ariana uses such operations to fund its activities and for economic warfare against the US and its allies.
+
North Torbian and Olvanan operations in Nyumba creates a target of opportunity for intelligence collection attempts by foreign intelligence agencies. Foreign intelligence services attempted to recruit agents from both countries and also requested that Nyumba provide information on the activities of selected North Torbian and Olvanan individuals operating in Nyumba. Nyumba is very selective in its response to these requests, choosing those that are the greatest benefit to its interests. 
  
 
=== Open Source Intelligence ===
 
=== Open Source Intelligence ===
−
Ariana probably operates a massive open source intelligence (OSINT) program with government and government-affiliated operators who collect primarily via the Internet. The Arianian military continues to mobilize a large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and English language skills, to both collect data on internal opposition to the Arianian government and Arianian adversaries like the US or Israel.
+
Nyumba is slowly expanding its internet capabilities and in parallel open source intelligence (OSINT). The trend is to use questionable techniques to gather information from the public web, gray zone sources, and the dark web to mine critical information. Training supplied by North Torbia continues to train Nyumban cyber staff with their perspective and approach to OSINT information collection.
  
 
=== Signals Intelligence ===
 
=== Signals Intelligence ===
−
Arianian SIGINT programs consistently demonstrate success in combating Western communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor OPSEC. In any case, Western countries can expect Arianian SIGINT to provide the Arianian military with useable indications and warning, capabilities assessment, and targeting intelligence. Most Arianian SIGINT operators have significant “real world” experience and capabilities in all languages of the Caucasus area of operations. In the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the combined Shia Internationalist Brigades/Arianian all-source intelligence effort against the Israelis provided the tactical disposition, order of battle, and tactical warning to Shia Internationalist Brigades units. Additionally, Ariana cooperates extensively with Syria in SIGINT operations.
+
Signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection capabilities consist of rudimentary direction finding and intercept. Nyumba has little capability with modern systems and relies on broadband jamming when it targets opponent communications, command and control.
  
 
=== Imagery Intelligence ===
 
=== Imagery Intelligence ===
−
Arianian IMINT operations utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and other air-breathing platforms, such as fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. However, recent developments have indicated that Ariana has access to a government owned and operated low resolution imaging satellite (three meters). This satellite is in low earth orbit (LEO) and is believed to have a relatively short life span, approximately four months. Images received from this satellite are stored and periodically dumped  to a ground station located somewhere in Ariana. To further supplement its IMINT requirements,  the Arianian military regularly purchases commercial imagery from other countries.
+
Nyumba sources its imagery intelligence from online services and commercial satellite.  Often there are significant delays in obtaining imagery in a timely manner with a direct impairment of security operations.  
  
 
=== Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ===
 
=== Measurement and Signatures Intelligence ===
−
Ariana probably maintains a basic MASINT capability, though little on this topic appears in open- source references. Given recent reports that its nuclear program was targeted by foreign-introduced malware, Ariana is expected to aggressively explore options to secure its nuclear facilities.
+
Nyumba has no established MASINT capability.
  
 
== Summary ==
 
== Summary ==
−
Ariana maintains a wide range of INFOWAR capabilities, which is likely to expand further in the future. The Arianians have successfully dealt with a wide and dynamic cyber effort by internal opposition forces, which has given the country’s cyber officials a great deal of real-world experience, and they have the support of Shia Internationalist Brigades operations for external operations. Ariana will retain a large measure of control over the nation’s information environment for the foreseeable future.
+
Nyumba maintains a government controlled and protected information environment that controls the information sector through state-owned media outlets. Due to economic limitations the population has few alternatives to gain access to current information and media. The government uses the control of the information environment to support IO activities of foreign government entities working from Nyumba. In this manner they are able to gain rapid technological advancement from support by both North Torbia and Olvana. Support ranges from construction of a new internet fiber backbone to international cyber operations focused on penetrating financial institutions and foreign companies to gain revenue and sensitive information. While not possessing organic IO capabilities the country does use COTS hardware, software, and supporting staff to strengthen its position regionally and internationally. 
  
 
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Revision as of 19:37, 16 April 2018

This page is a section of Nyumba.

Nyumba’s population is non-technical with radio and word of mouth (WoM) as their primary information sources. A select segment of the population, (those with money or influence), have access to and use the latest information technologies. The government leadership, social, and financial elite, and military leadership maintains power over the population through control of the media and exploitation of the latest technologies. Those in power use their status to sanction and benefit from the exploitation of information. This includes hosting e-criminal enterprises that seek to exploit regional and international targets. Information systems complement or support other typical criminal activity: smuggling, cyber theft, human trafficking, and hostage data.

The government controls all media outlets in Nyumba. Television, radio, print, and internet are all under government control or censorship. Even though the laws and constitution of the country stipulate freedom of speech and press, in practice the government restricts private media by failing to issue or suspending any operating licenses. The World Press Freedom ranking for Nyumba is 170th out of 180 countries. This control typically intensifies just prior to elections or when the government is being criticized by the public. Government intelligence agencies block any access to opposition information and actively work to discredit any sources contrary to the government message.

The government controls all communication technologies; internet, satellite phones, cell phones, satellite television. Generally, the population does not have access to these technologies due to lack of infrastructure or no economic means to get access. Very limited access to satellite television is available for purchase from both commercial and black market sources but the cost is high and prohibitive for the majority of the population.

Military information operations are very limited by modern standards. Few electronic warfare assets exist in the Nyumba inventory with only rudimentary radio intercept and direction finding.  Data collection for intelligence focuses on HUMINT and limited IMINT directed at the national level. The government and power elite control intelligence resources to remain in power. Information warfare resources are only allocated to the military to the extent necessary to plan operations.

Nyumba views their regional neighbors as resources to exploit for revenue generation. Cyber-attacks on financial institutions and relatively rich populations are within Nyumba’s capabilities by hiring hacker services. The government established relationships with hackers and cyber-attack groups from foreign nations who sought a safe-haven for illicit activities. These arrangements included Nyumba support with infrastructure, government legitimacy, security, and financial interest in return for information exploitation services. Basically, Nyumba established and nurtures the “wild west” of information operations both in the region and the world.

Satellite Telecommunications

Nyumba contracts with a satellite telecommunications company for broadband data and voice services. The satellite services support use of multiple communications platforms ranging from military radios to machine-to-machine communications. This allows Nyumba access to the most technologically advanced systems while not incurring the costs of a satellite program. Communications security is potentially compromised to a degree by using commercial vendors but use of point of use encryption offsets the vulnerability.

Navigation

Global positioning system (GPS) is in use throughout Nyumba based on systems available commercially. Primarily, the country relies on the GLONASS-M constellation of 24 navigation satellites in medium earth orbit. The satellites transmit L1 FDMA signals at 1,602 MHz and L2 FDMA at 1,246 MHz resulting in 100 meter accuracy for civilian use and 10 to 20 meter for military uses.

Public Communications Media

The government continues its control of radio, television and now the Internet through the Nyumba Ministry of Communication and Culture (NMCC). NMCC issues all licenses for television, radio, and internet service providers. It also monitors the activities of foreign journalists to enforce their compliance with restrictive regulations governing the content of articles and news reports.

The government through the NMCC pursues a program to develop the Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT) sector with support provided by Olvana. As part of the agreement between the two countries, Olvana is to establish a port facility in the vicinity of Lamu to support its military and commercial operations in the region, in recompense, Olvana will provide significant support to develop Nyumban ICT infrastructure. The ceding of the land for the Olvanan port at Lamu is directly tied to the payments for the ICT expansion. These advances in ICT will expand Nyumban information system capabilities but also increase the ability to support illicit cyber operations of both countries.

Internet

Nyumba’s general population has no access to internet services and only those sanctioned by the government are allowed routine service.  Internet penetration of the 8.8 million population stands at a low 11% or 950,000 Nyumbans.

Figure 1 Internet penetration is low with little growth prospect.

The only expansion projects underway are those the government is funding or has approved. As part of the Olvanan-delivered modernization program, the government is pursuing an expansion of the fiber-optic network to and within Kismaayo.

PLACEHOLDER FOR NYUMBA INTERNET BACKBONE AND COUNTY NETWORK. 

Figure 2. Fiber optic backbone limited in Nyumba

Nyumba does host cyber operations from North Torbia as a means of generating revenue and also access to information warfare capabilities. Mutual support agreements are in place that allow the government to gain cutting edge capabilities in exchange for sanctioning the activities of the North Torbia group. This arrangement allows North Torbia cyber operations groups to gain the top-cover necessary to build their portfolio of both legitimate and dark web cyber activities.

Television

Television remains limited throughout Nyumba with service primarily located in the major cities. The general public does not have access to television because of the cost and the broadcast footprint of the government network. The terrestrial-based network is completely state-owned and broadcasts only state approved programming. International news shows are aired along with sporting events and other entertainment that is not critical of the Nyumban leadership.  

NMCC operates the sole terrestrial TV network and approves all programming to ensure it supports government positions.  There are no private TV broadcasts and transmissions of several international broadcasters are available for those that can afford the equipment and service.

PLACEHOLDER FOR NYUMBA TELEVISION TOWERS AND NETWORK.

Figure 3 Television is not widely available.

Radio

The government controls radio, as with television, broadcasting infrastructure with only two domestic radio networks. The networks are located in the major cities of the country, broadcast AM, FM, and SW during the day (7 AM to 5 PM), and only approved programs on FM and SW at night (6 PM to 9 PM). Broadcast equipment is prone to breakdown due to infrequent maintenance and poor technical knowledge of the government staff.

PLACEHOLDER FOR RADIO BROADCAST INFRASTRUCTURE

Figure 4 Radio is more accessible than TV for the Nyumban public. 

Print Media

The low literacy rate in Nyumba (27%) limits the impact of print media for much of the Nyumba public. Print media does serve the wealthy elite and government workers but provides only articles that have a neutral or positive view of the government.

Newspapers and handbills are also limited to the official and semi-official languages found predominantly around the major cities. The official language of Nyumba being French finds most of the print media written in that language. Additional print publications are found in Arabic, Amharic, Bantu, and English. These newspapers and other print media have limited readership with circulation under 76,000 countrywide.

The government continues mixed censorship of the 4 daily newspapers actively printing in Nyumba. Two of the papers are subject to active censorship due to their propensity to publish articles that are controversial and critical of the country’s leaders. The government typically issues a suspension of the newspapers printing rights for a period of time when a critical article appears. Clearing the suspension is either based on a stated amount of time or some arbitrary stipulation issued with the suspension notice.  

PLACEHOLDER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA FLYER/BULLETIN

Telephone

Businesses and private citizens in Nyumba followed the same path as many other countries in Africa and jumped directly to mobile phone service, bypassing landlines as the main communications means. Phone landlines are in a steady decline with only an estimated 121,000 citizens still using the service. Within the limits of the economy, those with resources do have cell phone access using a limited network of cell towers. The network is only found in the main metropolitan centers with no connectivity in the rest of the country. These conditions cause Nyumbans to resort to satellite phones for critical communications. As with most of the economy if an individual has money, then they can get the necessary equipment and connectivity. Very little government regulation of the telephone system; landline, cellular, or satellite phone systems.

PLACEHOLDER FOR MOBILE PHONE COVERAGE

PLACEHOLDER FOR MOBILE PHONE PENETRATION

Figure 5 Mobile phones use and coverage is limited in Nyumba.

Postal/Courier

The postal system (Post) in Nyumba is poorly run and very unreliable.  Carrier delivery of mail is unreliable but they do serve as a conduit for WoM communications throughout the country. Carriers are given free passage throughout the country by the tribes and groups to facilitate the flow of news. They also have the reputation for smuggling media and information restricted by the government. Risk is relatively low due to the corruption in the postal system and lax inspection practices by government security.

Couriers and freight shippers cater to both legitimate commercial business as well as movement of illicit cargoes. They use the legitimate commercial business as fronts to navigate customs and bypass many inspections designed to intercept illegal shipments. North Torbian, Olvana, and other criminal elements find Nyumban couriers a ready and willing service able to ship any type of illegal or restricted cargoes. Elephant ivory, rhino horn, drugs, guns, fake condoms, and more are acceptable cargoes for Nyumban couriers.  With a 25% HIV rate in the adult population, Nyumba has one of the highest infection rates in the world, and preventing fake condoms in the market place is a critical item of national interest. 

Word of Mouth

The low literacy rate ensures that word-of-mouth (WoM) remains a key means of information transfer for the majority of Nyumba’s population. Individuals rely on family and tribal connections to provide access to news and knowledge. Particularly those family members in the diaspora supply reliable news and information from outside the country. 

WoM creates a very detailed understanding of the clan’s local environment; geography, climate, flora and fauna, and other conditions that impact day-to-day life. Often, those providing the communication put their own slant or interpretation on the news or events.

Information transmission within a clan follows traditional paths; discussion during meals, folklore, songs, and oral education. The traditional information streams are;

  • Family leaders conveying to the family the laws and opinions of the tribal elders. Elders exchange information with other clans and villages that provides a consistent flow of news and information.
  • Daily activities are the venue for the transmission of information; herding, cooking, collecting water and food, etc.
  • Fathers and men instruct the young men and boys, women teach the young girls and in some aspects young boys.

Any break in the information conduit caused by death or absence is alleviated to some degree by other family members. Significant losses of clan members because of disease or other calamities within the clan results in knowledge being lost to the group. The clan’s intimate knowledge of the local and regional environment creates a fairly rapid and detailed understanding of any threats or changes that could affect the clan or village. Interception of information transmitted by WoM is only possible by successfully interrogating a clan member. 

Information Control

The Nyumban government has a good understanding of the threats present in today’s information environment. Exploitation of information control for economic gain is a mainstay of the government’s approach. The government controls the content and messages provided by the media with the main focus of staying in power and reaping the greatest gain possible.  

INFOWAR

Nyumba controls and directs INFOWAR (IW) at the national level. The principle objective is to use all available information resources to maintain the leadership’s hold on power and control of the country. In addition to using INFOWAR to maintain national control the government also uses its diplomatic status to cover the cyber activities of foreign companies and government personnel as they support both Nyumba’s requirements as well as those of their parent country.  In many instances, Nyumba learned IW from North Torbia and routinely uses those policies and procedures to advance its interests. 

Electronic Warfare

Nyumba holds no organic electronic warfare (EW) capability in its government or military forces. However, other countries established bases to use Nyumban airspace and land installations to monitor and track activities in the region. One of the most recent bases established by Olvana is at the port of Lamu which continues to grow and expand. Costal bases support EW monitoring of the shipping lanes leading to regional ports facilitating tracking of legitimate shipping as well as pirate vessels. The exact agreement between the government of Nyumba and the foreign interests is unclear but sharing of intelligence collected is a distinct possibility.

The country’s military forces have very limited command and control communications systems. The majority of the equipment, provided through Western aid programs, remains the mainstay of the government’s ability to communicate with forces deployed within Nyumba. As such, security of message traffic relies on manual encryption and brevity codes. 

Figure 6. National Command Authority Communications Center in Kismaayo.

Computer Attack

Nyumba’s government bases its computer attack capabilities on contract services. It tailors purchased services from North Torbia and a European technical services company to match the exact target and outcome desired.  Nyumban government offices, businesses, and private citizens show a strong trend towards using outdated operating systems. Africa-wide 67.5% of users still rely on computer operating systems (OS) that are no longer supported. This condition leaves systems open to exploitation and computer attack. Nyumba’s computer modernization status, or lack thereof, causes the outdated OS to be even higher at an estimated 75% of personal computers. 

Information Attack

The Nyumba government is deeply concerned over the capability of its adversaries to attack critical databases.  To counter the threat they actively employ cyber capabilities supplied by other countries or criminal syndicates to achieve the capabilities needed to attack the systems of regional and international competitors. Nyumban cyber personnel use the threat intelligence and security procedures produced by the contracted security firms to guide cyber-attack plans.  

Deception

The Nyumban government and military use active deception to hide the activities of international cyber groups operating in the country. The government expends a great deal of time, resources, and effort to mask the activities of the North Torbia cyber group operating from Nyumba. This is due to both self-interest as well as being part of the agreement between Nyumba and North Torbia.

Physical Destruction

Nyumba does not possess power projection systems that facilitate physical destruction of command and control nodes or networks of opponents. At best, Nyumba is capable of using sabotage to disrupt or destroy the command and control (C2) systems of foreign elements operating in Nyumba. Typically, Nyumban destruction attacks are characterized by asymmetric methods used to target either C2 systems or nodes, or the support services needed to operate them. 

Protection and Security Measures

The African cyber market is a lucrative target for e-crime with a projected value of 34.6 billion by 2023. Nyumba plans to exploit that potential target as well as protecting its own assets. Recognizing the cyber threat related to hosting foreign cyber operations, the government entered into a series of contracts for broad cyber protective services. These services include threat intelligence, vulnerability management, and training of government staff supporting cyber operations. 

Perception Management

Nyumban leadership’s primary concern is maintaining the public’s perception that it is strong and actively seeking to protect the country’s’ interests. The government maintains strict control of all internal media released to the public through the various media sources.  Simultaneously, the government attempts to present the outward appearance of supporting freedom of speech and free flow of information to the rest of the world. 

Intelligence

Nyumba maintains a centralized intelligence organization and allocates assets to military, security, or national missions based on analyzed requirements. The government gains a certain amount of intelligence based on agreements with foreign countries and illegal groups stemming from their operations in Nyumba. 

Command and Control Systems

Government

  • Networks – Using donations from international aid programs to field basic C2 capabilities
  • Radar – Systems are limited and controlled at the national level
  • Optical – Currently purchasing required imagery
  • Satellite – Purchased services for communications and imagery

Military

  • Networks – Basic radio and fixed installation use of fiber-optic
  • Radar – National level air traffic control  
  • Radio – Basic command and control network; HF, UHF, VHF and fiber-optic voice over IP

Human Intelligence

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is internal to Nyumba with little external capability. The main focus of HUMINT assets within Nyumba is to identify threats to the current regime’s power. Internal intelligence operations center on political groups using covert collection and coercion to gain information from the population. Externally, the government relies on information collection from agents operating in port facility operations, government offices, and financial institutions.

North Torbian and Olvanan operations in Nyumba creates a target of opportunity for intelligence collection attempts by foreign intelligence agencies. Foreign intelligence services attempted to recruit agents from both countries and also requested that Nyumba provide information on the activities of selected North Torbian and Olvanan individuals operating in Nyumba. Nyumba is very selective in its response to these requests, choosing those that are the greatest benefit to its interests. 

Open Source Intelligence

Nyumba is slowly expanding its internet capabilities and in parallel open source intelligence (OSINT). The trend is to use questionable techniques to gather information from the public web, gray zone sources, and the dark web to mine critical information. Training supplied by North Torbia continues to train Nyumban cyber staff with their perspective and approach to OSINT information collection.

Signals Intelligence

Signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection capabilities consist of rudimentary direction finding and intercept. Nyumba has little capability with modern systems and relies on broadband jamming when it targets opponent communications, command and control.

Imagery Intelligence

Nyumba sources its imagery intelligence from online services and commercial satellite.  Often there are significant delays in obtaining imagery in a timely manner with a direct impairment of security operations.  

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

Nyumba has no established MASINT capability.

Summary

Nyumba maintains a government controlled and protected information environment that controls the information sector through state-owned media outlets. Due to economic limitations the population has few alternatives to gain access to current information and media. The government uses the control of the information environment to support IO activities of foreign government entities working from Nyumba. In this manner they are able to gain rapid technological advancement from support by both North Torbia and Olvana. Support ranges from construction of a new internet fiber backbone to international cyber operations focused on penetrating financial institutions and foreign companies to gain revenue and sensitive information. While not possessing organic IO capabilities the country does use COTS hardware, software, and supporting staff to strengthen its position regionally and internationally. 

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