Chapter 5: Noncombatants
A host of noncombatants add complexity to any operational environment (OE). The irregular OPFOR attempts to manipulate these noncombatants in ways that support its goals and objectives. Many noncombatants are completely innocent of any involvement with the irregular OPFOR. However, the irregular OPFOR will seek the advantage of operating within a relevant population of noncombatants whose allegiance and/or support it can sway in its favor. This can include clandestine yet willing active support (as combatants), as well as coerced support, support through passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by noncombatants.
Contents
General Characteristics
Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting of any of the forces involved in combat. They can be either armed or unarmed. Figure 5-1 shows examples of these two basic types of noncombatants that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR. These examples are not all- inclusive, and some of the example entities can be either armed or unarmed. (See Armed Combatants and Unarmed Combatants later in this chapter for more detail on various subcategories.)
Note. From a U.S. viewpoint, the status of noncombatants is typically friendly, neutral, or unknown. Conversely, the noncombatants would view U.S. and/or local governing authority forces as friendly or neutral in regard to themselves. For the sake of consistency throughout the chapters of this TC, however, this chapter occasionally refers to the governing authority and associated U.S. or coalition forces as “enemy,” referring to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR.
Aside from military and paramilitary forces, the civilian population of a nation or region is often the single most important aspect of an OE. This situation can be further complicated by the presence of other noncombatants who are not indigenous to the country or region.
Relation to the Irregular OPFOR
The irregular OPFOR recognizes that noncombatants living and/or working in an area of conflict can be a significant source of—
- Intelligence collection.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Technical skills.
- General logistics support.
Therefore, the irregular OPFOR actively uses noncombatants within a relevant population to support its goals and objectives. It sees them as a potential multiplier of irregular OPFOR effectiveness. It will also attempt to use the presence of noncombatants to limit the effectiveness of its enemies. The irregular OPFOR can marshal and conceal its combatant capabilities while hiding among armed and unarmed noncombatants in a geographic or cyber location.
Changes in an OE and persuasion by the irregular OPFOR’s information warfare (INFOWAR) activities can cause rapid or gradual shifts in allegiance by noncombatants. Any noncombatant is a potential recruit to become a combatant in support of irregular OPFOR goals and objectives. However, the irregular OPFOR will also attempt to use those who remain noncombatants to its advantage. It purposely exploits noncombatants to cause doubt or hesitation in an enemy’s decision to act. It takes advantage of the difficulties its enemies may have in distinguishing combatants from noncombatants. This uncertainty exists because both may or may not be armed and may appear to not be participating in or supporting irregular OPFOR actions. The irregular OPFOR may use noncombatants for shielding its operations close to and/or within a relevant population, where enemy reaction may cause harm to noncombatants. Incidents such as noncombatant detention and/or casualties can alienate a relevant population from enemy forces.
Note. The Geneva Conventions state criteria for combatants as individuals who operate under the recognized command and control of an organization, are clearly armed, and do not attempt to disguise their intended actions when deploying for and conducting military-like actions. The irregular OPFOR is not bound by such conventions. The U.S. Army and regulated military forces of other nations consider chaplains, medical doctors, and medics as noncombatants. However, the irregular OPFOR does not necessarily recognize such functional distinctions. In guerrilla units, for example, medics are combatants, trained to fight alongside other guerrillas.
Motivations
The irregular OPFOR uses several forms of persuasion to motivate and obtain support from noncombatants in a relevant population. Means of persuasion can include—
- INFOWAR activities.
- Social welfare programs.
- Political activism and mobilization.
- Coercion.
When co-opted directly or indirectly by the irregular OPFOR, noncombatants are a means to weaken control and legitimacy of a governing authority over its population. The irregular OPFOR attempts to communicate a compelling narrative of its own legitimacy that is accepted by the relevant population. Its visible actions, often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating its power and authority.
The irregular OPFOR may appeal to noncombatants based on unresolved grievances of a relevant population. These unresolved grievances, perceived or factual, create conditions where individuals believe they must act to obtain a just solution. The irregular OPFOR can also appeal to aspects of ethnicity, geography, and regional history that affect personal and group relationships. These are reflected in social status and networks, lifestyle, employment, religion, and politics. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate at least three areas of grievance by to obtain noncombatant support:
- Personal or social identity and/or social mobility or advancement.
- Religious beliefs and/or persecution.
- Unjust political representation and/or governance.
Motivations to support the irregular OPFOR may vary from religious extremism to pure criminality for personal or organizational profit. Often, the deciding factor may be the desire for local freedom from control by the governing authority and its international supporters.
Types of Support
The relevant population can willingly provide active or passive support to the irregular OPFOR. If necessary, however, noncombatants can be coerced by the irregular OPFOR. Some noncombatants may be aware of irregular OPFOR activities and choose to remain passive and not report information to the governing authority. Noncombatants may be sympathetic to the irregular OPFOR but remain uninvolved in any activity. Other noncombatants may unknowingly support irregular OPFOR initiatives such as money donations to charities or apparent humanitarian relief organizations that are actually front organizations for irregular OPFOR financing and/or materiel support. Those members of the local populace who elect to participate in or actively support the irregular OPFOR become combatants, even if they do not bear arms. (See Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.) Figure 5-2 shows various types of support to the irregular OPFOR.
Armed Noncombatants
In any OE, there are likely to be nonmilitary personnel who are armed but are not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nonetheless, such people may be disgruntled and hostile to the governing authority or forces that support it. Armed noncombatants may represent a large portion of the undecided citizens in a population. Some of these nonaffiliated people may possess small arms legally to protect their families, homes, and/or businesses. Some may use weapons as part of their occupation (such as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some may be minor criminals who use their weapons for activities such as theft or extortion. Given the fact that they are already armed, it would be easy for such noncombatants to become combatants. Any number of reasons, including prejudices and grievances, can cause them to choose sides or change sides. They may switch allegiances repeatedly as circumstances evolve.
Some armed noncombatant entities can be completely legitimate enterprises. However, some activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate business. The irregular OPFOR can embed operatives in legitimate commercial enterprises or criminal activities to obtain information and/or capabilities not otherwise available to it. Actions of such operatives can include sabotage of selected commodities and/or services. They may also co-opt capabilities of a governing authority infrastructure and civil enterprises to support irregular OPFOR operations.
Examples of armed noncombatants commonly operating in an OE are—
- Private security contractor (PSC) organizations.
- Local business owners and employees.
- Private citizens and private groups authorized to carry and use weapons.
- Criminals and/or organizations with labels such as cartels, gangs.
- Ad hoc local “militia” or neighborhood watch programs.
Private Security Contractors
Private security contractors (PSCs) are commercial business enterprises that provide security and related services on a contractual basis. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter intrusions or theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. They may also be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat. PSCs can act as an adjunct to other security measures and provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for a state’s military, paramilitary, and police forces. They may also be employed by private individuals and businesses (including transnational corporations).
PSCs may be legitimate, well-respected corporations providing contract advisors and employees as part of a military nation-building program funded by a foreign government. A PSC that provides services on a contract basis outside its country of origin also falls into the category of a transnational corporation. Other PSCs may be domestic firms that supply contract guard forces. In its simplest form, a PSC might be a local citizen organization that performs actions on a short-term contractual basis.
Relation to the Irregular OPFOR
The irregular OPFOR can identify required or desired capabilities in a PSC and either overtly or covertly obtain the capabilities. It can also infiltrate a PSC with its own operatives, to covertly pursue its own objectives. A PSC’s use of local hires can make it relatively easy to infiltrate with actual or forged documentation. Infiltration can allow the irregular OPFOR to observe actions and procedures, collect information and intelligence for future sabotage, and/or incite dissatisfaction within and among foreign and local contractors.
The irregular OPFOR might actually be a customer of a PSC. For example, the leader of an insurgent or criminal organization may employ a PSC to provide bodyguards or conduct surveillance or a search and assessment prior to his arrival. Another group, such as a drug organization, may contract a PSC to guard its facilities. (A drug organization can afford to pay more than many small countries.) The PSC may erect a fence or employ roving, armed guards to protect facilities.
PSCs use both active and passive measures that may be rudimentary or employ advanced technology such as sophisticated surveillance, identification devices, and alarms. During the conduct of their duties, members of a PSC can take offensive actions. For example, a security, guard, or patrol team might conduct an ambush to counter an intrusion by a governing authority on an irregular OPFOR operation.
The irregular OPFOR’s INFOWAR activities can spotlight known or alleged abuses by PSCs in order to build negative sentiments against governing authority and/or coalition actions. Incidents can include PSCs—
- Shooting civilians misidentified as combatants.
- Using excessive force.
- Being insensitive to local customs and beliefs.
- Other inappropriate actions.
The irregular OPFOR can exploit such incidents to damage international and coalition relationships and trust. Additional public dissent might limit use of PSCs or restrict where and how they can be used. Prohibition on use of PSCs in certain circumstances could further constrain governing authority and coalition programs. It could also place additional operational requirements on enemy military forces.
Functions
Most functions of a PSC involve protecting personnel, facilities, or activities. Such security functions normally require armed contractors. However, PSCs can also perform other, security-related functions that do not require armed personnel.
Armed Functions
Functions typically requiring armed personnel can include—
- Personal security details to protect a person or group of people.
- Guard protection of static sites (such as housing areas, building sites, government complexes, and businesses—both legal and illegal).
- Transport security support to convoys and special materiel shipments.
- Security escorts.
- Cash transport.
- Covert operations.
- Surveillance.
- Intelligence services.
- Advising and/or training of indigenous or extraregional security forces.
- Operations and administration within governing authority prisons and/or detention facilities.
Unarmed Functions
Functions typically not requiring armed personnel include—
- Unarmed security functions when presence is deemed an appropriate deterrent.
- Air surveillance.
- Psychological warfare.
- Intelligence support (including information collection and threat analysis).
- Operational coordination (such as command and control, management, and communications).
- Personnel and budget vetting.
- Hostage negotiation services.
- Risk advisory services.
- Weapons procurement.
- Weapons destruction.
- Transportation support.
Advantages and Disadvantages
PSCs provide key capabilities and can often be hired quickly and deployed faster than a military force with similar skill sets. This flexibility allows governmental or commercial organizations to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing OE. Employing a PSC can keep military forces available to conduct traditional or specialized military missions.
Evolution of private sector military-like services by corporations can be a very influential factor in international and regional diplomacy. Although coalition operations may appear in need of services from PSC, governmental authorities and private citizen groups can be concerned on the level of PSC transparency and accountability when high-profile incidents occur that involve PSCs.
PSCs often hire large numbers of indigenous people from the local area. The vetting procedures may not screen out some undesirable elements of the population. A legitimate PSC may be susceptible to insider threats that infiltrate elements of the organization and subvert legitimate practices into forms of corruption. PSC security for the governing authority or commercial enterprises can be a conduit for corruption that disrupts support to a governing authority and/or coalition forces. The irregular OPFOR can cooperate with or coordinate corruption and extortion by local or regional warlords and criminal organizations. Private security subcontractors can be warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the governing authority for power and authority. Providing “protection” services empowers PSC leaders with money and legitimacy. In some cases, PSCs can become private armies. Irregular OPFOR operations under the guise of a PSC can thrive in areas that appear to be devoid of government authority.