Chapter 5: Noncombatants
- This page is a section of TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces.
A host of noncombatants add complexity to any operational environment (OE). The irregular OPFOR attempts to manipulate these noncombatants in ways that support its goals and objectives. Many noncombatants are completely innocent of any involvement with the irregular OPFOR. However, the irregular OPFOR will seek the advantage of operating within a relevant population of noncombatants whose allegiance and/or support it can sway in its favor. This can include clandestine yet willing active support (as combatants), as well as coerced support, support through passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by noncombatants.
Contents
- 1 General Characteristics
- 2 Armed Noncombatants
- 3 Unarmed Noncombatants
- 4 Unarmed Combatants
General Characteristics
Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting of any of the forces involved in combat. They can be either armed or unarmed. Figure 5-1 shows examples of these two basic types of noncombatants that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR. These examples are not all- inclusive, and some of the example entities can be either armed or unarmed. (See Armed Combatants and Unarmed Combatants later in this chapter for more detail on various subcategories.)
Note. From a U.S. viewpoint, the status of noncombatants is typically friendly, neutral, or unknown. Conversely, the noncombatants would view U.S. and/or local governing authority forces as friendly or neutral in regard to themselves. For the sake of consistency throughout the chapters of this TC, however, this chapter occasionally refers to the governing authority and associated U.S. or coalition forces as “enemy,” referring to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR.
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Aside from military and paramilitary forces, the civilian population of a nation or region is often the single most important aspect of an OE. This situation can be further complicated by the presence of other noncombatants who are not indigenous to the country or region.
Relation to the Irregular OPFOR
The irregular OPFOR recognizes that noncombatants living and/or working in an area of conflict can be a significant source of—
- Intelligence collection.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Technical skills.
- General logistics support.
Therefore, the irregular OPFOR actively uses noncombatants within a relevant population to support its goals and objectives. It sees them as a potential multiplier of irregular OPFOR effectiveness. It will also attempt to use the presence of noncombatants to limit the effectiveness of its enemies. The irregular OPFOR can marshal and conceal its combatant capabilities while hiding among armed and unarmed noncombatants in a geographic or cyber location.
Changes in an OE and persuasion by the irregular OPFOR’s information warfare (INFOWAR) activities can cause rapid or gradual shifts in allegiance by noncombatants. Any noncombatant is a potential recruit to become a combatant in support of irregular OPFOR goals and objectives. However, the irregular OPFOR will also attempt to use those who remain noncombatants to its advantage. It purposely exploits noncombatants to cause doubt or hesitation in an enemy’s decision to act. It takes advantage of the difficulties its enemies may have in distinguishing combatants from noncombatants. This uncertainty exists because both may or may not be armed and may appear to not be participating in or supporting irregular OPFOR actions. The irregular OPFOR may use noncombatants for shielding its operations close to and/or within a relevant population, where enemy reaction may cause harm to noncombatants. Incidents such as noncombatant detention and/or casualties can alienate a relevant population from enemy forces.
Note. The Geneva Conventions state criteria for combatants as individuals who operate under the recognized command and control of an organization, are clearly armed, and do not attempt to disguise their intended actions when deploying for and conducting military-like actions. The irregular OPFOR is not bound by such conventions. The U.S. Army and regulated military forces of other nations consider chaplains, medical doctors, and medics as noncombatants. However, the irregular OPFOR does not necessarily recognize such functional distinctions. In guerrilla units, for example, medics are combatants, trained to fight alongside other guerrillas.
Motivations
The irregular OPFOR uses several forms of persuasion to motivate and obtain support from noncombatants in a relevant population. Means of persuasion can include—
- INFOWAR activities.
- Social welfare programs.
- Political activism and mobilization.
- Coercion.
When co-opted directly or indirectly by the irregular OPFOR, noncombatants are a means to weaken control and legitimacy of a governing authority over its population. The irregular OPFOR attempts to communicate a compelling narrative of its own legitimacy that is accepted by the relevant population. Its visible actions, often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating its power and authority.
The irregular OPFOR may appeal to noncombatants based on unresolved grievances of a relevant population. These unresolved grievances, perceived or factual, create conditions where individuals believe they must act to obtain a just solution. The irregular OPFOR can also appeal to aspects of ethnicity, geography, and regional history that affect personal and group relationships. These are reflected in social status and networks, lifestyle, employment, religion, and politics. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate at least three areas of grievance by to obtain noncombatant support:
- Personal or social identity and/or social mobility or advancement.
- Religious beliefs and/or persecution.
- Unjust political representation and/or governance.
Motivations to support the irregular OPFOR may vary from religious extremism to pure criminality for personal or organizational profit. Often, the deciding factor may be the desire for local freedom from control by the governing authority and its international supporters.
Types of Support
The relevant population can willingly provide active or passive support to the irregular OPFOR. If necessary, however, noncombatants can be coerced by the irregular OPFOR. Some noncombatants may be aware of irregular OPFOR activities and choose to remain passive and not report information to the governing authority. Noncombatants may be sympathetic to the irregular OPFOR but remain uninvolved in any activity. Other noncombatants may unknowingly support irregular OPFOR initiatives such as money donations to charities or apparent humanitarian relief organizations that are actually front organizations for irregular OPFOR financing and/or materiel support. Those members of the local populace who elect to participate in or actively support the irregular OPFOR become combatants, even if they do not bear arms. (See Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.) Figure 5-2 shows various types of support to the irregular OPFOR.
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Armed Noncombatants
In any OE, there are likely to be nonmilitary personnel who are armed but are not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nonetheless, such people may be disgruntled and hostile to the governing authority or forces that support it. Armed noncombatants may represent a large portion of the undecided citizens in a population. Some of these nonaffiliated people may possess small arms legally to protect their families, homes, and/or businesses. Some may use weapons as part of their occupation (such as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some may be minor criminals who use their weapons for activities such as theft or extortion. Given the fact that they are already armed, it would be easy for such noncombatants to become combatants. Any number of reasons, including prejudices and grievances, can cause them to choose sides or change sides. They may switch allegiances repeatedly as circumstances evolve.
Some armed noncombatant entities can be completely legitimate enterprises. However, some activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate business. The irregular OPFOR can embed operatives in legitimate commercial enterprises or criminal activities to obtain information and/or capabilities not otherwise available to it. Actions of such operatives can include sabotage of selected commodities and/or services. They may also co-opt capabilities of a governing authority infrastructure and civil enterprises to support irregular OPFOR operations.
Examples of armed noncombatants commonly operating in an OE are—
- Private security contractor (PSC) organizations.
- Local business owners and employees.
- Private citizens and private groups authorized to carry and use weapons.
- Criminals and/or organizations with labels such as cartels, gangs.
- Ad hoc local “militia” or neighborhood watch programs.
Private Security Contractors
Private security contractors (PSCs) are commercial business enterprises that provide security and related services on a contractual basis. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter intrusions or theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. They may also be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat. PSCs can act as an adjunct to other security measures and provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for a state’s military, paramilitary, and police forces. They may also be employed by private individuals and businesses (including transnational corporations).
PSCs may be legitimate, well-respected corporations providing contract advisors and employees as part of a military nation-building program funded by a foreign government. A PSC that provides services on a contract basis outside its country of origin also falls into the category of a transnational corporation. Other PSCs may be domestic firms that supply contract guard forces. In its simplest form, a PSC might be a local citizen organization that performs actions on a short-term contractual basis.
Relation to the Irregular OPFOR
The irregular OPFOR can identify required or desired capabilities in a PSC and either overtly or covertly obtain the capabilities. It can also infiltrate a PSC with its own operatives, to covertly pursue its own objectives. A PSC’s use of local hires can make it relatively easy to infiltrate with actual or forged documentation. Infiltration can allow the irregular OPFOR to observe actions and procedures, collect information and intelligence for future sabotage, and/or incite dissatisfaction within and among foreign and local contractors.
The irregular OPFOR might actually be a customer of a PSC. For example, the leader of an insurgent or criminal organization may employ a PSC to provide bodyguards or conduct surveillance or a search and assessment prior to his arrival. Another group, such as a drug organization, may contract a PSC to guard its facilities. (A drug organization can afford to pay more than many small countries.) The PSC may erect a fence or employ roving, armed guards to protect facilities.
PSCs use both active and passive measures that may be rudimentary or employ advanced technology such as sophisticated surveillance, identification devices, and alarms. During the conduct of their duties, members of a PSC can take offensive actions. For example, a security, guard, or patrol team might conduct an ambush to counter an intrusion by a governing authority on an irregular OPFOR operation.
The irregular OPFOR’s INFOWAR activities can spotlight known or alleged abuses by PSCs in order to build negative sentiments against governing authority and/or coalition actions. Incidents can include PSCs—
- Shooting civilians misidentified as combatants.
- Using excessive force.
- Being insensitive to local customs and beliefs.
- Other inappropriate actions.
The irregular OPFOR can exploit such incidents to damage international and coalition relationships and trust. Additional public dissent might limit use of PSCs or restrict where and how they can be used. Prohibition on use of PSCs in certain circumstances could further constrain governing authority and coalition programs. It could also place additional operational requirements on enemy military forces.
Functions
Most functions of a PSC involve protecting personnel, facilities, or activities. Such security functions normally require armed contractors. However, PSCs can also perform other, security-related functions that do not require armed personnel.
Armed Functions
Functions typically requiring armed personnel can include—
- Personal security details to protect a person or group of people.
- Guard protection of static sites (such as housing areas, building sites, government complexes, and businesses—both legal and illegal).
- Transport security support to convoys and special materiel shipments.
- Security escorts.
- Cash transport.
- Covert operations.
- Surveillance.
- Intelligence services.
- Advising and/or training of indigenous or extraregional security forces.
- Operations and administration within governing authority prisons and/or detention facilities.
Unarmed Functions
Functions typically not requiring armed personnel include—
- Unarmed security functions when presence is deemed an appropriate deterrent.
- Air surveillance.
- Psychological warfare.
- Intelligence support (including information collection and threat analysis).
- Operational coordination (such as command and control, management, and communications).
- Personnel and budget vetting.
- Hostage negotiation services.
- Risk advisory services.
- Weapons procurement.
- Weapons destruction.
- Transportation support.
Advantages and Disadvantages
PSCs provide key capabilities and can often be hired quickly and deployed faster than a military force with similar skill sets. This flexibility allows governmental or commercial organizations to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing OE. Employing a PSC can keep military forces available to conduct traditional or specialized military missions.
Evolution of private sector military-like services by corporations can be a very influential factor in international and regional diplomacy. Although coalition operations may appear in need of services from PSC, governmental authorities and private citizen groups can be concerned on the level of PSC transparency and accountability when high-profile incidents occur that involve PSCs.
PSCs often hire large numbers of indigenous people from the local area. The vetting procedures may not screen out some undesirable elements of the population. A legitimate PSC may be susceptible to insider threats that infiltrate elements of the organization and subvert legitimate practices into forms of corruption. PSC security for the governing authority or commercial enterprises can be a conduit for corruption that disrupts support to a governing authority and/or coalition forces. The irregular OPFOR can cooperate with or coordinate corruption and extortion by local or regional warlords and criminal organizations. Private security subcontractors can be warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the governing authority for power and authority. Providing “protection” services empowers PSC leaders with money and legitimacy. In some cases, PSCs can become private armies. Irregular OPFOR operations under the guise of a PSC can thrive in areas that appear to be devoid of government authority.
Organization
A PSC can be fairly small in scale or a large corporate organization. Figure 5-3 shows an example of possible functions in a PSC organization. The board of directors acts much like a headquarters staff of a military organization. Support services provide administrative, financial, and logistics support. Information and investigative services collect, analyze, and disseminate all types of information and intelligence, including economic intelligence. They also perform personnel security investigations and counterintelligence functions. Security services provide active and passive security measures that may be either rudimentary or use advanced technology. Guard services provide bodyguards, personal security details, stationary guard teams, and surveillance teams. Patrol services conduct patrols and tactical may conduct actions such as an ambush (to counter an intrusion). Security, guard and patrol service members receive weapons training.
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A PSC organization is tailored to serve its customer’s needs. However, its organizational structure and level of capability are often directly related to a client’s ability to pay. The capabilities of PSC employees vary from highly trained former military members to uneducated, poorly trained recruits. The level of competence and the sophistication equipment depends on what the client can afford.
The weapons and equipment mix is based on team specialization and role. Equipment might include—
- Listening and monitoring equipment.
- Cellular phones.
- Cameras.
- Facsimile machines.
- Computers.
- Motorcycles.
- Helicopters.
- All-terrain vehicles.
- Light armored vehicles.
- Assault rifles.
- Machineguns.
- Submachineguns.
- Antitank grenade launchers.
- Antitank disposable launchers.
- Silenced weapons.
Local Business Owners and Employees
Local commercial enterprises often have authorization to own personal firearms to protect their workplace from theft or robbery. Authorization may be for either concealed or open carry. A business owner or employee with a weapon is not necessarily a threat to the governing authority or coalition forces. However, the mere presence of many weapons in public places adds to the uncertainty whether those forces should consider such armed noncombatants as friend or foe. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of uncertainty to slow the actions and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces.
A local business may hire a PSC to protect its assets and interests. The irregular OPFOR or criminal organizations may coerce a businessperson into running a front company on their behalf.
Criminals and Criminal Organizations
Criminals and the irregular OPFOR in an OE can be associated and/or affiliated with each other. For example, some insurgents and criminals can form temporary coalitions when it serves their mutual interests. Crime is a lucrative means to—
- Fund operations.
- Coerce and control key leaders and/or a relevant population.
- Erode governmental authority.
Some criminals may oppose the irregular OPFOR when its actions jeopardize criminal operations and profits. Criminal organizations may hire PSCs to provide additional security. Larger criminal organizations can employ paramilitary elements and tactics. Some may expand from traditional criminal activities into a pseudo-insurgency and establish de facto governance in areas, regions, and enclaves within an otherwise sovereign territory of the governing authority. (See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of criminal organizations and their possible roles in support of and/or cooperation with the irregular OPFOR.)
Private Citizens and Groups
Local citizens often have authorization to own personal firearms for the personal security. Some may carry weapons as part of their occupation (such as hunters, security guards, or local police). Some are members of legitimate private clubs for shooting competitions or hunting. In some societies, carrying a weapon is simply part of the local culture. Many armed noncombatants openly carry weapons. This generally includes the individuals mentioned above, as well as members of public law enforcement agencies and various types of internal security forces. Other organizations and individuals may be authorized to carry concealed personal weapons.
Ad hoc local militia or neighborhood watch programs may provide some of the same functions as a PSC. However, they do so without some of the more sophisticated means and without the profit motive. These ad hoc local citizen organizations perform such actions on a volunteer basis to protect their families, homes, and businesses. (A local citizen organization that performs these functions on a contractual basis is a PSC.)
Such a large number of armed noncombatants in public places makes it harder to distinguish them from combatants. Members of the irregular OPFOR also try to blend in with the local populace when they are not conducting operations. The irregular OPFOR can use this type of uncertainty to slow the actions and reactions of the governing authority and/or coalition forces.
Note. In a broad sense, all individuals and groups not part of a formal, regulated military force are civilians. That includes insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals.
Unarmed Noncombatants
Other actors in an OE include unarmed noncombatants. These nonmilitary actors may be neutral or potential side-changers in a conflict involving the irregular OPFOR. Their choice to take sides depends on their perception of who is causing a grievance for them. It also depends on whether they think their interests are best served by supporting the governing authority. Given the right conditions, they may decide to purposely support hostilities against a governing authority that is the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. Even if they do not take up arms, such active support or participation moves them into the category of unarmed combatants. (See the section on Unarmed Combatants at the end of this chapter.)
Some of the more prominent types of unarmed noncombatants are—
- Media personnel.
- Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
- Transnational corporations and their employees.
- Private citizens and groups.
However, unarmed noncombatants may also include internally displaced persons, refugees, and transients. They can also include foreign government and diplomatic personnel present in the area of conflict.
Media Personnel
An area of conflict attracts a multitude of media personnel. This includes local, national, and international journalists, reporters, and associated support personnel. They may be independent actors or affiliated with a particular news organization.
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
The media can be a credible source of current information for multiple actors in an OE. News cycles demand timely information and near-simultaneous reporting on current events. The irregular OPFOR recognizes the value of media coverage of significant incidents. This coverage can draw attention to irregular OPFOR successes or highlight failures or missteps by its enemies. The irregular OPFOR can exploit media coverage to attack the will and resolve of—
- Its enemies’ regular military and internal security forces.
- The governing authority.
- A relevant population.
Media coverage of operations can dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction.
The irregular OPFOR may closely observe media personnel. This surveillance can identify character flaws or weaknesses of personnel the irregular OPFOR can co-opt to the advantage of its INFOWAR activities. Although media personnel may seek to remain objective and report accurately, they can be coerced or persuaded to promote an irregular OPFOR perspective. The irregular OPFOR uses threats, extortion, and/or physical violence to minimize media coverage that is counter to its interests. Some media representatives who support irregular OPFOR motives may purposely distort information to support irregular OPFOR objectives.
The balancing effect of multiple reporting sources tends to reduce the impact of any one source with overt bias. The irregular OPFOR recognizes that democracies with freedom of the press and widespread access to media and other information systems can be less susceptible to INFOWAR. However, the international public and foreign governments are still susceptible to how the irregular OPFOR presents its agenda to a global audience.
Exploiting Media Access
The pervasive presence of the media provides access to information that might not otherwise be available to the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR can use the physical access allowed to media representatives to enhance its intelligence collection, information analysis, and consequent actions. Some members of the irregular OPFOR or individuals who support them may be able to pass themselves off as independent reporters or embed themselves in a media team under the guise of functional media expertise. Media credentials can be easily counterfeited. The embedding may take place with or without the knowledge of a sponsoring media organization. This may enable them to access plans and monitor operations of the governing authority or regular military forces with which the irregular OPFOR is in conflict.
Media Organization Structure
A media entity can be as small as an independent reporter or videographer operating as a free-lance entrepreneur or as large as a sophisticated media team with the credentials of a major news corporation or international sponsor. Well resourced reporters or media teams may have—
- Cellular telephones.
- Cameras.
- Video cameras.
- Tape recorders.
- Notebook or laptop computers.
- General office equipment.
They may have an all-terrain vehicle equipped with the latest video manipulation technology and satellite communication links.
Figure 5-4 shows an example of possible functions and individuals in a media team organization. While most media teams carry out most of these functions, they do not necessarily have all these specific coordinators and teams.
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Media Team Leader
The media team leader is responsible for the overall media coverage and news release program. This individual supervises the development of products that the media team presents. He promotes the value of its media resources and products and continually seeks to expand business investment in the team products.
Press Release Coordinator
The press release coordinator is the promotional “face” with the general relevant population and its influential leaders. He develops the persona of a trusted member to relevant population.
Documentation Coordinator
The documentation coordinator transforms raw audio or video coverage and produces a final package for release to the media-at-large via multiple means. Production coordination includes adding music, verbal announcements, graphics, and other sound and visual elements to enhance a compelling message. This coordinator is also responsible for crafting the long-term and recurring reinforcement of a particular message in conjunction with the press release coordinator.
Administration and Logistics Coordinator
The operational administration and logistics of the media team is the responsibility of the administration and logistics coordinator. Functions include—
- Personnel management.
- Transportation.
- Lodging.
- Technical support.
- Repair services.
- Communications connectivity.
- Transmission security.
The administration and logistics coordinator coordinates with the security team in planning, occupying, and departing designated media coverage areas.
Videographer Team
The videographer team uses video camera equipment to record an assigned project. It then edits and assembles an audio-visual production. The documentation coordinator and videographer team review the product to ensure consistency and relevancy in support of an intended message. Each team member is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the equipment used in shooting and editing. A videographer may also be responsible for lighting and sound at a particular event. Depending on the assigned task, videographers can use diskette, videotape, and/or live broadcast capabilities.
Cameraman Team
The cameraman team is responsible for physically operating a camera and maintaining composition and camera angles throughout a given mission or task. Still-shot images are the norm for a cameraman. Duties are similar to that of a videographer.
Graphics Designer
The graphics designer has expertise in emphasizing visual impact to using graphics or other special effects such as animation. This individual also coordinates with media points of contact on how to best promote the news message and image of materials including electronic and other media venues. Much of the graphics design is focused on what effectively communicates with the targeted audience. This audience is usually influential individuals of a relevant population in an irregular OPFOR area of responsibility (AOR) as well as governing authority officials that are in conflict with the irregular OPFOR.
Liaison Team
The liaison team works closely with community members and leaders to ensure access to areas and information that supports the media mission or task. However, other teams may conduct their own liaison.
Security Team
The security team is responsible for the physical security and protection of media team members in the conduct of their duties. Security includes the actual mission sites, movement from and to the media team’s operating base and/or logistics support areas.
Relationship to OPFOR Public Relations
Like media affairs, OPFOR public relations involve focused efforts to understand and engage key audiences of a relevant population. Their purpose is to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of OPFOR interests, policies, and objectives. They accomplish this through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with all regular OPFOR and irregular OPFOR actions.
Public relations are part of the perception management element of INFOWAR. In an expanding INFOWAR campaign, the irregular OPFOR seeks partners within the specific OPFOR AOR and regional and/or global supporters. When external states provide overt and/or covert support, the irregular OPFOR provides appropriate public relations guidance on how to portray or hide such support.
A significant audience external to an irregular OPFOR AOR can be the diaspora of a relevant population. INFOWAR and public opinion are critical to obtaining diaspora support and keeping the struggle of guerrillas and/or insurgents in the spotlight of globalized media.
Nongovernmental Organizations
A nongovernmental organization (NGO) is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights; supporting conflict resolution; and/or encouraging establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). NGOs are likely to be present in any OE.
Variety of Types
The global community of NGOs includes a wide variety of organizations that are independent, diverse, and flexible. They differ greatly in size, resources, capabilities, expertise, experience, and missions. An NGO may be local, national, or transnational. It may employ thousands of individuals or just a handful. It may have a large management structure or no formal structure at all. It may be a large organization with a huge budget and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief or a newly created small organization dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development programs, human rights, and conflict resolution.
Some NGOs represent members of a particular religious faith. In most of these cases, humanitarian aid originates in faith-based principles, but promoting a particular religion is not part of the aid provided. However, some missionary aid groups use humanitarian aid as a means of access for religious awareness and conversion of a relevant population.
Within a particular OE, there may be local NGOs as well as an international support presence of larger NGOs. International NGOs may use localized staffs in building capabilities in and for a region. Sometimes larger NGOs from outside a geographic region may not be openly visible while operating through these local organizations. This cooperation can provide resources unavailable at the local and regional levels during a crisis while incorporating localized capacity and knowledge of conditions, interpersonal relationships, and informal operations.
NGO Organizational Structure
A board of directors (sometimes called executive committee) is normally part of the large-scale decisionmaking process and working issues of the organization. The board serves as the trustee body of the NGO. Board members are valuable in that they extend the organization’s resources into various communities and include personalities that are not specifically significant in daily operations but provide credibility to the organization as a whole. Many NGO boards have celebrities, former government officials, experts, academics, and community leaders with the intention of attaining recognition or publicity. During emergency appeals, NGOs will often send board members out to make public statements, write newspaper or journal editorials, make speeches, or give interviews to spark focus on the organization’s work and needs in responding to the emergency.
NGO boards vary widely in style. Some are very active, often establishing close relationships with NGO officers and staff and involving themselves in planning processes and fundraising programs. Other boards are largely fundraising entities, lending their names to give credibility to an organization’s fundraising practices. Boards can be primarily symbolic and fulfill the legal requirements of meeting a specific number of times each year and certifying financial obligations. The actual authority may reside in leaders who purposely remain discrete or unpublicized donors of an NGO.
Note. The irregular OPFOR may seek to co-opt board representatives and/or influential celebrities and donors to overtly or covertly support its goals and objectives.
Figure 5-5 shows an example of the possible functions of an NGO field office. A smaller, local NGO may not have all these functions.
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Internal coordination, though not always formal, is the most common way civilian sectors organize in humanitarian emergencies. NGOs coordinate extensively within the local NGO community to manage information. They can act as advocacy bodies to international donors or local and regional governments. There is also external coordination between NGOs, regular military forces, governments, and donor agencies involved in a geographic region and/or international setting.
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
Some internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups as local implementing partners. Extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes.
Many NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for communications and personal security. They prefer instead to rely on the good will of the local populace for their safety. However, many larger NGOs have very capable communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide considerable support and assistance in the security area.
Communications provide some special challenges to NGOs. NGOs strive to provide assistance based on need rather than race, religion, political affiliation, or ability to pay. To avoid the perception of favoritism and operate in a neutral manner, NGOs normally do not use any encryption devices. They operate with the understanding that the local governing authority will likely be monitoring all their communications. They often have access to sensitive information that could assist political or military objectives of either side. This requires that information be recorded and transmitted in a way that reduces rather than incites conflict.
Modern communications equipment is essential for the NGO headquarters to remain in contact with field offices or mobile teams. However, such equipment might make NGO personnel a target of crime in areas where the technology is not commonly available. A satellite phone, which provides an NGO team global coverage, might represent a significant capability if acquired by the irregular OPFOR or criminals. The same might apply to a vehicle outfitted with a communication suite of sophisticated radios. In some areas, simply carrying a cellular phone or radio could be viewed as a threat by actors who would like to keep their activities concealed.
Security planning by an NGO is an ongoing process that continually reassesses threats. In some cases, NGOs operate in violent environments without developing a strong organizational culture of safety and security. Aid personnel often rely on the apparent immunity provided by a perceived humanitarian space and do not view themselves as party to the conflict. Various factors, including programs connecting an NGO and a governing authority, can cause specific targeting of NGO staff for kidnapping or murder by violent groups. NGOs often have formal safety and security systems to meet these threats. Some NGOs use professional security officers and/or PSCs with former military, police, or intelligence experience.
Reliable transportation is essential for NGO operations. However, this also poses the risk of accidents, assault, injury, and death for aid workers. The NGO must balance the need for a completely reliable vehicle against the risk of becoming a target of carjacking in areas of conflict or crime. NGOs may hire local drivers who have knowledge of which routes to use and how to negotiate check points. Such drivers may eventually gain trust as representatives of the organization. A driver from a group disenfranchised due to religious, ethnic, racial, or caste, may cause prejudice against the NGO. A driver might also be part of a criminal gang or the irregular OPFOR with the intent on stealing the vehicle or committing a crime against the NGO.
NGO Cooperation with a Governing Authority or Coalition Forces
The mission of an NGO is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting a military force in accomplishing its objectives. International guidelines on NGOs emphasize the principle of “humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality).
The preferred external coordination for NGOs is a United Nations (UN)-coordinated effort rather than a military-administered effort unless the UN is unable to do so. In cases where civil government is incapable or not present to coordinate NGO response, NGOs and militaries can interface with each other in operations centers administered by regular military forces.
Large NGOs often employ specialists or retired military personnel to assist in managing relations and activities that require interface with military entities. NGOs and military units have many incentives to coordinate and collaborate. NGOs often need many things from the military: logistics assistance, communications, intelligence, and protection. Military forces often find value in coordinating with NGOs for understanding ground-level activity, and to manage population movements, assistance projects, and general humanitarian activities. Both groups find that coordination is essential.
Military personnel often contact a NGO coordination group, which can—
- Provide contact information for liaison with member NGOs.
- Indicate what NGOs are doing in the region or area.
- Identify which NGOs are active in specific areas.
The UN often sets up humanitarian information centers (HICs) as central coordination points. NGOs are either required or voluntarily register with an HIC to keep updated on information and regional developments. A civil-military operations center or humanitarian operations center can be established for official coordinating between NGOs, the UN, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and the military.
NGOs and military forces can operate together, but challenges exist. Sometimes, in a region receiving NGO support and despite coordination efforts and extensive collaboration, NGOs can become frustrated with the apparent idle capacity that military commanders have in reserve for emergency or contingency actions. NGO managers may question why large numbers of military personnel, expertise, and supply stores remain unused while NGOs are short-staffed and significant support requirements exist for displaced persons and other elements of a relevant population. NGOs often want to ensure a distinct separation between military operations and NGO relief activities.
Coordinating and cooperating among NGOs and regular military forces does not necessarily mean sacrificing NGO impartiality or transparency. The benefits of working with military forces can enhance more effective and efficient NGO operations. Some factors for and against cooperation are—
- NGOs are generally capable organizations but may lack robust communication and logistics capacities.
- NGOs are civilian organizations that do not fall into a military-style command structure.
- NGOs prefer to keep their programs, activities, and image as independent as possible.
- NGOs can work effectively and efficiently during an emergency, often with a comparative advantage, in specific areas or regions.
- Routine and informal meetings between the NGO community, UN agencies, and the military can reduce much of collective tension and misunderstanding.
Motivations
NGOs are generally motivated by charity. They are trying to help the local population deal with manmade and natural disaster and disease, hunger, and poverty. NGOs are not affiliated with a government, but may be influenced by governing authority policies of their home nation.
NGO leaders and operators may have both stated and hidden interests and objectives. Some organizations and individual participants may have motivations that differ from the NGO’s public mission statements. These motivations can be—
- Political.
- Economic.
- Ideological.
- Religious or theological.
- Social or cultural.
- Private and/or personal agenda.
The irregular OPFOR may play on these motivations to induce NGO personnel to act in ways that favor its own objectives.
Relation to Irregular OPFOR
Individuals participating in or in conjunction with an NGO may willingly support or be coerced to support the irregular OPFOR. The irregular OPFOR seeks to embed its supporters and/or covert operatives in NGOs operating its AOR. This could allow it to access plans and monitor operations of the governing authority or regular military forces with which it is in conflict.
Perceptions can easily be interpreted as reality by a relevant population when INFOWAR presents a compelling irregular OPFOR message and story of unresolved grievances. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate NGO actions to knowingly or unknowingly serve its goals and objectives.
The irregular OPFOR can use visible cooperation by an NGO with regular military or internal security forces of a governing authority to its advantage in INFOWAR. Media exploitation by the irregular OPFOR can depict NGO presence as biased in favor of a governing authority that is unjust and corrupt. Reducing NGO presence or causing NGOs to depart particular geographic regions may increase the civil turmoil the irregular OPFOR desires in its actions against the governing authority.
NGOs can be inundated with large numbers of civilians seeking medical care in refugee camps and NGO facilities. It may be difficult for an NGO to distinguish sick or wounded members of the irregular OPFOR from others requesting care.
NGOs provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need. Unfortunately, the irregular OPFOR may exploit the charitable sector to support its organizations and activities. This abuse can take many forms, including:
- Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of irregular OPFOR organizations.
- Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across geographical boundaries.
- Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support irregular OPFOR organizations.
- Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for irregular OPFOR organizations.
Transnational Corporations
A transnational corporation is a business that conducts commerce beyond national boundaries. Corporate activities may be regional or global. The term transnational, as opposed to international, accentuates the fact that these organizations and activities are not created or governed national governments. Instead, they arise under private enterprise for profit.
Transnational corporations may enter into partnerships with countries that are trying to increase their world economic position. Emerging states may invite such corporations to establish research and manufacturing facilities in their countries as a means of building infrastructure. The presence of these corporations can also enhance a country’s security. However, the motivations of transnational corporation leaders are business oriented and not usually charitable. The corporations may try to influence regional affairs or assist their host country in actions that promote their own economic gain.
Note. In pursuit of its own financial gain, a transnational corporation may provide overt or covert support to the irregular OPFOR. This may include support in obtaining weapons and equipment, fiscal funding, transshipment of materiel to irregular OPFOR sanctuaries, and/or placing economic pressure on governing authorities.
When external forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account transnational corporations conducting business in the region. The presence of these outside business interests can put additional pressure on the intervening external forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian life and property.
Note. Some transnational corporations may have their own armed security forces, or hire PSCs, to protect their business interests or perhaps also those of the host country and governing authority. Such security forces become armed noncombatants. However, if they participate in armed conflict on behalf of the host country, they become combatants.
A host country must also take into account transnational corporations conducting business within its borders or region, and their international connections. If the host country’s actions adversely affect foreign commercial enterprises or regional security, conditions may encourage local, regional, or international support for irregular OPFOR goals and objectives.
Private Citizens and Groups
The various types of civilians in an OE can include—
- Government officials.
- Business people.
- Farmers.
- Lawyers.
- Doctors.
- Clergy.
- Tradesmen.
- Shopkeepers.
- Other groups of the local relevant population.
- Transients.
- Internally displaced civilians.
- Refugees.
These individuals and activities include offices, bureaus, and agencies of a governing authority, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil organizations, and independent or transnational corporations. They provide a wide range of services, support, and other activities that can be susceptible to the influence of the irregular OPFOR.
Note. The irregular OPFOR can attempt to embed operatives in low-level jobs in order to infiltrate government, commercial, and military activities. Such an insider threat can reap significant information and intelligence for the irregular OPFOR. It can also increase the restrictions placed on a relevant population and/or incite additional dissatisfaction with policies and practices of the governing authority.
Some government officials, such as police and emergency service personnel, have specialized equipment and standard uniforms. Other officials, such as mayors and town council members, wear clothing appropriate to the local customs. These officials are generally linked to a geographical area and/or functional responsibility and authority. Each actor has varied concerns and agendas. In some instances, the irregular OPFOR can masquerade as officials and act in a manner to discredit the governing authority.
Various political, religious, or social groups may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR. Even if unarmed, this can affect their status as noncombatant actors. Criminal organizations or elements of a criminal organization can—
- Be unarmed noncombatants who violate civil law.
- Be armed noncombatants.
- Be involved in armed combatant acts.
Note. The irregular OPFOR identifies weaknesses in the social structure and/or individuals of a relevant population and seeks to co-opt or manipulate particular individuals and/or groups to enhance its agenda. It may also acquire organizational capabilities, skill sets, and/or materiel in the population within which it operates. When possible, it gains this support voluntarily. However, it uses extortion and violence to attain its objectives if required.
Support from the civilian population is a key to irregular OPFOR operations. The irregular OPFOR recruits its manpower, gains intelligence, and receives safe haven and materiel support from the relevant population. Even if it also has external support, the irregular OPFOR cannot exist for an extended period without significant support from the civilian population.
Unarmed Combatants
The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely support hostilities against the enemy of the irregular OPFOR. Such active support or participation may take many forms, not all of which involve possessing weapons.
In an insurgent organization or guerrilla unit, unarmed personnel might conduct recruiting, financing, intelligence-gathering, supply-brokering, transportation, courier, or INFOWAR functions (including videographers and camera operators). Technicians and workers who fabricate improvised explosive devices might not be armed. The same is true for people who provide sanctuary for combatants.
Unarmed religious, political, tribal, or cultural leaders might participate in or actively support the irregular OPFOR. Unarmed media or medical personnel may become affiliated with a military or paramilitary organization. Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants.
Note. From the viewpoint of some governing authorities, any armed or unarmed person who engages in hostilities, and/or purposely and materially supports hostilities against the governing authority or its partners is a combatant.
Individuals who perform money-laundering or operate front companies for large criminal organizations might not be armed. Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons.