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Chapter 6: Terrorism

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Terrorism is a tactic. This chapter presents an overview of conditions that are a composite of real-world capabilities and limitations that may be present in a complex operational environment that includes terrorism. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are in conflict. International conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict are often not a constraint on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, and/or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and/or psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and governing institutions. Social and political pressure, internal and/or external to a relevant population and governing authority, is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global information environment. The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state and/or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its relevant population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually defeat an enemy.

Terrorism in Complex Operational Environments

Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Often motivated by philosophical or other ideological beliefs, objectives are typically political in nature. The pursuit of goals and conduct labeled as terrorism by some actors in complex operational environments (OE) can be considered fully justifiable by other actors. The spectrum of actors in an OE can range political, public, and/or commercial institutions, other institutions appearing legitimate but disguising an illicit agenda, and/or organizations and individuals who openly declare intent to use terror as a matter of policy and practice. Irregular forces typically use terrorism (see figure 6-1).

The geographical perspectives of local, national, regional, international, and/or transnational terrorist acts can indicate why terrorism is used but a more effective measure of understanding terrorism must relate directly to the actors involved in a particular OE. Ultimately, terrorism is about people and the psychological effectiveness of convincing or compelling a relevant population to act in a desired manner.

Multiple actors in an OE can use terrorism to enhance the conditions that favor their agenda and overarching purpose. Terrorism in irregular actions favors indirect and asymmetric approaches. However, terrorism can be employed within a full range of military and other explicit or subtle capabilities in order to erode an enemy’s power, influence, and will. Irregular forces are generally categorized as armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of a governing authority. Similarly, a hybrid threat can be visualized as the diverse and dynamic combination of regular armed forces, irregular forces such as insurgent organizations and/or guerrilla units, and/or affiliated and associated criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Other irregular forces can include mercenaries, corrupt officials of a governing authority, compromised commercial enterprises, public entities, active or covert supporters, and/or coerced and passive citizens of a populace.

Independent actors using terrorism can also exist in an OE distinct and separate from the agendas from other irregular forces. Adherents may have no direct connection with an irregular force but apply terror in support of an irregular force’s agenda. Threats can be as small as one individual or expand in size from a small and discrete band, cell, or unit to the noticeable presence as a large group of rogue actors that are affiliated or united in purpose.

Irregular forces adapt their capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to achieve organizational objectives. Terrorism is a means of conducting violent conflict that typically provides significant psychological impact on an intended target. Acts of terror may be actually intended for an audience other than the victims of an attack. Conducting terrorism typically emerges from a deliberate decisionmaking process. Terrorists usually compare and contrast advantages and disadvantages to evaluate probable cost- benefits of a particular act or acts of terror. When an irregular force terrorist self-justifies the legitimacy of using terrorism against an enemy, the terrorism often affects enemy combatants and noncombatants in a relevant population. The analysis and decision to use terror is often a simple cost-efficient and effective results-oriented means to pursue violent conflict in order to achieve a purpose.


Note. For the purpose of this TC, the term enemy refers to an enemy of the irregular force.


Motivations

Motivations often include a wide range of reasons that an individual, cell, unit, or other type of irregular force organization may feel compelled to use terrorism. Encouragement from outside an organization to use terrorism can be part of the conditions and circumstances that influence an irregular force to act. Support to use terrorism may be from regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces (SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces and/or law enforcement organizations that have been infiltrated by an irregular force can also support irregular force actions within a local or regional area of responsibility. The collaboration among organizations, units, cells, and/or individuals may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or long-term common goals and objectives.

Motivations for initiating and/or continuing acts of terrorism can include—

  • Spotlight attention on unresolved grievances with an enemy.
  • Disrupt an enemy’s ability to continue actions against an irregular force.
  • Champion causes of a suppressed and/or disenfranchised segment of a relevant population.
  • Demonstrate irregular force capabilities.
  • Obtain active and/or passive support from a relevant population.
  • Receive overt and/or covert support from a state or non-state actor.
  • Deter continued enemy military operations in a particular geographic area.
  • Dissuade enemy governmental influence over a relevant population.
  • Develop acceptance and legitimacy of an irregular force agenda and programs.
  • Cause an enemy to overreact to acts of terror and correspondingly alienate a relevant population.
  • Defeat enemy military and/or internal security forces and/or its governing institutions.
  • Achieve irregular force objectives.

Irregular force objectives promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular relevant population. An irregular force may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and non-lethal action to achieve its objectives, but is committed to violent action when necessary to compel an adversary, enemy, and/or other opposing form of governance to submit to the irregular force demands. In most cases, irregular force operations include politically oriented plans of action. Some irregular force organizations, such as affiliated criminal gangs, exist for their own commercial profit and power and are not interested in improving aspects such as quality of life and civil security of a relevant population that they affect.

Transforming a grievance into a concept and plan for action develops typically along a pattern that evolves from generalized ideas to tactical options and a heightened sense of needing resolution to a grievance. Continuous information and intelligence collection refines options for the likelihood of success and a decision to act. Motivation provides a momentum of commitment to actually conduct the terrorism. A way to visualize this human dimension sequence is a terrorism planning cycle.

Terrorism Planning and Action Cycle

A generic sequence and timing of irregular force terrorism depends on organizational capabilities and limitations, operational constraints, and the level of commitment of an irregular force actor or organization. To effectively understand this commitment, knowing the underlying motivation is fundamental to appreciating the resolve to plan and act. The irregular force sets conditions to optimize its awareness, training, and mission readiness to achieve objectives that counter enemy forces. When advantageous to irregular force operations, coordination and cooperation can combine the capabilities of conventional military, paramilitary, criminal activities, and/or terrorism.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures include creating conditions of instability in a particular OE, alienating the population from the governing authority of the region, and improving the irregular force influence on a designated populace and key leaders in that relevant population. In complex conditions, an irregular force may be able to employ a range of organizational options from small loosely affiliated cells to global networks in order to promote psychological effect and mission success. Such networks can be local, regional, international or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs programs; as well as acquire covert and/or overt financial, political, military, or social support.

A terrorism planning cycle is actually a continuum. Irregular forces plan, prepare, act, and apply experience and skill in order to achieve objectives. The concept of a spiral effect may be an effective way to visualize and understand a planning cycle of terrorism. Even with periodic setbacks in acts of terror capabilities and execution, the resolve of terrorists to a compelling agenda is often progressive, adaptive, and long-term in order to achieve objectives.

Broad Target Selection

Irregular force terrorism operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest probability of success by avoiding an enemy’s strengths and concentrating attack on an enemy’s weaknesses. Emphasis is often placed on maximizing irregular force security and terrorism effects. Security measures usually include planning and operating with small numbers of irregular force members to more effectively compartment knowledge of a pending terrorism mission.

Collection against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon. Detailed planning is a norm but can be deliberately shortened when an opportunity arises. While some targets may be vulnerable enough with shorter periods of observation, the information gathering and analysis for intelligence will be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or cancelled due to changes at the target or in local conditions. Tactical missions conducted by and/or for larger irregular forces complement operational objectives and strategic goals of the irregular force. The psychological impact on a targeted population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation.

There is no universal model for planning, but irregular forces use their experience and expertise to effectively apply traditional principles for plans and operations. Irregular forces often exchange expertise in particular skill sets such as recruitment, media affairs, and training on various forms of direct action in terrorism. Tactical methods and analysis of successful missions are often shared via the Internet and websites hosted by an irregular force. Adaptability, innovation, improvisation, and risk assessment are key components of plans and actions toward mission success (see figure 6-2).

Tactical and operational planning can be analyzed according to common requirements. A plans and operation cycle provides a baseline in assessing particular organizational requirements to conduct an act of terror. The significant differences among irregular forces often center on factors of intent and capability and the organizational, key leader, and individual commitment to a philosophical, ideological, or otherwise practical motivation and compulsion.

Irregular forces often pride themselves on being a learning organization. Combined with motivation and a compelling agenda, irregular forces gather information and intelligence, analyze their own and enemy strengths and weaknesses, determine enemy patterns, trends, and emerging actions susceptible to attack, and identify key vulnerabilities in an enemy’s systems, functions, and actions.

Consideration in selecting potential targets focuses directly to counter enemy governing authority or supporting force programs that demonstrate security, safety, and assurance to the relevant population that the irregular force needs to influence. Tactical operations that might counter an enemy through irregular force subversive or direct actions can include—

  • Secure a critical segment of a relevant population.
  • Declare the control and/or sovereignty of geographic areas that support the irregular force.
  • Disrupt military and/or internal security forces of an enemy.
  • Diminish the credibility of civil police and law enforcement activities.
  • Degrade a public sense of safety and stability from the enemy governing authority.
  • Discredit the political agenda of the enemy governing authority.
  • Demonize key leader actions of the enemy governing authority and civil administration.
  • Provide basic social services not being adequately provided by the enemy governing authority.

Initial Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance

Targets displaying significant vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort for intelligence gathering and surveillance. This potential for successfully attack establishes a requirement to gather additional information on a target’s patterns over time. This phase may be very short or can span months and even years. The type of surveillance employed depends on the type of target and its location. Elements of information typically gathered include—

  • Assessing the practices, procedures, and/or routines of an organization and/or facility. Items of interest include scheduled product deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures and other observable security routines. Examples are as simple as recording when regularly scheduled supply deliveries arrive or commodity pickup occurs, or where key leaders park personal vehicles.
  • Observing the physical layout and individual activities at residences and business offices of key leaders. Actions include knowing how the power grid services the location and critical points of failure if electrical power is to be interrupted during an attack.
  • Monitoring transportation routes of travel for targeted individuals for common routes, choke points, and limited visibility areas along routes that may be conducive for an attack. Personal patterns can include routes among a personal residence, temporary lodging, commercial site, gym, and/or school or university. Attention at facilities may include access and exit points, types of vehicles allowed on the facility property, and/or physical security barriers that must be bypassed or breached to enter a location.
  • Probing security measures to determine the complexity of security at a target and/or reaction time of security response units. Other items of interest can include any hardening of structures, barriers, or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of emergency reaction drills at a facility.

Specific Target Selection

Selection of a target for actual tactical planning typically considers some of the following issues:

  • Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)?
  • Will the target attract immediate high profile media attention beyond the immediate region?
  • Does attack success emphasize the desired grievance to the appropriate audience that can resolve the grievance?
  • Is the attack effect consistent with overarching objectives of the irregular force?
  • Does the target and mission success provide an advantage to the irregular force by demonstrating its organization’s capabilities?
  • What are the near-, mid- and long-term costs versus benefits of conducting the operation?

A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the selected target. Targets that do not receive immediate primary consideration may still be collected on for future opportunities.

Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning

Members of the unit or cell that will conduct the attack begin to appear during this phase. Trained intelligence and surveillance personnel or members supportive of the irregular force may be organized to prepare logistics and/or locations for the operation. Operatives gather detailed information on the target’s current patterns in recent days to weeks. The irregular force assesses and confirms information gathered from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities.

The type of surveillance employed depends on the target’s activities. Current information is used to—

  • Conduct security studies.
  • Conduct detailed preparatory plans and operations.
  • Recruit specialized operatives and/or active supporters.
  • Procure a base of operations in the target area such as safe houses and caches.
  • Design and test escape routes.
  • Decide on types of weapons and other means of attack.

Rehearsal

Rehearsals improve the probability of success, confirm planning assumptions, and assess contingencies. Rehearsals test security reactions to particular attack profiles in primary and alternate plans of attack. Irregular forces use their own operatives and/or unsuspecting people to test target reactions. Typical rehearsals include—

  • Equipment and weapons operational checks.
  • Communications and signals to be used in the mission.
  • Skills performance of all and/or particular specialists.
  • Final preparatory checks.
  • Pre-operations inspection drills.
  • Deployment sequence of movements and maneuver into the target area.
  • Actions near and/or on the objective.
  • Primary and alternate escape routes.
  • Initial safe haven, hide sites, and/or rally point actions.
  • Transfer plans from initial to subsequent safe havens or hide sites.

Confirmation checks in the target area can include—

  • Target information gathered to date.
  • Target patterns of activities.
  • Physical layout of target area for changes in routes and/or manmade features.
  • Time-distance factors from the assault position to the attack point.
  • Security force presence during varied states of alert.
  • Reaction response timing by security forces to a demonstration, feint, and/or threat.
  • Ability to preposition and/or retrieve equipment or vehicles near the objective.
  • Ease of blocking and/or restricting an escape route at critical choke points.

Attack and Actions on the Objective

The irregular force executes its tactical plan but remains flexible to changing conditions and adapts accordingly. The plans and rehearsals have considered primary and contingency actions that possess the advantages of initiative and deception. Actions provide for—

  • Use of Surprise.
  • Choice of time, place, and conditions of attack.
  • Employment of diversions and supplemental attacks.
  • Support of security and related positions and/or forces to neutralize target reaction forces and security measures.

Simultaneous actions may include an assault element, security element, and support element. Some missions may require a breach element. Actions on the objective will sequence through several main tasks:

  • Isolate the objective site.
  • Gain access to the individual, individuals, and/or asset.
  • Control the target site.
  • Seize and/or destroy the individual, individuals, and/or asset at the objective.
  • Achieve the mission task.
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