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Chapter 2: Insurgents

This page is a section of TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces.

This chapter presents an overview of insurgent organizations and actions as part of the irregular OPFOR for U.S. Army training. The insurgent irregular OPFOR is representative of threats in a resistence movement and/or insurgency that can exist in various operational environments (OEs). Insurgents can be armed or unarmed. In addition to functional tactics (see chapter 7), insurgents can use acts of terrorism (see chapter 6) to intimidate or influence a governing authority or a relevant population.

General Characteristics

Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion and violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. They can transition between subversion and violence dependent on specific conditions. Both types of action intend to disrupt a governing authority. They gradually undermine the confidence of a relevant population in a governing authority’s ability to provide and justly administer civil law, order, and stability. Insurgents can achieve their aims without violence, but this is not the norm.

Relationships With Other Organizations and Actors

During an insurgency, the distinctions among insurgents, guerrillas, criminals, and other actors in an OE are often unclear. Insurgents may use deception to add to this confusion and sometimes deny responsibility for direct actions or acts of terrorism. Insurgent organizations can act separately from other groups, organizations, and/or activities in conflict with an enemy or in conjunction with them to achieve common goals.

Insurgents may conduct operations in combination with regular military forces of a state in conflict with the governing authority that insurgents oppose. Advisors, liaison teams, and military forces—especially from special-purpose forces (SPF)—can provide overt and covert support for insurgent actions.

When present in the irregular OPFOR, guerrillas are normally incorporated into and subordinate to a higher insurgent organization. However, guerrilla forces can also be aligned with local insurgent organizations. In some cases, lower-level guerrilla units may be subordinate to a local insurgent organization. Guerrilla forces can also exist as an independent capability, completely independent of higher and local insurgent organizations. Evolving conditions may cause affiliations or task organizations that are particular to that context. The relationships between insurgents and guerrillas operating in an area may be temporary and remain in effect only as long as the both organizations mutually benefit. Guerrillas are described in detail in chapter 3.

Insurgents may also act in conjunction with criminal elements. Criminals may exploit the instability caused by insurgency to further their own profit. Insurgents may consort with criminals or resort to criminal activities themselves, in order to finance and sustain their operations.


Note. The Hybrid Threat (HT) used in training of U.S. Army forces can include all these types of actors and capabilities. The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following components: regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. Possible HT combinations include insurgents and other parts of the irregular OPFOR operating openly with regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by another state’s governmental ministries and/or departments, or supported by non-state organizations. (See TC 7-100 for detailed discussion of the HT.)


Insurgent organizations can form temporary affiliations with other commercial, social, or political entities. They can also solicit or coerce the active and/or passive support of civilians in and outside of the area of conflict. Such supporters can include—

  • Those merely sympathetic to the goals of the insurgents.
  • Those providing monetary support.
  • Those actively supporting and engaging in direct actions alongside the insurgents and/or guerrillas.

Insurgents may have the overt and/or covert support of a government-in-exile when both organizations view a governing authority as a common enemy.

Scope

Insurgent organizations normally conduct irregular conflict within or near the sovereign territory of a state in order to overthrow or force change in that state’s governing authority. Some insurgent activities— such as influencing public opinion and acquiring resources—can occur outside of the geographic area that is the focus of the insurgency.

An insurgent organization may begin or remain at the local level. A local insurgent organization may exist at small city, town, village, parish, community, or neighborhood level. It may expand and/or combine with other local organizations. Cities with a large population or covering a large area may be considered regions and may include several low-level insurgent organizations. A higher insurgent organization may exist at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational level. Higher insurgent organizations usually contain a mix of local insurgent and guerrilla organizations. The higher insurgent organization can apply both types of forces with a wider scope of impact. The OE and the specific goals determine the size and composition of each insurgent organization and the scope of its activities. (See sections on Higher Insurgent Organizations and Lower Insurgent Organizations, below, for more detail.)

Lines of Effort

An insurgency is fundamentally a political movement. The expectation of a long-term conflict requires plans for and use of physical and psychological force. Civic actions develop, expand, and marshal the support of a relevant population for the insurgency’s agenda. A comprehensive plan of action typically incorporates three main lines of effort:

  • Political influence.
  • Direct action violence and terrorism.
  • Civic interaction and support.

Political Influence

The political element provides the overarching command and control (C2) of the insurgent organization. The political leadership plans and directs the strategy and actions to divide or weaken the governing authority they oppose. Information warfare (INFOWAR) activities foster dissatisfaction of the relevant population with the governing authority and show the insurgency as an opportunity for change. The insurgency degrades the confidence of the population in the governing authority. At the same time, the political element is preparing and/or implementing its own administrative and governance capabilities that provide solutions to the population’s grievances.

Direct Action Violence and Terrorism

Insurgent cellular organization provides an adaptable function-based capability. Direct action cells reside primarily in local insurgent organizations and usually conduct small-scale and focused violent acts at the tactical level of conflict. (Direct action cells are described in detail later in this chapter.) Actions can range from one-person tasks to multiple cells tailored temporarily for specific operations. Subversion and selective or random violence are planned acts to incite frustration and overreaction by a governing authority. The government reaction can anger the relevant population and further undermine its allegiance or passive support to the governing authority. If an insurgency advances to the use of guerilla units, the guerrillas conduct operations against elements of the governing authority with functional tactics. (See chapter 3 for detail on guerrillas and chapter 7 on functional tactics.) Terrorism can be applied throughout these direct and supporting actions. (See chapter 6 on terrorism.)

Targets are often the activities and organizations that provide civil law and order such as—

  • Police.
  • Civil administrators.
  • Internal security forces.
  • Regular military forces of the governing authority.

Insurgent actions can range from simple threats and hoaxes to use of sophisticated technology and weapon systems. Insurgent organizations generally do not possess much of the heavier and more sophisticated equipment the guerrilla organizations possess. If the insurgents require these weapons or capabilities, they may either obtain them from guerrillas, or the guerrilla organization may provide its services depending on the relationship between the two organizations at the time. Some insurgent organizations profess the desire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Civic Interaction and Support

Civic interaction by insurgents with a relevant population establishes and maintains influence over the population. It allows the insurgency to successfully organize clandestine actions. Activities can—

  • Incite open demonstrations against the governing authority.
  • Improve recruitment efforts for the insurgency within the population.
  • Demonize the governing authority as a threat to the population rather than protector.

If a relevant population believes that a governing authority is incapable of effective governance, insurgents can usually obtain increasing active and passive support from the population. Insurgents degrade the operational effectiveness of a governing authority in selected functions. They use a full range of INFOWAR capabilities to exhaust the resolve of a governing authority and increase the population’s will to support the overthrow of such governance.

Insurgents conduct some civic initiatives in a manner that does not overtly link the services to it. Other actions often assist in providing basic social services that mitigate suffering of the population and provide support. The insurgents will want to take credit for these. Such support can be humanitarian programs for—

  • Food.
  • Potable water.
  • Basic medical services and preventive medicine.
  • Basic safe guarding of personal and commercial property.
  • Arbitrating civil and social disputes ignored by a governing authority.

The insurgent organization can sometimes obtain enough public support its representatives can be legally elected to political positions within a governing authority. Ultimately, the insurgency must convince an increasing number of uncommitted citizens and passive supporters within the relevant population to accept its agenda for change or replacement of the current governing authority.

Insurgent Organizations

Insurgent organizations do not have a fixed structure. The mission, environment, geography, goal, and many other factors determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization. Their composition varies from—

  • Organization to organization.
  • Mission to mission.
  • OE to OE.

The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The size, specialty, number, and type of subordinates also depend on the size, number, and specialties required for specific missions in an OE.


Note. Additional details of insurgent direct action and supporting cells are in FM 7-100.4. To find these details, use Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access to the Hybrid Threat Doctrine folder at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/30837459. Then, go to the “FM 7-100.4 Org Guide” folder and click, in sequence, as follows: Administration Force Structure; Vol III Paramil Nonmil Orgs; 01 Combatants; 01 Armed Combatants; 01 Insurgent Orgs; 01 Local Insurgent Org. This FM will transition to a TC 7-100.4.

The insurgent organization diagrams of FM 7-100.4 and the personnel and equipment lists that accompany them represent a composite of actual insurgent forces. They are a baseline that U.S. Army trainers can modify to provide the appropriate conditions required for a particular training exercise and/or training task. FM 7-100.4 provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to construct a task organization based on the training requirements. FM 7-100.4 also describes how to select equipment options. See also TC 7-101 for guidance on creating the appropriate OPFOR order of battle during exercise design.


Capabilities

Insurgent organizations are flexible, agile, and adaptable. They can quickly change their composition to optimize capabilities and use these capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of an enemy. These dynamic organizations are able to—

  • Adjust continually to changing conditions.
  • Shift organizational structures and alliances.
  • Influence and blend within a relevant population.
  • Simultaneously conduct covert and overt actions.
  • Use subversion and violence in innovative ways.
  • Shift between functional tactics and terrorism.
  • Employ a wide spectrum of lethality—from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to possible WMD.

The irregular OPFOR can include insurgent organizations in two levels of capabilities:

  • Higher insurgent organization.
  • Local insurgent organization.

A higher insurgent organization includes at least one local insurgent organization and can include guerrilla forces. The higher and local insurgent organizations include direct action cells and supporting cells. The direct action cells are primarily within local insurgent organizations. The differences in supporting cells of higher and local insurgent organizations relates to the scope of mission and responsibilities usually associated with the size of geographic areas within which they operate. Some direct action and supporting cells break down into teams.

A higher insurgent organization can have subordinate guerilla units. In some cases lower-level guerrilla organizations may be subordinate to or affiliated with a local insurgent organization. In either case, guerilla units operate in conjunction with the activities of direct action cells and/or supporting cells.

Networks

The interactions between and/or among organizations, units, cells, and teams vary in complexity. They can be hierarchical but most often take the form of a network. Communication and coordination in a network can be linear and visualized as links in a chain, with each node connected to the next node in sequence. Another option is a hub, in which one node (a director or decisionmaker) is central to a number of other nodes that are not directly in contact with each other. A wheel is a variation on the hub in which each of the nodes is in contact with neighboring nodes, with the central node providing common source of information and/or guidance. An all-channel array provides contact among all nodes of a particular network. The network of an insurgent organization can include a combination of all these types (as shown in figure 2-1). (See figure 2-5 on page 2-14 for another example of such combinations.)

Figure 2-1. Network types
Figure 2-1. Network types

A network C2 structure adapts configurations to best use the capabilities of available organizations, units, cells, and teams. Adaptability and innovation are hallmarks of the insurgent organization.

Leadership, Action, and Support

Insurgents are flexible in how to organize C2. However, figure 2-2 shows six categories of leadership, action, and support that normally exist in an organizational structure in either a hierarchy or network:

  • Senior leaders.
  • Subordinate leaders.
  • Cadres.
  • Active supporters.
  • Passive supporters.

The pyramid illustration in figure 2-2 indicates a relative number of people in each category. Underlying this pyramid is the relevant population that is critical to how these levels function for C2 and/or influence. Insurgents can use the population in various ways, such as a mass human shield or to assist in insurgent organization security.

The insurgents can also solicit and/or coerce support from the population. Another consideration is the amount of support that is or is not provided by state and non-state sponsors for the insurgency.

Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support
Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support

Senior Leaders

Senior leaders are the recognized authority of the insurgency. They conceive and state a philosophical or practical justification for actions by subordinate operational leaders and followers. These senior leaders—

  • Announce strategic direction and policy.
  • Approve goals and objectives.
  • Provide overarching guidance for operations and protracted conflict.

The leadership of an insurgent organization may be one individual or a group of leaders, who may or may not consult formally with advisors. Leadership may informally use advisors or a council comprised of tribal, religious, political, secular, radical sectarian, other associations, and/or any combination thereof. A formal council of advisors is more common in a higher insurgent organization (see discussion of advisors under that heading, below). The insurgent leader may also be a tribal, cultural, political, or religious leader. The leader of a guerrilla unit may join the leader of a political element in an insurgency and form a collective leadership for the insurgent organization.

Although leadership may be shared or apportioned among several individuals, one senior leader is often identified as the recognized authority and primary spokesperson for the objectives of the insurgent organization. The leader focuses on the strategic perspective and understands how to communicate the ideology and/or objectives that motivate the insurgents. A leader may have risen from the tactical ranks of the organization with calculated actions and political savvy, and/or may have achieved notoriety and/or demonstrated his influence through acts of terror. The leader usually is knowledgeable of world politics and complex socio-political environments. Individual leadership skills are often supplemented by personal charisma.

Insurgent leaders can be located within or outside of the insurgent organization’s geographic area. These leaders provide strategic guidance that is implemented by subordinate leaders conducting operations within the geographic area. Leaders use the media to convince or coerce targeted segments of a population to act in a particular way. These leaders may solicit clandestine financing and other support for operations to attack high-priority targets.

A situation may arise where the senior insurgent leadership is coordinating closely with a government-in-exile in order to reestablish authority over a state that has had its legitimate government ousted. Insurgent leaders can use multiple means to support a government-in-exile such as gradually providing civil and social services the existing governing authority is not providing to a relevant population. Another means is to gradually use political processes to obtain legitimate representation in local, regional, and national political parties and institutions. Leaders use these informal and formal processes to gain and sustain support of designated segments of a population and continually expand the positive influence of the insurgent organization’s agenda.

Subordinate Leaders

Subordinate leaders of the insurgent organization command or control organizational activities within geographic areas or functions. These leaders provide direction and guidance, approve goals and objectives, and provide overarching coordination in support of senior leader guidance. They may be leaders of cells and/or teams of specialized expertise or leaders of local insurgent organizations comprising several cells. The subordinate leaders may have responsibilities as special advisors to the senior leadership, media spokespersons, political leaders, or functional experts. If decentralized in structure, these leaders plan and act within general senior leader mission guidance. Other leaders, if structured in a more hierarchical military-type organization, plan and act within specified planning directives or guidance from senior leaders.

For security and a division of labor, subordinate leaders may sometimes use intermediate leaders to communicate directives and guidance to subordinate cells and supporting activities. Clandestine communications can use sophisticated techniques such as electronic steganography to hide information within a message or email, or simple techniques such as human couriers and intermediaries to relay oral information and/or directives.

Leaders can have varied effects on an organization’s effectiveness if they are eliminated. The insurgent organization develops redundancy among leaders and subordinate leaders in order to minimize significant disruption when a leader is killed or captured.

Cadres

In a general sense, a cadre is a nucleus of trained personnel capable of assuming control and of training others. In an insurgent organization, cadres include both the political or ideological cadre of an insurgency and the cadre of operators who direct and conduct direct action and supporting functions.

One type of cadre is the political or ideological core of an insurgent organization. Movements based on religious extremism include religious and spiritual advisors among the cadre. Political advisors may have a special role in some organizations. The cadre can be openly active or mask their activities within a relevant population. Some cadre activities are violent enforcement of political and ideological discipline, subversion of opponents, and/or manipulation of social power to support an insurgent program. Cadre may perform key shadow-government or government-in-exile functions that are physically distant from a relevant population.

Another type of cadre is the nucleus of experts in direct action or supporting cells of the insurgent organization that carry out specific functions and/or instruct other insurgents in functional capabilities. Some mid-level cadres are trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadres can be direct action operators but usually supervise and coordinate other insurgents rather than actually conducting direct action tasks. These actors can have functional, specialized, multifunctional, and/or supporting purposes based on knowledge and skill sets.

Examples of activities conducted, coordinated, and led by cadre can include but are not limited to—

  • Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.
  • Political affiliations and alliances.
  • Recruiting programs.
  • Training programs.
  • Ideology education programs.
  • Weapon system and communications acquisition and maintenance.
  • Logistics sustainment.
  • Finances and fiscal resourcing programs.
  • Social and medical welfare support.
  • INFOWAR capabilities against the opposition government and adversaries in the relevant population and international community.
  • Operational missions.
  • Acts of selective and/or random terrorism.

Some cadres use coercion and leverage to gain limited, periodic, or one-time cooperation from individuals in the relevant population. This forced cooperation can range from gaining specific information on a proposed target to supporting or conducting a suicide bombing attack.

Active Supporters

Active supporters are fully aware of their relationship to the insurgent organization but do not normally commit violent acts. They can continue normal positions in society while providing functional expertise or general support to the insurgents. Depending on the type of organization, they may operate in functional capacities, such as politics, fund-raising, and/or INFOWAR activities of the insurgency. Acting as visible or tacit partners, active supporters may also—

  • Conduct or augment intelligence, surveillance, and counterintelligence activities.
  • Provide and administer safe houses and safe havens.
  • Promote dissatisfaction with the status quo in recurring media affairs information releases.
  • Support recruiting efforts for new members and affiliates.
  • Solicit and collect financial or other types of donation support.
  • Provide civilian transportation.
  • Conduct courier and communications services.
  • Produce forged documents.
  • Acquire commodities to assist insurgent direct action and supporting cells.
  • Store caches of supplies, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other materiel.
  • Assist in the manufacture of weapons and IEDs.
  • Assist in subversive activities.
  • Assist in sabotage, assassination, or other direct and violent actions.
  • Provide medical treatment and related support.

Supporters can improve insurgent initiatives to obtain the representation of legitimately elected political officials. Other supporters may assist the actions of a direct action cell or a guerrilla hunter-killer (HK) team. Active supporters may or may not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement in an insurgent agenda. They can conduct covert and overt operations. They can infiltrate organizations of the governing authority and conduct subversive activities against civil, social, and/or military programs.

Insurgent leaders often broker associations for active support with civil, political, or other paramilitary organizations for selected purposes. Such associations may arise from specific mutual interests when cooperative efforts might not normally be expected. Public statements and/or secretive agreements that promote mutual support for a specific agenda of an insurgent organization can include the following themes:

  • Historical and recent perspectives to remedy grievances.
  • Familial, tribal, or clan allegiance.
  • Business and social productivity.
  • Faith system dogma.
  • Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.
  • Civil and political opposition to programs of a governing authority in a state or region.
  • Interference of an extraregional state in the domestic affairs of a state or region.
  • Potential future roles in society.

Passive Supporters

Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals and intentions of an overarching insurgent agenda. However, they are not committed enough to take an active role in insurgent direct actions or acts of terrorism. Sometimes fear of reprisal by opponents of the insurgency leads to passive yet sympathetic support.

Passive supporters may not be aware of their tacit relationship to the insurgent organization. They may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of their actual relationship to the organization. Individuals may develop suspicions of activities that might be supporting insurgent actions, but decide to ignore indications and continue their daily lifestyle actions.

The insurgent organization recognizes that a sympathetic base of passive support in a population is an ever-changing factor with multiple social, economic, religious, or political motives. The insurgency depends on a sympathetic segment of the population remaining passive. Nonetheless, passive supporters can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and/or unwitting assistance in intelligence gathering and other nonviolent activities. A primary value of passive support is minimal interference by the citizenry in ongoing overt actions of the insurgent organization.

Passive support can undermine civil and social programs, and political and/or theological institutions, of the governing authority. Many functions of such programs and institutions must rely on voluntary cooperation by large segments of the population.

Higher Insurgent Organizations

The term higher insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial, district, or national level, or at the transnational level. Cities with a large population or covering a large geographic area are considered regions. Higher insurgent organizations may control several local insurgent and/or guerrilla organizations. They can have transnational affiliations or other overt and/or covert support.

The main capabilities of a higher insurgent organization that are not usually present in a local insurgent organization are as follows:

  • Subordinate local insurgent organizations in their network. (Local insurgent organizations usually do not have echeloned subordinate local insurgent organizations.)
  • Guerrilla units within their network and operating in the same geographic area. (Local insurgent organizations may have temporary affiliations with guerrilla units or may occasionally command and control them.)
  • Personal protection and security cell(s) for the organization’s senior leaders and designated advisors or special members. (A local insurgent organization does not normally have a personal protection and security cell.)
  • Associations and/or affiliations with criminal organizations directly and without coordination with subordinate local insurgent organizations. (The long-term vision in a higher insurgent organization may include cooperation with regional or transnational criminal organizations for specific capabilities or materiel available through criminal networks.)

Higher insurgent organizations have no standard organizational structure. They are not necessarily subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. However, higher and local insurgent organizations can be subordinate to and/or loosely affiliated with regional and national insurgent organizations. Any relationship of independent insurgent organizations to regional or national structures may be one of affiliation or dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal.

Local insurgent organizations, guerrilla units, and other organizations (such as criminal gangs and networks) often operate in the same geographic area as a higher insurgent organization and can be subordinate, loosely affiliated, or independent of a higher insurgent organization. Any relationship of organizations and units to one another may be allegiance, affiliation, or temporary association based on shared aims and/or mutual support.

A higher insurgent organization is normally cellular and comprises a network of functional capabilities. Figure 2-3 shows the types of organizations and cells that can comprise a higher insurgent organization.

Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization
Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization

Some insurgent organizations may not have separate cells for all of the required functions. However, someone in the organization must be designated to perform all basic and critical functions. For example, the intelligence cell may also incorporate the counterintelligence and security functions, or the logistics cell may also perform the functions of the shelter and/or transportation cells.

Subordinates and supporting cells of a higher insurgent organization may or may not be colocated with each other or with the leadership of the higher insurgent organization. They may be located in separate villages, towns, cities, regions, or countries, as long as they can adequately and securely provide the required support in a timely fashion. The numbers and types of each, and their locations, may change frequently.

A higher insurgent organization can have all the same types of supporting cells found in a local insurgent organization. (These types are described under Local Insurgent Organization.) Compared to their local counterparts, these cells may be larger and have expanded capabilities. However, the higher organization may also have advisors and one or more personal protection and security cells.

Advisors

The senior leader (or leaders) may or may not have a council of advisors. He can receive advice from others inside and outside the organization. However, he may rely heavily on his council of advisors to provide counsel, guidance, and/or expertise on a wide variety of areas. If present, advisors can include—

  • Political (international relations; shadow government).
  • Military (advice and liaison with affiliated nations or guerrillas; acquisition of military weapons and equipment, advisors, or fighters).
  • Religious (religious leaders or liaison with them).
  • Cultural (ethnic, tribal, minority populations).
  • Financial (international and money-raising).
  • Mass media (perception management).

The number and types of advisors is situation dependent. Some insurgent leaders may have an advisor for every issue requiring specialized expertise, while other leaders may have advisors that can provide counsel on several functions. An example of a multifunctional advisor would be one that could provide counsel on political, religious, and tribal issues. Some functions may require specialized expertise. For example, in order to manipulate the media to achieve a specific goal in perception management, the leader of the INFOWAR cell may require expertise and/or advice from several advisors such as a cleric, a politician, and a tribal and/or ethic leader.

The number of permanent advisors can be many but is often limited to a few individuals. One of these advisors generally rises to the position of primary advisor to the leader. In some insurgent organizations, in addition to providing counsel, the primary advisor also serves in a position comparable to that of a second-in-command, a deputy, or a chief of staff. The position of primary advisor is an extremely prestigious, influential, and powerful position in the insurgency. The primary advisor is usually the religious, political, or the military advisor. The choice of primary advisor typically reflects the insurgency’s goals and agenda.

Advisors may consult with the leader on policies, tactics, and weapons to be used. They may use simple or information-age technology to exchange experience, practical observations, and lessons learned. Such advisors may coordinate activities among various supporting cells while also coordinating selective activities of direct action cells.

Even if not part of a formal council of advisors, leaders of supporting cells directly assist a senior leader in planning and supervising the actions of the insurgent organization. For instance, the leaders of the INFOWAR, logistics, and finance cells may advise the leader on matters pertaining to their functional specialties.

Advisors may or may not be armed. In most cases, advisors will possess firearms but may not choose to carry them on all occasions. There are typically security specialists (personal bodyguards) and drivers assigned to the advisors. The advisors’ association with the insurgency may be covert, with very few people aware of their connection. Most insurgent organizations have a mixture of overt and covert counselors.

Personal Protection and Security Cells

A personal protection and security cell is responsible for the personal security and welfare of the senior leader(s) and other important persons. The cell’s armed security specialists provide around-the-clock protection for these personnel and vehicles for transporting them. The vehicle may or may not be armored. Even if armored, it is built to appear just like any other vehicle commonly used in the environment. Some weapons and/or equipment may be left in the vehicle until required or not carried on the mission at all. All cell members are cross-trained in the use of all weapons, equipment, and vehicles assigned to the cell.

This cell works closely with both the counterintelligence and security cell(s) and the intelligence cell(s). When needed, it receives augmentation of trained personnel from direct action teams.

Local Insurgent Organizations

The term local insurgent organization applies to any insurgent organization below regional, provincial, or district level. This includes small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities, neighborhoods, and/or rural environments. (Large cities are equivalent to regions and may contain several local insurgent organizations.) Activities remain focused on a local relevant population.

Differences between a local insurgent organization and a higher insurgent organization are as follows:

  • Direct actions cells are present within a local insurgent organization. Their multifunctional and/or specific functional capabilities may be enhanced or limited based on availability of resources and technical expertise in or transiting the local OE. These direct actions are planned for immediate and/or near-term effects related to the local insurgent organization’s area of influence.
  • Guerrilla units might not be subordinate to the local insurgent organization. However, temporary affiliations between local insurgents and guerrillas are possible for specified missions coordinated by a higher insurgent organization. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside of, or assist affiliated forces, and guerrillas to achieve their common goals or for any other agenda. Guerrilla units may operate in a local insurgent organization’s area of influence and have no connection to the local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization.

Criminals can affiliate with a local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization as a matter of convenience and remain cooperative only as long as criminal organization aims are being achieved. The local insurgent organization retains a long-term vision of its political agenda, whereas cooperation by a criminal organization is usually related to localized commercial profit and/or organizational influence in a local environment. This usually equates to criminals controlling or facilitating materiel and commodity exchanges. The criminal is not motivated by a political agenda.

The local insurgent organization uses functional tactics (see chapter 7) and terrorism (see chapter 6) as the primary means to achieve its goals. Terrorism instills fear and anxiety that coerces and degrades the resolve of an enemy governing authority and selected people in a relevant population.

Relation to Other Insurgent Organizations

The local insurgent organization is the basic level of insurgent organization. Local insurgent organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. They may be completely autonomous and independent of a larger insurgent movement and not be associated with it in any way. In other cases, they can be either subordinate to or loosely affiliated with such a larger organization. They may operate under the guidance of a larger insurgent organization even is no command relationship exists. In some cases a local insurgent organization may provide only financial support and general guidance to its direct action and supporting cells (see figure 2-4).

Cells of a local insurgent organization may be forced to provide for themselves in several areas. A typical example of this is a smaller direct action cell separated from the parent insurgent organization by distance, population, or ability to communicate securely. They may not have access to the expertise or products such as IEDs provided by the technical support cell and must improvise IEDs by themselves.

Any relationship to a higher organization or among independent local insurgent organizations may be dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal. These relationships are generally fluctuating and may be fleeting, mission dependent, event- or agenda-oriented, mutually coordinated, and/or coerced for a specific temporary purpose. There may be loose coordination of certain actions, after which the organizations revert back to their independent modes.

Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization
Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization

Dispersion

Direct action cells and supporting cells disperse as a norm. They are not normally colocated with each other or with the leader(s) of the local insurgent organization. Although in some cases direct action cells may come together to provide mutual support, they usually carry out their mission independent of other cells. Dispersion enhances the security and survivability of the local insurgent organization and its individual cells. It also distributes the influence of the insurgency to a wider area and a larger segment of the population.

Leadership

Leadership in a local insurgent organization may reside in one individual or more than one individual. Advisors or a small council may exist but are not always present in a local insurgent organization to assist the leader or leaders. (See Advisors under Higher Insurgent Organization, above.) In some cases, command directives can be very specific and focused. In other cases, the leadership may purposely issue only general guidance to allow initiative at the cellular level for specific actions.

Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example)
Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example)

Cellular Structure

As with a higher insurgent organization, local insurgent organizations have a cellular structure. However, there are several differences in functions and scope of operations. Figure 2-4 and 2-5 show the types of cells that may be present in a local insurgent organization. Local insurgent organizations are typically composed of anywhere from 3 to more than 30 direct action and supporting cells. However, a smaller insurgent organization may consist of as few as one direct action cell (see figure 2-6).

Cellular structure in the local insurgent organization comprises two basic types of capability. These cells are—

  • Direct action cells.
  • Supporting cells.
Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols
Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols

Direct Action Cells

Direct action cells are the backbone of the insurgency movement. They contain the actual fighters of the insurgency. Some direct action cells have a multifunction purpose, while others are organized to perform a specialty function. Specialties can include, but are not limited to, assassination, sniper, kidnapping, extortion, INFOWAR, or mortar and/or rocket attacks. Every direct action cell is capable of performing all the missions listed above, to some degree. All cells are capable of sabotage and IED emplacement and detonation.

Typical types of direct action cells that may be present in a local insurgent organization are—

  • Multifunction.
  • INFOWAR.
  • Assassination and sniper.
  • Kidnapping and extortion.
  • Mortar and rocket.

The types of direct action cells and numbers of each can vary greatly from one local insurgent organization to another. Some may have—

  • All multipurpose cells.
  • All specialized cells, each with a different focus.
  • All specialized cells with a single focus.
  • Any mixture of the above.

Most insurgent organizations have a mix of separate specialty cells and multifunction cells. All these cells are designed to operate independently (if necessary) once they have started their mission.

Direct action cells do not have a fixed structure. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The size, specialty, and number of cells employed also depend on the size, number, and specialties required for specific missions. A cell typically contains from 6 to 10 personnel. However, a cell can be as small as 2 people or consist of over 20 people. Direct action cells easily lend themselves to be broken down into subordinate teams whenever necessary.

All direct action cells record key events and successful results on digital video and/or still cameras. In some cases, the key event may be staged for the camera. Upon mission completion, the direct action cells turn the information over to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation. The videographers or camera operators try to blend in with crowds and disassociate themselves from the operation. Sympathizers in the local population may also serve in this role.

Direct action personnel may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be used as runners, messengers, scouts, guides, drivers, porters, snipers, lookouts, videographers, camera operators, or in other roles. They may also emplace and/or detonate IEDs, signal flares, and mines. Women (and possibly children) may be fighters and participate in assassinations, ambushes, or assaults. They may also serve (willingly or unwillingly) as suicide bombers.

Multifunction Cell

The direct action cell (multifunction) is the basic direct action cell structure. It can employ functional tactics or terrorism, as necessary. It possesses all the capabilities of specialized cells (such as assassination and sniper; kidnapping and extortion; INFOWAR; and mortar and rocket) but normally to a lesser degree. When not engaged in specialized activities the, specialized cells can serve as multifunction direct action cells.

Bombs (especially IEDs) are the weapon of choice for multipurpose direct action cells. They can be used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, and producing mass casualties. The cells usually acquire IEDs from the technical support cell as unassembled, pre-manufactured components. The multifunction cell assembles them and adds fuzes and detonators. Within the multifunction cell, an IED team usually includes at least three people: a lookout, the IED emplacer, and a triggerman. In some cases, a small multifunction cell of three or four personnel may act as an IED cell. The team or cell emplaces the IEDs, and the triggerman detonates them at the appropriate time. If additional assistance or IED expertise is required, they receive it from the technical support cell.

Insurgents often use IEDs as secondary devices, to detonate on the arrival of personnel responding to another attack or IED. IEDs can be detonated by a variety of means, including remote, command, electrical, trip wire, pressure, time, and others.

Assassination and Sniper Cell

The primary mission of the direct action cell (assassination and sniper) is to terrorize a relevant population and/or to assassinate preselected persons. (See chapter 6 on Terrorism.) In either the assassination or the sniper task, the cell creates a psychological impact to intimidate and demoralize the population. The cell may indiscriminately select individual targets in crowded marketplaces or religious and political gatherings with the sole intent to terrorize.

An assassination is a deliberate action to kill political leaders or very important people rather than killing common people, which is considered murder. The insurgent assassinates or murders people it cannot intimidate, who have left the group, or who have some symbolic significance for the enemy or world community. Insurgent organizations may refer to these killings as “punishment.”

Many targets of assassination are symbolic and often have a great psychological impact on the enemy. For example, assassinating an enemy negotiator or successful businessperson can demonstrate the enemy’s inability to protect its own people.

The assassination and sniper cell consists of two teams. The cell leader serves as a team leader of one team, and another insurgent serves as the assistant cell leader and team leader of the other team. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. Weapons appropriate to each mission are selected. The other equipment is left behind or cached.

The cell could select its own targets based on opportunity, as long as hitting such targets supports (or does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent organization. Assassination methods include remotely-detonated bombing, the use of firearms, and poisoning. The target’s vulnerabilities determine the method of assassination. The insurgent leadership and/or the planning cell can exercise centralized control as necessary in order to orchestrate concerted action or to achieve a specific goal in its area of influence.

When not engaged in specialized activities, the assassination and sniper cell serves as a multifunction direct action cell. Depending on mission requirements, the assassination and sniper cell may also serve as a reconnaissance element, a stay-behind element, or provide security for other direct action cells.

Kidnapping and Extortion Cell

The primary mission of the direct action cell (kidnapping and extortion) is to conduct kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, and hostage-taking. These acts help to finance the insurgent organization and serve to influence and/or terrorize the population. (See chapter 6 on Terrorism.) Each action, particularly a kidnapping, requires detailed planning and support by a number of other cells.

The kidnapping and extortion cell may be authorized to identify victims as targets of opportunity as long as hitting such targets supports (or does not conflict with) the overall goals of the insurgent organization. However, the insurgent leadership can exercise centralized control as necessary, in order to orchestrate concerted action, and might identify certain targets or types of targets in order to achieve a specific goal in its area of influence. For a mission directed by the leadership, this cell may receive augmentation of insurgents from other cells.

The kidnapping and extortion cell leader coordinates with the intelligence cell for reconnaissance and surveillance of targets. The intelligence cell provides information on the target’s vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and routine behavior. Every member of the insurgent organization as well as sympathizers can help gather this target information. The intelligence cell must thoroughly analyze the target so that it can advise the insurgent leadership, the planning cell, and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell on selection of the target site and method of kidnapping. Human intelligence is vital when planning and conducting a kidnapping. The intelligence cell continuously conducts surveillance on the target to identify potential security flaws and identifies vulnerabilities that the direct action cell can exploit.

The intelligence cell and/or the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts detailed reconnaissance/surveillance of potential kidnap sites to determine the best site, considering cover, concealment, and escape routes. Once the target and site are selected, the kidnapping and extortion cell (and/or the planning cell and intelligence cell) conducts detailed analysis to provide the kidnapping and extortion cell with the requisite data on the target. The information required depends on the location of the target and site, but typically includes—

  • The exact route the target uses.
  • The method of conveyance and its specific characteristics.
  • The number of security personnel, their location, disposition, and types of weapons used.
  • The target’s likes, dislikes, allergies, habits, and routines.

After planning and reconnaissance, the kidnapping and extortion cell conducts the actual action. For a kidnapping, the cell leader designates a specific team to conduct the kidnapping. After receiving intelligence, the team rehearses specific kidnapping techniques, such as an ambush or abduction, and finalizes planning. The team plans the escape route in great detail because of the complexities of transporting the victim. It usually disables the victim to make the escape easier. The team determines the best method of disabling the victim (such as drugging, stunning, or binding him).

The kidnapping and extortion cell coordinates with the shelter cell for a safe house when kidnapping and/or hostage-taking is the mission. The INFOWAR cell helps create and maintain the fear caused by kidnapping and extortion through its propaganda and media manipulation means.

Information Warfare Cell

The direct action cell (INFOWAR) supports the insurgent organization’s INFOWAR plan. It may or may not receive guidance and assistance from the local insurgent organization. INFOWAR cell or its counterpart in a higher insurgent organization. (See appendix A for more detail on INFOWAR.)

There may be as few as one direct action cell (INFOWAR) to over 20 such cells depending on the mission, the targets within a relevant population and governing authority, and topics to be exploited. The cells can be broken down into teams when necessary. The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix, all depend on specific mission requirements. Personnel select weapons appropriate to the mission. Other weapons and equipment are added as required, such as computers, computer-rigged vehicles, specialized antennas, and communications.

Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the cell may be capable of several functions. Examples of functions performed by the INFOWAR cell are—

  • Selective sabotage actions.
  • Information management (internal methods, links, and security).
  • Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation).
  • Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda and indoctrination videos; broadcast successes of the direct action teams).
  • Civic actions popular to a relevant population.
  • Cyber-mining for information and intelligence.

Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other subject matter experts. Some functions can also be performed by personnel outside of the INFOWAR cell. Several members of the cell may be hired INFOWAR specialists or “gun fighters.”

Mortar and Rocket Cell

The primary purpose of the direct action cell (mortar and rocket) is to either terrorize or influence the local populace and governing authorities. It may indiscriminately fire into crowded marketplaces and religious gatherings with the intent to terrorize and influence a relevant population. Targets may include religious or national icons and/or landmarks. These attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. They may also be used in a manner to shift blame for the attack to the enemy. The cell can provide indirect fires in support of insurgent missions. When insurgents need additional mortar and rocket fires, they may look to affiliated guerrillas for support.

The rocket and mortar cell typically consists of a mortar team and a rocket team. Each team may have approximately six personnel. The mortar team of the cell may have light and/or medium mortars. When it uses medium mortars, it may require additional ammunition bearers and possibly a light truck for transporting the weapon. The rocket team normally fires medium rockets, sometimes from improvised rocket launchers. The mortar team and rocket team can conduct missions as a cell or conduct mortar and rocket missions as separate teams. The normal plan is for the team(s) to execute a fire mission and quickly disperse from the firing point.

When not engaged in specialized activities, the mortar and rocket direct action cell can serve as a multifunction direct action cell. The mortars, rockets, and associated equipment may be cached or left behind, in which case the cell members carry weapons and munitions similar to the multifunction cell.

Supporting Cells

Supporting cells support and assist operations of the direct action cells or the insurgent organization as a whole. At the local level, the supporting cells either support the roles of the direct action cells or exploit their successes. The same types of supporting cells may be present in a higher insurgent organization. Figure 2-7 shows the graphic symbols of supporting cells.

Supporting cells that may be present in the insurgent organization are—

  • Intelligence.
  • Counterintelligence and internal security.
  • Planning.
  • INFOWAR.
  • Technical support.
  • Logistics.
  • Communications and tradecraft.
  • Finance.
  • Shelter.
  • Training.
  • Recruiting.
  • Transportation.
  • Civil affairs.
  • Medical.

The local insurgent organization normally possesses the supporting capabilities listed here. However, some of these functions may be combined, rather than having separate cells. Also, supporting cells are not limited to these types.

Intelligence Cell

The intelligence cell plans, coordinates, and implements the insurgent intelligence collection plan and provides intelligence and information to support insurgent operations. The cell also conducts reconnaissance to obtain information about the activities, tactics, and resources of the enemy and potential supporters of the insurgency. Reconnaissance methods include surveillance, use of informants, and infiltration of organizations. Observation is the most common method used to conduct reconnaissance.

The insurgent organization usually produces its own general intelligence and targeting information. Every member of the insurgent organization is an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Intelligence cell personnel may serve in any occupation (such as a taxi or delivery driver, or truck driver) that allows them to blend in with the population and still provides them the flexibility and mobility needed to gather information. Information in raw form may be freely provided by sympathizers conducting surveillance on behalf of the insurgent organization while living, traveling, or working near either a target area or the enemy. Raw information may also be purchased locally from affiliated insurgents, guerrillas, or criminal organizations. The intelligence cell analyzes all this information and turns it into intelligence.

In addition to conducting intelligence analysis, typical activities of an intelligence cell may include—

  • Tracking enemy movements.
  • Determining enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.
  • Scouting potential targets.
  • Establishing enemy vulnerabilities.
  • Selecting attack locations.
  • Stalking potential assassination targets.
Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols
Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols

Collecting information is a continuous function performed by every insurgent organization. Overt activities include the open collection of information by individuals who circulate among the people. Other activities involve secret collection of information. This can include information collected through the use of extortion, bribery, or coercion. Insurgents also collect information using electronic devices and human- intelligence agents who may join or infiltrate popular organizations, government organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. The intelligence cell of a local insurgent organization may further disseminate the information to its counterpart intelligence cell in a higher insurgent organization.

When planning any action, an intelligence cell analyzes information from all available sources. Sleeper agents, members of the insurgent organization, or active supporters and sympathizers who may have resided within the target area for years often have the specific mission of gathering information. This information may later serve to support direct action missions.

The information gathered by the insurgent organization is used to plan future activities and determine the feasibility of planned actions. In the offense, efforts are concentrated on the enemy at his location and the area surrounding the target. In the defense, the reconnaissance effort is to determine when and where the enemy will conduct offensive actions against insurgent forces.

The insurgent organization’s intelligence may be superior to the enemy’s. This is because insurgents may have—

  • More intimate first-hand knowledge of all aspects of the local environment.
  • Close relationships with the population.
  • Penetration of governmental structures.
  • Ability to maintain observation across the countryside or urban area.
Counterintelligence and Internal Security Cell

The counterintelligence (CI) and internal security cell conducts internal CI and operations security (OPSEC) activities. Members of this cell infiltrate other cells to identify security weaknesses or breaches, and enforce proper security measures. The cellular structure of the insurgent organization helps ensure against the compromise of the identity, location, or activities of leaders and members of other cells should there be a breach of internal security.

The local insurgent organization must place great emphasis on the conduct of internal CI activities because of the criticality of maintaining cohesion within the hazardous environment in which it operates. It is susceptible to infiltration by enemy agents. If the local insurgent organization is infiltrated, it will not survive.

It is within the CI and internal security cell that all OPSEC measures for the organization’s activities, as well as other security measures, are developed, disseminated, and enforced. In most insurgent organizations, violation of these security rules can result in immediate death to the violator and/or his family members. This cell is responsible for maiming or assassinating current or former insurgent members who commit breaches. Paranoia among the members actually increases security, since all members desire to remain free of suspicion. Individuals assigned to the CI and internal security cell are usually mature, experienced, or senior in the organization.

Planning Cell

The planning cell conducts near-, mid-, and long-term planning for missions of the insurgent organization. This cell plans current and future actions of direct action and other supporting cells that contribute to the goals of the overall organization. It coordinates cooperation among cells, when necessary. It works closely with the intelligence and training cells to coordinate capabilities and minimize the impact of organizational limitations on insurgent operations.

The cellular structure of the insurgent organization helps ensure against the compromise of the plans and actions of direct action and/or supporting cells should there be a breach of internal security. Communication between and among cells may use intermediaries to provide additional security from infiltration and/or identification of key leaders and planners.

Information Warfare Cell

The information warfare (INFOWAR) cell plans, coordinates, and implements the local insurgent organization’s INFOWAR activities. (See appendix A for more detail on INFOWAR.) This cell also provides guidance and assistance to the direct action cells (INFOWAR) whenever required. Portions of the cell may be dispersed.

Depending on the size, nature, and focus of the insurgent organization, the INFOWAR cell may be capable of several functions. Some example functions are—

  • Information management (internal methods, links, and security).
  • Media manipulation (misinformation and disinformation).
  • Public affairs designed to influence the population.
  • Communications (cyber embeds via Internet sites, propaganda videos, broadcast successes of direct action teams, and printing).
  • Rumor control.
  • Sabotage actions.
  • Civic actions.
  • Fund-raising (including international).
  • Recruiting.
  • Indoctrination training.
  • Assistance in cyber-mining for intelligence.

All these functions are integrated to further short- and long-range goals. Some of the functions may require specialized expertise. For example, the media manipulation function may require expertise and/or advice from a cleric; a political, tribal, ethic, or cultural leader; or other subject matter experts.

IED and other attacks are often used to support the overall INFOWAR plan. In all direct action cells, key events (especially successes) are recorded on digital video and still cameras. Upon mission completion, the recordings are turned over to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation. Although the direct action cell has a video camcorder and digital camera capability within its cell, an INFOWAR cell may be tasked to provide video or digital collection of the event for rapid media distribution in the insurgent INFOWAR campaign.

Technical Support Cell

The technical support cell is responsible for all acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of bombs, mines, and other tactical demolitions and fuze materiel. It is the primary bomb factory for the insurgent organization. Bombs can include—

  • IEDs.
  • Signal flares (actually a subcategory of IEDs).
  • Bombs configured for individual and vehicular suicide tasks.
  • Even a WMD, when materiel and expertise is available in the insurgent organization.

Bombs (specifically IEDs) are a preferred weapon of choice for the insurgent organization. This is because—

  • They are inexpensive.
  • The materials are readily available.
  • They are relatively easy to build.
  • They are extremely destructive.

Bombs (IEDs) may be very sophisticated or extremely simple. They easily lend themselves to terrorizing the population. They are used in support of assassination, maiming, sabotage, mass casualties, and mass destruction.

Although members of the technical support cell are very capable of emplacing and detonating IEDs and other demolitions, they normally do not do so. Their expertise is far too critical for them to routinely go on direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the devices. On occasion, a representative from the technical support cell may be required to accompany the direct action cell to properly emplace and detonate the device, especially when dealing with WMD IEDs. Those insurgents requiring specific expertise in the fabrication, emplacement, and detonation of WMD such as radiation (dirty bombs) and biological weapons may acquire the expertise and material from outside the local insurgent organization.

The number of teams subordinate to the technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on the specific missions. Types of teams that may comprise the technical support cell are—

  • Demolition, sabotage, and IED team.
  • Suicide IED team (individual and vehicular).
  • WMD support team.

Demolition, Sabotage, and IED Team. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team is the primary IED and tactical munitions factory for the technical support cell. This team is responsible for all acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of IEDs, suicide bombs, side-attack (antitank and anti-vehicle) mines, and other tactical demolitions and fuzing for munitions. The team prepares these devices for distribution to other elements of the insurgent organization or affiliated organizations and/or persons. Some demolition, sabotage, and IED teams may be located in factories in small villages (or other remote areas or local accommodations) where they build their IEDs and then smuggle them into cities, where suppliers may then distribute them (or sell them) to insurgent organizations or other customers.

This team provides IEDs (usually unassembled, pre-manufactured components) to direct action cells. The direct action cell then assembles and adds a fuze or detonator to the IEDs. Some direct action cells may not have access to the expertise or products (IEDs) provided by the technical support cell. In these cases, the team trains, advises, and provides expertise to direct action cells. The team may also train direct action cells to manufacture limited qualities of IEDs for their own use.

The demolition, sabotage, and IED team may train, advise, and provide expertise to direct action cells (especially the multifunction cells) on how, where, and when, to emplace and detonate munitions and on the proper assembly, fuzing, and detonation of the devices. The team also provides instruction on remotely detonated mines.

Suicide IED Team. A suicide IED team (individual and vehicular) is responsible for acquisition, manufacturing, and storage of IEDs and/or vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) for suicide missions. The number of such teams in a technical support cell is not fixed and varies depending on specific missions. All suicide IED/VBIED team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions necessary to fabricate IEDs and VBIEDs including automotive welding and fabrication. Members of the team are very capable of detonating IED/VBIEDs and other demolitions, but they normally do not do so— even to detonate a device carried or driven by someone else.

Direct action cells are responsible for the emplacement and detonation of the IED/VBIEDs. Suicide bombers/drivers are recruited by the recruiting cell, and turned over to direct action cells to properly emplace the individual-carried IEDs and VBIEDs. Once the direct action cell has ensured the proper emplacement of the IED/VBIED, they can either trigger the IED/VBIEDs remotely or use other detonation methods. On occasion, a representative from the suicide IED/VBIED team may be required to accompany the direct action cell to ensure proper emplacement and detonation of the device.

WMD Support Team. The WMD support team has the primary purpose of creating weapons to either terrorize or influence a relevant population and governing authorities. Insurgent organizations use indiscriminate techniques to create mass casualties and mass disruption. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are the potential weapons of choice for organizations employing terror tactics. Insurgent organizations may obtain or use CBRN weapons for a variety of motives. They might threaten the use of these weapons as “saber rattlers” to raise the ante in response to political or military actions of the governing authority or foreign powers. They may actually use such weapons to achieve a specific objective or to terrorize.

Use of a WMD such as a radiological (dirty bomb) and biological weapon can require specific expertise in fabrication, emplacement, and detonation or activation of the WMD. The WMD support team acquires necessary expertise and material from outside the local insurgent organization. Other types of WMD may be relatively simple to fabricate and use with devastating effects.

Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and/or toxic industrial material (TIM) can be used as a WMD to cause mass casualties and psychological stress and anxiety. Most WMD support teams have easy access to TICs and TIM. TICs are highly toxic commercial chemical substances with acute toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes. They can be solid, liquid, or gas. These are the normal weapons of choice for the WMD support team. TIM has similar toxicity and can be used as a complement to TICs or other mass effects on an enemy such as officials of a governing authority and/or a relevant population. Even though a mass release of TICs or TIM causing numerous noncombatant casualties was due to an IED explosion, the insurgent organization might be able to blame the casualties on the enemy as an intentional act.

Once an insurgent organization acquires the ability to produce WMD IEDs, a WMD support team will normally have at least one such weapon fabricated and available at any given time. It may also have others in various stages of manufacture.

All WMD support team personnel are cross-trained to perform all functions necessary to fabricate WMD IEDs. However, team members do not normally emplace and detonate WMD IEDs because their expertise is too critical to risk in direct action missions. Direct action cells emplace and trigger the WMD IEDs. On occasion, a representative from the WMD support team may need to accompany the direct action cell to ensure proper placement and detonation of the weapon.

Logistics Cell

The logistics cell is the resource planner for the insurgent organization. This cell is responsible for the planning, acquisition, and distribution of all resources ̶ human and materiel. Resources can come from sources outside of the insurgent area of interest, or can be obtained from within the geographic area. In addition to the direct purchase of materiel and/or support and services, the insurgent organization can obtain logistics in ways to include the following:

  • Theft from the governing authority.
  • Voluntary donations from a supportive relevant population.
  • Tax and/or levy on local and area populations.
  • Specified materiel from a relevant population in exchange for social services and/or health welfare support.
  • Self-manufacturing of designated materiel.
Communications and Tradecraft Cell

The communications and tradecraft cell is the communications planner for the insurgent organization. The cell advises insurgent organization leaders on the feasibility of all insurgent activities from a communications perspective. It also determines the internal communications equipment necessary for the success of direct action missions.

This cell facilitates communications inside and outside of the organization with a courier service, dead-drop locations, and other tradecraft (clandestine) communications. It also provides multiple electronic means for digital and secure communications. It is equipped with computers, radios, small satellite communication antennas, and long-range cordless telephones. The cell is a source of communications, Internet, electronic tradecraft, and steganography expertise and provides training as required. It maintains close coordination with the INFOWAR cell for Internet communications.

This cell provides courier service as s simple and secure means of communication among cells in the insurgent organization. Transportation for a courier may be a civilian model motorcycle, moped, motor scooter, bicycle, sedan, or even a taxi. The courier probably will not have an overt weapon or radio and will appear to be a noncombatant. Another insurgent may ride with the courier as a lookout or to provide security. Depending on the circumstances, some couriers may not use vehicles and will be used instead as foot messengers. Couriers may be male, female, or even children. Messages may be written, encrypted, or memorized and presented orally in person.

Finance Cell

The finance cell is the financial and economic planner and provider for the insurgent organization. It determines the internal financial requirements necessary for the success of direct action missions. This cell plans local fund-raising activities such as bribery, extortion, robbery, and operating front companies in order to finance and resource the insurgent organization’s activities. It also has links to regional, national, and international fund-raising activities. The cell also determines the roles of direct action cells and other cells in acquiring additional funds for the insurgent organization.

Finance personnel establish and monitor internal and external funding and funds management mechanisms. Skilled operators appeal to the local and international community, possibly through the media, for political, monetary, and logistics support. They may do this in coordination with the INFOWAR cell and logistics cell.

Voluntary or coerced contributions from the diaspora of a relevant population are a significant enterprise of regional, international, and transnational connections for the insurgency. Both governmental and nongovernmental donations and grants may wittingly or unwittingly finance an insurgency.

Shelter Cell

The shelter cell plans for and provides secure accommodations at safe houses for direct action and supporting cells. Safe houses may also accommodate visiting and high-ranking insurgents. These shelters are closely coordinated with the intelligence, planning, logistics, and transportation cells. Caches of materiel can be aligned with locations of safe houses and/or transit routes to and from insurgent areas of interest and territorial safe havens.

Sympathizers in the relevant population may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services. Maximum use is made of local assistance and facilities regardless of capability.

Training Cell

The training cell plans and coordinates training for the insurgent organization members. Training covers the basic organization, duties, and responsibilities of the insurgent organization, and advances to specialized training of insurgents for cell or team responsibilities.

Basic instruction includes—

  • Basic marksmanship.
  • Surveillance and intelligence-collection methods.
  • Basic tactical instruction.
  • Communications techniques.

Examples of specialized instruction may include advanced tactical instruction such as conduct of—

  • Ambushes.
  • Assaults.
  • Raids.
  • Assassination.
  • Bombing with IEDs.
  • Sniper activities.
  • Advanced surveillance and intelligence-collection methods.
  • Kidnapping.
  • Extortion.

Training may be centralized or be conducted at the cell level depending on the structure and mission of the insurgent organization. Generally, training is a combination of both with the basics taught in a centralized location and specific mission and functional training conducted at the local cell level. Training may be distributed via the Internet. Training actions are coordinated closely with the planning and recruiting cells.

Recruiting Cell

The recruiting cell provides the manpower resourcing and recruitment planning and for integrating recruits into the insurgent organization. Recruiting can promote radical religious, militant ethnic, nationalist, or social agendas that propose to remedy compelling grievances within a relevant population. Recruits might not be aware of the true nature of the organization they are joining. Recruiting may be wittingly or unwittingly financed from both governmental and nongovernmental donations and grants.

Often, legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for insurgent organizations. The organizations from which individuals can be recruited need not necessarily be violent or illegal themselves, but simply contain populations that are sympathetic to the same goals as the insurgent organization. Recruiting may be for particular skills, training, and/or qualifications and may not be tied to ideological characteristics. Insurgent organizations may attempt to recruit current and former members of national armed forces, both as trained operatives and as agents in place.

The recruiting cell uses many varied and different methods to persuade potential insurgents to join them. Some of these persuading factors may be monetary, religious, ethic, nationalistic, anger, promise of power, or fear. The Internet is a powerful recruitment tool. The recruiting cell maintains close coordination with the INFOWAR cell.

Insurgents may also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting a suicide bombing. Blackmail and intimidation are common forms of coercion. Threats to family members are also employed. Coercion is often directed at personnel in government security and intelligence organizations.

Internal security is the primary concern of the insurgent organization when recruiting. First, a potential recruit must pass an intense screening process. Once selected for recruitment, he/she is then closely monitored by the CI and internal security cell prior to full recruitment and integration into the insurgent organization.

Transportation Cell

The transportation cell plans and facilitates transportation for the insurgent organization. It responds to transportation requirements of other cells in the organization, especially the logistics and direct action cells. If sufficient or specific transportation is not available, the transportation cell either provides or arranges for it.

Insurgents may have no vehicles or supplies at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other transportation or supply means. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. Depending on the mission, the local insurgent organization may be augmented by any and every type of personnel and/or vehicle. Insurgents may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of civilian personnel for drivers, porters, lookouts, and security personnel. Draft animals may also be used as bearers and/or porters.

The vehicles in the transportation cell are indistinguishable from civilian vehicles and are always kept as dispersed as possible, in order to prevent detection and destruction by the governing authority. Rarely, if ever, will all vehicles in the cell be colocated. Whenever possible, vehicles are dispersed for use by locals as commercial, delivery, agricultural, general cargo, construction, and general-purpose vehicles used in everyday life. When required, the transportation cell assembles the appropriate mix of vehicles to transport items and/or personnel to a specific location. After performing the necessary transportation tasks, the vehicles then melt back into the general population and environment.

Civil Affairs Cell

The civil affairs cell is responsible for the planning, preparation, and implementation of all civil affairs activities for the insurgent organization. It organizes a synchronized program of actions for the benefit of a relevant population. The cell may work openly and/or discretely with the INFOWAR cell for media manipulation to ensure the insurgent organization gets credit for providing those benefits.

Key civil affairs events are digitally recorded on digital video and still cameras in order to publicize results and successes intended to create a positive image in the relevant population. Some activities may be staged to enhances the prestige of the insurgent organization and/or present a negative image of the governing authority. The recordings are transferred to the INFOWAR cell for manipulation and exploitation and/or released to sympathetic media for local or worldwide distribution.

Medical Cell

Insurgent medics are combatants. When necessary, they fight. Insurgent medical personnel may be a mixture of men and women. Women may make up 50 percent or more of the medical cell strength.

The insurgent organization has limited medical capability. However, insurgent medical care is coupled with local medical assets in the area whenever possible. Maximum use is made of local medical assistance and facilities regardless of medical capability.

Insurgents will persuade and/or coerce local civilian medical support when needed. Sympathizers in the local populace may volunteer their homes, equipment, vehicles, and services for ad hoc medical care. Local medical personnel may volunteer to treat the ill and wounded. Sympathizers may also assist in the evacuation of wounded insurgents to civilian, militia, state, or even military facilities. Evacuation means can include general-purpose cargo vehicles, carts, or even taxis.

When necessary, supported direct action cells receive litters from the medical cell to transport wounded. The supported cell provides its own litter bearers. Noncombatants may also be forced to serve as litter bearers.

A medical aid station is usually set up in a fairly safe area, while other medics may accompany direct action cells or other insurgents. When necessary, medical functions are performed in tents, tunnels, caves, or local accommodations. In some cases, the medical cell may colocate with a village clinic. Insurgents may or may not have the services of a civilian medical officer (physician). If available, the physician can provide immediate trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention. Meanwhile, the medics provide limited medical intervention, minor surgery, and treatment of most common illnesses and lesser wounds.

Severe and long-term medical care relies on evacuation to civilian or other medical facilities. More routine and excess ill and wounded are transported to civilian medical facilities or may be cared for in insurgent safe havens.

As the insurgent organization establishes gradual control in designated areas, medical care extends beyond the role of preserving capabilities of only the insurgent organization. Basic preventive medicine and medical care can be offered to a relevant population as a means to encourage and develop popular support.

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