TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces

This training circular (TC) is one of a series that describes an opposing force (OPFOR) for training U.S. Army commanders, staffs, and units. See the References section for a list of other TCs in this series. (Other publications in the former Field Manual [FM] 7-100 series will be converted to TCs as well.) Together, these TCs outline OPFOR that can cover the entire spectrum capabilities of regular and/or irregular forces against which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict.

Applications for this series of TCs include field training, training simulations, and classroom instruction throughout the Army. All Army training and red team venues should use an OPFOR based on these TCs, except when mission rehearsal or contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based threat or enemy. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the OPFOR TCs to fill information gaps in a manner consistent with what they do know about a specific threat or enemy.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) /Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats. Send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to CTID at the following address: Director, CTID, TRISA-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 467, Rm 15), 803 Harrison Blvd, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.

This publication is available at on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (RDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Also, see Army Training Network (ATN) https://atn.army.mil with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access. Two locations on the ATN front-page access TRADOC G-2 products. Click the “Training for Operations” button and then click the “CTID Operational Environment Page” link. Click the “DA Training Environment” button and click the “OPFOR & Threat Doctrine” link. Both of these sites provide threat and opposing forces (OPFOR) resources and references for training, professional education, and leader development. Updates subject to the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) approval process will occur as required, and as a result of a normal review production cycle for an Army training circular. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest change update.

1 Introduction
2 Chapter 1: Irregular Opposing Force Fundamentals
3 Chapter 2: Insurgents
4 Chapter 3: Guerrillas
5 Chapter 4: Criminals
6 Chapter 5: Noncombatants
7 Chapter 6: Terrorism
8 Chapter 7: Functional Tactics
9 Appendix A: Information Warfare
10 Glossary: TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Force Manual
11 References

Introduction

This training circular (TC), as part of the TC 7-100 series, addresses the irregular opposing force (OPFOR), which in Army training exercises represents a composite of actual threats and enemies that comprise irregular forces. The three primary categories of irregular forces portrayed by the OPFOR are insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals. These actors may operate separately or in conjunction with one another and/or combined with regular military forces as the Hybrid Threat (HT) for training. This TC also addresses other actors present in an operational environment (OE), who may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR through willing support or coercion, and/or may be passive or unknowing supporters of the irregular OPFOR.

Irregular Forces

Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). The distinction of being armed as an individual or group can include a wide range of people who can be categorized correctly or incorrectly as irregular forces. Excluding members of regular armed forces, police, or internal security forces from being considered irregular forces may appear to add some clarity. However, such exclusion is inappropriate when a soldier of a regular armed force, policeman, or internal security force member is concurrently operating in support of insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal activities.

Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination thereof. Any of those forces can be affiliated with mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace. Independent actors can also act on agendas separate from those of irregular forces. Figure I-1 depicts various actors that may be part of or associated with irregular forces.

Figure I-1. Irregular force actors

Closely related to the subject of irregular forces is irregular warfare. JP 1 defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” The definition spotlights a dilemma of conflict in and among a population. It also indicates that the non-state actors characterized as irregular forces may operate in other than military or even military-like (paramilitary) capacities.

Irregular OPFOR and Hybrid Threat for Training

The function of the OPFOR is to portray a threat or enemy in training exercises. Army Regulation (AR) 350-2 establishes policies and procedures for the Army’s Opposing Force Program. Since 2004, that AR has defined opposing force as “a plausible and flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training or developing U.S. forces.” AR 350-2 has defined threat as “any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” However, that definition of threat was much narrower than the way ADRP 3-0 now defines it.

“A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies.” (ADRP 3-0)

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0). A hybrid threat can consist of any combination of two or more of those components.

The preface of TC 7-100 says that TC outlines “the Hybrid Threat that represents a composite of actual threat forces as an opposing force (OPFOR) for training exercises.” After focusing on real-world hybrid threats in its first part, TC 7-100 states: “Part two of this TC focuses on the Hybrid Threat (HT) for U.S. Army training. The HT is a realistic and relevant composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat...represented as an opposing force (OPFOR) in training exercises.” That means that, in the context of the HT for training, the OPFOR can also include nonmilitary actors (such as criminal elements), which are part of the threat faced by the training unit. Since the definition of hybrid threat includes other than military and paramilitary actors, it has broadened the application of the term OPFOR.

The AR 350-2 definition of OPFOR used the term paramilitary forces, defined in JP 3-24 as “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.” However, the ADRP 3-0 (and TC 7-100) definition of hybrid threat uses the broader term irregular forces, defined in JP 3-24 as “armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.” Thus, irregular forces would include paramilitary forces, but also other armed individuals or groups that do not resemble regular armed forces. Although the ADRP 3-0 definition of hybrid threat includes “terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements,” both criminals and actors who use terrorism as a tactic would actually fit under the JP 3-24 definition of irregular forces.

FM 7-100.4 lists criminal organizations under non-state paramilitary actors, but only because “Criminal organizations at the higher end of the scale can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organization.” However, it notes that “individual drug dealers and criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs)” do not have that type of capability. FM 7-100.4 also refers to “other armed combatants” as “nonmilitary personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nevertheless, they may be disgruntled and hostile.” ARDP 3-0 defines “a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized” as an enemy. In a training exercise, such an enemy would be portrayed as part of the OPFOR.

FM 7-100.4 also recognizes the category of “unarmed combatants.” It says: “The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely and materially support hostilities against the United States. ... Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons. ... Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants. Thus, various types of unarmed combatants can be part of the OPFOR.”

Thus, a threat or enemy can be any individual or group—not necessarily military and/or paramilitary, or even armed. The same is true of the OPFOR that represents the threat or enemy in a training exercise.

Tailoring the OPFOR

The OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must be capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained. This TC addresses the irregular OPFOR with a tactical focus on insurgents, guerrillas, and/or criminals. In exercise design (see TC 7-101), the type(s) of forces making up the OPFOR will depend upon the conditions determined to be appropriate for accomplishing training objectives. In some cases, the OPFOR may only need to reflect the nature and capabilities of a regular military force, an irregular force, or a criminal organization. However, in order to be representative of the types of threats the Army is likely to encounter in actual OEs, the OPFOR will often need to represent the capabilities of a hybrid threat. In that context, the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called the Hybrid Threat, with the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid Threat. The HT is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats.

Regular military forces of the OPFOR may have irregular forces and/or criminal elements acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of the Army unit being trained. The OPFOR tactics described in TC 7-100.2 are appropriate for use by an OPFOR that consists either entirely or partly of regular military forces. Some of those tactics, particularly those carried out by smaller organizations, can also be used by insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals. Even those tactics carried out primarily by regular military forces may involve other components of the HT acting in some capacity. When either acting alone or in concert with other components of the HT, irregular forces and/or criminal elements can also use other tactics which are outlined in TC 7-100.3.

Note. After this introduction, the chapters and appendixes of this TC address their topics from the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the irregular OPFOR and other parts of the Hybrid Threat. Likewise, enemy refers to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR, which may be an opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent (normally the United States or a U.S.-led coalition).

Chapter 1: Irregular Opposing Force Fundamentals

This chapter describes the fundamental characteristics of the irregular opposing force (OPFOR). This TC portrays three main categories of irregular OPFOR: insurgents (chapter 2); guerrillas (chapter 3); and criminals (chapter 4). Other actors present in an operational environment (OE) can be willing, coerced, and/or unknowing participants in irregular OPFOR activities (chapter 5). The irregular OPFOR interacts with the eight operational variables that make up an OE. This interaction among variables adds to the complexity of an OE and creates multiple opportunities for the irregular OPFOR to optimize its capabilities against an enemy. The irregular OPFOR can use terrorism as a tactic (chapter 6) in addition to military-like functional techniques (chapter 7). A table in this chapter compares and contrasts the capabilities and limitations characteristic of a guerrilla force, an insurgent organization, and a criminal organization. The particular capabilities and limitations of the various types of irregular OPFOR are described in subsequent chapters of this TC.

Chapter 2: Insurgents

This chapter presents an overview of insurgent organizations and actions as part of the irregular OPFOR for U.S. Army training. The insurgent irregular OPFOR is representative of threats in a resistence movement and/or insurgency that can exist in various operational environments (OEs). Insurgents can be armed or unarmed. In addition to functional tactics (see chapter 7), insurgents can use acts of terrorism (see chapter 6) to intimidate or influence a governing authority or a relevant population.

Chapter 3: Guerrillas

This chapter presents an overview of guerrilla organizations and actions as part of the irregular OPFOR for training U.S. forces. Training conditions presented by this type of OPFOR are a composite of real-world guerrilla forces and indicate guerrilla capabilities and limitations that may be present in actual operational environments (OEs). Guerrilla combat power can be enhanced by possible affiliations with other combatants such as insurgents, criminal elements, special-purpose forces (SPF), or regular military forces. Passive or active civilian supporters can expand guerrilla capabilities.

Chapter 4: Criminals

Criminal elements exist at every level of society and in every operational environment (OE). Their presence, whatever their level of capabilities, adds to the complexity of any OE. They may be intertwined with irregular forces and possibly with regular military and/or paramilitary forces of a nation-state. However, they may also pursue their criminal activities independent of such other actors.

Chapter 5: Noncombatants

A host of noncombatants add complexity to any operational environment (OE). The irregular OPFOR attempts to manipulate these noncombatants in ways that support its goals and objectives. Many noncombatants are completely innocent of any involvement with the irregular OPFOR. However, the irregular OPFOR will seek the advantage of operating within a relevant population of noncombatants whose allegiance and/or support it can sway in its favor. This can include clandestine yet willing active support (as combatants), as well as coerced support, support through passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by noncombatants.

Chapter 6: Terrorism

Terrorism is a tactic. This chapter presents an overview of conditions that are a composite of real-world capabilities and limitations that may be present in a complex operational environment that includes terrorism. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are in conflict. International conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict are often not a constraint on terrorists. Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, and/or purposely haphazard, the physical, symbolic, and/or psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and governing institutions. Social and political pressure, internal and/or external to a relevant population and governing authority, is frequently exploited by terrorists with near real-time media coverage in the global information environment. The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state and/or non-state actors can often isolate an enemy from its relevant population and foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to use terror to achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually defeat an enemy.

Chapter 7: Functional Tactics

Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ adaptive functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission. Then he allocates functional responsibilities to his subordinates and synchronizes the effort.

Note. Since criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional tactics, the term irregular OPFOR in this chapter refers to insurgents and/or guerrillas.

Appendix A: Information Warfare

The irregular OPFOR (including insurgents, guerrillas, and criminal elements) is trained to use adaptive techniques to defeat a superior opponent. Naturally it uses information warfare (INFOWAR) to obtain asymmetrical effects. These tactics are constantly evolving thanks to the exponential growth of networking and information technology. Increased accessibility to the Internet, commoditization of information, and unprecedented global awareness provide the irregular OPFOR with the ability to focus its INFOWAR activities on one of the enemies greatest weaknesses—his dependence on information communication technology in every aspect of his operations.

Glossary: TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Force Manual

References

Documents Needed

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. ADP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013.

ADP 7-0. Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2013. ADRP 1-02. Operational Terms and Graphics. 24 September 2013.

AR 350-2. Opposing Force Program. 9 April 2004.

DOD MIL-STD-2525-C. Common Warfighting Symbology. 17 November 2008.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.

TC 7-100. Hybrid Threat. 26 November 2010.

TC 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. 9 December 2011.

TC 7-101. Exercise Design. 26 November 2010.

Readings Recommended

These sources contain relevant supplemental information. ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 1 August 2012.

AR 11-33. Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP). 17 October 2006.

AR 381-11. Intelligence Support to Capability Development. 26 January 2007. ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011. ATTP 3-21.9. SBCT Infantry Platoon and Squad. 8 December 2010.

DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006. DODD 3000.07. Irregular Warfare. 1 December 2008.

FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007. FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 December 2006.

FM 3-24.2. Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009

FM 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 18 February 2011.

FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009. FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations. 27 December 2004.

FM 7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide. 3 May 2007.

Geneva Conventions. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Geneva_conventions-1949.html JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011

JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 24 November 2010.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011. JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-13.4. Military Deception, 26 January 2012.

JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations. 5 October 2009.

JP 3-26. Counterterrorism. 13 November 2009.

JP 3-40. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 10 June 2009.

Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [Database with Conditions Version 7.1.] 17 July 2012.

U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism

Department of Army Forms

DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil). DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.