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Chapter 7: Functional Tactics

This page is a section of TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces.

Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ adaptive functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission. Then he allocates functional responsibilities to his subordinates and synchronizes the effort.


Note. Since criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional tactics, the term irregular OPFOR in this chapter refers to insurgents and/or guerrillas.


Contents

Functional Organization of Forces and Elements

An irregular OPFOR commander or leader specifies the initial organization of forces or elements within his level of command, according to the specific functions he intends his various subordinates to perform. At brigade level (when that exists in guerrilla units), the subordinate units performing these functions are referred to as forces. At lower levels they are called elements.


Note. This functional organization provides a common language and a clear understanding of how the commander or leader intends his subordinates to fight functionally. Thus, subordinates that perform common tactical tasks such as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, security, deception, or main defense are logically designated as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, security, deception, or main defense forces or elements. Irregular OPFOR commanders and leaders prefer using the clearest and most descriptive term to avoid any confusion. When the irregular OPFOR operates in conjunction with an affiliated regular military force, there is the advantage that regular OPFOR commanders also use this common language.


The commander or leader organizes and designates various forces and elements according to their function in the planned offensive or defensive action. A number of different functions must be executed each time the irregular OPFOR attempts to accomplish a mission. The functions do not change, regardless of where the force or element might happen to be located. However, the function (and hence the functional designation) of a particular force or element may change during the course of a tactical action. The use of precise functional designations for every force or element involved in a particular tactical action allows for a clearer understanding by subordinates of the distinctive functions their commander or leader expects them to perform. It also allows each force or element to know exactly what all of the others are doing at any time. This knowledge facilitates the ability to make quick adjustments and to adapt very rapidly to shifting tactical situations. This practice also assists in a more comprehensive planning process by eliminating the likelihood of some confusion (especially on graphics) of who is responsible for what.


Note. A subordinate designated as a particular functional force or element may also be called upon to perform other, more specific functions. Therefore, the function of that force or element, or part(s) of it, may be more accurately described by a more specific functional designation. For example, a disruption force generally “disrupts,” but also may need to “fix” a part of the enemy forces. In that case, the entire disruption force could become the fixing force, or parts of that force could become fixing elements.


The various functions required to accomplish any given mission can be quite diverse. However, they can be broken down into two very broad categories: action and enabling.

Action Forces and Elements

One part of the organization conducting a particular offensive or defensive action is normally responsible for performing the primary function or task that accomplishes the overall mission goal or objective of that action. In most general terms, therefore, that part can be called the action force or action element. In most cases, however, the higher unit commander will give the action force or element a more specific designation that identifies the specific function or task it is intended to perform, which equates to achieving the objective of the higher command’s mission.

For example, if the objective of the action of a guerrilla company or a grouping of insurgent direct action cells is to conduct a raid, the element designated to complete that action may be called the raiding element. In a brigade-level offensive, a force that completes the primary offensive mission by exploiting a window of opportunity created by another force is called the exploitation force. In defensive actions, the grouping that performs the main defensive mission is called the main defense force or main defense element.

Enabling Forces and Elements

In relation to the action force or element, all other parts of the organization conducting an offensive or defensive action provide enabling functions of various kinds. In most general terms, therefore, each of these parts can be called an enabling force or enabling element. However, each subordinate force or element with an enabling function can be more clearly identified by the specific function or task it performs. For example, an element that clears obstacles to permit an action element to accomplish a battalion’s tactical task is a clearing element.

In most cases, irregular OPFOR tactical actions would involve one or more types of enabling forces or elements designated by their specific function. The most common types include—

  • Disruption force or element. Disrupts enemy preparations or actions; destroys or deceives enemy reconnaissance; begins reducing the effectiveness of key enemy elements.
  • Fixing force or element. Fixes the enemy by preventing a part of his force from moving from a specific location for a specific period of time, so it cannot interfere with the primary OPFOR action.
  • Security force or element. Provides security for other parts of a larger organization, protecting them from observation, destruction, or becoming fixed.
  • Deception force or element. Conducts a deceptive action (such as a demonstration or feint) that leads the enemy to act in ways prejudicial to enemy interests or favoring the success of an OPFOR action force or element.
  • Support force or element. Provides support by fire; other combat or combat service support; or command and control (C2) functions for other parts of a larger organization.
  • Reconnaissance force or element. Conducts specific reconnaissance task(s) tailored to the mission.

Note. In a defensive situation, there may be a particular unit or grouping that the irregular OPFOR commander or leader wants to be protected from enemy observation and fire, to ensure that it will still be available for further actions. This may be designated as the protected force or element.


Flexibility

The function of a particular force or element may change in the course of a tactical action. For example, a grouping originally designated as a reconnaissance element may locate an enemy unit that it has the combat power to engage. In that case, the element in question could become an assault element, ambush element, or raiding element.

Types of Offensive Action

Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of offensive action also used by smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include—

  • Ambush.
  • Assault.
  • Raid.
  • Reconnaissance attack (guerrillas only).

Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack. (See TC 7-100.2 for basic discussion of these offensive actions, as they are also conducted by the regular OPFOR.)

Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the offensive action best suited to accomplishing their mission. Insurgent cells and small guerrilla units typically execute one combat mission at a time. Therefore, it would be rare for such a cell or unit to employ more than one type of offensive action simultaneously. However, irregular OPFOR organizations are dynamic and adapt very quickly to the situation. An offensive action may have to make use of whatever cell(s) or unit(s) can take advantage of a window of opportunity.

Ambush

An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position against a moving or temporarily halted target. In an ambush, the actions of the enemy determine the time, and the irregular OPFOR leader decides on the location. Similar to purposes used by regular military OPFOR, the irregular OPFOR can conduct ambushes to—

  • Destroy or capture enemy elements, personnel, and/or designated very important persons.
  • Secure supplies.
  • Demoralize enemy military forces and officials of a governing authority.
  • Delay introduction of international and/or enemy coalition assistance to a governing authority.
  • Block enemy movements and/or logistics support.
  • Canalize or restrict enemy movement.

The irregular OPFOR can use an ambush as a primary psychological tool in its information warfare (INFOWAR) activities. The psychological effects of ambushes can be enhanced by—

  • Conducting recurring ambushes at known areas and/or points where enemy forces must travel.
  • Changing the tempo or the number of ambushes to appear unpredictable.
  • Attacking targets that were previously considered safe or had not been attacked.
  • Using weapons with range capabilities previously not used in an area of conflict.
  • Increasing weapons and/or demolitions effects against particular targets.

A common tactic is to conduct an ambush as a means to set up ambush(es) of enemy forces that respond to the original ambush. Multiple and nearly simultaneous ambushes can be conducted along likely avenues of approach to the area of the initial ambush. Ambushes may also target enemy medical treatment and evacuation assets, when irregular OPFOR commanders or leaders decide to not comply with international conventions and law of war norms that regular military forces use. The destruction of means to evacuate and treat wounded can instill a sense of tentativeness in enemy soldiers because they realize that, should they become wounded or injured, medical help may not be forthcoming.

Attacking known points of enemy weakness is a fundamental planning consideration for the irregular OPFOR. Correspondingly, the irregular OPFOR avoids enemy strength.

Surprise and overwhelming massed firepower at a specific place and time provides an expectation of tactical success for the irregular OPFOR. Factors that complement tactical surprise and massed firepower are—

  • Detailed plans and rehearsals.
  • Selection of ambush positions.
  • Rapid and violent conduct of the ambush.
  • Disciplined withdrawal of irregular OPFOR elements from the ambush site.

Functional Organization for an Ambush

An ambush force is typically organized into three types of elements: the ambush element, security element, and support element. There may be more than one of each element (see figure 7-1).

Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example)
Figure 7-1. Insurgent ambush (example)
Ambush Element(s)

The ambush element has the mission of attacking and destroying enemy elements in kill zone(s). Other tasks may include capturing personnel and/or recovering supplies and equipment.

Security Element(s)

The security element has a mission to provide early warning to irregular OPFOR elements of any enemy presence that might disrupt the ambush. Another task can be to protect the ambush element from becoming decisively engaged by enemy forces before, during, or after the ambush.

Support Element(s)

The support element can include direct and/or indirect fires and provides general support to improve success of the ambush. The insurgent leader or guerrilla commander typically commands and controls the ambush from the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control.

Executing an Ambush

There are three types of ambushes based on the desired mission effects⎯annihilation, harassment, or containment. The irregular OPFOR conduct ambushes with a particular purpose that often supports a larger tactical action.

Annihilation Ambush

The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to destroy an enemy force within a designated kill zone. In addition to massed direct fires, the irregular OPFOR often increases the lethality of a kill zone with indirect fires, manmade obstacles, mines, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to halt, contain, and kill the enemy force in the kill zone (see figure 7-2).


Note. For guerrilla forces, annihilation ambushes in complex terrain, including urban environments, often involve task-organized hunter-killer (HK) teams.


Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example)
Figure 7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example)

Irregular OPFOR commanders and leaders may be willing to accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of ambush. An annihilation ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks to—

  • Block.
  • Contain.
  • Destroy.

The ambush and support elements normally remain in their fighting positions until the enemy in the kill zone is rendered combat ineffective. The intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the kill zone with concentrated firepower.

Once the enemy is destroyed, the ambush element can secure the kill zone and eliminate any remaining enemy in the kill zone. The support element provides overwatch protection to the ambush element when the ambush element is directed to search the destroyed enemy force and equipment for information and/or intelligence. Weapons and materiel can be seized by the ambush element for future irregular OPFOR tactical actions.

The security element remains in fighting positions to ensure early warning, isolate a kill zone, and prevent any enemy from escaping the kill zone. Once the ambush element clears the kill zone, the ambush force withdraws from the ambush area. The ambush element withdraws first and is followed by the support element. The security element is the last element to depart the kill zone area and delays or blocks any rapid response of enemy forces that attempt to pursue irregular OPFOR elements as they depart the kill zone area. Depending on the size of the ambush force, the elements typically reassemble at a predetermined location and time at a safe house or safe haven.


Note. An irregular OPFOR ambush could employ security elements to provide early warning and/or isolate a series of kill zones on a known convoy route of the enemy. Restrictive natural terrain and manmade features are reinforced with IEDs to disrupt and contain an enemy force in the kill zones. A simple ambush technique is to employ a decoy IED that is observable on an enemy force route. Once enemy forces halt to investigate the potential of an IED detonation, the ambush force initiates the actual ambush with the simultaneous detonation of IEDs directed into the kill zone where enemy soldiers and vehicles are expected to halt. Lead and trail vehicles are initially the primary targets for massed direct fires and destruction. When they are destroyed, the ambush and support elements shift direct and indirect fires from both ends of the enemy column toward the center of the contained enemy forces. The enemy convoy is destroyed with massed overlapping direct and indirect fires. Ambush elements and designated support elements exfiltrate from the area while security elements provide rear security and an all-arms air defense capability against any enemy response forces. On order, security elements also exfiltrate from the ambush site and rendezvous with other guerilla elements at a safe haven.


Harassment Ambush

The purpose of a harassment ambush is to disrupt routine enemy activities, impede the enemy’s freedom of movement, and/or create a negative psychological impact on enemy personnel. The irregular OPFOR may choose to conduct a harassment ambush when the enemy has superior combat power and destruction of an enemy force is not feasible as in an annihilation ambush. This type of ambush does not require the use of obstacles to keep the enemy in the kill zone but can include terrain reinforced into a kill zone with manmade obstacles, mines, and/or IEDs to halt and/or contain the enemy force for a limited period of time. Compared to an annihilation ambush, the irregular OPFOR typically conducts a harassment ambush at a greater distance from the enemy in a kill zone. A harassment ambush often considers the maximum effective range of its weapons when massing firepower.

The irregular OPFOR does not normally accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of ambush. A harassment ambush typically emphasizes tactical tasks that can include—

  • Disrupt.
  • Delay.
  • Defeat.

The ambush and support elements are often combined to provide more effective control of fires throughout the kill zone. This combination is especially useful when the kill zone is quite wide and/or extends for a long distance. The security element provides early warning of any enemy forces conducting reconnaissance prior to the ambush and/or enemy forces attempting to respond to the ambush.

Once the irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines that the ambush has achieved the desired effects, he directs the ambush and support elements to withdraw along designated routes. The security element continues to report on enemy activity in the kill zone area and any attempt of enemy forces to pursue. The irregular OPFOR will not become decisively engaged by enemy forces and often emplace mines and/or IEDs to delay enemy pursuit.

Repeated harassment ambushes against the enemy can⎯

  • Cause the enemy to allocate a disproportionate amount of forces to security tasks which affect other enemy force missions and potentially create enemy vulnerabilities.
  • Create a negative psychological effect upon enemy soldiers and leaders, and officials of a governing authority with which the irregular OPFOR is in conflict.
Containment Ambush

A containment ambush is a security task that is usually part of a larger tactical action. This type of ambush can prevent the enemy from using an avenue of approach or interdicting another tactical action such as a raid or another ambush.

The ambush element can be directed to secure a kill zone, but this task is not necessarily required for mission success. The support and security elements perform the same functions as those described in an annihilation ambush. Obstacles are an integral part of a successful containment ambush. The commander or leader determines if his relative combat power compared to enemy forces is adequate to conduct a containment ambush. The fact that containment may require the irregular OPFOR elements to remain in an ambush site for an extended period places those elements in danger of being fixed and defeated by enemy reinforcements.

The ambush force will normally not accept decisive engagement with the enemy in this type of ambush. However, it can be directed to accept decisive engagement in support of a larger irregular OPFOR action. A containment ambush typically emphasizes related tactical tasks that can include—

  • Contain.
  • Fix.
  • Delay.
  • Defeat.

Command and Control of an Ambush

The commander or leader of the ambush force normally positions himself with the support element and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the ambush element. However, the ambush force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the ambush.

Urban and rural complex terrain provides several tactical advantages to irregular OPFOR ambush, security, and support elements. Operating among indigenous citizens in an urban area or other complex terrain can be used to—

  • Observe enemy forces along known canalized routes or areas of reconnaissance and/or avenues of approach or directions of attack.
  • Provide for easily camouflaged irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
  • Provide covered and/or concealed irregular OPFOR routes into and out of the ambush kill zone area.
  • Improve irregular OPFOR ambush, security, and support positions with cover, concealment, and camouflage of the natural and manmade tactical environment.
  • Encourage deception activities in a relevant civilian population against enemy forces and a governing authority.
  • Encourage techniques that employ overlapping direct fires from multiple directions into a designated kill zone.

Support of an Ambush

An ambush typically requires several types of support. These can include reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR. Covert or overt assistance may also be provided from external sources such as special-purpose forces (SPF) of another state.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is critical to a successful ambush and is continuous in the objective area in order to confirm and/or adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities at the planned objective area in order to select the best terrain on which to locate irregular OPFOR positions.

The irregular OPFOR often has sufficient time in a local community and in vicinity of the objective to observe and interact with the relevant population. Posing as innocent civilians or coercing local civilians and/or civic leaders, irregular OPFOR reconnaissance and surveillance reports combine with the reports from active supporters. Assessing and analyzing these reports assist the commander or leader in finalizing his ambush plan. Once infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintain these routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the ambush. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations and activities is essential to tactical survival.

The irregular OPFOR will closely monitor—

  • Routines of enemy forces selected as the target.
  • Enemy use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork.
  • Lapses in local security measures among groupings of enemy soldiers and vehicles.
  • Routes and response time of enemy quick reaction forces during prior ambushes or irregular OPFOR ruses.
  • Cooperation of governing authority law enforcement and paramilitary units with enemy forces.
  • Medical treatment and evacuation norms of enemy forces.
Fire Support

Fire support is typically in the support element. In most ambushes, support elements in proximity to ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or antitank grenade launchers (ATGLs). However, some support elements may also provide indirect fires from mortars and rockets. Fires can also support security elements, if necessary. The irregular OPFOR emplaces fire support systems with the intention of quickly withdrawing them at the conclusion of the ambush.

Artillery from an affiliated regular military force can augment fires organic to the irregular OPFOR ambush force. Such artillery support can provide additional fires into the kill zone, illumination over it, or smoke to permit withdrawal.

Air Defense

Capabilities for air defense during an ambush may be limited to an all-arms air defense concept, using the small arms and direct fire weapons with the ambush force. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) capability in their weapons company. If allocated to an ambush force, these MANPADS would likely be located in security element(s).


Note. Air defense in the irregular OPFOR can also be improved by state and non-state sponsors providing sophisticated air defense weapons, technologies, training, and logistics support. Other opportunities may arise when insurgents or guerrillas in armed conflict capture or acquire sophisticated air defense weapons. In either case, clandestine state or non-state agents and/or technicians can provide technical support to ensure the effective use of the weapon systems. Examples of state-of-the-art air defense systems include shoulder-fired MANPADS and/or other air defense missiles with detection and tracking systems mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles.


Engineer-like Capabilities

Mobility and countermobility support often depends on insurgents or guerrillas with specialized skills and expertise from their civilian occupations or previous military experience. Guerrilla units include sappers, who are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. Covert or overt assistance may also be provided from external sources such as SPF of another state.

Logistics

Logistics are prepared as caches or supported from safe houses and havens as part of detailed planning and rehearsals. The ambush force typically moves from a secured location with everything it needs to complete the mission. In those rare situations that require a multi-day hide prior to executing the ambush, the ambush force will have to move with its own extra life support. Resupply of the ambush force would significantly increase the chances of its detection and defeat its purpose.

Infowar

INFOWAR activities can support ambushes by concealing the intended action through deception and information protection. An INFOWAR campaign may use successful ambushes to demonstrate the progressive failure of an enemy force and/or governing authority. INFOWAR support of an ambush can temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

Assault

An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation and/or destruction of his position. An assault is a basic form of irregular OPFOR tactical offensive combat. Therefore, other types of offensive action may include an element that conducts an assault to complete the mission. However, that element will typically be given a designation that corresponds to the specific mission accomplished. For example, an element that conducts an assault in the completion of an ambush would be called the ambush element.

Functional Organization for an Assault

The insurgent cell(s) or guerrilla unit(s) conducting an assault constitute an assault force. The assault force typically is organized into three types of elements:

  • Assault element.
  • Security element.
  • Support element.

There may be more than one of each of these types of element.

Assault Element

The assault element is the action element. It maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, destroying any forces there.

Security Element

The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy forces and prevents them from reinforcing the assaulted enemy unit. Security elements often make use of terrain choke points, obstacles, ambushes, and other techniques to resist larger forces for the duration of the assault. The commander or leader may (or may be forced to) accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early warning that is not strong enough to block or delay enemy reinforcements. This decision is based on the specific situation.

Support Element

The support element provides the assault element with one or more of the following:

  • C2.
  • Combat service support (CSS).
  • Supporting direct fire (such as small arms, grenade launchers, or ATGLs).
  • Supporting indirect fire (such as mortars or rockets).
  • Mobility support.

The assault force commander or leader typically commands and controls the assault from the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best exercise C2.

Executing an Assault

An assault is a rapid and violent action that can have significant and even decisive effects. However, a simple direct assault has a very low chance of success without some significant mitigating factors. Decisive assaults are characterized by—

  • Isolation of the objective (enemy position) so that it cannot be reinforced during the assault.
  • Early warning of any approaching enemy reinforcements and/or other security measures by the security element.
  • Effective suppression of the enemy by the support element prior to the assault element maneuvering on the enemy position.
  • Violent fire and maneuver into and through the enemy position.

The assault element maneuvers from its assault position to the objective and destroys the enemy located at the objective. It can conduct attack by fire, but this is often not an optimal method and should be used only when necessary. Typical tactical tasks of the assault element are—

  • Clear.
  • Destroy.
  • Seize.

The irregular OPFOR normally does not assault to secure, since this task indicates an intention to prevent the loss of an objective to subsequent enemy reaction. Any occupation of an objective is typically temporary to minimize the ability of an enemy force to mass overwhelming combat power against the irregular OPFOR. Speed of execution and surprise are critical to an assault. (See figures 7-3 and 7-4 for examples of assaults.).

Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example)
Figure 7-3. Insurgent assault (example)
Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example)
Figure 7-4. Guerrilla assault (example)

The security element is equipped and organized to detect enemy forces that may be able to react to an assault on an objective. While the assault is in progress, security tasks may include the requirement to isolate the objective from any reinforcement by enemy forces, with tasks such as block, contain, or delay. The security element may be directed to conduct similar tasks that allow the assault and support elements to exfiltrate.


Note. A simple, effective, and successful assault technique employed often by the irregular OPFOR is to surprise the enemy by focusing enemy attention in one direction and then assaulting from a different direction in a nearly simultaneous action with massed firepower and maneuver on the objective. Support element(s) shift and/or lift initial small arms fire across the objective as the assault element assaults through the objective. Security element(s) prepare to ambush any enemy response forces and provide early warning to other elements. The assault element is already exfiltrating from the objective when the assault force commander or leader gives the order to support and security element(s) to exfiltrate from the area. A security element with an INFOWAR team can record the successful assault and relay the video and audio coverage to an intermediary for delivery to local media outlets. The INFOWAR team can publish its videotape with added narrative from a higher headquarters spokesperson on an Internet website often within hours of the assault.


The commander or leader of the assault force typically exercises C2 from within the support element. He can also lead the assault element when he determines that his personal presence in the assault is critical to mission success.

The support element controls all combat support (CS) and CSS functions as well as any supporting fires. Tasks expected of support elements in the assault are normally attack by fire and/or support by fire. These direct and/or indirect fires are often intended to divert the enemy’s attention during the maneuver by the assault element.

Command and Control of an Assault

Command and control of the assault masses irregular OPFOR capabilities in time and space for rapid and violent attack on a selected objective. The irregular OPFOR normally plans an assault in detail to improve tactical execution with surprise and deception and in order to achieve temporary superior combat power against an enemy force. However, the irregular OPFOR will often take advantage of an unexpected opportunity as it occurs in order to assault an enemy force.

Fighting in complex terrain can be a significant tactical advantage for the irregular OPFOR. In urban areas the irregular OPFOR can use the civilian community and its infrastructure for shielding and obstacles against enemy forces. The irregular OPFOR may decide to not comply with international conventions and law of war restrictions that apply to regular military forces and governing authorities.


Note. Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (Restrictive terrain or environmental conditions include but are not limited to slope, high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.)


Channelized corridors of urban traffic networks and the vantage points of multi-story buildings and/or surface or subsurface infrastructure can be demoralizing to an enemy force attempting to counter the irregular OPFOR. People and facilities in urban areas provide cover and concealment to the irregular OPFOR. Beyond that, enemy forces often operate within a relevant population that they do not want to alienate due to excessive civilian casualties, restrictions, and/or damage to their facilities and livelihoods. In comparison, rural complex terrain may have fewer people within designated areas but can provide similar cover and concealment advantages to the irregular OPFOR. The civilians that reside in such rural areas can be influenced to support the irregular OPFOR involuntarily or voluntarily through an effective INFOWAR campaign.

Support of an Assault

Support of an assault normally includes reconnaissance, logistics, and INFOWAR. When required for a particular mission, capabilities such as fire support and air defense can be added to the elements conducting an assault.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance effort for an assault is continuous in the objective area in order to confirm and/or adjust information collection and intelligence previously collected and analyzed. The irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities at the planned objective area. Insurgents or guerrillas are often positioned in the local community and in vicinity of the objective posing as innocent civilians conducting normal commercial or social actions. These reconnaissance and surveillance reports, combined with the reports from active supporters, assist the commander or leader of the assault force in finalizing his assault plan to shape, assault, and exfiltrate. Once infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned, the irregular OPFOR maintains these routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the assault. Secrecy of irregular OPFOR locations and activities is essential to tactical survival. Locations of keen interest for reconnaissance and surveillance include—

  • Caches.
  • Infiltration routes.
  • Assault position.
  • Support position.
  • Objective.
  • Exfiltration routes.
  • Safe houses.
Fire Support

The primary mission of fire support in an assault is to suppress the objective and protect the advance of the assault element. Fire support assets are typically part of the support element(s). In most ambushes, support elements in proximity to ambush elements provide supporting direct fires from machineguns and/or ATGLs. However, the support element(s) can also include indirect fire weapons such as mortars and rockets allocated to the assault force.

Air Defense

The typical purpose of air defense support to an assault is to prevent enemy air power from influencing the action of the assault element. All three elements of an assault typically employ the concept of all-arms air defense. If specialized air defense weapons (such as MANPADS) are available, they could be used in any of the elements, but are least likely to be found in the assault element. The security element provides early warning of enemy aerial response to the assault and may try to destroy the enemy aircraft. The support element provides overwatch of the assault element and the objective. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Logistics

Logistics support for an ambush is similar to that for an ambush (see above). The support element is responsible for CSS.

Infowar

INFOWAR support of an assault considers the rapid and violent nature of an assault and the intention to temporarily and psychologically isolate the enemy force. Isolation of the enemy may also use physical means such as simultaneous assaults on multiple objectives to overload the enemy’s ability to respond and/or effectively reinforce an enemy force at a particular irregular OPFOR objective. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

Raid

A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory. Raids are usually small-scale attacks that use surprise and combat power to successfully accomplish the purpose of the mission. Sudden violence characterizes most raids and may be conducted to secure information, materiel, or individuals and can also be used to confuse or deceive an enemy. A raid concludes with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

Raids can be used to⎯

  • Destroy or damaging key systems or facilities (such as command posts, communication facilities, supply depots, radar sites)
  • Seize hostages and/or prisoners.
  • Rescue insurgents, guerrillas, and /or active supporters being detained and/or imprisoned.
  • Destroy, damage, or capture supplies or lines of communication.
  • Obtain or denying critical information to the enemy.
  • Support INFOWAR actions that distract attention from other irregular OPFOR actions, keep the enemy off balance, and/or to cause the enemy to deploy additional units to protect critical sites.

Functional Organization for a Raid

The size and configuration of a raiding force depends upon its mission, the nature and location of the target, and the enemy situation in the objective area. Examples various raiding forces and their missions could include—

  • A small insurgent cell or guerrilla HK team attacking an isolated voting station or a portion of unprotected railroad track.
  • A larger raiding force attacking an enemy checkpoint, convoy route, or a large supply depot.
  • A larger insurgent cell, group of cells, or task-organized guerrilla unit attacking an enemy combat outpost that is attempting to interdict irregular OPFOR movements and control in a geographic area.

Regardless of size and specific capabilities, a raiding force typically consists of three elements: raiding, security, and support. However, a raiding force may employ other functional elements such as a fixing element or breaching element. It may also obtain advice and direct assistance from SPF teams and or regular military forces that are in conflict with the same enemy force or governing authority.

Raiding Element(s)

The raiding element executes the primary task of the raid. That is to destroy or seize the objective of the raid. In some situations, the raiding element moves physically into the objective, and in other cases it is able to accomplish the raiding task from a distance. Other elements of a raid support and/or protect the raiding element while it approaches, enters, and departs the objective.

Security Element(s)

The security element in a raid is primarily focused on enemy containing enemy security forces, blocking enemy response forces, and/or fixing enemy escape from the objective area. Any of these tasks are usually conducted for a limited time period in support of the raid objective. The security element is often equipped and organized to detect enemy forces in the vicinity of the objective and prevent them from alerting enemy forces at the objective. Insurgents or guerrillas may infiltrate into the objective area and position themselves posing as civilians until the time of mission execution.

The task of a security element is to occupy enemy security and response forces and fix these enemy forces so that they cannot react to the raiding element. Security elements deploy to locations where they can deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce the objective or interfere with the raid mission. Insurgents and guerrillas employ an all-arms air defense concept that uses all available weapons to disrupt and/or defeat enemy aircraft. Any additional air defense assets are most likely found in the security element(s).

Covering the withdrawal of the raiding element with a designated level of rear security, the security element typically does not allow itself to become decisively engaged. The size of the security element depends upon the size of the enemy’s estimated capability to intervene and disrupt the raid.

Support Element(s)

The support element in a raid serves several enabling functions that assist in setting the conditions for success of the raid. This support may take several forms. The support element provides fire support, logistics, mobility and countermobility actions, and INFOWAR support to the raiding and security elements.

The commander or leader of the raiding force normally commands and controls the raid from within the support element. However, he will position himself where he can best command and control the raid.

Critical support element tasks are often executed immediately prior to conduct of the raid and/or facilitate its execution. Tasks that assist the raiding element(s) to achieve their objective can include—

  • Breaching and removing obstacles to the objective.
  • Conducting diversionary actions.
  • Providing fire support.

Executing a Raid

Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders plan for a rapid and violent execution of a raid. They do not intend to be decisively engaged with the enemy. The security and support elements normally remain in their fighting positions unless a task requires an element to accompany the raiding element into the objective. A breaching element may be required to clear a lane or lanes in enemy defenses and pass the raiding element(s) through to the objective.

When the intent is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment within the kill zone, concentrated firepower may be able to accomplish the task without physically entering the objective. For example, a guerrilla unit could use indirect fire weapons to raid an enemy site as an attack by fire with no intention of entering the objective site (see the examples in figure 7-5 and 7-6 at pages 7-16 to 7-17).

If the raiding task includes seizing individuals and/or equipment, the raiding element temporarily secures the objective and seizes designated equipment, individuals, and/or other materiel. The support element provides protection to the raiding element when the raiding element searches the objective for information and/or intelligence. The raiding element can seize weapons and other materiel for future irregular OPFOR tactical actions.

Command and Control of a Raid

A raid is conducted by elements that are often autonomous from other irregular OPFOR or regular OPFOR cells or units but can be coordinated in actions to support a common purpose. A raid is not necessarily associated with actions being conducted concurrently by larger OPFOR organizations in the same area. Irregular OPFOR raids are typically conducted by small insurgent cells or guerrilla units at the tactical level of conflict.

The commander or leader of the raiding force normally positions himself with the support element and designates a subordinate leader to move and maneuver with the raiding element. However, the raiding force commander or leader locates himself where he can best command and control the raid and may maneuver with the raiding element into the objective when appropriate.

Support of a Raid

A raid typically requires several types of support. These types of support can typically include reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR.

Reconnaissance

The primary task of reconnaissance and surveillance in a raid is to collect information and intelligence on the target of the raid and monitor all activities in and near the objective. Reconnaissance also identifies the locations of response forces and their expected response routes to the objective during a raid.

Reconnaissance elements confirm and/or adjust information collection collected previously in order to determine current intelligence. Insurgents and guerillas are often members of a local community and easily interact with the relevant population. The irregular OPFOR uses active supporters in the relevant population to observe and report on enemy activities at the objective area in order to select the best terrain in which to locate irregular OPFOR positions. Infiltration and exfiltration routes are planned and rehearsed, and security elements maintain these routes under constant surveillance prior to and during the assault.

In preparation for a raid, the irregular OPFOR will closely monitor—

  • Patterns of enemy force activities selected as the target.
  • Lack of discipline in enemy soldier use of weapons and equipment, crew duties, and teamwork.
  • Lapses in enemy local security measures in the objective area.
  • Availability of enemy quick reaction forces.
Raid Examples
Insurgent Raid

Insurgents could use a raid to rescue an insurgent leader who is being held in a governing authority detention facility. A suicide vehicle-borne IED detonates at the main gate to breach barriers and kill, wound, or daze internal security force (ISF) guards in the immediate vicinity. Concurrently, support elements use small arms and ATGL fire to kill and/or contain other guard forces at a separate gate and small barracks. Security elements detect and ambush enemy reaction forces coming to the aid of the detention facility.

Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example)
Figure 7-5. Insurgent raid (example)
A raiding element of four motorcycles moves through the breach at the main gate to a designated linkup point inside the facility that had been coordinated within a covert operative of the insurgency. The covert operative kills guards inside the holding cells area and releases the insurgent leader. Once the raiding element secures the insurgent leader, the element exits the facility through a side gate and quickly departs the area on motorcycles to a safe house.

During the raid, security elements positioned along likely avenues for enemy response forces ambush and delay law enforcement and quick reaction forces as they approach the detention facility. The local insurgent leader in command of the raid determines that the insurgent leader secured from the facility is now safe and directs support and security elements to exfiltrate from the area.

An INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points. It releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media outlets within hours of the raid.

Guerrilla Raid

A guerrilla battalion could employ a raid to demonstrate the inability of the enemy to effectively defend critical infrastructure. However, the battalion in this example has suffered significant losses, now having only one of its original three guerrilla companies. Therefore, it is reluctant to attempt a raid against an enemy POL installation by physically entering the objective, which has an enemy motorized infantry company and two combat outposts in the vicinity. However, the guerrilla battalion still has two of the original three 107-mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) of its weapons company, although it has lost the crews trained to operate them. So the battalion commander has one guerrilla platoon from his remaining company task-organized as an MRL platoon and moved to a designated site for specialized training in MRL tactical operations. SPF advisors from a neighboring state deploy into the area to train the task-organized platoon and continue plans and rehearsals for the MRL raid. Insurgent leaders and senior guerrilla commanders position themselves to observe the raid. An INFOWAR cell of the local insurgent organization positions to record the raid.

Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example)
Figure 7-6. Guerrilla raid (example)
In this example, the raiding element is one MRL section from the task-organized MRL platoon, with one MRL (broken down into man-packable loads), the mortar crew, and additional riflemen (from the original guerrilla platoon). It infiltrates to a firing point near the maximum range of the rockets and establishes observations posts and security teams. With their weapon reassembled and ammunition ready for firing, the section leader orders the firing to commence. Significant damage is accomplished with three volleys of rockets from the MRL. The guerrillas quickly disassemble the weapon and move to hide positions along multiple exfiltration routes. The INFOWAR cell video and audio records the raid from several vantage points and releases an account of the successful raid on the Internet and to regional media outlets with a message from the local insurgent organization leader. On order, the guerrillas split into small teams and continue to exfiltrate to safe havens in the neighboring mountain range.
Fire Support

Most raids may use support elements in proximity to raiding elements with supporting direct fires from light, medium, or heavy machineguns and/or ATGLs. In some cases, support element(s) can also provide indirect fires from mortars or rockets allocated to the raiding force.

Fire support for a raid can assist in—

  • Isolating a point of penetration in the enemy defenses at the objective.
  • Fixing enemy forces in the objective and protecting the breach of enemy defenses.
  • Suppressing effective direct and indirect fires from enemy forces.
  • Disrupting enemy response forces.
  • Obscuring the vision and sensors of the enemy as the raiding force withdrawals.
Air Defense

The irregular OPFOR recognizes that air defense is an all-arms effort that uses all weapon systems and resources available to the raid. (See TC 7-100.2, chapter 11 for more information on the OPFOR all- arms air defense concept.) The irregular OPFOR seeks new and adaptive ways to employ systems not traditionally associated with air defense. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited MANPADS capability in their weapons company. If allocated to a raiding force, these MANPADS would likely be located in security element(s). Security elements provide early warning and fires against enemy aerial response forces. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

Irregular OPFOR cells and units do not have organic mobility and/or countermobility capabilities. Breaching and/or removing obstacles before and during a raid on an objective may require insurgents or guerrillas with specialized skills and expertise from their civilian professions or previous military experience. Guerrilla sappers are not engineers but can perform some engineer-like functions. The irregular OPFOR may also rely on assistance from affiliated SPF or regular military forces in support of a raid. Tasks in either situation involve ensuring freedom of movement and maneuver to the objective, within the objective and to the target, and timely withdrawal from the objective. Insurgents, guerillas, and/or SPF soldiers with these skills may be located with the raiding, support, and/or security element depending on the assigned tasks.

Logistics

Raids are typically brief in duration. The raiding force will move from a secured location such as a safe house or safe haven to the objective area with all materiel required for the raid. Caches can be used in the vicinity of the objective when this technique improves tactical security and/or when irregular OPFOR materiel needs to be located close to the objective. Caches can also be mobile in transportation masked within a relevant civilian population in urban or rural environments. Examples of mobile caches are as simple as a wheel barrow covered with a tarpaulin to a modern truck with hidden compartments as part of a commercial convoy.

INFOWAR

INFOWAR primarily supports a raid by concealing the action through deception and information protection. Successful raids can be used in INFOWAR to demonstrate the inability of enemy forces to do one or more of the following:

  • Defend civilian, government, and military facilities.
  • Safeguard key representatives of the governing authority.
  • Protect civilian and military infrastructure critical to a governing authority’s counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla campaign.

(See appendix A for more information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

Recurring irregular OPFOR raids can be conducted to—

  • Isolate psychologically the enemy force and governing authority from each other and the relevant civilian population.
  • Degrade the resolve of the enemy force and governing authority to continue counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla operations.
  • Obtain needed materiel to continue the irregular OPFOR.

Reconnaissance Attack (Guerillas)

A reconnaissance attack is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. A guerrilla commander may also use it to gain information about the enemy’s location, dispositions, military capabilities, and possibly his intentions. (Insurgent cells typically do not have sufficient combat power to conduct a reconnaissance attack.)

The guerrillas recognize that an enemy will conduct significant measures to prevent them from gaining critical intelligence. Therefore, quite often they will have to fight for information, using an offensive action to penetrate or circumvent the enemy’s security forces to determine who and/or what is located where or doing what.

The reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious method to collect information and is ordered by a guerrilla commander only after prudent consideration of other tactical alternatives. Key factors in reconnaissance attack considerations are—

  • Accurate situational assessment of an area of responsibility (AOR) within which the guerrillas operate.
  • Contact conditions: having maintained contact with the enemy or the requirement to reestablish contact.
  • Current capabilities to simultaneously support the movement and/or maneuver of multiple reconnaissance, security, and action elements in the guerrilla AOR.
  • Level of active support from the local relevant population.

Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack

Depending on the situation, a guerrilla commander organizing a reconnaissance attack may designate reconnaissance, security, and/or action elements. There may be more than one of each type. The commander may also form various types of support elements.

Reconnaissance Element(s)

If the purpose of the reconnaissance attack is merely to gain information, a guerrilla commander may organize several reconnaissance elements. Their role is to locate enemy elements operating in the unit’s AOR. If the purpose is to also have the capability to fix and/or destroy located enemy elements, the reconnaissance elements provide reconnaissance and surveillance support to the elements that carry out those functions. A tactical option is for security elements to perform this role if reconnaissance elements are not formed. Once a reconnaissance element locates an enemy element, it may become a security element.

Security Element(s)

If the guerrilla commander believes he has sufficient combat power to engage enemy elements that may be located, he may also organize one or more security elements. Size and task organization of security elements are dependent on the assigned mission and the expectation of how long a security element will conduct its functional tasks before arrival of action elements or other elements. (When performing some of these functional tasks, the unit originally designated as a security element may receive a designation that describes that specific function.)

Security elements can either work in conjunction with reconnaissance elements or perform the reconnaissance role for the guerrilla unit. Upon locating an enemy element, a security element may be directed to conduct one of several tactical tasks. It may—

  • Report on conditions in the AOR.
  • Observe and monitor the enemy in the AOR.
  • Locate enemy direct-fire weapons concentrations such as enemy antitank ambush sites.
  • Locate enemy countermobility obstacles along friendly axes.
  • Identify bypasses to enemy countermobility obstacles.
  • Prepare infiltration lanes through enemy countermobility obstacles that cannot be bypassed.
  • Fix enemy forces (as a fixing element).
  • Block probable enemy avenues of withdrawal or reinforcement (as a blocking element).
  • Attack a smaller enemy element (as an ambush element or raiding element).
Action Element(s)

A guerrilla commander task-organizes one or more action elements to conduct designated tasks against enemy element(s). These action elements may receive a functional designation that more specifically describes the action they are to accomplish, such as raiding element. Once an enemy element is located and/or fixed, the action element(s) attack to defeat or destroy the enemy. The number of action elements for a mission is based on the anticipated tasks to engage enemy elements located by reconnaissance and/or security elements. Action elements may be directed to plan for operations in conjunction with one or more security elements in an AOR. Each security element may not necessarily have an action element dedicated to follow and assume an offensive task.

Support Element(s)

One or more support elements can perform various supporting tasks. Typical CS and/or CSS tasks are discussed in subsequent paragraphs under Support of a Reconnaissance Attack.

Executing a Reconnaissance Attack

Multiple attack axes often characterize reconnaissance attacks. Control measures may include start times, check points, orientation objectives, and objective rally points designated for each axis. Multiple axes of advance provide more tactical flexibility to guerrilla elements in accomplishing their respective missions and tasks (see figure 7-7 on page 7-21).

Guerrilla elements normally infiltrate within or into an AOR. The norm is reconnaissance and/or security elements maneuvering separately to find the enemy and/or report on activity and/or conditions along designated routes or axes. When the enemy is located, the guerrilla commander decides on subsequent tasks for his unit. A typical task is to fix the enemy with security forces and attack with action elements to defeat or destroy the enemy. Success often relies on the ability of reconnaissance and/or security elements to operate independently. Action elements are positioned within an AOR to quickly respond to intelligence confirmed by reconnaissance and/or security elements. (See figure 5-7 for an example of a reconnaissance attack.)

Reconnaissance Attack Example
Recent combat actions have severely reduced a guerrilla battalion two guerrilla companies and limited organic fire support. The guerrilla brigade allocates mortar and rocket launcher support as the guerrilla battalion prepares for a reconnaissance attack. The battalion commander uses remnants of his third company to create two dummy companies as deception elements. SPF INFOWAR teams support guerrilla deception activities. Avoiding enemy screening elements, several reconnaissance elements infiltrate to reestablish contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance elements report on activities and conditions within the AOR, identify enemy force locations, and guide security elements into positions to fix enemy forces. Other reconnaissance elements reach their orientation objectives without enemy contact and transition to security tasks. The guerrilla battalion conducts simultaneous attacks on enemy forces using massed direct and indirect fires.
Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example)
Figure 7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example)
Guerrilla forces quickly withdraw to safe havens while security elements and on-call indirect fires prevent any enemy pursuit. The surprise attack by guerrillas disrupts enemy logistics and stalls enemy offensive operations.

Command and Control of a Reconnaissance Attack

A reconnaissance attack requires planning and coordination typically more detailed than in other offensive actions for a guerrilla unit. The commander or leader must plan for multiple reconnaissance and/or security elements operating across a broad area is one consideration. He must also position one or more action elements to respond quickly to tactical opportunities identified by reconnaissance and/or security elements. The organization and positioning of functional elements is further complicated as guerrillas plan to deceive the enemy as to their presence and tactical intentions.

Support of a Reconnaissance Attack

A reconnaissance attack typically requires several types of support. These can include reconnaissance, fire support, air defense, engineer-like capabilities, logistics, and INFOWAR.

Special situations may exist when guerrilla units have levels of capability more expected of regular forces. These capabilities can include armored fighting vehicles, aviation, and additional air defense or fire support. Weapons and equipment can be—

  • Provided by state and/or non-state sponsors.
  • Acquired from indigenous resources.
  • Captured from the enemy.
  • Purchased from criminal organizations and/or other commercial enterprise intermediaries.

Sustained intelligence activities, logistics, and training support are critical aspects of long-term guerrilla unit effectiveness. These types of functional capabilities of a guerrilla unit can be supported by—

  • SPF from a state overtly or covertly affiliated with the guerrilla unit.
  • Regular military force or intelligence activity liaison teams that operate with the guerrilla unit.
  • Criminal organizations with expertise and assets available on a contractual basis to the guerrilla unit.
  • Adherents in the relevant population who actively support guerrilla actions but will not be visibly involved in the direct actions and combat of the guerrilla unit.
  • Higher-level or SPF-supported INFOWAR activities.
Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance in a reconnaissance attack can be conducted in two primary ways. A reconnaissance element can be formed with a mission to find the enemy forces and guide security elements to locations that allow the security elements to fix the enemy forces. When no reconnaissance element is formed, each security element performs its own reconnaissance tasks with the responsibility to both find and fix an enemy force.

Armored Fighting Vehicles

Some guerrilla units may have armored vehicles present in their organization and can use them for particular tasks. When a guerrilla commander believes he has a level of near parity with local enemy forces and is confident in his air defense capabilities for limited periods of time, he can use armored vehicles in his various functional element(s). With effective camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D), he may decide to introduce wheeled and/or tracked armored vehicles from safe havens or local hide positions to augment reconnaissance and/or security elements. The thermal imagers and other electro-optical aids on armored vehicles can be of great value in detecting enemy forces. Armored vehicles can also increase mobility, firepower, and protection for reconnaissance and/or security elements, significantly enhancing their ability to fix and possibly destroy the enemy. The mobility and speed of these vehicles permit them to serve in the action element(s), rapidly orienting on located and/or fixed enemy forces and moving to a position of advantage to destroy them. Especially when the enemy was previously unaware of their presence in the AOR, these armored vehicles can provide a significant advantage in firepower and shock effect.

Fire Support

Fire support is positioned in an AOR to provide responsive fires throughout the reconnaissance phase, security element movement and occupation of fixing and/or blocking positions, and the maneuver and combat of action of elements. Various wheeled, towed, or tracked fire support systems may be available to cover the withdrawal of reconnaissance, security, action, or other support elements after completing the reconnaissance attack mission.

Guerrilla units may include medium and heavy mortars, artillery, and/or rocket systems as a varied collection of antiquated and contemporary capabilities. Mobility of systems can vary also. Guerrilla units may have to improvise transportation, using captured military trucks, local commercial vehicles that conceal a weapon system, or other expedient means. In some cases, pack animals, bicycles with reinforced frames, and/or porters can be used to transport disassembled fire support systems for reassembly at locations unexpected by the enemy.

Aviation

Aviation is not typically anticipated in a guerrilla unit order of battle. However, a guerrilla commander can acquire small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with relative ease through normal means on the commercial market and/or illicit purchases from criminal organizations or other sources. State sponsors can provide technical expertise with clandestine agents and/or technicians or provide training and advice through SPF teams. A guerrilla commander could acquire systems and technical expertise on a contractual basis from disenfranchised experts or rogue non-state enterprises. UAVs in a guerrilla unit can be used to enhance real-time reconnaissance and surveillance in conjunction with reconnaissance elements maneuvering on the ground in an AOR. A number of small UAVs could be armed with IEDs to create an aerial attack capability. Used with a swarm technique on a point or area target, a mass of low-flying UAVs could conduct a disruptive or devastating attack on critical enemy assets.

Aviation in guerrilla units can also include rotary- and/or fixed-wing capabilities. Although these capabilities may be considered exceptional for most guerrilla forces, state and non-state sponsors can covertly introduce limited aviation capabilities into an advanced insurgency and/or highly trained guerrilla units. Operating from a guerrilla enclave or safe haven, even one or two helicopters or fixed-wing commercial aircraft could be converted into an attack system with military-grade rockets or bombs. Capability for aviation attack against a governing authority or its military forces could create a significant psychological impact in a guerrilla INFOWAR campaign.

Air Defense

Guerrilla air defense can be developed to a level of protection that limits enemy aerial response forces and reinforcements from influencing a particular guerrilla mission in the AOR. Any guerrilla unit conducts all-arms air defense as a norm to damage and/or destroy tactical enemy aircraft within the range of their available small arms weapons systems. (For more information on the all-arms air defense concept, see chapter 11 of TC 7-100.2.) However, guerrilla battalions also typically have a limited MANPADS capability in their weapons company. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

Mobility and countermobility support to a reconnaissance attack focuses on freedom of movement and/or maneuver of reconnaissance, security, and action elements. Mobility and countermobility tasks are performed by guerrillas with specialized skills. For example, guerrillas with expertise from civilian engineering occupations and/or previous training by SPF teams may be assigned tasks that concentrate on emplacing rudimentary obstacles and IEDs along planned withdrawal routes to disrupt any pursuit by the enemy after a successful reconnaissance attack. Guerrillas from sapper units can be task-organized to assist various elements in infiltrating through enemy security elements, breaching enemy obstacles, as well as support attacks on located enemy forces or installations.

Additional mobility and countermobility support, training, and assistance can be obtained from sappers in SPF teams that accompany and/or augment a guerrilla unit. SPF and/or guerrilla sappers can also train active supporters in the relevant local population to assist the reconnaissance attack in specified supporting roles. Guerrilla units can use to their advantage the blurred distinctions of what constitutes the role of active support versus being considered a guerrilla. Regardless of who is providing mobility and countermobility support, this guerrilla capability is essential to offensive action in fixing, blocking, and/or attacking enemy forces.


Note. Guerrilla sappers are not combat engineers. However, sappers are trained to perform several tasks that are typical of raider and combat engineer-like functions.


Logistics

A reconnaissance attack can be conducted by widely dispersed guerrilla elements operating over extended time periods and distances. Elements typically carry sufficient logistics with them during their movements. Guerrillas can create and stock caches and/or preposition designated logistics elements in an AOR for multiple reconnaissance advances toward orientation objectives and during guerrilla unit withdrawals to safe havens after a reconnaissance attack.

Guerrillas are self-sufficient as a goal but must often subsist on the local economy without offending a local relevant population. Use of civilian facilities and support of the population to guerrilla units may result in reaction by enemy forces and the governing authority on the civilian population and its institutions. Guerrilla INFOWAR activities amplify enemy repression to increase and sustain tactical and logistics support by a relevant population for guerrilla actions.

INFOWAR

With the support of INFOWAR deception, the guerrilla commander attempts to deceive the enemy concerning the strength and composition of his forces, their current deployment and orientation, and the intended manner of employment. False intelligence provided to enemy forces by active supporters of the guerrillas disrupts enemy information collection. When successfully conducted, deception activities support tactical surprise by the guerrilla force and improve the likelihood of achieving the reconnaissance attack objective.

INFOWAR activities in a reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to—

  • Deceive the enemy force regarding guerrilla actions and intentions.
  • Protect elements of the guerrilla force from being detected.
  • Create a false sense of security in the enemy.
  • Encourage the active and passive support of the guerrilla operations by a relevant population.
  • Demoralize enemy forces and the governing authority they support.

Types of Defensive Action

Insurgents and guerrillas can employ some of the types of defensive action also used by smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR. Such actions can include—

  • Defense of a simple battle position.
  • Defense of a complex battle position.

(See TC 7-100.2 for basic discussion of these types of defensive actions, as they are also conducted by the regular OPFOR.)

Irregular OPFOR leaders and commanders select the defensive action best suited to accomplishing their mission, given the conditions under which they assume a defensive posture. Some parts of an insurgent or guerrilla organization may conduct defensive actions while other parts of the same organization are on the offense.

Battle Positions

A battle position (BP) normally is a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. However, the irregular OPFOR may select defensive locations to avoid contact with an enemy but provide for defense if discovered. When irregular OPFOR leaders determine that they will operate in a defensive posture, defensive positions will be either a simple battle position (SBP) or complex battle position (CBP). The mission and specific circumstances will influence the type of BP to establish and occupy. Figure 5-8 shows examples of symbols for SBPs and CBPs (see figure 7-8.)

Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions
Figure 7-8. Simple and complex battle positions

Note. Sometimes graphics show a relatively large unit, such as a guerrilla battalion or brigade, inside a symbol for a CBP. This actually means that such a unit’s subordinates occupy a series of CBPs within that area.


Simple Battle Position

A simple battle position (SBP) is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. SBPs are not necessarily tied to complex terrain. However, they often employ as much fortification and C3D measures as time allows. Defenses are improved upon continuously until the SBP is abandoned.

Complex Battle Position

A complex battle position (CBP) is a defensive location designed to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and engineer-like capabilities to protect the cells or units within them from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. CBPs typically have the following characteristics that distinguish them from SBPs:

  • Not on or along an enemy avenue of approach.
  • Limited avenues of approach toward and/or in vicinity of a CBP.
  • Observation of any existing avenues of approach.
  • Defensive posture with an integrated 360-degree perimeter.
  • Countermobility and mobility efforts prioritizing C3D measures of the CBP location.
  • Substantial logistics caches.
  • Sanctuary.

Defense of a Simple Battle Position

Construction of an SBP places special attention on the camouflage, concealment, and cover of fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR normally expects significant enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities and recognizes that sophisticated RISTA capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of sophisticated technology and systems may be to embed the SBP within a relevant population in an urban and/or rural environment, or physically use rural and/or urban terrain to mask the presence of SBPs. Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves, and/or village or city dwellings. An SBP or group of SBPs establishes kill zone(s) on likely enemy avenues of approach.

Deceptive techniques can include the façade of being commercial or private equipment, vehicles, work places, and/or public institutions and public gathering places such as houses of worship, hospitals, and civic centers with regular intermingling of the relevant population. Insurgents usually wear the clothing of the local population and often keep weapons, munitions, and materiel in caches that are easily retrievable in the vicinity of the SBP. The same may be true of guerrillas. However, guerrillas may transition to recognizable paramilitary uniforms.

The irregular OPFOR commander or leader makes prudent risk assessments when establishing SBPs. He evaluates the desirability and/or requirement to invest substantial time, effort, and materiel on an SBP. He weighs this against the expectation that he must defeat an enemy that can typically mass combat power quickly against an SBP.

Once the commander or leader decides to defend an SBP, he focuses his available combat power on one or more kill zones. The irregular OPFOR plans and rehearses all actions necessary to prevent enemy penetration of an SBP and/or what an SBP or group of SBPs is protecting, and also considers measures to defeat an enemy penetration of an SBP if it occurs.

The commander or leader considers what criteria he will use to direct a withdrawal and/or withdrawal under pressure from an SBP or group of SBPs. Unless directed to retain a specific SBP by a higher level, the commander or leader responsible for an SBP recognizes that he is committed to a long- term struggle and that preserving combat power for a future engagement may be the appropriate decision. However, some insurgents or guerrillas may have a self-determined commitment or directed mission to fight until killed or captured in a particular SBP.

Functional Organization for Defending an SBP

The commander or leader defends an SBP with cells or units that are organized as functional elements. Typical functional designations are—

  • Disruption element.
  • Main defense element.
  • Reserve element.
  • Support element.
  • Deception element.

There may be more than one of each type. The name of an element describes its function within the defensive action.

Disruptive Element(s)

Insurgents or guerrillas assigned to a disruption element have a mission of identifying enemy reconnaissance efforts and reporting the location, disposition, and composition of approaching enemy forces. When disruption elements have the capability to target and attack designated subsystems of an enemy force, they conduct disruption actions as part of a comprehensive defense plan of the higher commander or leader.

Disruption activities may include direct and indirect fires, remote-controlled or command- detonated IEDs and/or other execution of obstacles to slow, channel, contain, or block an enemy force. The normal intention of a disruption element is to not become decisively engaged by the enemy. However, a commander or leader can direct decisive engagement if the action is necessary to preserve the combat power of other critical capabilities in the irregular OPFOR organization.

Tactical tasks typical of a disruption element include—

  • Ambush.
  • Attack by fire.
  • Delay.
  • Disrupt.

The irregular OPFOR will typically not assign a small cell or unit a fixing task when an expectation of “fix” is to deny movement of any part of an enemy force. A more probable task for the irregular OPFOR in an SBP is “delay” with an expectation to slow the momentum of an enemy advance and cause significant damage to the enemy force without becoming decisively engaged.

A disruption element for an SBP can be as small as one or two insurgents or guerrillas with assault rifles, light and/or medium machineguns, grenade launchers, IEDs, and/or ATGLs. Typically, it is no larger than 8 to12 such personnel.

Main Defense Element(s)

The main defense element of an SBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. Insurgents or guerrillas in a main defense element are prepared to use fires and maneuver to defeat the penetration or seizure of their SBP or other SBPs. Main defense elements focus the combat power of available weapon systems into designated kill zones to defeat or destroy an enemy force.

Reserve Element(s)

The reserve element of an SBP exists to provide the irregular OPFOR commander or leader with tactical flexibility. The commander or leader will normally assign priorities of effort to the reserve element for contingency planning and rehearsals. Although a reserve element may not have specified tasks to perform initially, tactical tasks it can later receive include—

  • Counterattack.
  • Block.
  • Contain.
  • Delay.
  • Defend.
Support Element(s)

The support element of an SBP can include—

  • CSS.
  • C2.
  • Direct fires such as heavy machineguns, ATGLs, antitank guided missiles, recoilless rifles, or automatic grenade launchers.
  • Indirect fires such as mortars or rockets.
  • Nonlethal actions such as smoke obscurants.
  • INFOWAR activities.
  • Engineer-like capabilities with specialized talents of individual insurgents or guerrillas.
Deception Element(s)

To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force measure to portray strength where none exists.

Organizing the Battlefield for an SBP

When establishing an SBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. This normally includes a battle zone and often a support zone. It may also include a disruption zone. (See figures 7-9 and 7-10 for examples of SBP defense.)

Battle Zone

The battle zone is the area where the defending commander or leader commits the preponderance of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces. Generally, an SBP will have its battle zone fires integrated with those of any adjacent SBPs. Fires will orient to form kill zones where the defenders plan to destroy key enemy targets.

Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example)
Figure 7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example)
Disruption Zone

The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to—

  • Report on the enemy situation.
  • Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.
  • Detect attacking forces.
  • Disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach.
  • Engage and destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.

Engagement (such as ambush or attack by fire) in the disruption zone may be beyond the capabilities of a small disruption element. However, it may be able to delay or disrupt the enemy advance or channel it away from the SBP(s). In any case, some level of reconnaissance and/or security will be placed outside of an SBP for early warning of enemy approach.

Support Zone

Depending on the mission and size of the defensive positions, support capabilities may be incorporated into the battle zone of an SBP, or there may be a support zone inside or outside the battle zone. Aside from the support element(s), the support zone may contain a reserve element.

Executing Defense of an SBP

Aggressive security measures throughout the development and occupation of an SBP provide early warning of enemy activities. Once enemy forces are detected, the irregular OPFOR commander or leader decides when to engage the enemy. He may direct that disruption elements engage with direct and indirect fires, or he can continue to observe movements and maneuver of the enemy as it approaches SBP kill zones.

Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example)
Figure 7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example)

On order of the commander or leader, the irregular OPFOR engages the enemy to defeat and/or destroy the enemy in designated kill zones. Given the norm of an enemy quickly responding to contact with additional forces, the commander or leader may decide to withdraw or reposition from initial defensive positions.

The irregular OPFOR can initiate deception activities to confuse an enemy when it is displacing from its initial SBP or SBPs. Deception can include small stay-behind direct action cells or guerrilla teams to indicate a continued defense of an SBP or SBPs. Other actions that can slow the reaction of enemy forces to irregular OPFOR maneuver are keeping insurgents or guerrillas close to or within a relevant civilian population as a shield. Multiple IEDs along withdrawal routes can be both active and inert munitions. Both types of IED-appearing obstacles cause enemy responses to assess and disarm or bypass the munitions.


Note. The commander or leader of an SBP can position main defense elements to mass overlapping small arms fire (SAF) and ATGL fires in to a kill zone or kill zones. He selects the kill zone(s) to best use restrictions in terrain, such as difficult fords across a river. He reinforces the terrain with antipersonnel mines to further channel, separate, or contain the enemy force as it enters the kill zone(s). Security elements are located where they can observe any approaching enemy along ground and aerial avenues of approach to the SBP. The security elements may be directed to continue reporting on enemy activity and to not engage the enemy. Support elements such as mortars are ordered to commence indirect fires in support of machinegun and automatic rifle SAF that coincide with detonation of antipersonnel mines and/or IEDs in and near the kill zone. All SAF orient on identified enemy in their kill zone(s).

When the commander or leader determines that he has achieved the intended effects on the enemy, he directs exfiltration of his elements and rendezvous at a designated location. Main defense elements disengage while support elements continue to suppress enemy forces. Security elements may add their SAF to the suppression. Security and support elements disengage but may leave observers in the area to continue reporting on actions of the enemy.


Command and Control of an SBP Defense

The irregular OPFOR commander or leader will position himself where he can best command and control the defensive fight. Security during defensive preparations includes communications such as couriers, landline or wire intercommunication systems, visual signals, and limited use of cellular telephones. Once the irregular OPFOR initiates the defense with direct and indirect fires, communications make full use of handheld radios and cellular telephone technology.

Support of an SBP Defense

Support of an SBP defense is typically provided from local resources in the geographic area and may include CS and/or CSS. While some of this support resides in irregular OPFOR cells or units, a higher-level organization may temporarily allocated some support or assign it to a particular subordinate cell or unit.

Reconnaissance

SBP defenders will perform aggressive counterreconnaissance activities to prevent the enemy from remaining in reconnaissance contact with the SBP. The irregular OPFOR will observe avenues of approach to provide early warning; determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct fires against key enemy capabilities.

Armored Fighting Vehicles

The irregular OPFOR may occasionally capture armored fighting vehicles or acquire them from other sources operating in the region. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored fighting vehicles are normally concealed and covered in hide positions until the commander or leader directs them into the engagement. Their visible and other signatures are masked to preclude identification by enemy RISTA systems. Once armored fighting vehicles are employed in defensive actions, they move frequently to alternate and supplemental fighting positions to improve their survivability.

Fire Support

Fire support to an SBP or SBPs is usually under the command and control of the commander or leader responsible for the defensive actions. When additional fire support assets are required in a defensive mission, a higher-level organization may allocate assets to a subordinate for a particular mission or on a temporary basis.

Air Defense

The irregular OPFOR in an SBP can employ active and passive air defense measures to protect the defender from air threats within an all-arms air defense concept. Medium or heavy machineguns and shoulder-fired MANPADS may be found in or near an SBP. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

The irregular OPFOR commander or leader is responsible to countermobility and mobility tasks. He uses the specialized talents that exist among insurgents or guerrillas in a cell or unit but does not have cells or units structured for only engineer-like tasks.

Logistics

When present, logistics capabilities will normally be found with the support element, within the SBP. However, they can also be located in caches and safe houses in or near an SBP. Weapons, munitions, and materiel will normally be hidden from open surveillance until just prior to a defensive action. Items are brought from concealment and emplaced in fighting positions on order of the irregular OPFOR commander or leader.

INFOWAR

The SBP obtains support from INFOWAR activities that deceive the enemy as to the defenders’ presence, actual locations, and/or intentions. A successful INFOWAR campaign can promote the impression that the enemy to failing to effectively protect its population. Other INFOWAR messages portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime and further isolate them from a relevant population the irregular OPFOR claims to protect. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

Defense of a Complex Battle Position

C3D measures are critical to the success of a CBP, since the defenders generally want to avoid enemy contact. Additionally, cells or units in a CBP will remain dispersed to negate the effects of precision ordnance strikes. Generally, once the defense is established, non-combat vehicles will be moved away from concentrations of personnel to reduce their signature on the battlefield.

Units defending in CBPs will use restrictive terrain and countermobility efforts to deny the enemy the ability to easily approach the position. Construction of a CBP places special attention on the camouflage, concealment, and cover of fighting positions in urban and rural terrain. The irregular OPFOR normally expects enemy RISTA capabilities to be significant and recognizes that sophisticated RISTA capabilities may be supporting the enemy. An effective counter to such levels of sophisticated technology and systems may be to embed a CBP within a relevant population in an urban and/or rural environment. Examples include the use manmade underground shelters, tunnels, natural shelters such as caves, and/or village or city dwellings.

Cultural shielding is a tactical consideration to deny the enemy the ability to detect and attack a CBP. Examples of cultural shielding in order to create tactical standoff are using a religious location, school, community center, or medical facility as a base of fire or firing from within a crowd of noncombatants.

If a CBP is identified and attacked, the commander or leader will engage only as long as he perceives an ability to defeat the enemy. Prior to becoming decisively overmatched, he will withdraw in order to preserve his combat power. A guerrilla commander or leader can be directed by a higher guerrilla headquarters to accept decisive engagement in order to support a larger mission.

Functional Organization of a CBP Defense

The commander or leader of the defending force organizes his subordinates as functional elements. Typical functional designations are─

  • Disruption element.
  • Main defense element.
  • Reserve element.
  • Support element.
  • Deception element.

These functional elements conduct tactical actions very similar to those used in defending an SBP. That is because the names of these elements identify their basic functions. However, the following paragraphs highlight some differences. There may be more than one of each type of element.

Disruption Element(s)

The disruption element of a CBP is primarily concerned detecting attackers and providing early warning to the defending force. The disruption elements may be directed to only observe and report enemy movements and maneuver but can also be directed to attack enemy forces once they pass the disruption elements.

Main Defense Element(s)

The main defense element of a CBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. This element can be directed to delay an enemy while other cells or units withdraw from direct contact with the enemy.

Reserve Element(s)

The reserve element of a CBP exists to provide the commander or leader with tactical flexibility. Tasks for a reserve element can include—

  • Counterattack.
  • Block.
  • Delay.
  • Defend.
Support Element(s)

The support element of a CBP has tasks that include C2, CS, and CSS for the defending force. Other support functions can include direct and direct fires; countermobility or mobility capabilities; and/or INFOWAR activities. Support elements typically are located within the CBP but can be outside and in the vicinity of a CBP.

Deception Element(s)

To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the defenses and to draw fire away from actual elements, the defending force may establish dummy firing positions and battle positions. In addition to enhancing force protection, the irregular OPFOR may use these deception elements as an economy-of-force measure to portray strength where none exists.

Organizing the Battlefield for a CBP

When establishing a CBP, the commander or leader of the defending force specifies the organization of the battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. He will determine if he designates a battle zone supported by a disruption zone and support zone. (See figures 7-11 on page 7-33 and 7-12 on page 7-34 for examples of a CBP defense.)

Battle Zone

The battle zone is the area where the defending commander commits the preponderance of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy forces or delaying them while the defenders withdraw. In the defense of a CBP, the battle zone is typically the area in and surrounding the CBP that the defending force can influence with its direct fires. It may be larger depending on the availability of indirect fires.

Disruption Zone

The disruption zone is the area outside the battle zone where the defenders may seek to—

  • Report on the enemy situation.
  • Defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts.
  • Detect attacking forces.
  • Disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach.
  • Destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.
Support Zone

The support zone contains C2, CSS, fire support, and other supporting assets. A reserve element may also be located there. The support zone is normally located within the CBP.

Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example)
Figure 7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example)

Executing Defense of a CBP

The commander or leader will determine whether or not to organize a disruption force in a disruption zone. He may determine that the manning and capabilities of his organization are more effectively used with security elements close to the defensive perimeter of the CBP. Whether near or distant from the CBP main defenses, security actions are disruption, active reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance. However, contact with the enemy is on order of the commander or leader. The normal intention is to keep a CBP undiscovered by enemy forces. Working in close coordination with main defense elements, support capabilities are often incorporated into the CBP.

A disruption element in the disruption zone can engage enemy forces in tactical depth as they approach the CBP or CBPs. Direct and indirect fires coordinated by a disruption element can delay and attrit enemy forces and cause them to enter the attack on a CBP in a piecemeal manner.

Main defense elements mass direct and indirect fires to defeat an enemy attack. The commander or leader of the defending force may retain a reserve element and commit it only when necessary to prevent defeat by enemy forces. Support elements in the support zone provide support to defenders in the disruption zone and battle zone as required. In the event the commander or leader orders of a withdrawal from the CBP, some support elements will exfiltrate quickly while other elements such as indirect fires continue support to the main defense elements until directed to disengage by the commander or leader and also exfiltrate.

Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example)
Figure 7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example)

Command and Control of a CBP Defense

The irregular OPFOR leader will position himself where he can best command and control the defensive fight. C2 of a CBP is generally more difficult than that of an SBP because the defenders may be more dispersed. Insurgents or guerrillas operating in and from the CBP use secure communications such as couriers and wire.

Support of a CBP Defense

Support of a CBP can be provided from within the local insurgent or guerrilla organization and/or local resources in the relevant population. Some support may be allocated higher-level irregular OPFOR organizations or from a state or non-state sponsor. Specialized support such as SPF can be temporarily associated with insurgents or guerrillas in a CBP in order to provide training, materiel, and/or tactical and technical advice.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance assets observe avenues of approach key to providing early warning and allow the commander or leader time to defend or to exfiltrate personnel and resources from the CBP. Insurgents, guerrillas, and/or their active supporters embed themselves within local populations. The irregular OPFOR is less likely to engage in counterreconnaissance activities if these actions would reveal CBP location.

Armored Fighting Vehicles

Armored vehicles are not the norm in a CBP. When possessed by the irregular OPFOR, armored fighting vehicles and ad hoc fighting vehicles mounting heavy weapons are normally concealed and covered in hide positions. The commander or leader may retain armored vehicles as part of his reserve for quick response to contingencies in defense of his CBP.

Fire Support

CBPs are typically self-supporting in their defense. Fire support assets normally locate within the CBP but may also locate outside of the CBP perimeter to best employ specific fires. Defenders employ these fires to—

  • Defeat enemy forces in the battle zone.
  • Attrit enemy forces along avenues of approach near a CBP.
  • Disrupt enemy use of landing zones in the vicinity of a CBP.
  • Delay enemy forces to support withdrawal of the irregular OPFOR from the CBP.
Air Defense

Passive air defense is the norm for a CBP. Active air defense generally involves systems that do not emit an electromagnetic signature. Insurgents or guerrillas engage aerial targets on order of the commander or leader. An all-arms air defense concept involves using weapons of all personnel of a CBP to protect against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft threats. However, guerrilla battalions typically have a limited MANPADS capability in their weapons company. When available, shoulder-fired MANPADS would likely be located in disruption or security element(s) that occupy fighting positions near a CBP oriented on probable enemy air avenues of approach. (See note under Air Defense in Support of an Ambush regarding additional air defense assets that may be available.)

Engineer-Like Capabilities

The irregular OPFOR conceals fighting and survivability positions using C3D techniques with locally available resources. Military-manufactured antipersonnel and/or antitank mines and/or IEDs are emplaced on or near likely enemy avenues of approach. Particular mines and/or IEDs are emplaced and secured with a cell or unit designated to arm and/or detonate the munition on order of the commander or leader.

The irregular OPFOR reinforces urban and/or rural terrain to channel enemy forces into kill zones on approaches to a CBP. Obstacles are generally more protective in nature than obstacles used near an SBP. Insurgents or guerrillas may have specialized talents for engineer-like countermobility and mobility tasks. When supported overtly or covertly by a state sponsor, SPF or regular forces may be associated with an insurgent or guerrilla organization in order to provide training, materiel, and advice.

Logistics

Logistics operations of a CBP are generally self-sustaining and blend into the local commerce and daily operations of a relevant population in the vicinity of the CBP. Provisioning a CBP with regular resupply is facilitated by active supporters of the insurgent or guerrilla organization. The commander or leader typically does not coerce local citizens to provide logistics support but can use such extortion when critical commodities are required to sustain the CBP defense.

Supply caches and safe houses are distributed throughout the urban or rural area near the CBP. Other supply caches and safe houses are located within the CBP perimeter.

INFOWAR

Elements from the CBP may attempt to integrate within any local communities for the purpose of gathering information, collecting intelligence, and disseminating INFOWAR themes to the local relevant population. Active supporters of the irregular OPFOR assist the commander or leader in keeping a low profile. INFOWAR activities may focus on downplaying the existence or significance of the CBP. Generally, the CBP will not conduct easily detectable INFOWAR activities that would call the enemy’s attention to it. (See appendix A for additional information on irregular OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities.)

If the presence of a CBP cannot be hidden, INFOWAR may attempt to convince enemy forces that the defenders are friendly to them. It may attempt to convince leaders of the governing authority that the insurgents or guerillas are willing to affiliate and/or associate with them in levels of reconciliation. Other INFOWAR techniques can portray the enemy force and governing authority as a corrupt regime to further isolate them from the relevant population. The insurgents or guerrillas can claim and demonstrate themselves to be the population’s protector. In some cases, senior irregular OPFOR leaders may conduct INFOWAR from a CBP to convince followers in other locations that they are still alive and leading their organizations in the struggle against the enemy. INFOWAR can include support to provide basic social and civic services to the relevant population that is not being provided by the governing authority.

Other INFOWAR techniques can result in the gradual acceptance by the relevant population to the point that members of the insurgent or guerrilla organization become informal or legitimate representatives in civil governance. This recognition can lead to election in a state’s formal voting processes and/or establishing self-proclaimed semi-autonomous enclaves within a state with which the irregular OPFOR is in conflict. In either case, the irregular OPFOR ensures a significant INFOWAR campaign to weaken enemy support and strengthen its own support from a relevant population.

Irregular OPFOR in Hybrid Threat Tactics

The above section of this chapter shows examples of functional tactics in which insurgents and/or guerrillas employ some of the same types of offensive and defensive actions used by smaller tactical units of the irregular OPFOR (see TC 7-100.2). However, insurgents and/or guerrillas may also participate in larger-scale functional tactics when acting as part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (See TC 7-100 for examples of such involvement.) They often work closely with SPF units in such roles.

One would expect the irregular OPFOR to play a relatively minor role in HT tactics, perhaps used as an economy-of-force measure when regular OPFOR units are not available. However, as examples in TC 7-100 show, insurgents and guerrillas can sometimes do things that regular military units cannot. For example, they are well suited to dispersed actions as part of a disruption force in a disruption zone (in offense or defense). However, their small size and ability to blend in with the local population also make it easier for irregular OPFOR units or cells to infiltrate into enemy-held positions. There, they may serve as enabling forces or elements, paving the way for exploitation by larger, regular military units, or they may play key roles as part of an exploitation force or other action force or element that accomplishes the overall mission of the HT action.


Note. Insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals can perform acts of terrorism that complement functional tactics actions separate from or in conjunction with a larger HT force. (See chapter 6 for more details on terrorism.)


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