Difference between revisions of "Europe"
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− | Arnland sits on the southern tip of the Torrikan peninsula. Originally part of the Skolkan Empire, it gained independence in 1917. Arnland is a multi‐party democratic republic with open elections. | + | Arnland sits on the southern tip of the Torrikan peninsula. Originally part of the Skolkan Empire, it gained independence in 1917. Arnland is a multi‐party democratic republic with open elections. There are currently seven political parties with varied representation in the National Assembly, two of these—the center right and the social democrats—have dominated the political landscape for the past 25 years. Arnland’s foreign policy supports the country’s strategic goal of maintaining its independence. The Arnish maintain neutrality in the region while fostering diplomatic—and in some cases military—relations with their regional neighbors. The regional and international relationships maintained and the priorities that are placed in maintaining them change as the ruling parties change, and are a major cause of internal political tension. The European Union (EU) has been in negotiations with Arnland over membership but has yet to enter into any formal agreement. |
The Arnland Armed Forces consists of two distinct components. The Active Defense Force comprises the regular Army, Navy and Air Force units subordinated to the General Staff, while the Standby Defense Force is a regionally based reserve force that answers to the regional governor in peacetime and to the General Staff during war. Arnland’s military forces are essentially dysfunctional. Although there are pockets of excellence, the majority of the forces is poorly trained, poorly equipped, badly paid, and ineffective. | The Arnland Armed Forces consists of two distinct components. The Active Defense Force comprises the regular Army, Navy and Air Force units subordinated to the General Staff, while the Standby Defense Force is a regionally based reserve force that answers to the regional governor in peacetime and to the General Staff during war. Arnland’s military forces are essentially dysfunctional. Although there are pockets of excellence, the majority of the forces is poorly trained, poorly equipped, badly paid, and ineffective. |
Revision as of 17:19, 14 September 2018
“Not every problem has a military solution, but most foreign policy problems have a military dimension.” - Gen. Joseph Dunford: On the frontlines, but playing it down the middle. Washington Examiner Online, June 5 | Jamie McIntyre
The purpose of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Europe is to provide the training, education, and leader development community with a detailed description of the conditions of a series of composite operational environments (OEs) in the European region. Its intent is to present trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios to support specific training and education events rather than a specified scenario. DATE Europe offers discussions of OE conditions through the framework of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. DATE applies to all US Army institutional and operational units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) and partner nations that participate in DATE compliant Army training exercises.
The DATE Europe OE constructs incorporate conditions projected to the year 2028 derived from the TRADOC OE White Paper, “Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations”, August 2012. This document is the TRADOC G-2’s view of the current and near term strategic environment. The goal is to highlight the most significant global conditions and related military implications. Specifically, it is the selection and analysis of key conditions manifesting across the strategic environment through 2028.
TRADOC G-2 uses the OE White Paper to frame all OE work across the Army. Because only when the conditions of the OE are captured, understood, and factored into Army decision-making…only then can realistic training occur….the correct mix of systems and capabilities, and the proper approaches to leader development and education be identified and implemented across the Army. Thus, the DATE Europe conditional framework is designed to optimize desired learning or training objectives within the Army Learning Model use for training, education, and leader development in both the operational and institutional domains.
The DATE Europe Framework reflects the five main characteristics of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) conducted in multiple environmental conditions (arctic, sub-arctic, and temperate continental climate) that are likely to impact land force operations in the future.
- Potential for adversary overmatch - Overmatch is the application of adversary capabilities or unique tactics with the intent to prevent or mitigate U.S. forces tactics or equipment.
- Increased momentum of humanitarian interaction and events - Meeting the challenge of increased momentum will require the Army to integrate capabilities in time, space, and purpose to adapt quickly to momentum shifts.
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) - Solving future WMD challenges require ground forces that have the ability to endure for the considerable amounts of time in inhospitable conditions.
- Increasing importance of the cyber and space domains - As part of MDO, the cyber and space domains increasingly impact land force operations.
- Demographics and operations among populations in complex terrain - With continuing worldwide urbanization; populations in dense urban terrain will be a pervasive condition for future Army operations.
DATE Europe's composite countries encompass over 751,000 square kilometers (290,000 square miles), of a varied and complex region which encompasses much of Scandinavia. The region includes the OEs of Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, and Torrike. It also incorporates the influences and activities of OEs from other DATEs; principally western Donovia, Olvana, and Pirtuni.[1] The region has a long history of instability and conflict; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors have increasing strategic interests in the region. DATE Europe thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.
DATE Europe adversary nations observed and analyzed western military operations since the early 1990’s. This includes but not limited to military operations such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, etc. Using knowledge developed from these observations, the nations redesigned their respective force structures, types of equipment, and doctrinal constructs to achieve the desired objective of a peer to peer to at least a near peer capable force. Respective modernization efforts began as early as 2008 and progressed steadily on a timeline to reach full modernization to a Tier One structure by the target year 2026. As part of the military dimension discussed by Gen. Dunford, perception of NATO influence and activities drives various responses from the DATE Europe OEs. Recognizing that NATO Article 5[2] agreements specify that an armed attack against one or more partners constitutes an attack against all, the OEs shape their relations with NATO through the Gulf of Bothnia Cooperation Council (GBCC).
Key Points
- DATE Europe is neither a scenario or vignette. It is a conditional framework to facilitate the development of a scenario or vignette.
- With the exception of Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, Torrike, Donovia and Pirtuni all other countries in DATE Europe are real-world.
- Incorporates the complexity in the region created by both NATO members and partner nations.
- Real-world countries cannot be an adversarial country.
- Threat Force Structures (TFS) for each OE are equivalent to Administrative Structures in Western armies; Orders of Battle (ORBATs) are task-organized units from within a TFS.
DATE Europe Operational Environments (OEs)
Arnland
Arnland sits on the southern tip of the Torrikan peninsula. Originally part of the Skolkan Empire, it gained independence in 1917. Arnland is a multi‐party democratic republic with open elections. There are currently seven political parties with varied representation in the National Assembly, two of these—the center right and the social democrats—have dominated the political landscape for the past 25 years. Arnland’s foreign policy supports the country’s strategic goal of maintaining its independence. The Arnish maintain neutrality in the region while fostering diplomatic—and in some cases military—relations with their regional neighbors. The regional and international relationships maintained and the priorities that are placed in maintaining them change as the ruling parties change, and are a major cause of internal political tension. The European Union (EU) has been in negotiations with Arnland over membership but has yet to enter into any formal agreement.
The Arnland Armed Forces consists of two distinct components. The Active Defense Force comprises the regular Army, Navy and Air Force units subordinated to the General Staff, while the Standby Defense Force is a regionally based reserve force that answers to the regional governor in peacetime and to the General Staff during war. Arnland’s military forces are essentially dysfunctional. Although there are pockets of excellence, the majority of the forces is poorly trained, poorly equipped, badly paid, and ineffective.
Bothnia
Bothnia is a country famous for its scenic beauty. Thousands of lakes dot its landscape, and thick forests cover almost two‐thirds of the land. The country is a socialist state; although officially there are three main political parties, in reality the Socialist Party of Bothnia dominates the political environment—in effect allowing the other two parties to exist to offer the illusion of choice for the population. Relations with other former Skolkan Empire countries are good except for that with Torrike, which has been strained over Bothnia’s claim to the island of Gotland.
The essence of Bothnia’s defense policy is to defend the State and the achievements of the Bothnian people against all aggressors and threats, whether external or internal. To this end, the purpose of the military is to prepare, plan and execute the total defense of Bothnia, in conjunction with all other agencies of the Bothnian State. The policy allows for all methods to be used to ensure the survival of the State and does not preclude preemptive actions or actions limited to the territory of Bothnia. As such Bothnia’s military is sizeable, with some 120,000 troops in service with, theoretically, another 1,000,000 eligible to be called up from the Reserve.
The deterioration of relations with Torrike and the increased threat of NATO have forced Bothnia to reevaluate its status in the region. It increasingly sees Donovia as an ally and a useful counterbalance to the influence of NATO and the EU. Bothnia is also wary of the motivations of the Baltic States following their admission into NATO; as a result, Bothnia perceives a “threat” from multiple entities.
Framland
Framland is a prosperous country to the east of Torrike; it stretches from the Baltic Sea to north of the Arctic Circle. The country is a multi‐party constitutional monarchy with open elections and political power vested in the prime minister. Its population enjoys freedom of speech and expression, and its relatively stable economy ensures a reasonable standard of living. The Framish people clearly consider themselves Europeans, but are hesitant to become a member of the EU, seeing it as compromising their national identity.
While maintaining good relations with the rest of European nations, Framland is extremely aware of the strategic visions of Bothnia and Torrike. Their claims to power and land within the region create the potential for confrontation with Framland. Notwithstanding these perceptions, Framland cultivates and enjoys good relations with both of its larger neighbors. It is a member of the UN and continues to build its relationship with both NATO and the EU, albeit keeping the latter two at arm’s length. Framland and Donovia have normal political relations with growing economic and cultural exchanges, especially on a regional basis; however, they both foster an age‐old distrust, and have diverging attitudes toward democracy and human rights.
The Framland Defense Force is unusual in the region in that it is all volunteer and does not rely on conscription. It is also the smallest force in the region by a considerable margin. Notwithstanding size, the armed forces in general, and the army in particular, have built up considerable operational expertise through deployments on UN and associated missions. In keeping with the country’s modern and Western outlook, the armed forces are completely apolitical. The Framish government uses its armed forces as a useful diplomatic tool to build stability throughout the world.
Otso
Otso sits on the easternmost edge of the region. Previously part of a larger Otsobothnia, it has been an independent nation since the end of World War II. Otso is a constitutional monarchy with open elections and three prominent political parties. The country prides itself on being neutral not only within the old Skolkan region, but also in regards to the EU and NATO. In reality, the government and populace tend to have Donovian sympathies. Donovia originally utilized Otso as a buffer between itself and the wider alliance of Torrike and Bothnia. The recent souring of the relationship between Bothnia and Torrike created the opportunity to use Otso as a stepping stone to advance Donovia’s influence in the region.
Otso’s main political and military aim is to contribute to regional stability through the application of a firm and fair policy of neutrality. Otso considers itself as setting an enlightened example and support for the UN is a key pillar of this policy. A primary component of this is to ensure that any dispute is brought to arbitration at the earliest opportunity and full engagement of the relevant international bodies is actively pursued.
Otso has a small population and its armed forces are correspondingly small. The basic structure is built on the Otsonian perception of the Canadian model, with a single service (defense forces) and specialist branches (land, air, naval). The forces are largely conscripted, with a professional core; the ratio of regular personnel to conscripts varies depending on the complexity of the assigned task. On completion of service, conscripts have a reserve liability until their 50th birthday.
Torrike
Torrike lies in the region’s west and represents the heartland and remnant core of a once considerably larger and more powerful political entity, the Skolkan Empire. The country’s formal political system is a democratic republic, with both President and Parliament being subject to periodic election. However, Torrike’s power structure is highly centralized and features appointment rather than election to most offices, with control of patronage resting with the President. Parliament is dominated by the Torrike Unity Party, either alone or in coalition with the Torrikan Nationalist Party. There are formal and informal mechanisms for dealing with political dissent that can be used ruthlessly when needed; however, most Torrikans are content with their system, and those who oppose current policies have little traction.
The country’s foreign policy is based on the overriding principle that it is the natural regional leader and that the other nations should align themselves under Torrike’s benevolent guidance. Frictions are high between Torrike and Bothnia due to the latter’s recent claim of sovereignty over the island of Gotland, despite it being in Torrikan waters. This is further exacerbated by the improving relationship between Bothnia and Donovia, putting not only the Torrikan concept of resurrecting a Torrike lead empire in jeopardy, but also strengthening Bothnia’s position within the region. Torrike has increasingly come to regard NATO as an aggressive, expansionist, and interventionist political entity that poses a potential strategic threat to the country’s regional ambitions. Framland is considered a reliable neighbor, albeit one with a differing international outlook.
The Torrikan Armed Forces are modern, structurally sound, and well equipped. In theory a largely conscript force, national service is used to identify suitable candidates for long-term service and the reserves. All adults are subject to conscription and must complete an induction period that provides basic military training and an assessment period for identifying potential future leaders. The armed forces have always had a highly intellectual approach to warfare, seeking to maximize their effectiveness through a vigorous analysis of strategy and tactics. However, the Torrikan Armed Forces have little actual operational experience and have only exercised with Framland and, to a lesser extent, Arnland. Otsonian military observers monitoring Torrikan exercises have found them to be somewhat rigid in outlook.
Strategic Positioning
The Skolkan Empire once comprised all of what are now the countries of Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, and Torrike, with lordship over Norway. The Empire periodically attempted to extend its power into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but its influence was always tenuous. Toward the end of the 19th century it became more and more obvious that the cohesion among the Skolkan nations was rapidly degrading. The Empire ultimately split into the countries of Arnland, Framland, Torrike, and Otsobothnia, with the latter eventually dividing into the nations of Otso and Bothnia; Norway also gained independence during this turbulent time.
Relations among the countries in this region are heavily influenced by this past history and proximity to Donovia. Framland considers itself a staunchly neutral European nation and is wary of its stronger and more ambitious neighbors of Bothnia and Torrike. Arnland works to maintain its independence through neutrality and diplomacy, and leans toward the West and EU membership; it also borders the regionally important chokepoint between the North Sea/Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea. Torrike is working to re-establish an empire and sees itself as the regional leader—thus setting itself against Donovian interests in the region. Torrike’s alliance with Bothnia helped bolster its position until their recent falling out over the island of Gotland. As the westernmost country on the Gulf of Finland, Bothnia can potentially limit both Otso’s and Donovia’s wider maritime access to the Baltic Sea as well. However, the country is unlikely to do so: it simultaneously views Donovia as an ally and Otso as a buffer against the same—thus helping to ensure its continued independence. Otso seeks to utilize this position to its advantage, fostering positive relations with both Donovia and Bothnia in order to cement its position as neutral neighbor and buffer state.
Strategic Logistics Conditions
For each country the strategic logistics complex is the foundation for support of national military objectives. Fundamental logistics objectives make possible the twin notions of total war and employing all means necessary. As a consequence, each country fully integrates civilian and military components of both its materiel and service industries to support national defense. Thus, the strategic logistics complex includes the national industrial base with its supply points, distribution centers, arsenals, plants, manufacturing facilities, medical support, and personnel support centers. While this national industrial base is capable of building everything from small arms to nuclear-capable missiles, the government of each country sets policy to define logistic priorities that direct the selection of system designs, production targets, and support of fielded systems.
The design of national level logistics systems focuses on meeting the needs of the nation for both civilian and defense sectors. The degree to which government policy emphasizes one sector over the other determines the type military force available to meet national objectives for offense or defense. Ultimately, each country approaches national security strategy with the view that both its military force and the entire population be prepared for the sudden outbreak of war or for response to natural disasters. Each country directs and provides resources to make major improvements in all aspects of its logistics system based on these priorities.
OE Security Policy
In planning and execution, each OE establishes priorities and assigns responsibilities to each department or ministry for support of national defense. The government leadership specifies a lead individual, directorate, or agency to act as the executive agent, responsible for integrating all the instruments of national power under one cohesive national security strategy. Each OE accomplishes this security function using different techniques but ultimately their objective is overall defense of the country.
The executive agent marshals all elements of national power to fulfill security policy. Policy execution ranges from identification and allocation of civilian and military manpower to designation of raw materials to maintain a ratio of consumer goods to military systems. Management of manpower resources entails several approaches; maintenance of a standing army, a mix of military cadre supported by a large reserve for wartime mobilization, or even a reliance on private military contract expertise. The method selected determines peacetime military force, training, and other resources as well as the mobilization structure required to achieve full national defensive posture.
Regional Views of the US
The view that each country holds toward the US primarily aligns with its political leaning and strategic position. Torrike is wary of the US for several reasons: the plan to revive some form of a Torrike-lead empire; US dominance in the Atlantic Ocean—and thus ability to curtail Torrikan access to the same; and US presence in neighboring NATO member Norway. Bothnia takes a similar view of US power and influence in the region, and for comparable reasons. Otso is careful to remain neutral in its interactions with the United States in light of its geographical position as Bothnia’s and Donovia’s neighbor. Framland and Arnland are inclined to view the US as part of the NATO and EU counterbalance to Bothnia, Donovia, and Torrike—which helps ensure their continued independence—and react accordingly. While US strength is respected throughout the region, none of the countries would place the United States in the category of “friend or protector.”
Regional PMESII-PT Overview
Political
The governments in DATE Europe tend to fall on opposite ends of the spectrum. Arnland, Framland, and Otso are liberal democracies, while Bothnia and Torrike are effectively one-party autocratic governments. With the exception of Torrike—which desires regional hegemony—all of the governments act in ways to ensure their country’s continued existence as an independent entity, either by working to remain neutral or by allying themselves with other, more powerful nations or organizations.
Gulf of Bothnia Cooperation Council
The major regional entity is the Gulf of Bothnia Cooperation Council (GBCC), an intergovernmental political and economic union. Member States consist of all countries of the Gulf of Bothnia: Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, and Torrike; Donovia has Observer status.
The GBCC members have an established security cooperation agreements with Donovia. The agreement ensures annual training and exchanges with a focus on equipment, military doctrine, counter-terrorism, arms control, and broader government cooperation. The GBCC has been working with Donovia and other western countries on buying counter-UAV technology, robotics, and training.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
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Military
Military forces in the region vary in size, but have similar purposes. Arnland has a small, dysfunctional defensive military that is focused on the country’s perception that Torrike poses a threat to its independence. Bothnia’s military forces are strongly defensive in nature and focused against the West, though possession of ballistic missiles means the country could choose to take the offense. In addition, the nation is modernizing its defense equipment. Framland possesses the smallest armed forces in the region. Acutely aware of this fact, the country focuses on other methods—diplomatic and economic—to help ensure its continued existence as an independent entity. Otso’s military focus is two-fold: defend against external aggression, and support world peace through deployments in support of international peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Torrike fields modern, well-equipped armed forces designed to prevent interference with its regional ambitions by outside parties—namely NATO. While the military is supposedly defensive in nature, Torrike states it will not hesitate to use power projection in order to protect its interests.
Despite its public statements about being a political and economic entity only, defense matters are discussed within the forum of the GBCC but there has been no suggestion of any military alliance. However in the last three years there has been an increase in military activities. Recent GBCC activities have expanded to include increased military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and counter‐terrorism.
There have been a number of GBCC joint military exercises. The first of these was held in 2003, with the first phase taking place in Torrike and the second in Bothnia. Since then Torrike and Bothnia teamed up for large‐scale war games in in odd-numbered years (2005, 2007, 2009, 2011) under the auspices of the GBCC, but since the dispute over the sovereignty of Gotland began there have been no further joint exercises.
Many observers believe that one of the original purposes of the GBCC was to serve as a counterbalance to NATO and other organizations such as the EU with a military structure, however this never quite came to fruition.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
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Economic
The economic conditions in the five countries cover a wide spectrum, ranging from strong open markets, to weak capitalistic systems reliant on international aid, to oppressive state-controlled ones. Despite their differences, the countries’ economies are heavily intertwined with each other. Arnland exports goods and electricity to Torrike and the EU. Bothnia’s primary trading partners are other regional countries. Framland receives part of its energy from Torrike—one of its most important trade partners. Otso is heavily dependent on raw material imports from other regional countries. Torrike relies on Arnland for energy and labor. Any major change to just one of the regional economies could have significant ripple effects on those of the others.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
Economic |
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Social
The countries in the region vary little in social aspects. All possess a nearly homogeneous population in terms of both ethnicity and language, with English as a common second language. Christian religions—primarily Lutheran and Catholic—are the most common faiths, but church attendance is sparse and an increasing number of people do not identify with a religion at all. Though indigenous religions are present, they are followed by only a small minority of the population. Birth rates are low throughout the region, while the percentage of elderly is growing. Education is highly valued in all countries as a way for individuals to improve their socioeconomic situations, and public education is universal and usually high-quality. The exception is Arnland, where residents must rely on private tutoring for any hope of gaining acceptance to a university. Crime in the region tends to be similar in type and level to that of other Europeans nations.
Crime is a growing problem throughout the region. Most common is smuggling of several varieties. However, transnational organized crime organizations exist in each country and have linkages to the Caucuses, the Pacific, Africa, and Europe.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
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Transnational Criminal Organization | Criminal activity | Gulf of Bothnia Cooperation Council (GBCC) Countries | Extra-regional linkage |
Atbrivosana/ATB | Hackers-for-hire in the criminal world
Ransomware Distributed denial of services (DDOS) attacks Introduction of malware (logic bombs, worms) into servers and individual computers Defacing public websites The Otsan branch has become very effective at cyber-theft and the use of ransomware. Darknet/Dark Wallet operations Cryptocurrency mining and theft Linked to ZI. No allegiance to NATO or the former Skolkan countries but will work with them for the right price. |
Bothnia, Framland, Otso, Torrike | *Suspected of assisting Donovia in disinformation campaigns
*Linked to ZI in Latvia |
Baltic Buddies | Cyber theft
Media manipulation Perception management through the Internet Development and dissemination of “fake news” |
Bothnia | *Estonia
*Latvia *Lithuania *Suspected cells throughout Europe |
Bloodsport | Smuggling and human trafficking | Arnland, Torrike | Donya Syndicate from Kujenga, Africa |
Donovian Mafia | Prostitution
Drug trafficking Financial crimes (Cryptocurrency mining and theft, Dark Wallet operations) European smuggling Protection Extortion |
Bothnia, Framland, Otso, Torrike | Donovian Mafia in the Caucasus |
Furnace Motorcycle Club (MC) | Local methamphetamine production and distribution
Prostitution Smuggling Extortion Motorcycle and car theft Murder for hire |
Bothnia, Framland, Otso, Torrike | *U.S. chapters
*Bocyowicz Crime Family (BCF) in Atropia |
“G.Y.” = Gammal Yrkesbrottsling | Protection
Cigarette smuggling Pimping |
Torrike | Criminals in Norway and Framland |
Legion | Robbery
Extortion |
Torrike | Hodari Cartel in Amari, Africa |
Nutakus | Asian smuggling
Corruption stevedores at ports, local law enforcement officers and judges |
Bothnia, Torrike | Nutakus in Olvana |
Saints of Cognitio (SoC) | INFOWAR capabilities
Media manipulation Information activities Computer warfare |
Bothnia | Elements in Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia, with increasing activity world-wide |
Uber Cyber “Tree”, AKA “SPRUC_3”, “Spruce 3”, “3ntity”, and “Entity” | Decentralized Anonymous network of “Blackhat” hackers. Anti-NATO in political position.
Darknet/Dark Wallet operations Cyber theft Cryptocurrency mining and theft Money laundering |
Arnland, Bothnia, Torrike | Europe |
Ziepiekkalns Izturiba (ZI), AKA “Ziepiekkalns Resistance” | Kidnapping, prostitution and human trafficking
Weapons trafficking Drug trafficking Financial crimes (cryptocurrency theft and money laundering, Dark Wallet operations) European smuggling Protection Extortion Corruption of politicians, local law enforcement, and unions; Loan sharking Illegal high-stakes gambling Cargo highjacking (sea and truck) Homicide |
Arnland, Otso | *Latvia
*Europe *ATB |
Information
The countries all possess a modern communications architecture and each government recognizes the importance and influence of media and its control. Approaches range from extremely loose to tight governmental control. Bothnia and Torrike practice strong control over public communications media in an attempt to control their populations, while Arnland, Framland, and Otso do the opposite. However, even in the latter group there is some soft censorship: extremist views are rarely published, and Otsonian media outlets are wary of distributing material that would easily offend Donovia or Bothnia. New means of information-sharing using modern technology are rapidly adopted by the population, unless the government intervenes in an attempt to control information flow.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
Information |
Infrastructure
The region displays relative uniformity of infrastructure in types, scope, and maintenance levels. Over 60% of the populace resides in cities; the one notable exception is Framland, where fewer than half of the residents live in an urban environment. With the exception of the far north, utilities and transportation are well-distributed in both urban and rural areas. Power generation relies heavily on hydropower, nuclear, and fossil fuels, with renewable fuels (biomass, peat, wood) and wind power playing a lesser role. All countries have modern Western-style roads, rail, airports, seaports, and mass transit, though maintenance levels vary somewhat. Framland and Torrike’s infrastructures are well-maintained; Bothnia and Otso have recently completed infrastructure development programs, including improvements to their ports for cold-weather operations; while Arnland’s deteriorating infrastructure reflects the country’s struggle to fund maintenance. Of the five countries, Otso is the only country whose infrastructure is somewhat lacking in scope. Regional travel is efficient and can occur by road, rail, ferry, or plane.
River Crossing Capability
Each nation within the Gulf of Bothnia Cooperation Council and Donovia are trained in river crossing and bridge construction. They can assemble a pontoon bridge up to 544 meters in length over water in 24 hours that is capable of supporting rail and vehicular traffic. Each nation also can assemble a 200 meter pontoon bridge of similar type and function in approximately 12 hours.
Donovian Rail network (Infrastructure )
Donovia has multiple rail lines to support the transport of commercial and military cargo and equipment towards the borders of Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus. During the past 12 years, Donovia has conducted multiple upgrades to the rail network system (digital switching, improved track, ands diesel powered engines) to support the movement of heavy cargo such as coal, oil, petroleum products, industrial chemical products, and containerized cargo. The rail lines are generally single track broad gauge. However, there are some segments that are double track.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
Infrastructure |
Physical Environment
Arnland, Framland, and Torrike lie to the west of the Gulf of Bothnia, on the same peninsula as Norway, while Bothnia and Otso are on the eastern side. Each country possesses a mainland area, a coastline, and a few outer islands. The countries all consist of flat to rolling terrain except Torrike, which also has a mountainous spine on its western border. Heavily treed, the far southern part of the region has deciduous trees, while the more northern areas boast conifers. The higher mountains of Torrike lie above the tree line, and are instead covered with hardy grasses. The southern areas experience a temperate climate, while the northern climate is subarctic in nature. All countries have four seasons, with winter increasing in length the farther north one travels—resulting in a corresponding lessening of agricultural cultivation. Major geographic features include the Torrikan mountains and a plethora of rivers, lakes, and streams. The most important bodies of water are the seas and gulfs, which provide both sustenance and a means of transportation. Several islands in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothinia, such as Gotland and Bornholm, lie in strategic locations that dominate shipping, telecommunications, and commercial air routes throughout the region. Multiple natural hazards exist, including droughts, floods, forest fires, land and mudslides in the mountains, and ice floes on the major bodies of water.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
Physical Environment |
Time
All DATE Europe countries use the Gregorian calendar. Arnland, Framland, and Torrike are in the Central European time zone (GMT +1), while Bothnia and Otso are on Eastern European time (GMT +2). All of the regional countries observe Daylight Savings Time (DST). The relative proximity to the North Pole means that the days are very long in summer (up to 18 hours of sunlight) and short in winter (seven hours of sunlight).
Approaches to time are consistent throughout the region: good timekeeping is the norm, and poor timekeeping is seen as disrespectful. The only notable exception is Bothnia, in that the more senior/high-ranking an individual is, the more lax he will be in adhering to a schedule. This is accepted and should be taken into account when planning meetings, etc.
REGIONAL SUMMARY | |||||
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Arnland | Bothnia | Framland | Otso | Torrike | |
Time |
DATE Europe Quick Links . | |
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Arnland | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Bothnia | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Donovia-West | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Framland | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Otso | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Pirtuni | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Torrike | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
Other | Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions • DATE Map References • Using the DATE |
- ↑ The DATE countries listed below are fictionalized territories at the national and first-order administrative levels (i.e. province or county depending on the country). Lower order boundaries such as city wards and municipalities, and physical features such as mountains, rivers, and deserts, have retained their actual names. In many cases literature and media sources will use more than one name for a feature, and may spell them in different ways. As practicable, DATE will follow the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency's guidance contained in the Geonet Names Server (GNS), "the official repository of standard spellings of all foreign geographic names sanctioned by the United States Board on Geographic Names (US BGN)". However, the reader should be cautioned that reference texts and maps may use these other variants. These common variants are also listed in the GNS. DATE Europe can, as needed, be used in conjunction with any, or all, of the other DATEs: DATE Africa, DATE Caucasus, and DATE Pacific. (See also Using the DATE and TC 7-101 Exercise Design). A glossary of terms used throughout DATE Europe can be found in the DATE Europe Glossary along with the real-world names of various cities and towns etc which have been altered within each OE.
- ↑ Article 5 “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”