TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics

This training circular (TC), as part of the TC 7-100 series, describes an opposing force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces for potential combat operations. This OPFOR reflects a composite of the characteristics of military and/or paramilitary forces that may be present in actual operational environments (OEs) in which U.S. forces might become involved in the near- and mid-term. Like those actual threats or enemies, the OPFOR will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The nature of OEs is constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments to keep pace with real-world developments.

Operational Environments

The DOD officially defines an operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (JP 3-0). This definition applies to an OE for a specific operation, at any level of command. In planning a training scenario and its road to war, trainers need to take into consideration the entire OE and its impact on the OPFOR’s operations and tactics.

Contemporary Operational Environment

The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) is the collective set of conditions, derived from a composite of actual worldwide conditions, that pose realistic challenges for training, leader development, and capabilities development for Army forces and their joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners. COE is a collective term for the related aspects of contemporary OEs that exist or could exist today or in the near- and mid-term future (next 10 years). It is not a totally artificial construct created for training. Rather, it is a representative composite of all the operational variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations in various actual OEs in this contemporary timeframe. This composite can, therefore, provide realistic and relevant conditions necessary for training and leader development.

Why It Is Called Contemporary

The COE is “contemporary” in the sense that it does not represent conditions that existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather those conditions that exist today and in the near- and mid-term future. This composite COE consists not only of the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the seven other operational variables that help define any OE.

Training Applications

The COE is particularly valuable in training. Its flexible composite should be capable of addressing the qualities of virtually any OE in which the units or individuals being trained might be called upon to operate. In training environments, an OE is created to approximate the demands of actual OEs that U.S. forces might encounter and to set the conditions for producing desired training outcomes. This involves the appropriate combination of an OPFOR (with military and/or paramilitary capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential adversaries) and other variables of the OE in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner. See TC 7-101 for more detail on the incorporation of the COE into the design of training exercises.

The Army trains as it will fight. It trains and educates its members to develop agile leaders and organizations able to adapt to any situation and operate successfully in any OE. A training objective consists of task, conditions, and standard. The “conditions” for Army training events must include an OE that is realistic, relevant, and challenging to the ability of the training unit to accomplish the same kinds of mission-essential tasks that would be required of it in an actual OE for an actual operation. As much as possible, a combination of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training enablers can help replicate conditions representative of an actual OE. (See FM 7-0.)

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Conditions. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance. (JP 1-02)

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In predeployment training, the OE created for a training exercise should represent as closely as possible the conditions of the anticipated OE for the actual mission. Otherwise, the OE for training may represent a composite of the types of conditions that might exist in a number of actual OEs.

Operational Variables

All military operations will be significantly affected by a number of variables in the OE beyond simply military forces. Analysis of any OE, including the composite OE created for training purposes, focuses on eight interrelated operational variables:

• Political. Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance— formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers.
• Military. Explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE.
• Economic. Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources.
• Social. Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members.
• Information.   Describes   the   nature,   scope,  characteristics,   and  effects   of  individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
• Infrastructure. Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society.
• Physical Environment. Includes the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations.
• Time. Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE.

The memory aid for these variables is PMESII-PT.

An assessment of these eight operational variables and their relationships helps to understand any OE and its impact on a particular operation. The operational variables form the basis for determining the conditions under which a unit will not only operate but also under which it will train. (See TC 7-101 for guidance on use of the operational variables in creating an appropriate OE for a training exercise.) Just as in an actual operation, commanders and staffs must seek to develop an understanding of the particular OE they face in a training event.

The OPFOR represents a major part of the military variable in training exercises. As such, it must fit in with the characteristics of the other seven operational variables that are selected for that exercise.

Opposing Force

AR 350-2, which establishes policies and procedures for the Army’s Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program, defines an opposing force as “a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing U.S. forces.” The TC 7-100 series describes the doctrine, organizations, and equipment of such an OPFOR and how to combine it with other operational variables to portray the qualities of a full range of conditions appropriate to Army training environments. As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring partner capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. force.

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Note. Although the OPFOR is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For example, some capability development activities that do not require simulation of a specific real- world potential adversary may use an OPFOR to portray the “threat” or “enemy.”

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When U.S. forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account the presence and influence of various types of threats and other actors. In a training environment, an OPFOR can represent a composite of those nation-state or non-state actors that constitute military and/or paramilitary forces that could present a threat to the United States, its friends, or its allies. As in actual OEs, the OE used in training environments will also include various types of other, nonmilitary actors that are not part of the OPFOR, but could be part of the OE. The OPFOR employs tactics that can either mitigate or exploit the OE.

The commander of a U.S. unit plans and conducts training based on the unit’s mission-essential task list and priorities of effort. The commander establishes the conditions in which to conduct training to standards. These conditions should include an OPFOR that realistically challenges the ability of the U.S. unit to accomplish its tasks. Training requirements will determine whether the OPFOR’s capabilities are fundamental, sophisticated, or a combination of these.

The Hybrid Threat for Training

In exercise design (see TC 7-101), the type(s) of forces making up the OPFOR will depend upon the conditions determined to be appropriate for accomplishing training objectives. In some cases, the OPFOR may only need to reflect the nature and capabilities of a regular military force, an irregular force, or a criminal organization. However, in order to be representative of the types of threats the Army is likely to encounter in actual OEs, the OPFOR will often need to represent the capabilities of a hybrid threat.

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. See TC 7-100 for more information on the nature of hybrid threats. However, TC 7-100.2 will focus on the representation of the tactics of such hybrid threats in training exercises. In that context, the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called the Hybrid Threat, with the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid Threat. The HT is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat whose military and/or paramilitary forces are represented as an OPFOR in training exercises.

The OPFOR, when representing a hybrid threat, must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must be capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained.

Military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of the Army unit being trained.

The OPFOR tactics described in TC 7-100.2 are appropriate for use by an OPFOR that consists either entirely or partly of regular military forces. Some of these tactics, particularly those carried out by smaller organizations, can also be used by irregular forces or even by criminal elements. Even those tactics carried out primarily by regular military forces may involve other components of the HT acting in some capacity. When either acting alone or in concert with other components of the HT, irregular forces and/or criminal elements can also use other tactics, which are outlined in other parts of the TC 7-100 series.

Baseline OPFOR

This TC introduces the baseline tactical doctrine of a flexible, thinking, adaptive OPFOR that applies its doctrine with considerable flexibility, adaptability, and initiative. It is applicable to the entire training community, including the OPFORs at all of the combat training centers (CTCs), the TRADOC schools, and units in the field. It provides an OPFOR that believes that, through adaptive use of all available forces and capabilities, it can create opportunities that, properly leveraged, can allow it to fight and win, even against an opponent such as the United States.

As a baseline for developing specific OPFORs for specific training environments, this TC describes an OPFOR that is representative of the forces of contemporary nation-states. This composite of the characteristics of real-world military forces (possibly combined with irregular forces and/or criminal elements) provides a framework for the realistic and relevant portrayal of capabilities and actions that U.S. armed forces might face in actual OEs.

The State

TC 7-100.2 outlines the tactical-level doctrine of an OPFOR that primarily represents the armed forces of a nation-state. For this composite of real-world nation-state threats, the TC 7-100 series refers to the country to which the regular military forces belong as “the State.” The general characteristics of State’s doctrine and strategy could fit a number of different types of potential adversaries in a number of different scenarios.

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Note. In specific U.S. Army training environments, the generic name of the State may give way to other fictitious country names. (See guidance in AR 350-2.)

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The OPFOR exists for the purpose of opposing U.S. forces in training exercises. However, like most countries in the world, the State typically does not design its forces just to fight the United States or its allies. It may design them principally to deal with regional threats and to take advantage of regional opportunities. At the same time, the State is aware that aggressive pursuit of its regional goals might lead to intervention by a major power, such as the United States, from outside the region. To the extent possible, therefore, it might invest in technologies and capabilities that have utility against both regional and extraregional opponents. The basic force structure of the OPFOR is the same for conflict with either type of opponent.

The State must go to war⎯or continue the war after extraregional intervention⎯with whatever forces and capabilities it had going into the war. However, it can adapt how it uses those forces and capabilities to fit the nature of the conflict and its opponent(s). Either on its own or as part of the HT for training, the State can employ adaptive strategy, operations, and tactics.

At the strategic level, the State’s ability to challenge U.S. interests includes not only the military and paramilitary forces of the State, but also the State’s diplomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Rarely would any country engage the United States or a U.S.-led coalition with purely military means. Trainers need to consider the total OE and all instruments of power at the disposal of the State⎯not just the military element. It is also possible that the State could be part of an alliance or coalition, in which case the OPFOR could include multinational forces. These nation-state forces may also operate in conjunction with non-state actors such as irregular forces or criminal elements as part of the HT for training.

Flexibility

The OPFOR must be flexible enough to fit various training requirements. It must be scalable and tunable. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of-the-art, relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of those categories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.

In the OPFOR baseline presented in this TC, the authors often say that the State or the OPFOR “may” be able to do something or “might” or “could” do something. They often use the progressive forms of verbs to say that the State “is developing” a capability or “is continually modernizing.” The State participates in the global market, which can allow it to acquire things it cannot produce domestically. Such descriptions give scenario writers considerable flexibility in determining what the State or the OPFOR actually has at a given point in time or a given place on the battlefield⎯in a particular scenario.

Thinking

This TC describes how the OPFOR thinks, especially how it thinks about fighting its regional neighbors and/or the United States. This thinking determines basic OPFOR tactics—as well as strategy and operations, which are the subject of FM 7-100.1). It drives OPFOR organizational structures and equipment acquisition or adaptation. It also determines how the nation-state OPFOR that represents the armed forces of the State would interact with other, non-state actors that may be present in the COE.

Just because the U.S. force knows something about how the OPFOR has fought in the past does not mean that the OPFOR will always continue to fight that way. A thinking OPFOR will learn from its own successes and failures, as well as those of its potential enemies. It will adapt its thinking, its makeup, and its way of fighting to accommodate these lessons learned. It will continuously look for innovative ways to deal with the United States and its armed forces.

Adaptability

The OPFOR has developed its doctrine, force structure, and capabilities with an eye toward employing them against both regional and extraregional opponents, if necessary. It has thought about and trained for how to adapt once an extraregional force becomes engaged. It has included this adaptability in its doctrine in the form of general principles, based on its perceptions of the United States and other threats to its goals and aspirations. It will seek to avoid types of operations and environments for which U.S. forces are optimized. During the course of conflict, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.

In general, the OPFOR will be less predictable than OPFORs in the past. It will be difficult to template as it adapts and attempts to create opportunity. Its patterns of operation will change as it achieves success or experiences failure. The OPFOR’s doctrine might not change, but its way of operating will.

Initiative

Like U.S. Army doctrine, OPFOR doctrine must allow sufficient freedom for bold, creative initiative in any situation. OPFOR doctrine is descriptive, but not prescriptive; authoritative, but not authoritarian; definitive, but not dogmatic. The OPFOR that U.S. units encounter in various training venues will not apply this doctrine blindly or unthinkingly, but will use its experience and assessments to interpolate from this baseline in light of specific situations. Thus, U.S. units can no longer say that the OPFOR has to do certain things and cannot do anything that is not expressly prescribed in established OPFOR doctrine. Doctrine guides OPFOR actions in support of the State’s objectives; OPFOR leaders apply it  with judgment and initiative.

Terminology

Since OPFOR baseline doctrine is a composite of how various forces worldwide might operate, it uses some terminology that is in common with that of other countries, including the United States. Whenever possible, OPFOR doctrine uses established U.S. military terms⎯with the same meaning as defined in FM 1-02 and/or JP 1-02. However, the TC 7-100 series also includes some concepts for things the OPFOR does differently from how the U.S. military does them. Even if various real-world foreign countries might use the same concept, or something very close to it, different countries might give it different names. In those cases, the OPFOR TCs either use a term commonly accepted by one or more other countries or create a new, “composite” term that makes sense and is clearly understandable. In any case where an operational or tactical term is not further specifically defined in the TC 7-100 series, it is used in the same sense as in the U.S. definition.

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Note. After this introduction, the chapters of this TC address their topics from the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the OPFOR and allied or affiliated forces. Likewise, enemy refers to the enemy of the OPFOR, which may be an opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent (normally the United States or a U.S.-led coalition).

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The COE and OPFOR Continue to Evolve

Taking into consideration adversaries in real-world OEs and desired training outcomes and leader development goals, the authors of TC 7-100 series have developed an OPFOR doctrine and structure that reflect those of forces that could be encountered in actual OEs. While the Army integrates this OPFOR and other operational variables into training scenarios, the authors of the TC 7-100 series are continuing to research real-world OEs and to mature the OPFOR in training in order to provide a richer, appropriately challenging training environment and keep the OPFOR and the COE truly “contemporary.”

The nature of real-world OEs and potential OEs is extremely fluid, with rapidly changing regional and global relationships. New actors⎯both nation-states and non-state actors⎯are constantly  appearing and disappearing from the scene. As the United States and its military forces interact with  various OEs worldwide, the OEs change, and so does a composite of those OEs. Therefore, the nature of the COE for training is adaptive and constantly changing. As the Army applies the lessons learned from training, the OPFOR and potential real-world adversaries will also learn and adapt.

The OPFOR tactical doctrine provided in this TC should meet most of the U.S. Army’s training needs for the foreseeable future. In the near- and mid-term, almost anyone who fights the United States would probably have to use the same kinds of adaptive action as outlined in this doctrine.

However, as real-world conditions, forces, or capabilities change over time, OPFOR doctrine and its applications will evolve along with them, to continue to provide the Army an appropriate OPFOR. Thus, the OPFOR will remain capable of presenting a challenge that is appropriate to meet evolving training requirements.

Chapter 1: Strategic and Operational Framework

Main article: Chapter 1: Hybrid Threat Roles and Relationships in Training

A Hybrid Threat Force Structure is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential combat operations.

Chapter 2: Hybrid Threat Force Structure

Main article: Chapter 2: Hybrid Threat Force Structure

This chapter and the organizational directories to which it is linked provide the Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) to be used as the basis for a threat organization in all Army training, except real-world-oriented mission rehearsal exercises. This includes the forces of Threat actors as well as key non-state actors. In most cases, the organizations found in the HTFS will require task-organizing (see chapter 3) in order to construct a threat order of battle appropriate for a training event.

Chapter 3: Task-Organizing

Main article: Chapter 3: Task-Organizing

The concept of task-organizing for combat is not unique to the Threat. It is universally, performed at all levels, and has been around as long as combat. The U.S. Army defines a task organization as “A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission” and defines task-organizing as “The process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships” (ADRP 1-02). Task-organizing of the Hybrid Threat must follow Hybrid Threat doctrine (see TC 7-100, FM 7-100.1, and TC 7- 100.2) and reflect requirements for stressing U.S. units’ mission essential task list (METL) in training.

Chapter 4: Equipment Options

Main article: Chapter 4: Equipment Options

The Hybrid Threat Force Structure (HTFS) organizational directories provide example equipment types and the numbers of each type typically found in specific organizations. The purpose is to give trainers and training planners a good idea of what a Threat Force Structure should look like. However, training requirements may dictate some modifications to this baseline. Therefore, training planners have several options by which they can modify equipment holdings to meet particular training requirements.