Amari

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Amari
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Capital	Tehran
Largest city	Tehran (12 million)
Official languages	58.0% Persian Dialects 26.0% Turkic Dialects 9.0% Kurdish 2.0% Luri 1.0% Baluchi 1.0% Arabic 1.0% Kalarian 2.0% Other
Ethnic groups	51.0% Persian 24.0% Atropian 8.0% Gilaki or Mazandarani 7.0% Kurd 3.0% Arab 2.0% Lur 2.0% Baluch 2.0% Turkmen 1.0% Other
Religion	89.0% Shia Muslim 9.0% Sunni Muslim 2.0% Other
Demonym	Arianian
Government	Theocracy
• Supreme Leader	Ayatollah Mahmood Mekhenei
• President	Ahmad Moudin
Legislature	Unicameral Legislature
Theocracy
Area
• Total	588,764 sq mi (1,524,890 km2)
Population
• July 2016 estimate	8,372,373 (129th)
• Density	8,372,373/sq mi (3,232,591.3/km2) (167th)
GDP	2016 estimate
• Total	$85.77 billion
Time zone	WAT
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Ariana is a true theocracy, with every significant political action affected by the clerical class. A brutally efficient military ensures the continuation of the current power structure, while a sham representative government appeases or distracts Western interests. Ariana’s military is second only to Donovia in strength, and regularly exercises dominance and maintains connections with criminal and terror groups. Reportedly, Ariana has nuclear weapons and three identified nuclear sites. Ariana possesses massive oil and gas reserves in its southwest region along the Persian Gulf, and provides relatively modern infrastructure with big cities and a complex transportation architecture. Ariana’s government is aggressive, capable, revolutionary, and intent on spreading its vision of Islamic governance and the establishment of a new Arianian hegemony throughout the region. The majority of Arianians are Shia Muslim, and all citizens suffer from a lack of information due to the government’s strict regulations on media.

Political

Main article: Political: Amari

TEST(J) At the heart of political power in Ariana is the Council of Guardians Revolution. The Revolution considers itself the vanguard of proper Islamic sentiment on the planet, and the heart of a global conversion to its version of Islam. The Revolution has successfully defended itself from both internal and external threats, and remains committed to the export of its vision of theocratic rule.

Military

Main article: Amari National Defence Force

The Amari National Defense Force (ANDF) is the state military of Amari. Its composition, disposition, and doctrine are the result of years of relative peace, but near constant internal security concerns and regional threats. Internal security and the constant struggle against border incursion continue to shape its structure and roles. The ANDF consists of the Amari Army, Air Force, and Navy. Amari paramilitary forces include the Border Guard Corps (BGC) and Special Reserve Force (SRF). The ANDF is a well-integrated and professional force with good command and control and high readiness. It has a limited force projection capability and a mix of static and mobile forces. Amari is an active contributor to both regional and international peacekeeping forces and has hosted such forces within its borders.

Jump to Army, Navy, Air Force, Paramilitary, Threat Actors within Amari

Economic

Main article: Economic: Amari

The Caucasus countries that possess hydrocarbon resources will continue to depend on the oil and gas industries to drive their economies, while those that do not possess such resources will attempt  to tie themselves to hydrocarbon-rich nations. Both Ariana and Atropia face geopolitical difficulties in exporting their oil and natural gas. Bordered by adversaries, the Arianians and Atropians must rely on tenuous routes to export their resources. For Gorgas and Limaria, which lack extractive or mature industries, transshipment of hydrocarbon products or providing other services to oil-wealthy countries will be their primary short- to medium-term means to achieve economic development. Donovia continues to recover from a collapse two decades ago that crippled its economy. All nations of the Caucasus have relatively high inefficiency due to corruption, government involvement in the economy, and/or lack of export industry development.

Ariana’s economy has pockets of economic vitality but suffers from governmental legislation and regulation that restrict its growth. Ariana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) consistently improves about 4-6% annually and even reached 7-8% growth in 2007. Much of Ariana’s GDP growth,  however, depends on hydrocarbon revenues that make up the largest sector of the Arianian economy and suffer the whims of international market commodity prices. The Arianian government continues to push for greater market liberalization and reform, but large Arianian special interests are expected to continue blocking economic progressive legislation to prevent any decrease in their power. Additionally, the government plays a significant role in the Arianian economy; its social welfare policies fund various charities and numerous subsidies for commodities ranging from foodstuffs to gasoline.

Ariana’s economy is a series of contrasts. While a population surge reached the labor market over  the last decade, Arianian unemployment continued to decrease over the same period. While trade and finance sanctions create significant foreign investment obstacles, overseas trade—especially  with East Asian countries—continues to grow as Asia desires raw hydrocarbon resources and Ariana seeks finished consumer goods. Although Ariana’s industrial sector continues as one of the region’s strongest, its factories suffer from international sanctions on the parts and technology needed to update its hardware and techniques.

President Ahmad Moudin’s financial policies support his populist agenda, including an expansionary fiscal policy. Moudin continues to support massive subsidies for the populace; energy subsidies alone account for approximately 12% of Ariana’s GDP. The People’s Wealth Fund (PWF), which uses oil revenue proceeds as a hedge against the volatile price fluctuations on the international petroleum market, supports oil subsidies to the Arianian people. The high oil prices of the last decade filled the PWF coffers with enough revenue to pursue Moudin’s populist policies, like fuel subsidies, and possibly provided funds to continue Ariana’s investment in nuclear technology.

As a result of Ariana’s successful nuclear weapons program, the US Treasury enacted sanctions against Ariana that hamper its international and domestic economic systems and promote policy changes. In addition, the US hopes the sanctions will deter Ariana from providing financial support to Middle East terrorists.

Social

Main article: Social: Amari

Ariana enjoys an ancient heritage and rich culture. Ariana possesses a well-documented reputation as the center of knowledge, art, poetry, and mathematics in the region that dates back thousands of years. Most Arianians are proud of their nation and consider themselves Arianians and/or Persians, dependent on their ethnic group.

Over the last few years, radical Arianian powerbrokers with extremist world views have provided sanctuary to international terrorists. Ariana also sponsored the proxy wars of the Shia Internationalist Brigades and the Martyr’s Army versus Israel, as well as training and/or supplying Arianian Shia insurgent groups such as local Shia Internationalist Brigades. Ariana continues to threaten Israel, the US, and their allies with its domestically popular and successful nuclear  weapons program.

Since President Ahmad Moudin took power in 2003, his continual references to the 12th Imam’s imminent return and the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate stir the Shia faithful to action.   The rhetoric also diverts increasing social discontent to a common foreign enemy—the US and its infidel allies, such as Israel and Egypt. As long as religious zealots control the government, it remains likely that Ariana and the US will never become allies in the Caucasus region.

Social discontent and civil unrest continue to rise in Ariana. Tens of thousands of people protested the last election (August 2009), in which Moudin received the most votes in what many observers perceived as a rigged election. The perception by many Arianian citizens of deeply ingrained government corruption, skewed wealth distribution, high inflation, and high unemployment rates continue to drive this discontent and unrest. Protests, to include student organized protests, persist even to date in Tehran.

Regardless of these problems, the Arianian populace still enjoys a higher living standard than many regional neighbors. Ariana is not a poor nation. The Arianian poor generally earn more than $2 per day, the United Nations (UN) poverty standard. The government, however, states that only 18% of its citizens live below the poverty line. The Arianian people’s discontent may eventually lead to minor governmental changes but likely will not result in any fundamental changes to the Arianian political situation.

Most citizens enjoy clean water and electricity, most attend primary and secondary schools, and most urban citizens have access to phone services. Literacy rates remain very high in Ariana (77%), and over 80% complete high school. Each year, over one million high school graduates apply for entrance into Arianian universities. The more educated the Arianian public becomes, however, the more likely that they will speak out against the theocracy.

Information

Main article: Information: Amari

Ariana is a repressive information environment, with the government controlling all important information environment elements. Ariana is one of the most sophisticated nations in the world at information control, utilizing advanced capabilities to monitor and direct communications. Despite this, the fragmented Arianian opposition uses the Internet extensively, though its ultimate effect on the political environment is mixed at best. Ariana’s INFOWAR capability is generally good, with pockets of excellence in a variety of disciplines.

Infrastructure

Main article: Infrastructure: Amari

While the region’s five countries have a significant number of rural residents, the majority of each country’s population lives in urban areas. About two-thirds of the Arianian (68%), Donovian (67%), and Limarian populace (64%) and just over half of the Gorgan (53%) and Atropian (52%) populace  live in urban areas. All five countries contain a mixture of modern urban cities and almost pre- modern rural villages. Modern utilities can be found in most major cities but not in the rural villages and countryside.

The Arianian infrastructure resembles a patchwork quilt with a mixture of modernization and obsolescence. While previous Arianian leaders made substantial investments, the infrastructure now faces significant challenges from the stresses of both war and peace. While rail, road, air, and seaports are marginally adequate, the natural gas and oil infrastructure suffers from archaic construction. Environmental and population pressures on aquifers, along with considerable pollution levels, create significant stress on water and other natural resources. Over 40% of Ariana’s more than 77 million people reside in its 18 largest cities, all of which have at least 350,000 residents.

Physical Environment

Main article: Physical Environment: Amari

Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Limaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kalaria. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Limaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kalaria.

Time

Main article: Time: Amari

The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time, and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as the US and most other Western countries do. Most of the people in the region do not view time as a resource and do not feel any compulsion to effectively manage their time. The people in the Caucasus region do not make the connection between effective use of their time and production. This lack of time consciousness will likely frustrate US soldiers as they work with their allies, but it will also give the US a battlefield advantage against its enemies.

Threat Actor Chart

Threat Actor	Organization Type	OE	Activities	Targets
Salasyl	Insurgent	Southeast Atropia with nation-wide capabilities	Possible ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors. Has engaged the Atropian regime in a lowlevel insurgency for the past 20 years. Promotes violent populace opposition to state taxation policies, unreliable public services, substandard medical preventive services, inaccessible state education programs for working class citizens, and a judicial system that illegally favors the ruling political party. Salasyl and South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) insurgents often clash violently over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.	Atropian government facilities and leaders
South Atropian People's Army (SAPA)	Insurgent	Focuses on eight provinces in the south with cultural ties to Ariana	Primary goal is to create a separate country composed of southern Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces. Receives most of its training, equipment, and supplies from Ariana. SAPA and Salasyl insurgents often clash violently over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.	Atropian government facilities and leaders
Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB)	Insurgent	Northern Vetlia and Erdabil Provinces	Donovia supports the BFB, creating political tension between Donovia and Atropia.	Atropian government facilities and leaders
Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL)	Insurgent	Southern Erdabil and Western Sirvaki Provinces	Small insurgent group with limited regional activities.	Atropian government facilities and leaders
Bocyowicz Crime Family	Criminal	Ungoverned Territories	Acquires political power in poorly-governed regions, eventually gaining control of geographic space. These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the criminal organization's activities. As a result, the third-generation criminal organization and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority.	Atropian police and security forces
Atropian Organized Crime (AOC)	Criminal	Baku	The growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and even human trafficking conducted outside of established channels only began recently. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Lower Janga and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.	Police and security forces
Al Iksir Cartel	Criminal	Northern Atropia and Southern Donovia	The growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and even human trafficking conducted outside of established channels only began recently. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Lower Janga and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.	Police and security forces

Significant Threat Actors within Amari

Amarian People’s Union (APU)

Main article: Amarian People’s Union

The Amarian People’s Union (APU) is the militant wing of the Amarian People’s Party (APP). The APU has openly espoused violent actions when political desired are unfulfilled. The APU’s members are predominantly hostile and would likely support enemies of Amari. The APU is responsible for numerous attacks against government facilities and military or police forces. They have also targeted Amari civilians whom they identify as “non-loyal.” The most common attacks include government posts or personnel, machines and power facilities, and civilian crops.

Pemba Island Native Army (PINA)

Main article: Pemba Island Native Army

The Pemba Island Native Army (PINA) is a low-level nativist insurgency, fighting for increased autonomy and relief from alleged Amarian oppression. Low-level violence and vandalism has been directed against Amari officials and BGC units tasked with providing security on the island. While PINA is largely bluster, radical elements break out and have attacked state forces and anyone they deem an “outsider.” The most violent acts usually follow pressing of Amari policies and BGC patrols.

Mara-Suswa Rebel Army (MSRA)

Main article: Mara-Suswa Rebel Army

The Mara-Suswa Rebel Army (MSRA) is an aggregate of multiple rebel groups and militias in central Amari, west of Nairobi. The group is allegedly responsible for widespread violence and harassment throughout the region. They have also conducted attacks against tourists and villages in Kujenga and Ziwa. This group is known for brutality and has taken responsibility for attacks on tourists and traffic along secondary roads. Territorial fighting between rival factions has made travel in remote rural areas almost impossible - particularly at night, where sustained gunfire is a nightly occurrence.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM)

Main article: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AQIM is a Salafi-jihadist militant group operating in the AOR. While attacks are not common in Amari, there have been a number of high-profile bombings in Mombasa and Arusha attributed to the group. They reportedly operate and stage in predominantly urban Muslim districts and universities.

They also have a history of collaboration with criminal and insurgent groups in Amari to spread their ideology and establish relationships. Activities with criminals are largely to raise funds, trafficking everything from arms to cigarettes. AQIM’s kidnapping for ransom campaigns have focused is estimated to have raised more than $30 million in the last decade . Activities with insurgent groups and militias are largely for capability-sharing.

"Mtangazajiland"

The upper northwestern area of Amari, nicknamed "Mtangazajiland" (land of the wanderers) has become a de facto homeland for former child soldiers. Many of the remaining villages were developed by Amari government programs, while some developed organically as populations swelled. The people in the villages are mostly men between 16 and 40 years old that have escaped forced service with any of the militias and other forces to the north in Nyumba, although some have started families. There are approximately 15-20 villages in the area, with a few in decline or as splinters from other villages. The Amari Interior Ministry continues partial supports many of the villages to help rehabilitate the men and prevent potential conflict from migrating elsewhere. Villagers are predominantly friendly towards Amari officials, but will suspicious of outsiders .

Cross-border militia raids from Nyumba against the villages occur with some frequency and can be extremely brutal. The level of villager participation in illicit trafficking, interdiction of commercial traffic, or raids on other villages or refugee settlements to supplement state stipends is not known.

Amari military forces regularly allocate resources and provide assistance and monitoring of the villages to ensure their ongoing stability and rehabilitation. These former child soldiers likely maintain numerous small arms. The amounts and types or larger weapons and organization levels is unknown. The villages may present a buffering effect in the northwest, allowing the military and BGC to be more effective in this somewhat wild region.

Hodari Cartel

Main article: Hodari Cartel

The Hodari Cartel is the largest and most powerful heroin trafficking organization in the region. Its primary operating base is in and around the Port of Mombasa, although it operates processing and distribution nodes throughout Amari. Limited, tense cooperation among other regional drug trafficking organizations may exist to minimize public or political backlash.