Political: Olvana

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Political History

Beginnings of Communism

Modern Olvana emerged in the early 20th century from the ashes of nearly three millennia of imperial dynastic rule. Following a turbulent and highly destructive 19th century, the Republic of Olvana was declared in 1912 and consolidated over the next two decades. However, the Republic was beset early in its life by two powerful but opposing forces - Communists and imperialists from both Europe and Asia. Following yet another period of destructive wars through the mid 20th-century, the Republic was severely weakened both financially and militarily. Communists intensified their campaign, and, with the help of Donovia, took control of Olvana after a years-long struggle known as the Olvanese Civil War. On 1 November 1951, the People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO) was declared by Olvanan Communist Party (OCP) Chairman Cheng Ze, establishing the present-day political body that rules Olvana.

Cheng was an enthusiastic communist and began immediately to remodel the Olvanan government and economy based on the Donovian model. Ironically, Donovia later denounced many of these policies, which, in turn, created a serious and, as it turned out, permanent rift between Donovia and Olvana, culminated by an official Olvanan denouncement of Donovian communism in 1961. The desire to create a uniquely Olvanan interpretation of communism drove the government to implement several extraordinarily radical programs of agricultural and industrial reform coupled with mass relocations of ethnic minorities. This effort nearly destroyed the Olvanan economy, resulted in the forced relocation of millions of people based on arbitrary borders, and contributed to or caused the deaths of tens of millions of people, mostly peasant farmers, from starvation, disease, and exposure.

These reforms seriously undermined Cheng’s power and authority and for much of the early 1960s, Cheng was relegated to a menial role within the party. However, in 1968 Cheng initiated a new revolutionary movement intended to both restore his authority and re-establish the identity of Olvanan communism. Called the “Cheng Revolution,” it resulted in attacks against large numbers of extant party officials and other authorities. Eventually the movement spiraled out of even Cheng’s control, essentially devolving into a large number of localized violent uprisings with a wide variety of goals and objectives.

Modern Reforms

Cheng’s death in 1979 brought the end of Cheng’s Revolution and signaled a great shift in Olvanan internal politics. A struggle for power erupted between a number of senior party officials. Cheng’s chief allies, who called themselves the Gang of Eight, were ousted in October of 1979. Eventually, longtime senior party member and Cheng’s Revolution victim Qin Jinqing consolidated power by 1980, signaling a new era in Olvanese politics.

Beginning in 1978 and stretching throughout the 1980s, Olvana repositioned itself as a participant in the global economy under the careful eye of Jinqing.  For the first time in decades, Olvana allowed large scale foreign investment inside its borders. Economic and social reforms moved away from Chengist collectivization and hardline communism to increasingly free-market/capitalist solutions. However, the OCP remained the nation’s sole political authority, and despite liberalization of many laws and policies, unrest persisted. This culminated with a series of demonstrations in 1990 and 1991. Though these demonstrations were violently suppressed, the OCP accelerated its liberalization and anti-corruption movement throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium.

During the first decade of the new millennium, Olvanan political power shifted rapidly between various factions within the OCP. Some of these shifts were visible to the west, and some were not. At the same time, enormous economic growth and subtle liberalization of economic, social, and political policies triggered large changes in Olvanan demographics and culture. For a time, it appeared that the OCP was vulnerable to either major reform or replacement. This perception ended abruptly 5 years ago when Kang Wuhan ascended simultaneously to the General Secretary of the OCP and President of the PRO. Kang rapidly consolidated power and quickly amassed political capital unmatched since the days of Jinqing and Cheng. Opposition within the OCP was ruthlessly—but legally—silenced, and previously uncommitted party officials rapidly pledged support to Kang.

Kang wasted little time implementing an agenda of anti-corruption coupled with a subtle return, in some respects, to Marxist and Chengist policy. The effects of this change on Olvana’s political and social landscape remain to be seen.

Centers of Political Power

People's Republic of Olvana

Tribes. Although Olvana claims over 50 different indigenous tribes, traditional ethnic/tribal relationships play nearly no meaningful role in Olvanan politics. The most significant region that still sees some traditional tribalism is in the southwest of the country, where numerous minority ethnicities still exist. The major impact that traditional tribes have on Olvanese politics is as a propaganda tool. By highlighting and publicizing the presence of traditional tribes, Olvana wishes to show greater ethnic diversity and tolerance for minorities, contrasting with their human rights record.

Elites. The situation with elites in Olvana is evolving, and is potentially of great interest. While historically the caste system delineated elite status, with the advent of the Communist revolution, the elite in Olvana were simply the top echelon of the OCP. Relatively little wealth or power existed outside of the top echelons of the party. However, with the liberalization of the Olvanan economy in the 1980s, a new class of wealthy and powerful elites emerged. While practically all are still party members, they are essentially capitalist in nature: they make use of extremely low interest rates available through government investment to create globally competitive companies, then enjoy advantages in the export market due to Olvanan currency policies and advantageous laws. In recent years, this privileged class took to educating their children (and in some cases themselves) outside of Olvana. This portends a shift in culture in the top echelons of the social ladder, as these young people are far more western-friendly, as well as having far more capitalist sensibilities. While it is unlikely that any widespread reform or revolutionary activity will occur, so long as this trend continues Olvana’s gradual liberalization will likely continue. These unique conditions created unprecedented gaps in wealth between the rich and poor in Olvana, a situation that the government has identified as problematic and potentially destabilizing. The emerging power and status of Olvana’s economic elites also places them in potential opposition to Kang and the OCP, who represent a more traditional Marxist/Chengist viewpoint. The friction between these factions will likely define much about Olvana over the next several years.

The Olvanan Communist Party. Though Olvana’s 19th and 20th centuries were very tumultuous, the nation has enjoyed a period of considerable growth and stability thanks in large part to the power and organization level of the OCP. The OCP is one of the largest and certainly the most powerful political party in the world. Olvana’s government, along with one of the world’s largest economies, runs almost entirely under its umbrella. Its authority within Olvana is almost completely uncontested, and global perceptions of the OCP have improved considerably since the days of Cheng. Though periodic demonstrations, calls for democratization, and complaints about human rights and worker abuses are still constant, there appears to be no immediate threat to the authority or stability of the OCP or Olvana at large.

Military Authority

Unlike most western democracies, the Olvanan People's Army (OPA) is a significant political entity within Olvana. Given its historical prominence as a vanguard of Olvanan communism, the military has influence in the internal politics of the OCP. The clear delineation between civil authorities and military leadership is somewhat blurred within the OPA. Following student demonstrations in the late 1980s, the OCP sought to reduce the influence of the OPA in internal politics, with varying degrees of success. Several high profile incidents, including the unapproved test flight of a new fighter aircraft in response to an American visit to Olvana in 2011, suggest that civilian control of the military may not be as absolute as it is in western governments. While the OCP and OPA were once virtually indistinguishable from one another, lines of authority today are somewhat vague and rely on ad-hoc party connections. These appear to be eroding as the upper echelons of the OCP transition to a more plutocratic/capitalist elite, while the OPA retains a more traditional communist/revolutionary mindset. While there is no evidence to suggest that the OPA and OCP have differing strategic objectives, an autonomous or uncontrolled OPA may make decisions not in keeping with the overall political objectives of the OCP. Consequences of this may include escalating conflict against the wishes of the OCP.

Family Authority

The family was traditionally—and remains today—the single most important social construct of Olvanese culture. Throughout all of the various wars, upheavals and reforms of the 20th century, the Olvanan family remained largely untouched. Olvanan families place great emphasis on the elders of the family, on multi-generational households, and on loyalty to the family group ahead of anything else. The main recent domestic political issue with regard to the family was attempts to limit population growth by forcing or coercing couples to have only one child. While this arguably slowed population growth, it had significant consequences for the family. Since, in Olvanese culture, men traditionally take care of elderly parents, families aborted, adopted out, or abandoned female children in large numbers. This in turn had many significant second and third order effects: male births shot up, which caused a huge discrepancy in the male:female ratio, which in turn created large numbers of young males unable to find wives and start their own families. Olvana eventually repealed the policies, replacing them with milder population control directives.

Religious/Clerical Authority

Majority religion.  Olvana is officially an atheist country, but the region historically gave rise to several major religious and philosophical belief systems. The majority of the Olvanese population identifies as either Hindu or some manner of “folk religion” such as Taoism or Confucianism. During the early days of the revolution, religious organizations and people were actively banned or expelled from the country, and religion was actively suppressed. The OCP found completely suppressing Hinduism impossible and despite efforts to eliminate the Hindu-based caste system, the government tolerated the practice and deemed Hindu dogma in general “appropriate for the family”.

Minority religions. Starting in the 1970s, tolerance for religion in general began to emerge, and several minor religious organizations were allowed, either officially or unofficially, to operate within Olvana. This in turn caused something of a spiritual revival. Today, Protestant Christianity, Islam, and other outside religions are gaining followings throughout Olvana; the OCP appears to be at least tolerant of this development. However, if any religious organization comes into direct conflict with the OCP, it will likely be suppressed or banned.

Description of Government

Official Flag of Olvana

The most recent Olvanan Constitution was adopted in 1985. It is essentially a codification of Qin Jinqing’s vision for post-Cheng Olvana. The document outlines Olvana’s approach to governance as a socialist state, proclaims adherence to the principles of Marx, Lenin, and Cheng, and outlines rights and responsibilities of Olvanese citizens. It does not provide a direct means for enforcing the Constitution; this responsibility is implied and goes to the OCP.

Olvana is a de facto one-party state; any understanding of Olvanan politics must be underpinned by an understanding of the OCP and its relationship to the other elements of the PRO government. Power within the OCP can be seen as a balance between three different organizations: the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the State Council, and the OPA.

The PSC is a group of five to nine individuals. It is the most powerful element of the PRO government. In keeping with the Leninist ideal of the Central Committee, each member is considered equal; each member’s say equaling one vote. In practice, however, there is a clear hierarchy, and complex internal politics dominate the PSC. The head of the PSC is the OCP General Secretary, the de facto head of the Olvanan government.

The State Council is the vast series of ministries that comprise much of the PRO bureaucracy. These ministries execute government at both national and local levels. The State Council is charged with local enforcement of OCP decisions and laws. While the State Council has no formal lawmaking power, they have great influence in the implementation of laws: they are responsible for creating the rules that enforce laws.

In contrast to the expressed limitations put on most western militaries, the OPA holds significant political influence. While the OCP maintains complete authority over the military, the OPA’s history as the vanguard of the revolution ensures it still holds considerable influence in both domestic and international decision-making. The OPA sends representatives to the Olvanan National Congress and is virtually completely separate from the State Council, reporting instead through two Central Military Commissions directly to party leadership.

Branches of Government

Legislative Authority

Olvana’s national legislative body is the Olvanan National Congress (ONC). Per the Constitution, the ONC has four main responsibilities: amend the Constitution and oversee its enforcement; enact and amend basic law governing criminal offences, civil affairs, state organs and other matters; elect and appoint members to the central state organs; and determine major state issues. In practice, the ONC has little real authority and is intended to reinforce or “rubber stamp” the decisions made by the OCP.

The ONC is unicameral, consisting of nearly 3,000 elected delegates. The main body convenes annually. A Standing Committee of 150 delegates serves as full time legislators. Elections are held every 5 years; delegates are elected by provincial people’s assemblies which are in turn elected by population at large. Delegates are elected for 5-year terms.

Opposition parties exist, but are essentially only for show. Approximately 70% of the body are members of OCP; the remaining 30% of seats belong to a variety of other political parties. Practically all members, however, are either outright OCP members, or are otherwise subservient to the OCP. The ONC essentially functions to give the appearance of Olvana as a democratic government. Since the ONC is only in session two weeks out of each year, day-to-day legislation is handled by the OCP, along with the Standing Committee. The OCP ostensibly represents the full spectrum of Olvana, as delegates come from every province/region. All real political influence essentially radiates from the OCP headquarters in Shanghai; delegates have no real power to represent the wishes of their constituents.

Executive Authority

Olvanese executive authority is both complex and inconsistent. While the government employs both a president (head of state) and prime minister (head of government), both positions are fully subservient to the OCP. At various times in Olvanan history, the president and prime minister have been the General Secretary of the OCP, at other times not. Regardless of title, true executive authority rests with the OCP General Secretary. At present, both the office of President and General Secretary, but not Prime Minister, are held by Kang Wuhan.

The president holds command authority over the OPA; the prime minister is generally responsible for domestic issues. Both positions are essentially figureheads for OCP authority. Both executive are elected by the OCP at the beginning of each session for a five-year term, with no more than two consecutive terms.

The president exercises much of his authority via his cabinet, which is in essence the top seven to nine members of the OCP’s Politburo. This body in turn exercises influence over the top administrative element of the OCP, known as the State Council. Each member of the cabinet is assigned a specific area of responsibility in much the same way as a western democracy; however, their appointments are based primarily on party ranking and not at the command of the president.

Judicial Authority

Olvana’s judiciary does not exist as a separate branch of government as it does in most western democracies. Instead, it is essentially an offshoot of the OCP enforcing a code of civil laws as provided by the ONC. Constitutionally the courts are independent of the OCP, but both in practice and in code, the courts acknowledge the higher authority of the OCP.

 The Supreme People’s Court is the high court of the land; it consists of a president and up to nine vice presidents, all of whom are appointed by the OCP. There are three levels of lower courts, all called “Local People’s Courts”—basic, intermediate, and high—that function in a similar way to American courts of appeals. Basic courts handle initial cases and simple appeals, intermediate courts handle important cases and appeals, high courts handle issues at the provincial level. One important thing to note is that PRO courts are empowered to judge “economic” cases, meaning they have the jurisdiction to pass judgment on issues associated with Olvanan Communism. Olvanan courts are generally subservient to the OCP, and thus essentially function as a wing of the party and executive branch. Constitutionally they are titled as the enforcement branch of the ONC, but in practice, there is little interaction between the two.

Government Effectiveness and Legitimacy

Short Term. Olvana has three primary short-term objectives: continue its meteoric economic growth (albeit at a slowed pace), begin a widespread shift from manufacturing and heavy industry to a more service and technology-oriented economy, and begin the process of rooting out corruption throughout the OCP and the government. Kang Wuhan is at the heart of all three of these objectives. He is considered the first Olvanane leader in a generation to have the political capital to seriously take on corruption both in and out of the party. Olvana is also seeking to recapitalize some industries, changing their capital structure to increase the state’s involvement. This requires a greater focus on the internal Olvanan political economy, which necessarily reduced focus on the export economy. At the same time, a new propaganda campaign, coupled with renewed use of suppression and intimidation, seeks presumably to bring both elites and the consumer class into line with the reforms.

Long Term. The overriding goal long term for Olvana is the preservation of the OCP and the one-party system. This traditionally took the form of “defending the revolution,” but as time has progressed, use of typical communist propaganda has waned significantly. Instead, the OCP seems to be taking more and more of a back seat to the “democratic” elements of the government, as witnessed most clearly by Kang’s rise to the office of president. Though Kang is still the leader of the OCP and a dominant party member, he tends to stylize himself as president, and focuses his attentions on Olvana as a whole, rather than on the well-being of the party—as did nearly all of his predecessors. The other primary long-term domestic goal for Olvana is the creation of a sustainable and permanent middle class. “Kangokang”—translating to “relatively well off”—is a program started in the mid-1990s. Its objective is to make every citizen in Olvana “relatively well off” by 2020. While this goal will almost certainly not be achieved, it remains an ongoing effort that guides nearly all major economic decisions made by the government.

Domestic Political Issues

Elections

Olvana consistently holds elections every 5 years, primarily to fill the positions within the ONC. Subsequent elections from the ONC appoint the president and other key government members. While not entirely for show, the ONC elections have minimal influence in the actual governance of the country: there is no meaningful political opposition in Olvana, and the ONC itself is little more than a rubber stamp for the OCP. Olvanan citizens in general are perfectly aware that their legislative body is essentially a showpiece. That has not diminished the hope, especially among younger Olvanans, that greater democratization will happen in the future. The international community follows Olvanan elections, though not nearly as closely as elections in other major powers. Much greater attention is paid to the system and hierarchy within the top levels of the OCP, as this is where nearly all political power rests in Olvana. No Olvanan election has ever caused a significant shift in power; major political events are tied to the internal politics of the OCP.

Rule of Law

Olvana in general boasts a strong adherence to the rule of law; this is generally supported in practice through both policy and process. However, this comes with the caveat that the OCP is a de facto autocratic body, and thus creates or modifies laws as it sees fit. Though Olvana has a Constitution and code of laws, the real authority in the country is the OCP.

Corruption

Corruption is a consistent part of Olvanese culture going back to the imperial era. It is deeply ingrained in local politics and generally goes to the highest levels of government: practically every major business deal or political negotiation in the country’s history involved some level of corruption. The OCP was no different, though it is difficult to say if it was worse than previous regimes. Corruption was so widespread that it essentially became vital to the function of the country: regional party officials were not paid living wages, so income from bribes and other extra-legal means became a necessary part of a functioning Olvanan government. The OCP retains near complete authority over the country and historically showed little to no interest in mitigating corruption. This coupled with the OCP’s general secrecy led, over time, to a culture wherein lines between corruption, legal, and semi-legal transactions became so blurred as to be largely meaningless. However, the new Olvanan government—under serious pressure from the new-age Olvanan elite quasi-capitalists,—began what may be considered the largest anti-corruption campaign in history. Thousands of officials at every level of government have been arrested and tried as the OCP attempts to reorient a very fundamental part of Olvanese culture. That said, it remains to be seen how much of the success of the anti-corruption campaign is itself resulting from corruption—it may yet prove to be little more than a play by one socioeconomic group against another, underwritten by a new, higher level kind of corruption.

Corruption within the OPA is just as endemic as the OCP, if not more so. Procurement and policy are areas particularly affected. OPA senior officers traditionally received bribes and other favors as a matter of privilege associated with their rank. The military, however, was purged along with the rest of the government, firing or arresting several high ranking officers and punishing many others largely as a result from bribery payments associated with procurement. While anti-corruption efforts should generally be seen as positive, it remains to be seen if this low-grade purge of the OPA will reduce their readiness or capability in the short term.

Much like the government, business in Olvana is largely built around a culture of corruption at every level. Corruption in business was historically exacerbated by the unclear delineation between business and government, particularly at state-owned enterprises. Starting with the liberalization in the 1980s, Olvanan businesspeople interacted with the international community much more often, and subsequently found that Olvanan expectations about corruption generally did not align to those in the west. This eventually culminated in the emerging anti-corruption effort, which is really intended to make Olvanan business interests more competitive globally, and to encourage foreign investment in Olvana.

Human Rights and Freedoms

Olvana has maintained tight control over public speech within its borders since its inception. The government uses a variety of means, including controlled/filtered internet access, expensive licensing, legal and extra-legal violence, and punishment under the law, to censor, manage, and control speech in the country. Large numbers of journalists are arrested every year; in recent years, this trend has also extended to lawyers who represent these journalists. Olvana is recognized as the world’s “worst press jailer”. In addition, Olvana is expanding its press suppression efforts to beyond its borders: the OCP deliberately and publicly attempted to manipulate dialogue on the internet and in the media of other nations—particularly those in the Pacific Rim—in a kind of low-grade INFOWAR. Ironically, the OCP recently claimed that certain free speech rights are being restored to its citizens. Several prominent Olvanans, including former senior party officials, published articles critical of the OCP over the last 5 years. This is deceiving however: this was only done to allow OCP officials to better monitor dissent, and to give the impression of more liberal free speech laws.

Much like other forms of speech, freedom to assemble and or protest in Olvana is very restricted. Anti-government protests are virtually outlawed and nearly always result in the immediate arrest and possible incarceration of the protestors. Protests against other entities, such as businesses, non-governmental organizations, or other nations, are carefully monitored. In recent years, Olvana began to try and loosen some freedom of assembly laws to improve their international image. The government set up “free speech zones” and offered protest permits, provided a fee was paid and the protest approved. In practice, this has done little to change the situation: virtually no protest applications were approved, and several applicants were arrested and jailed simply for applying.

Olvana is arguably the most carefully watched nation in the world with regard to human rights. Over 60 major human rights organizations monitor the nation, involving thousands of lawyers, diplomats, and activists. Olvana’s human rights record is at best poor: every year brings more reports of abuses against ethnic minorities, women, political dissidents, the disabled, human rights workers. The Olvanan stance on human rights within its borders is a complex issue: because they wish to be a full participant in the global economy and world politics, they actively work to suppress reports of abuses, yet meaningful reform is rare to nonexistent. This conflict is exacerbated by the reaction of the international community, and specifically the United States. Due to Olvana’s importance as a trading partner—and possibly due to its strategic importance as well—strong action condemning or punishing Olvana for its human rights abuses is notably absent from American business and political leaders. This creates a de facto contest between business and human rights. Olvana seeks to leverage its importance as a global economic power into immunity from human rights abuses, while the United States and multinational partners must balance priorities of business with those of humanity.

From its earliest days, Olvana maintained an ostensibly pro-feminist general policy, in keeping with Marxist thought and tradition. During the Revolution, numerous measures, to include emancipation, marriage equality, and abolishment of forced marriage made Olvana something of a world leader in women’s rights. These efforts were met with strong resistance by the Olvanan population, particularly in rural areas. While reforms were not officially rolled back, both the population and the OCP never seriously pursued policies of true equality. The emergence of the Single Child Policy further disenfranchised women from the political process, resulting in significant marginalization of the female population by the 1990s. In practice, discrimination against women is strong in practically every facet of society: education, jobs, family, and criminal justice. Men dominate both the economic elite and the highest levels of government. The government has made little effort to address this issue, though educational opportunities for women have increased in recent years.

International Relationships

Regional Actors

Olvanaointends to dominate the region and extend its influence into other areas of the world that support its economic and political goals. It supports North Torbia as a proxy and uses economic and military intimidation to influence other countries in the region. Olvana relations with Belesia and Gabal are complicated and, at times, tense. Olvana shares membership with other countries in the region focused on economic, environmental, and political issues important to the region.

Relationship with the US

Olvanan citizens take a generally dim view of America: only 44% view Americans positively. They see Americans as over-consuming and somewhat self-centered, though they respect and like many aspects of American culture. Much of this distrust comes from the expanding competition between American and Olvana. High proportions of both American and Olvanan citizens view the other nation as either a serious or a potential threat; majorities in both nations believe that Olvana will supplant the United States as the world’s preeminent superpower in the relatively near future. Much of this mistrust can be traced to previous generations’ perspectives: younger populations who did not live through the height of the Cold War have much higher positive perceptions of the respective opposite nation.

There is probably not a more watched, nor more consequential inter-governmental relationship than that between the US and Olvana. Olvana is one of the US's largest trading partners; both countries comprise critical pillars of one another’s economies, both in terms of international trade and domestic growth. The critical role that Olvana plays in the American economy often conflicts with American strategic or military interests, and with the American stance on human rights violations. The American government, usually ready and willing to embargo or sanction other nations as punishment for territorial aggression or human rights violations, has been consistently hesitant to do so with Olvana since the normalization of trade relations. Olvana continues to antagonize and bully American allies while espousing a strict policy of non-conflict with America. These conflicting objectives will define the future of the Pacific Rim and likely have an enormous influence on the global economy and world politics over the next half century.

Broadly speaking, Olvana’s population enthusiastically embraces America’s cultural exports. This is especially true of younger, affluent Olvanans, who identify American culture as highly desirable. Despite government censorship efforts, American media permeates the educated strata of Olvanan society, which serves to soften the otherwise stark differences between the two countries. This has not necessarily translated into increased trust of the American government or population, but it has served to subtly, positively alter the perspective of Olvanan citizens towards western, democratic societies. Conversely, aside from staple items like Americanized Olvanese food, Americans remain largely ignorant of and indifferent to Olvanan culture. Few Olvanan cultural exports take hold in America, and most Americans have no substantive interest in Olvana outside of economic and political/strategic matters.

Though the US military and the OPA view one another as rivals, there has been no lack of attempts to foster positive relationships between the two organizations over the last several decades. Beginning with tentative anti-Donovian cooperation over 50 years ago, both nations made numerous official visits, building a positive military-to-military relationship. This largely dissolved along with Communist Bloc. The current US–Olvana military relationship is a mix of cooperation and competition. There are some significant shared interests, coupled with number of competing interests. Leaders in both countries are aware that a military confrontation would have high costs for both sides: both sides are attempting to build mechanisms to avoid such an eventuality using military-to-military cooperation as a basis.

Olvana’s economic relationship with the US is critical to both countries. Olvana relies on the US as an export market; the United States relies on Olvana as a manufacturing partner, a destination for American corporations’ international expansion, and increasingly, as an export market. This relationship is consistently strained, however, by numerous factors: Olvana’s practices in the global trade market, the perception that Olvana is stealing jobs from American workers, lax enforcement of intellectual property laws, and cyber intrusions by the Olvanan government, just to name a few.

International Organizations

• Asian Development Bank (ADB)
• African Development Bank Group (nonregional member) (AfDB)
• Asia-Pacific Asian Economic Cooperation (APEC)
• Arctic Council (observer)
• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
• Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
• Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)
• Certified Internal Controls Auditor (CICA)
• East Asian Seas (EAS)
• Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
• Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
• G-20
• G-24 (observer)
• G-5
• G-77
• Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
• International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
• ICC (national committees)
• Institute of Certified Records Managers (ICRM)
• International Development (IDA)
• International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
• International Finance Corporation (IFC)
• International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS)
• International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)
• International Labour Organization (ILO)
•  International Monetary Fund (IMF)
• International Maritime Organization (IMO)
• International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)
• Interpol
• International Olympic Committee (IOC)
• International Organization for Migration (IOM)
• Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
• International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
• International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO)
• International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
• Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) (observer)
• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
• United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
• United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
• United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
• Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (observer)
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
• Organization of American States (OAS) (observer)
• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
• Pacific Alliance (observer)
• Permanent Court of Appeal (PCA)
• Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
• South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (observer)
• United Nations (UN)
• United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
• United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
• United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
• United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

International Economic Associations

• Asian Development Bank (ADB)
• Asia-Pacific Asian Economic Cooperation (APEC)
• Bank for International Settlement (BIS)
• Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
• International Development (IDA)
• International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
• International Finance Corporation (IFC)
• International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Military Alliances

The People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO or Olvanva) is the largest country in terms of size and population in the Western Pacific. Underpinning a national objective to become the regional hegemon, Olvana maintains the largest military in the region. Olvana strategic goals stem from its long history as the major power in the Western Pacific for more than 20 centuries. While Olvana has periodically been occupied by other powers for short periods of time, the people have always risen up to reinstate their independence from their oppressor. Olvana today wishes to be the regional hegemon, with major influence in all parts of the world.

Olvana desires regional hegemony in the Western Pacific, keeping other major powers out of the region. Olvana will not hesitate to join a local war if the result will help the country continue its economic and military climb to become a dominant world power on par with Donovia and the USA.

Olvana attempts to limit the US and its allies in Western Pacific through a combination of economic and military strategies. Olvana often provides funding for infrastructure projects in other countries—as long as Olvanese firms receive the bid for contract. Olvana often provides aid for regional natural disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis.

Influential Political Groups

Official Political Parties

Opposition parties exist, however, they function only as window dressing. Approximately 70% of the body are members of Olvanese Communist Party (OCP); the remaining 30% of seats belong to a variety of other political parties. In practice, all members are either outright OCP members, or are otherwise subservient to the OCP. Real opposition to OCP policies is not allowed.

Other Domestic Influential Groups

Mimicking traditional dynastic power structures, political elites within the OCP hold a level of hereditary power. Recent anti-corruption reformations, however, began breaking down these political dynasties. Though party elites retain a significant level of social power, there is longer a guarantee of familial succession. Instead, the OCP is developing a new political elite that is more of a meritocracy, comprised of those with both party loyalty and business acumen.

The media and civil society organizations, where they exist, are tightly controlled and punished when deemed subversive by the OCP. Imprisoned political prisoners exert a degree of influence, however, the practical implications of that influence is felt more internationally than domestically. A growing hunger for consumer goods produced in other countries and increasing opportunities to see life outside Olvana through university studies and tourism is loosening the traditional hold the government has had on the people.

Summary

 During the first decade of the new millennium, Olvanese political power shifted rapidly between various factions within the Olvanese Communist Party (OCP); some of these shifts were visible to the west, and some were not. At the same time, enormous economic growth and subtle liberalization of economic, social, and political policies triggered large changes in Olvanese demographics and culture. For a time, it appeared that the OCP was vulnerable to either major reform or replacement. This perception ended abruptly when Kang Wuhan ascended simultaneously to the General Secretary of the OCP and President of the PRO in 2013.  Kang rapidly consolidated power and quickly amassed political capital unmatched since the days of Jinqing and Cheng. Opposition within the OCP was ruthlessly—but legally—silenced, and previously uncommitted party officials rapidly pledged support to Kang.

 Kang wasted little time implementing an agenda of anti-corruption coupled with a subtle return, in some respects, to Marxist and Chengist policy. The effects of this change on Olvana’s political and social landscape remain to be seen.