WEG MediaWiki

Difference between revisions of "Africa"
 
(155 intermediate revisions by 8 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
−
{{Infobox country
+
−
|conventional_long_name = Europe
+
<!-- Introduction and Discussion of the OEs in the DATE -->[[File:DATE Africa Map.jpg|thumb|472x472px|DATE Africa Overview map]]
−
|common_name = Europe
+
The purpose of the '''Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Africa''' is to provide the US Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of four composite operational environments (OEs) in the Africa region. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events but does not provide a complete scenario. DATE Africa offers discussions of OE conditions through the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) and partner nations that participate in DATE-compliant Army or joint training exercises.
−
|image_flag = Official Flag of Ariana.png
 
−
|alt_flag = Vertical bicolor (green, red) with a pair of white crossed sabers under a white flame in the center of the flag.
 
−
|image_map = Ariana.png
 
−
|alt_map = Location of Ariana on the globe.
 
−
|official_languages =
 
−
{{unbulleted list
 
−
  | {{nowrap|58.0% Persian Dialects}}
 
−
  | 26.0% Turkic Dialects
 
−
  | 9.0% Kurdish
 
−
  | 2.0% Luri
 
−
  | 1.0% Baluchi
 
−
  | 1.0% Arabic
 
−
  | 1.0% Kalarian
 
−
  | 2.0% Other
 
−
}}
 
−
|demonym = Arianian
 
−
|ethnic_groups =
 
−
{{unbulleted list
 
−
  | {{nowrap|51.0% Persian}}
 
−
  | 24.0% Atropian
 
−
  | 8.0% Gilaki or Mazandarani
 
−
  | 7.0% Kurd
 
−
  | 3.0% Arab
 
−
  | 2.0% Lur
 
−
  | 2.0% Baluch
 
−
  | 2.0% Turkmen
 
−
  | 1.0% Other
 
−
}}
 
−
|religion =
 
−
{{unbulleted list
 
−
  | {{nowrap|89.0% Shia Muslim}}
 
−
  | 9.0% Sunni Muslim
 
−
  | 2.0% Other
 
−
}}
 
−
|capital = Tehran
 
−
|largest_city = Tehran (12 million)
 
−
|government_type = Theocracy
 
−
|leader_title1 = Supreme Leader
 
−
|leader_name1 = Ayatollah Mahmood Mekhenei
 
−
|leader_title2 = President
 
−
|leader_name2 = Ahmad Moudin
 
−
|legislature = Unicameral Legislature
 
−
|area_rank =  <!--Demographic Yearbook 1.-->
 
−
|area_magnitude = 1 E11
 
−
|area_sq_mi = 588,764 <!--Do not remove per [[WP:MOSNUM]]-->
 
−
|population_estimate = 8,372,373
 
−
|population_estimate_rank = 129th <!--UN World Population Prospects-->
 
−
|population_estimate_year = July 2016
 
−
|population_density_sq_mi =  8,372,373 <!--Do not remove per [[WP:MOSNUM]]-->
 
−
|population_density_rank = 167th <!--UN World Population Prospects-->
 
−
|GDP_nominal = $85.77 billion
 
−
|GDP_nominal_year = 2016
 
−
|sovereignty_type = Theocracy
 
−
|time_zone = [[West Africa Time|WAT]]
 
−
|footnote_a = This is a footnote.
 
−
}}
 
  
−
== Discussion of the OEs in the DATE ==
+
Over 795,000 square miles comprise DATE Africa, a varied and complex region which ranges from Lake Victoria in the west to the Indian Sea on its eastern coast. The region includes the fictional countries of [[Amari]], [[Kujenga]], [[Ziwa]], and [[Nyumba]].<ref>The DATE countries listed below are fictionalized territories at the national and first-order administrative levels (i.e. province or county depending on the country). Lower order boundaries such as city wards and municipalities, and physical features such as mountains, rivers, and deserts, have retained their actual names. In many cases literature and media sources will use more than one name for a feature, and may spell them in different ways. As practicable, DATE will follow the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency's guidance contained in the [http://geonames.nga.mil/gns/html/ Geonet Names Server] (GNS), "the official repository of standard spellings of all foreign geographic names sanctioned by the United States Board on Geographic Names (US BGN)". However, the reader should be cautioned that reference texts and maps may use these other variants. These common variants are also listed in the GNS.</ref> The region has a long history of instability and conflict; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors have increasing strategic interests in the region. DATE Africa thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.
−
Over 200,000 square miles comprise the Caucasus, a mountainous region located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The Caucasus includes Atropia, Limaria, and Gorgas, as well as parts of Ariana, Donovia, and Kalaria. The Caucasus Mountains, consisting of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus ranges, traditionally form the separation between Europe and Asia. The Caucasus region contains two major parts—the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus—that are divided by the Greater Caucasus Mountains. The North Caucasus region is contained entirely within Donovia, while the South Caucasus contains Gorgas, Limaria, Atropia, and parts of Ariana and Kalaria. The Caspian Sea holds large oil and natural gas reserves, potentially as large as those in Saudi Arabia, which contribute to the region’s geostrategic importance.
 
  
−
The region has a long history of warfare; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors like the US, the European Union (EU), China, and Middle East nations have increasing strategic interests in the region. The Caucasus thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.
+
''(See also [[Using the DATE]] and [[TC 7-101 Exercise Design]]).''
  
−
=== '''Country 1''' ===
+
==Key Points==
−
Ariana, the area’s second-largest and second-strongest nation militarily, possesses massive oil and gas reserves in its southwest region along the Persian Gulf. This area and the Strait of Hormuz comprise key terrain assets for the country. Ariana’s government is aggressive, capable, revolutionary, and intent on spreading its vision of Islamic governance and the establishment of a new Arianian hegemony throughout the region. Ariana mobilizes target populations through politicization of Islam to accomplish its long-term goals.
+
* The countries in the region have experienced dramatic changes in governing regimes over the last few decades.  
 +
* Political, economic, and environmental changes have created societal pressures that spawn conflict between nations, political factions, international players, and potential threat actors.
 +
* The complex tapestry of ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious loyalties make diplomatic and military operations in the region difficult.
 +
* US forces may be required to conduct operations in the region in a wide range of roles and will likely operate in a combined effort with other forces.
  
−
=== '''Country 2''' ===
+
==Discussion of the OEs within the DATE Africa Operational Environment==
−
Atropia is vulnerable because of its natural resources and as a result of conflicts over the Lower Janga region. Atropia possesses significant oil and gas reserves in both the northeast and the Caspian Sea. Further, the '''''Trans-Caucasus petroleum (TC-P) pipeline''''', one of the most critical infrastructure components in the region, originates near its capital city. These rich natural resources generate potential threats from external forces.
 
  
−
Limaria currently occupies Atropia’s Lower Janga region, an area fought over by Atropia  and Limaria for over a quarter of a century. At present, over 95% of the Lower Janga region population belongs to the Limarian ethnic group. Refugees displaced from the Lower Janga dispute amount to over one million people. An estimated 400,000 Atropian Limarians and 30,000 Lower Janga Limarians fled to Limaria or Donovia to avoid the conflict. An estimated 800,000 Atropians from Limaria or Lower Janga sought refuge in Atropia. Various other ethnic groups in Lower Janga also evacuated to refugee camps in Atropia or Ariana. All efforts to settle the dispute since 1997 have failed. Ariana contains a large internal Atropian ethnic minority and disagrees with Atropia over the delineation of Caspian Sea oil and gas fields. Atropia, a majority Shia nation, resists Arianian- sponsored attempts to politicize Islam within Atropia.
+
===Republic of Amari===
 +
{{Main article|Amari}}
 +
Amari, with its capital at Kisumu, is a functioning and relatively stable democracy, receiving significant support from the US and other western countries. A new constitution, implemented seven years ago, attempted to create a framework for better governance, with good results. Ethnic and tribal tensions continuously play out in multi-party politics, which has led to a history of electoral violence and distrust of the government. The last election was uniquely free of the violence of past elections. Other concerns include border security, instability spillover from neighboring countries, regional competition for resources, and terrorism.
  
−
=== '''Country 3''' ===
+
Amari gained independence from a western European colonial power fifty years ago; a time when colonial powers were divesting themselves of their African colonies. The government consists of an executive branch with a strong president, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary with an associated hierarchy of courts. Amari is making significant progress in areas of good governance but still struggles with institutional corruption. The new constitution has attempted to create a framework for better governance with good results. Other concerns include border security, instability spillover from neighboring countries, regional competition for resources, and terrorism.
−
Donovia is a resurgent nation that, prior to the early 1990s, was the region’s dominant political, economic, military, and social player. Internal turmoil lessened Donovia’s influence  during the period from the 1990s to around 2000. Now, riding a wave of higher oil prices, a reinvigorated Donovia seeks to rebuild its prior levels of regional and international influence through a combination of assertive diplomacy and military power. However, the desire for independence among the other states in the region creates friction between them. Ultimately, Donovia’s neighbors wish to accommodate Donovian power without jeopardizing their core equities.
 
  
−
=== '''Country 4''' ===
+
The Amari National Defense Force (ANDF) is the state military of Amari.  Its composition, disposition, and doctrine are the result of years of relative peace. Internal security and the constant struggle against border incursions continue to shape its structure and roles. The ANDF consists of the Amari [[Amari National Defence Force#Amari Army|Army]], [[Amari National Defence Force#Amari Air Force|Air Force]], and [[Amari National Defence Force#Amari Naval Forces|Navy]].  Amari [[Amari National Defence Force#Paramilitary Forces|paramilitary forces]] include the Border Guard Corps (BGC) and Special Reserve Force (SRF). The ANDF is a well-integrated and professional force with good command and control and high readiness. It has a limited force projection capability and a mix of static and mobile forces.  Amari is an active contributor to both regional and international peacekeeping forces and has hosted such forces within its borders.
−
Gorgas, like Atropia, is a small yet fiercely independent state in a fragile and dangerous area, but without Atropia’s hydrocarbon assets. The country’s primary strength is geographical—its Black Sea ports and land border with Kalaria make it a logical pipeline route and regional outlet to the outside world. Gorgas remains among the smallest and least economically developed nations in the region. It currently exists in a state of “frozen conflict” with Donovia over Donovian attempts to block Gorgas from NATO and EU membership, as well as Donovian support for Zabzimek and South Ostremek— two breakaway regions formerly part of Gorgas.
 
  
−
The breakaway territory Zabzimek is located in northwest Gorgas and borders Donovia. Currently, a ceasefire and line of separation exist between Gorgas and Zabzimek, but the Zabzimek militia poses a threat to the port of Poti and lines of communication from the Black Sea to the Gorgan capital city of Tbilisi. Zabzimek achieved de facto independence after the conflict with Gorgas in 1992, but only Donovia and Nicaragua recognize the country internationally. Strong criminal elements operate in Zabzimek.
+
===Republic of Ziwa===
 +
{{Main article|Ziwa}}Ziwa is a small landlocked nation located on the southern end of Lake Victoria.  Despite a troubled past, Ziwa is making progress toward greater transparency and good governance. Its development path stems from political turmoil in the last few decades and a growing economy—largely based on technical advancements and extensive mineral resources. Ziwa seeks to become a key player on the continent, but has experienced internal dissent and has been affected by regional disputes. Ziwa’s history since gaining independence is one of coups, disputed elections, regional and ethnic violence, and general instability. While Ziwa has expressed an intent to improve its governance, a lack of deep-rooted democratic and civil society institutions makes it one of the most vulnerable and unstable countries in the region.  
  
−
South Ostremek, in north-central Gorgas, also wants independence from Gorgas. Like Zabzimek, South Ostremek achieved ''de facto'' independence after the 2008 Donovia-Gorgas War, but only Donovia and Nicaragua recognize the new country internationally. South Ostremek wants to reunite with North Ostremek, a Donovian province. Currently, a ceasefire remains in effect between Gorgas and South Ostremek, primarily monitored by Donovian peacekeepers.
+
The Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) is the state military of the Republic of Ziwa.  Its structure and focus has adapted over the last decade alongside the country’s economic development. The ZPDF consists of the [[Military: Ziwa#Ziwa Ground Forces Command .28ZGFC.29|Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC)]], [[Military: Ziwa#Ziwa Air Corps .28ZAC.29|Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC)]], and the [[Military: Ziwa#Paramilitary Forces|National Guard]]. Ziwa’s military relations with its neighbors—Amari to the north and Kujenga to the south—are generally stable, despite sporadic low-level incidents along the border. Border control challenges contributed to the forward deployment of dedicated maneuver elements and leveraging of former rebels to ensure the appearance of security.
  
−
=== '''Country 5''' ===
+
Multiple threats exploit Ziwa’s dependence on natural resources and external power generation and transmission.  Brutal militants in the northeast mountain area (“[[Watasi Gang|The Watasi Gang]]”) and pockets of [[Union of Peace for the Ziwa|ethnic rebels]] throughout the country continue to plague stability and keep the military at a continually high operational tempo. Although both Kujenga and Amari have active security agreements with Ziwa, rumors persist of their covert support to the Ziwa rebels.
−
Limaria, a small and poor country, neighbors Atropia, Ariana, Gorgas, and Kalaria and also occupies the Lower Janga region. Limaria currently enjoys a strong economic and military relationship with Donovia and a good economic relationship with Ariana. Tensions still exist with Atropia over the disputed Lower Janga region, an Atropian province that is currently occupied by ethnic Limarians. Additionally, Ariana’s and Limaria’s improved trade relations have created tension with the US. Limaria will attempt to maintain relations with all the Caucasus powers due to its precarious economic development and isolated geopolitical position
 
  
−
== Regional PMESII-PT Overview ==
+
===Republic of Kujenga===
 +
{{Main article|Kujenga}}
 +
Kujenga gained semi-independence fifty-six years ago under a post-colonial United Nations mandated trusteeship. Three years later, Kujenga gained full independence, establishing a constitution built on a single political party system.
  
−
=== '''Political''' ===
+
Working under the UN mandate, the outgoing colonial power lent support to the group of elites who had made up the bureaucracy under colonial rule. These elites united under the political party People of Change (POC). They have since controlled the government through successive elections, except for a brief experiment with multi-party rule seven years ago that ended five years later with the subsequent election. After independence, Kujenga established diplomatic relations with the United States. Relations between the two countries have been strained at various times because of Kujenga’s tight-knit oligarchic political structure and repressive tendencies. Ongoing tensions and violence between the Kujengan government and the Tanga region brought especial US condemnation. The Kujengan government is focused on addressing rampant corruption and government inaction, but the country has also experienced a shrinking of democratic space.
−
Since the region’s distancing from Donovian influence, political divisions within the Caucasus have hardened to create deep animosity between some of the countries. A long history of conflict has created borders that are often illogical, with contested boundaries that divide ethnic groups, rupture trade and communication routes, and split previous economic and political interdependencies. Internal and external forces destabilize the relatively weak Caucasus governmental structures make the governments subject to potential breakdown. Ariana and Atropia put up the front of a democracy with elected officials—Ariana with its legislature and Atropia with attempts to follow the Kalarian secular-Muslim model; but in reality, power belongs to a small elite group. In Ariana, the clerical authority roots out serious dissent and liquidates any opposition. In Atropia, a ruling family dominates all political life. Gorgas wants to sever its former ties with Donovia as it courts membership in NATO and the EU. Limaria retains its ties with Donovia but would not hesitate to turn to other countries if such an alliance would ensure its survival.
 
  
−
Despite some advances in the creation of parliamentary and electoral mechanisms, enactment of limited liberal legislation, and the development of new leaders, the legitimacy of the region’s governments remains limited. These governments often resort to authoritarian methods to retain control of the state: manipulating elections, stifling opposition, clamping down on dissidents, violating political freedoms, and abusing human rights. As a result, long-term political, economic, and social stability prospects remain uncertain. Oil and natural gas resources draw outside powers  to the Caucasus, but the region’s history of outside interference and ethnic conflict makes its nations wary and prone to vendettas and grudges, whether in the countries’ best interests or not.
+
The Kujenga Armed Service (KAS) is the state military of the Republic of Kujenga.  It emerged from a somewhat turbulent past and a range of internal security challenges.  Kujenga’s military relations with its neighbors are relatively stable, although border security issues, particularly in the Tanga region, are increasing the risk of regional conflict. The KAS consists of the Kujengan Army, [[Kujenga Armed Service#Kujengan National Air Force .28KNAF.29|Kujengan National Air Force (KNAF)]], [[Kujenga Armed Service#Kujengan National Navy .28KNAV.29|Kujengan National Navy (KNAV)]], and [[Kujenga Armed Service#Paramilitary Forces|Security Corps]]. Kujenga’s primary internal security concerns include [[Free Tanga Youth Movement|Tangan separatists]], violent [[Kujengan Bush Militias|bush militias]] in the central mountains, and the brutal "[[Army of Justice and Purity]]" guerrillas in the Kasama region. External threats include border incursions by presumed Amari paramilitaries and cross-border smuggling.
  
−
Contributing to the inter-regional strife are the various political ideals and goals espoused by each individual nation:
+
===Democratic Republic of Nyumba===
−
* Ariana is a true theocracy, with every significant political action affected by the clerical class. A brutally efficient military ensures the continuation of the current power structure, while a sham representative government appeases or distracts Western interests.
+
{{Main article|Nyumba}}Nyumba is a troubled nation and has had little in the form of democracy since its inception. It has been primarily ruled by authoritarian governments and wracked with internal turmoil and paranoia about perceived external threats. It is suspicious of regional government alliances with western countries and, particularly, what the Nyumba government leaders see as international meddling in its sovereign domestic and regional interests.
 +
The government is authoritarian in all aspects. Beginning fifty-nine years ago, a military coup overthrew the newly elected civilian government, lasting only six years before an Islamist government took power. While the government is based on its interpretation of Sharia law, tribal traditions and influences permeate the government as well. Economic, religious, ethnic, and tribal interests complicate Nyumban politics and have led to decades of civil war and other internal conflicts. These conflicts have threatened border countries with refugees and provided a safe haven for terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and other disruptors. These deep-seated challenges show no signs of dissipating.
  
−
* Atropia is a classic dictatorship and uses a dynastic approach to governance. Every national success or failure reflects directly on the ruling family.
+
The Nyumban Armed Forces (NAF) is the state military of Nyumba and is key to the country’s stability. It has experienced significant challenges from various threat actors in Nyumba, distrust within its ranks, and from politicians. Civilian distrust is particularly high, leading to widespread tribalism and the rise of armed militias. Its composition and deployments are driven by political desires to maintain control of key forces and the de facto ceding of territory to tribes or armed groups. The NAF consists of the Nyumban National Army (NNA), the Nyumban Armed Forces Air Corps, and the Nyumban Navy. The Nyumban National Security Service controls a paramilitary group, the Rapid Security Forces (RSF) which is usually deployed in support of border and anti-insurgency operations. The NAF has inherited a varied structure and culture due to several regime changes and a colonial legacy. The lawlessness of the territory and general instability has heightened both political and military leaders’ wariness of the forces.
  
−
* Donovia is an authoritarian state led by a small, incestuous elite. This group uses state power and resources to enrich itself and secure both domestic and international political support. The Donovian elite wants to return Donovia to a co-equal place with the Great Powers of the world.
+
==Strategic Positioning==
 +
This OE is one of the most politically dynamic regions in the world. Almost nowhere else have geopolitical forces and regional ambitions combined to produce such volatile results. State developments ranging from gradual reforms to often violent regime change have occurred throughout the region's history.  Although the region may not have been the primary focus of global geopolitical contests, it has often been a factor in the larger geopolitical landscape.  This volatility is not likely to change in the coming years as greater multipolarity continues to increase throughout the region.
  
−
* Gorgas is a political oddity in the region as an emerging representative democracy. In a region driven by group politics and ethnic nationalism, Gorgas is trying to make a democracy work and stands to lose much if let down by Western interests.
+
Coinciding with increased international interest, the region's states grew stronger over the past several years, exerting their sovereignty in ways that challenge the post-Cold War development and humanitarian models. International players  increased pressure to gain a foothold on the continent.  As the countries in the OE forge new international relationships, they find a range of willing partners with a diverse set of motives. Non-state threat actors also find fertile ground for extremist messages. Uneven economic growth and the injection of international anti-terror military aid empower some states while channeling resources to specific interest groups in power, specifically to the executive and security sector. However, this will not guarantee stability or equitable human development. Rather, the region may see more money pouring into countries, but with greater partisan international interests and increased conflict.  
  
−
* Limaria is an autocracy. Limaria’s key political goal is the survival and advancement of the Limarian ethnicity. Any argument for action between Limarians can be won by the side offering better protection for the local and Diaspora population.
+
Strengthening centers of power may prevent non-violent political change from emerging. Ambitious leaders on the periphery are likely to resort to violence to unseat ruling regimes that themselves came to power as products of deeply embedded ethnic conflicts, cross-border regional power projection, and divisive domestic inequalities.  The OE is often viewed as a 'political marketplace,' the challenges of which could begin to lead the region down a violent path. The region has a history of weathering changes in international attention, while also managing local political conflicts and economic problems. National leader legitimacy deficits co-exist within an international context that often undermines the development of local solutions. Even as regional cooperation is increasing stability and the level of cross border interference has declined, the future is anything but certain. The ever-present international, regional, and national challenges continue to strain the ability and capacity of national and regional institutions to regulate and manage nonviolent change.
  
−
=== '''Military''' ===
+
===Regional Views of the US===
−
Because of ties to Donovia, most Caucasus countries use primarily Donovian-sourced military doctrine and equipment. Some of the countries, however, recently purchased Western hardware, and their interactions with NATO forces in operations around the world caused them to adopt more Western doctrine and technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and advanced anti-armor capabilities.
+
The countries of the OE voice mixed views of American soft and military power.  There is little consensus about U.S.-style democracy and there are many in the populations who oppose the spread of American ideas and customs in Africa and around the world. At the same time, many in the region still believe the U.S. respects the personal freedoms of its people and they aspire to similar freedoms.  While the U.S. and other nations are involved in widely-popular peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, the presence of outside forces has been a rallying cry for disenfranchised groups. The general pull away from U.S. intervention in the region has been aided by aggressive inroads from other external countries, such as [[Olvana]], that promise to supply an alternative to previously undisputed economic and military power.
  
−
Several factors threaten security and stability throughout the Caucasus region. For the most part, the region has no functional border guard units, so the borders remain quite porous. Secessionist conflicts, limited political and economic reforms, and increased social problems provide a fertile ground for germination of radical groups, infiltration of foreign Islamic networks, and formation of militant organizations. Overall, unresolved territorial conflicts pose the most dangerous and immediate threat to the region’s security.
+
== Regional PMESII-PT Overview ==
  
−
Ariana maintains the second-largest military of the five Caucasus countries—behind Donovia. Militarily, it is a dominant actor within the region, capable of conducting military action across the spectrum of operations. The Arianian military conducts overt, covert, and clandestine operations  with ripple effects across the region. Reporting also suggests ties between elements of Ariana’s military to criminal and terror groups within the region, which further extends the potential for a global threat. Ariana has generally antagonistic relations with Atropia and maintains good ties with Limaria. Ariana is focused on keeping Western influence out of the region and maintaining its current status and self-perceived logical role as a regional strongman. Reports indicate that Ariana possesses nuclear weapons, with three nuclear sites identified at Qom, Isfahan, and Natanz.
+
=== Political ===
 +
The governments in DATE Africa  are vulnerable to widespread corruption, entrenched political leaders who repeatedly amend constitutions to extend their rule, and the historical absence of a democratic political culture.  They are apt to place legal restrictions on civil society. A history of coups, civil conflicts, and political stalemates between opposing factions suggest a potential for democratic backsliding across the region. Weak and failed states contain ungoverned spaces that provide operational bases for numerous irregular threats.  
  
−
Atropia’s military forces consist of a small army, navy, and air force that have limited offensive capability, with doctrine and structure that reflect decades of Donovian influence. Due to the military’s small size, Atropia restricts its scope to defending the country’s borders and regional operations, mostly directed at Limaria. Atropian military forces emulate Limaria’s in size and capability, and the two nations are currently engaged in an ongoing arms race. Enduring skirmishes with Limaria over disputed territory drive Atropia’s deployment of forces. To counter Donovian support for Limaria, the Atropian military is attempting to gain Arianian military support to help reclaim lost territory. Atropia’s hydrocarbon revenue is currently allowing its military to modernize its equipment. The Atropian military’s current key mission is to defend its oil and gas infrastructure. Atropia hopes its oil and gas revenues—and the resulting prestige and power—will translate into a more robust military and overall regional power.
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:75%;"
 +
|+Regional Political Comparison
 +
! &nbsp; !! Amari !! Ziwa !! Kujenga !! Nyumba
 +
|- valign="top"
 +
| '''Political'''
 +
||
 +
* [[Level of Freedom]]: 2 on a 7 point scale.
 +
* Relatively free and functioning democracy.
 +
* Constitution approved  7-years ago.
 +
* Bicameral legislature (Senate and National Assembly for 5-year unlimited terms.)
 +
* President and Deputy President elected on the same ballot by popular vote for 5-years and limited to 2 terms.
 +
* Next national elections in 4-years.
 +
* Legal system blends common law, Sharia law, and customary law.
 +
* A history of election violence until significant improvements in elections 6-years and 1-year ago.
 +
* Challenges include public and private sector corruption, weak border enforcement, refugees, terrorism, fragile political parties, and internal ethnic tensions.
 +
||
 +
* [[Level of Freedom]]: 5 on 7 point scale.
 +
* Open anocracy - government functions on a continuum closer to a democracy than an autocracy, with improving democratic infrastructure.
 +
* Constitution approved 57-year ago.
 +
* Bicameral legislature (Senate and House of Representatives for 4-year unlimited terms).
 +
* President and Vice President elected on the same ballot by popular vote for 4-year terms and limited to 2 terms.
 +
* Next national elections in 2-years.
 +
* Judicial system is subject to corruption and inappropriate influence, but is making slow and incremental progress.
 +
* Recent elections, judged by past standards, are significant improvements in transparency, openness, and credibility.
 +
* In spite of a history of military rule and lacking democratic traditions, pressure from civil society groups, journalists, social media, and other organizations are slowly bringing about greater transparency.
 +
||
 +
* [[Level of Freedom]]: 6 on 7 point scale.
 +
* Closed anocracy - limited opposition activity allowed that does not threaten one-party rule.
 +
* Constitution approved 53-years ago.
 +
* Unicameral legislature controlled by the People of Change (POC) political party with 5-year unlimited terms.
 +
* Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister elected on the same ticket by a simple majority of the legislature.
 +
* Next national elections in 3-years.
 +
* Legal system is a combination of common law, Sharia law, and customary law, but with limited independence and pervasive corruption.
 +
* Regular harassment, arrests, and intimidation of opposition parties by the ruling party and members of state institutions insure ruling party success in elections.
 +
* The POC has passed legislation used to arrest, detain, and threaten opposition leaders in the name of national security.
 +
||
 +
* [[Level of Freedom]]: 7 on 7 point scale.
 +
* Authoritarian failed state.
 +
* Beginning fifty-nine years ago, a military coup overthrew the newly elected civilian government, lasting only six years before an Islamist government took power.
 +
* Unicarmeral legislature controlled by National People's Party (NPP) with 6-year unlimited terms.
 +
* President and 2 Vice Presidents elected by popular vote for 6-year and unlimited number of terms.
 +
* Next national elections in 3-years.
 +
* Legal system is outwardly based on holdover colonial law and Sharia, however, the government is able to manipulate the judicial system to comply with its will.
 +
* Elections are defined by corruption, intimidation, and other extra-legal activities that insure the election of candidates carefully chosen by the ruling party.
 +
* The ruling party dominates the political system and uses intimidation, arbitrary arrests, and onerous regulations to prevent other political parties and civil society activists from operating freely.
 +
|}
  
−
Donovia maintains a strong military, partially as an inheritance from its pre-1991 strength and partially through economic wealth being used to transform the pre-1991 military remnants into a modern military. Donovian doctrine and tactics are complex, supple, and competent, making Donovia a capable opponent. Donovia’s military capability ranges from irregular forces to nuclear weapons and anti-space capability. This strong military, combined with its assertive political agenda, make Donovia a prime consideration for all nations in the region.
+
===Military===
 +
The countries represented in DATE: Africa are a cross-section and composite of states and state forces.  State forces have evolved from a diverse set of conditions including colonial histories to a succession of regime changes and revolutions.  They are generally pragmatic in both structure and equipment - the result of constrained budgets and constantly changing threat conditions. The forces of the more modernized countries, such as [[Amari]] and [[Ziwa]], are generally more integrated, better equipped, and more professional.  At-risk countries, such as [[Kujenga]] and [[Nyumba]] demonstrate tribal or ethnic segregation, degraded readiness, and a structuring for regime survival. Participation in regional or international peacekeeping forces and exercises is often as much to train and equip their own forces as to develop interoperability and cooperation.  A variety of [[DATE Africa Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions|threat groups]] and endemic [[DATE Africa - Criminal Activity|criminal activity]] throughout the region contend to destabilize governments or build power in difficult-to-govern areas.
  
−
Like the rest of the Caucasus region, Gorgas has an extensive history of irregular and regular warfare. Of the five countries, Gorgas maintains the smallest military—consisting of a ground force, air force, and sea force (coast guard) capability for defensive operations, with limited offensive capabilities. Gorgas uses the military for defense and to maintain territorial sovereignty that includes regaining breakaway regions. Gorgas is currently attempting to join NATO and is the most accepting of Western influence.
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:75%;"
 +
|+Regional Military Comparison
 +
! &nbsp; !! Amari !! Ziwa !! Kujenga !! Nyumba
 +
|- valign="top"
 +
| '''Military'''
 +
||
 +
*Amari Defense Force (ANDF) includes, Amarian Army, Amarian Air Force, and Amarian Navy.
 +
*The National Command Authority (NCA) of Amari exercises overall control, planning, and execution of the national security. The Amari Chief of Military Defence Staff is the senior military position, with the Chiefs of the Military Defense Staff functioning at the top of the military hierarchy and decision-making process.
 +
*Army      12th Mechanised Brigade  14th Mechanised Brigade  18th Mechanised Brigade  5th Armour Regiment  102nd Infantry Regiment ("Amari Mounted Rifles")  Fires Regiment  Reconnaissance and Intelligence Formation (RIF)  Capital Defence Force and Strategic Reserve
 +
*Paramilitary Forces  Border Guard Corps (BGC)  Special Reserve Force (SRF)  Defense Force Reserves (DFR)
 +
*Air Force  Air Combat Group (ACG)      Fighter/Intercept SQDN      Ground Attack SQDN      Attack Helicopter SQDN      Intelligence and Surveillance SQDN  Air Transport Group (ATG)      Medium Air Transport SQDNs      2x Light Air Transport SQDNs      Medium Helicopter  Transport SQDNs      3x Light Helicopter Transport SQDNs
 +
*Navy  Coastal Defence Group (CDG)  Inland Maritime Security Group (IMSG)
 +
*Contributes to regional and international peacekeeping missions, to include deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
 +
*Multi-ethnic and desegregated units.
 +
*Major threats include cross-border incursions and criminal smuggling.
 +
||
 +
*Ziwa People's Defense Force (ZPDF) includes Ziwa Ground Forces Command,  Ziwa Air Corps, and the Ziwa National Guard.
 +
*Military branches of the Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) receive their authority via the Minister of Security and Defense, who exercises overall control of planning, control, and execution of all instruments of national power and strategy, under the direction of the President.
 +
*Army  7th Mechanized Brigade  1st Motorized Regiment  2nd Motorized Regiment   26th Artillery Regiment   27th Rocket Regiment   22nd Air Defense Regiment   1st Information Warfare Battalion   356th Engineer Battalion   51st Antitank Battalion
 +
*Paramilitary Forces  Ziwa People's National Guard
 +
*Ziwa Air Corp (ZAC)   Attack Aviation SQDN (FW)   Helicopter SQDN (RW)   Intelligence (UAV) SQDN
 +
*No Navy
 +
*Relies heavily on peacekeeping rotations to solidify and expand individual and small unit capabilities. 
 +
*The military fills the ranks of both its regular forces and the National Guard through an all-volunteer recruiting program. Reductions in regular force recruiting and retention levels were expected due to Ziwa’s economic growth, but personnel levels from Ziwa’s ethnic minorities and former rebels remain strong.
 +
*Major threats include internal militants, internal and cross-border ethnic rebels, criminal smuggling, and human and arms trafficking.
 +
||
 +
*Kujenga Armed Service (KAS) includes the Kujengan Army, Kujengan National Air Force, Kujengan National Navy, and Security Corps.
 +
*The Kujengan National Defense Council (KNDC) exercises overall control, planning, and execution of the national security. The KNDC includes the Defense Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, armed service chiefs, and the Chief of the Intelligence Division. The Prime Minister may appoint Special Advisors to the KNDC as needed. Each armed service chief is the senior officer of their respective services.
 +
*Army  1st Division (Western Region)  2nd Division (Upper Region)  5th Division (Central Region)  16th Division (Lower Region)
 +
*Paramilitary Forces  Kujengan Security Corps (KSEC)  Special Reaction Division (SRD)
 +
*Air Force  Air Combat Group      Fighter/Intercept SQDN      Ground Attack SQDN      Intelligence and Surveillance SQDN      3x Attack Helicopter SQDNs  Air Transport Group      2x Medium Air Transport SQDNs      Light Air Transport SQDNs      3x Light Helicopter Transport SQDNs
 +
*Navy  Coastal Naval District  Lake Tanganyika Naval District  Lake Malawi Naval District
 +
*Contributes to regional and  international missions.
 +
*Units are officially integrated, but unit-level segregation remains commonplace. Most units are manned by local people from the geographic area where their unit operates, though their hand-picked commanders are likely from elsewhere.
 +
*Major threats include separatists, bush militias, guerillas, border incursions, and cross-border smuggling.
 +
||
 +
*Nyumban Armed Forces (NAF) includes Nyumban National Army, Nyumban Armed Forces- Air Corp, and Nyumban Navy.
 +
*The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the planning and execution of national power and strategy, with the President exercising significant control over the military. Department chiefs are appointed directly by the President and almost exclusively affiliated and/or aligned with his tribe.  
 +
*Army  "Presidential" Division  "Marsabit" Division  50th Parachute Division  1st Guards Tank Brigade  21st Light Brigade  15th Motorized Battalion (SEP)  20th Motorized Battalion (SEP)
 +
*Paramilitary Forces  Rapid Security Forces (RSF)
 +
*Air Force  2x SQDN Multi-Role FW  1x SQDN Utility/Transport FW  1x SQDN Utility RW
 +
*Navy  Inland Maritime Security Group  Coastal Defence Group
 +
*Contributes to regional and international peacekeeping missions.
 +
*There is little tribal integration at the unit-level. Many of the tactical commanders will reflect the majority tribal or ethnic affiliation of their forces, but the higher leadership will be trusted members of the president’s tribe.
 +
*Major threats include insurgents, rebels, criminals, and instability driven by an authoritarian government.  
 +
|}
  
−
Regular and irregular warfare also permeate Limaria’s history. Limaria is heavily influenced by Donovia, which currently has advisors in the country. Limaria would most likely remain neutral if conflict began with Ariana. The Limarian military consists of only an army and an air force, and is roughly the size of the Atropian military. The Limarian military, heavily influenced by the territorial dispute with Atropia, cannot project forces outside of the region.
+
===Economic===
 +
The economic conditions in the four countries cover a wide spectrum. Ranging from modern economic systems to reliance on traditional cash-only systems. In all of the countries the underlying structure of family and tribe motivate most economic transactions and policies.
  
−
=== '''Economic''' ===
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:75%;"
−
Oil and gas resources drive the region’s economy. All international commerce centers around oil drilling and refining, and development of a transportation corridor. Significantly, the corridor serves as the main world market outlet for hydrocarbon resources from both the Caucasus region and the Central Asian countries. In addition, China and Japan continue to extend their influence into the region through financial involvement with Caspian energy projects. Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia possess the fossil fuels, while Gorgas provides the pipeline access required to ship oil and gas abroad. Limaria would like to participate in the transshipment of petroleum products, but its dispute with Atropia over the Lower Janga region precludes this possibility.
+
|+Regional Economics Comparison
 +
! &nbsp; !! Amari !! Ziwa !! Kujenga !! Nyumba
 +
|- valign="top"
 +
| '''Economic'''
 +
||
 +
*Nominal GDP: $85.12 billion (Agriculture 301.%, Industry 19.7%, Services 50.2%).
 +
*Real GDP Growth Rate: 9.8% (5 year average 19.4%)
 +
*Labor Force: 38.3 million (Agriculture 60.1%, Industry 10.4%, Services 29.5%).
 +
*Unemployment: 34.5%
 +
*Poverty: 45.4% (% of population below the international poverty line)
 +
*Net Foreign Direct Investment: $6.22 billion (No outbound FDI)
 +
*Budget: $14.21 billion revenue,    $38.25 billion expenditures.
 +
*Public Dept. 40.4% of GDP.
 +
*Infaltion: 6.5% (5-year average 15.5%).
 +
*Despite government corruption, Amari has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and a gradually improving economic growth rate.
 +
||
 +
*Nominal GDP: $14.52 billion  (Agriculture 2.5%, Industry 30.3%, Services 67.2% ).
 +
*Real GDP Growth Rate: 0.5%  (5 year average 6.9%).
 +
*Labor Force:   6.4 million  (Agriculture 5.2%, Industry 24.3%, Services 70.5%).
 +
*Unemployment: 7.4%
 +
*Poverty: 15.0% (% of population living below the international poverty line).
 +
*Net Foreign Direct Investment: $1.23 billion (No outbound FDI).
 +
*Budget: $4.73 billion revenue,          $4.28 billion expenditures.
 +
*Public Dept: 50.4% of GDP.
 +
*Inflation: 6.0% (5 year average 5.3%).
 +
*Although some private enterprise is allowed to function in accordance with open market dynamics, the government maintains an active role in managing the economy.
 +
||
 +
*Nominal GDP: $36.11 billion (Agriculture 20.1%, Industry 20.2%, Services 59.7% ).
 +
*Real GDP Growth Rate: 7.6% (5 year average 5.2%).
 +
*Labor Force: 18.8 million (Agriculture 70.0%, Industry 9.7%, Services 20.3%).
 +
*Unemployment: 15.8%
 +
*Poverty: 70.1% (% of population living below the international poverty line).
 +
*Net Foreign Direct Investment: $1.62 billion (No outbound FDI).
 +
*Budget: $5.49 billion revenue,       $10.85 billion expenditures.
 +
*Public Dept: 119.8% of GDP.
 +
*Inflation: 15.1%  (5 year average 8.7%).
 +
*Despite efforts to grow a viable middle class by diversifying the economy, most Kujengans—70 percent—still live on less than one dollar per day, while a small group of oligarchs retain Kujenga's economic power.
 +
||
 +
*Nominal GDP: $2.92 billion   (Agriculture 31.4%, Industry 63.4%, Services 5.2%).
 +
*Real GDP Growth Rate: -6.3% 5 year average 0.6% ).
 +
*Labor Force:     5.3 million   (Agriculture 65.4%, Industry 25.0%, Services 9.6%).
 +
*Unemployment: 13.0%
 +
*Poverty: 79.6% (% of population living below the international poverty line).
 +
*Net Foreign Direct Investment: $173.59 million (No outbound FDI).
 +
*Budget: $419.63 million revenue, $441.89 million expenditures.
 +
*Public Dept: 18.4% of GDP
 +
*Inflation:2.5%  (5 year average 3.3%).
 +
*By most modern standards, Nyumba is a very weak or failed state economically, with a small group of powerful individuals controlling the financial, trade, banking, and commodity sectors within the country.  
 +
|}
  
−
Regional conflicts compound local economic problems, generating hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and encouraging many others to leave their country, especially for Donovia. Donovia serves as the main market for regional goods, primarily hydrocarbon products and foodstuffs for several reasons, including international markets closed because of political instability, insufficient alternate transit routes, and stiff trade tariffs. With domestic markets contracted and trade opportunities constrained, all five Caucasus nations have limited potential for economic development outside the energy sector. The economic challenge is to identify ways to diversify the region’s economies through restoration and development of critical water resources, agriculture, and the ailing manufacturing sector. The region’s relatively weak central governments focus more on control than on the fledgling market economies, so inefficiency and criminal elements freely flourish. Its minimal diversity places the region’s economies in danger of stagnating, with  daily commerce and utilities degrading and the general standard of living falling. Because of this threat, some of the region’s inhabitants are returning to the countryside to survive from the land or seeking permission to migrate abroad.
+
===Social===
 +
In Sub-Saharan Africa, UN population growth forecasts exceed 2.0% per annum through 2035, with the majority of the population under age 25 through the year 2050. Sub-Saharan Africa’s global share of 15-24 year olds will increase from 14.3% to 23.3% over the forecast period. Under these circumstances, mega-cities will continue to grow rapidly, poverty will persist, and governments will struggle to provide basic services. Insurgent and terrorist groups will seek to exploit these conditions: competing with the state to provide social services; employing violence to intimidate political opposition; using terror attacks to provoke external actors into de-legitimizing military interventions; and aggressively recruiting among the region’s youth.  
  
−
The Arianian economy primarily centers on its petroleum industry, though it is highly diversified compared to other petroleum-dependent economies. The Arianians have attempted to create an industrial manufacturing sector, especially as international sanctions require them to increasingly in-source manufactured goods. Ariana also has a large agriculture sector.
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:75%;"
 +
|+Regional Social Factors Comparison
 +
! &nbsp; !! Amari !! Ziwa !! Kujenga !! Nyumba
 +
|- valign="top"
 +
| '''Social'''
 +
||
 +
*Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 42%  15-59 yr. 53%  > 60 yr. 5%
 +
*Median Age: 19.5
 +
*Pop. Growth Rate: 1.81%
 +
*Birth Rate (per 1,000): 25.1
 +
*Death Rate (per 1,000): 6.8
 +
*Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 38.3
 +
*Life Expectancy: 6
 +
*Literacy Rate:  Male 81%  Female 74%
 +
*Urban Population: 25.6%
 +
*Religion:  Christianity 80%  Islam 5%  Traditional/ Indigenous 4%  Other 2%
 +
||
 +
*Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 45%  15-59 yr. 49%  > 60 yr. 6%
 +
*Median Age: 20
 +
*Pop. Growth Rate: 3.2%
 +
*Birth Rate (per 1,000): 42.9
 +
*Death Rate (per 1,000): 10.2
 +
*Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 57.6
 +
*Life Expectancy: 65
 +
*Literacy Rate:  Male 85%  Female 72%
 +
*Urban Population: 16.8%
 +
*Religion:  Christianity 40%  Islam 35%  Traditional/ Indigenous 15%  Other 0%
 +
||
 +
*Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 45%  15-59 yr. 50%  > 60 yr. 5%
 +
*Median Age: 27
 +
*Pop. Growth Rate: 2.8%
 +
*Birth Rate (per 1,000): 35
 +
*Death Rate (per 1,000): 7.6
 +
*Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 41.2
 +
*Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 41.2
 +
*Life Expectancy: 62.2
 +
*Literacy Rate: Male 83%  Female 71%
 +
*Urban Population: 33%
 +
*Religion:  Christianity 27%  Islam 60%  Traditional/ Indigenous 10%  Other 3%
 +
||
 +
*Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 44%  15-59 yr. 52%  > 60 yr. 4%
 +
*Median Age: 18
 +
*Pop. Growth Rate: 2%
 +
*Birth Rate (per 1,000): 39
 +
*Birth Rate (per 1,000): 39
 +
*Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 96.6
 +
*Life Expectancy: 62.4
 +
*Literacy Rate:  Male 82%  Female 68%
 +
*Urban Population: 40.5%
 +
*Religion:  Christianity 3%  Islam 90%  Traditional/ Indigenous 7%  Other 0%
 +
|}
  
−
Atropia’s economy is also dependent on hydrocarbon extraction. Most industry other than oil and gas is engaged in subsistence-level agriculture or services. Atropia has attempted to diversify its  economy with little success. It is likely that hydrocarbon dependence will be the hallmark of the Atropian economy indefinitely.
+
===Information===
 +
The OE countries all recognize the importance and influence of information media and its control. Approaches range from low technical capabilities with tight government controls to rapidly modernizing technical capabilities with ineffective attempts by the government to control the public's perceptions. New means of information sharing using modern technology are rapidly adopted by the population unless the government intervenes in an attempt to control information flow. Countries jump directly from limited land-line telephone systems to ubiquitous cell phone use. Distances and improvements in technology, software, and infrastructure allow African countries to implement new information systems at a very rapid pace. In several instances, African countries are on the cutting edge of adopting new information technology to enhance the public's standard of living. Other instances see the leadership of a country attempting to control access to information systems to remain in power and to exploit it for their own benefit.  
  
−
Donovia is using its petrochemical wealth to climb out of economic stagnation. However, beneath the veneer of a market economy, former command elements have morphed into a crony capitalist economy. State-associated businesses dominate the economic landscape, and businesses not  affiliated with the government face significant hurdles from a variety of government bureaucracies. The general response to massive corruption is more corruption, which affects nearly every element of Donovian economic life. Services are an important element of the Donovian economy, but export of non-military manufactured goods and services remain dwarfed by hydrocarbon-based exports.
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:75%;"
−
 
+
|+Regional Information Environment Comparison
−
Gorgas is primarily a service economy, with many citizens also engaged in subsistence agriculture as a secondary sector. While the Gorgan economy is relatively free, development has been slow. The most likely growth opportunity will be as a petroleum transshipment point. Even this bright spot in the economy is overshadowed by the lingering, cooling effects of the Donovian-Gorgas War.
+
! &nbsp; !! Amari !! Ziwa !! Kujenga !! Nyumba
 +
|- valign="top"
 +
| '''Information''' <!-- ################ INFORMATION VARIABLE COMPARISON TABLE ############ -->
 +
|| <!-- Amari -->
 +
*Good diverse, open media
 +
*High INFOWAR capability
 +
*Diverse INT capabilities
 +
*Decent technology
 +
|| <!-- Ziwa-->
 +
*Govt. control/owned
 +
*Strong growth of ICT Sector
 +
*INFOWAR mixed
 +
*Mixed INT
 +
*Adopting modern technology
 +
*Rapidly growing cell phone capability
 +
|| <!--Kujenga -->
 +
*Ltd. media (radio, WOM) Govt./Private mix
 +
*Attempt at Govt. control - marginal effect
 +
*Ltd. INFOWAR
 +
*Ltd. INT (HUMINT, OSINT)
 +
*Entry-level cell phone
 +
|| <!-- Nyumba -->
 +
*Non-technical (WOM, radio)
 +
*Govt. media & control
 +
*INFOWAR niche purchases
 +
*Ltd. INT (HUMINT)
 +
*Paid/foreign-supplied IMINT
 +
*SATCOM phones only (elite)
 +
|}
  
−
Limaria, like Gorgas, is a service and agriculture-based economy. While not as politically free as Gorgas, Limaria benefits from overseas investment from the Limarian Diaspora and Donovia. Due to a  near blockade  of  goods  and  services from  Kalaria  and Atropia,  Limaria  is dependent  on  its relationships with Ariana and Gorgas for the movement of goods and services. However, international sanctions against Ariana and a limited Gorgan trade embargo against Limaria hamper the effectiveness of these partnerships.
+
===Infrastructure===
 +
{{Main article|DATE Africa Regional Infrastructure}}
 +
[[File:Africa Infrastructure Schematicv2.png|thumb|Regional infrastructure architecture diagram|381x381px]]
 +
African infrastructure is expensive. Long distances, low population densities, uneven management, and intraregional competition contribute to these costs. African infrastructure projects emphasize expensive rehabilitation over basic maintenance. The World Bank estimates that about 30 percent of Africa’s infrastructure requires rehabilitation – even more in rural and conflict-prone areas.
  
−
=== '''Social''' ===
+
Despite the cost, both domestic and international players are keen to expand Africa’s infrastructure. States control most infrastructure systems, but public-private partnerships (PPP) are increasingly more common. The World Bank and international development finance institutions provide most of the financing, followed by domestic government financing. Olvana is the largest financier and constructor of African infrastructure.
−
All countries in the region can trace their cultures back for centuries, and most ethnic groups retain rivalries against each other that date back just as far. The countries have long histories of internal and external volatility, usually over disputed territory. Each country possesses strong ethnic groups that do not tolerate others, and each is home to displaced persons who originated from the others’ territory. Many of the IDPs are born into a refugee situation and harbor resentment and intolerance to other displaced groups. This violent history keeps the countries and their people wary of each  other and of regional outsiders.
 
  
−
Literacy rates are high in the region, with only Ariana possessing a rate lower than 98%. Atropia, Gorgas, Limaria, and Donovia have all instituted educational reforms during the past two decades, with the aim of producing qualified, internationally competitive citizens who will reduce poverty, improve social welfare, and encourage economic growth.
+
The typical project involves a consortium of non-African state development agencies, international government organizations, private financiers, and construction companies. Following the financing announcement, spending or progress is hard to trace until the project is complete. A large portion of the announced projects are either scaled back or never completed. In some cases, competing projects do not have the demand to justify the large investments.
  
−
The vast majority of Ariana’s citizens are Shia Muslim and view themselves as either Persian or Arianian, depending on ethnicity. With a rich culture and heritage, Ariana’s social issues stem not from its people but from its leaders, whose actions are considered corrupt and repressive. Protests over government corruption, unequal wealth distribution, high inflation, and high unemployment rates occur often, despite the government’s frequent use of force to put them down.
+
Developed infrastructure correlates with population density. Amari’s main cities: Nairobi, Kampala and Mombasa, are key nodes of the 800-mile Northern Victoria Corridor, a road, rail, and pipeline network. Kujenga follows Amari in both population and infrastructure development, with the competing Dar Es Salaam - Kigoma, DARGOMA, Corridor linking the Indian Ocean port of Dar Es Salaam with Lake Tanganyika and Ziwa’s capital, Mwanza, on the southern shore of Lake Victoria. A major north-south transportation artery runs through Moyale in Nyumba, crossing into Amari just south of Isiolo, through Nairobi to Mbeya, Kujenga in the south. Nyumba, Amari, and Kujenga all compete to be the Indian Ocean gateway of choice to landlocked countries.
  
−
Atropia consists mainly of ethnic Atropian Shia Muslim, with small ethnic and religious minorities. Most Atropians choose to support the government, which may well be due to the continuing dispute with Limaria over the Lower Janga region. Those that do not usually fall into two categories: separatists who wish to create a new country from southern Atropia and northwest Ariana; and those upset over taxation, lack of utilities, substandard social services, and judicial favoritism.
+
Lastly, proposed infrastructure projects are increasingly gathering strong opposition through both standard and social media, quickly gathering international support. The more disruptive to the environment, the more opposition they garner. Examples include port expansion and coal power plant construction in Lamu, Nyumba, and transportation corridors bisecting wildlife ranges in all four countries. While opposition campaigns often start on social media sites and increasingly evolve to on-site demonstrations.
−
 
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:50%;"
−
Donovia’s population is predominately Arab Sunni, with significant social-related issues that retard economic and political development. In addition, certain Donovian social fabric elements, such as massive smoking, pervasive corruption, and endemic violence, have created significant social volatility that is manifested through gender imbalance, high crime rates, and systemic discrimination against ethnic minorities.
+
|+Regional Infrastructure Comparison
−
 
+
! &nbsp; !! Amari !! Kujenga !! Nyumba!! Ziwa
−
Most Gorgan citizens are of the same ethnicity and practice Orthodox Christianity. Though attacks do occur against other ethnic groups and religions, the government is working to protect the rights of minorities, as well as freedom of speech and of the press. Most social unrest revolves around Gorgas’ breakaway republics, which both the government and its citizens would like to see returned to Gorgan control.
+
|- valign="top"
−
 
+
| '''Infrastructure Summary/Condition'''  
−
Nearly all Limarians are ethnic Limarian Christians. Those that are not suffer some discrimination, but not at the levels experienced in neighboring countries. Major social issues that shape Limarian thinking are hatred of the Kalarians—a residue of '''''loss of territory in the 1940s'''''—and support for the autonomous Lower Janga region in Atropia.
+
|| Have-use-fix
−
 
+
|| Have-use-don’t fix
−
=== '''Information''' ===
+
|| Either have but degraded or
−
The Caucasus region receives the majority of its news and information through television, but Internet and mobile phone usage are growing. The region continues to evolve slowly from state- controlled media and information delivery. While governments still attempt to control information, satellite and computer technology enable many of the region’s people to bypass governmental controls. Information-based technologies sustained by the use of satellites will become more and
+
never-had
−
 
+
|| Have-use-don’t fix
−
more important as the need to communicate quickly, easily, and reliably increases. Satellites not only enable telecommunication across a wide spectrum, but also support economic growth and development, support transportation sectors, and assist with meteorological forecasting. Additional use of commercial satellites also supports navigation, enabling both public and commercial sectors to capitalize on the use of satellite technologies.
 
−
 
 
−
As more international companies move into the growing information market, technology and access continue to become more affordable to the average citizen. The mass use of television keeps perception management at the forefront of all political and military operations. Computer attacks have occurred in the region, and each country continues to expand both its Intelligence and Information Warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities.
 
−
 
 
−
Ariana is a highly-controlled information environment. The government controls all media outlets and attempts to limit its citizens’ access to outside sources of information like the Internet and satellite TV broadcasts. Despite the government’s actions, Arianian citizens—especially the educated urban elite—have aggressively attempted to circumvent the government-imposed information embargo.
 
−
 
 
−
The Atropian government attempts to regulate the information environment through ownership control of the main media outlets and occasional arrests of bloggers and reporters. No significant nongovernment-affiliated media outlets exist. The Atropian government also attempts to control the content of religious messages through the selection of religious authorities. If Atropians avoid messages with a strong religious or antigovernment tone, the content is generally allowed by the government.
 
−
 
 
−
Donovia is a world leader in INFOWAR. While information is subject to government pressure and outright censorship, censorship is usually self-imposed. Opinions contrary to the standing government line are primarily found in social media, which is outside the government oversight imposed on other mass media communications.
 
−
 
 
−
Gorgas maintains a generally free press, though government ownership and connections with media owners make certain subjects off limits. Unlike other countries in the region, Gorgas does have some media outlets that are independent, so debate in Gorgas is the freest among Caucasian countries.
 
−
 
 
−
Limaria follows the pattern set by Gorgas and Atropia, falling between the two in overall control of the information environment. The Limarian government controls the media environment, but only to a degree that does not antagonize its neighbors or the West. In this fashion, the Limarian government maintains the most flexible information posture.
 
−
 
 
−
=== '''Infrastructure''' ===
 
−
The Caucasus countries face several hurdles to infrastructure development. Atropia, Gorgas, Limaria, and Donovia rely on infrastructure mainly built decades ago, while Ariana possesses a somewhat newer infrastructure. The region remains dependent on oil and natural gas reserves in Ariana, Atropia, and Donovia. While these countries possess the financial resources to improve their infrastructure, Western embargos against Ariana, ethno-political issues in Atropia, and lack of government priority in Donovia prevent most infrastructure improvement outside the hydrocarbon industries. This aging infrastructure is affected by natural disasters such as landslides, mudslides, and floods, which routinely cause evacuation of local populations, loss of life, infrastructural damage and heavy material losses. Development of the Caucasus as a transportation corridor will not only increase incomes and boost the Atropian and Gorgan economies, but will also expand air pollution and noise issues. Construction of roads, railways, and pipelines may cause the loss of valuable agriculture land. Waste dumping along the transportation routes will become a growing issue.
 
−
 
 
−
Ariana has the second most modern infrastructure in the Caucasus region because of wealth generated by hydrocarbon exports. Ariana contains 12 cities with a population of over one million residents, high building density, and developed power, water, and sewage utilities that can reach at least 75% of the urban residents. Ariana operates complex transportation architecture with abundant multi-lane hard-surface highway networks, railway lines, and many operational airports. Ariana also possesses nuclear power plants, nuclear research facilities, and civilian industrial plants with the capacity to produce military-grade nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
 
−
 
 
−
Atropia’s largest cities possess a high building density and over 75% of the residents in the 10 largest cities enjoy access to modern power, water, and sewage utilities. The country has only moderate transportation architecture due to limited railroad lines. Conversely, it possesses considerable hydrocarbon resource infrastructure to export crude oil and natural gas to the outside world. Atropia has no nuclear power plants and only limited industrial capacity outside the hydrocarbon industry.
 
−
 
 
−
Despite years of neglect, Donovia still possesses the most modern infrastructure in the region. Of Donovia’s five largest cities, two have more than 1 million residents and lie outside its Northern Caucasus provinces. The remaining three are within the Caucasus region and have less than 1.1 million residents combined. All five provide more than 75% of their residents with access to modern utilities. The country has a complex transportation architecture with paved roads, railroads, and multiple airports. Dozens of nuclear power plants exist, as do nuclear research and industrial plants that can produce military-grade nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
 
−
 
 
−
The five largest Gorgan cities exhibit a high building density and in four these, 75% of residents have access to modern power, water, and sewer utilities. Zugdidi and all smaller Gorgan cities have only a utility access rate of 25-50%. Due to limited railroad lines and a lack of secondary roads between major cities, Gorgas has moderate transportation architecture. The country contains no nuclear power plants and little major industrial capacity.
 
−
 
 
−
Of the five Caucasus countries, Limaria’s infrastructure is the least modern. The five largest Limarian cities show a high building density, but modern power and water access rates are usually 25-50%. Yerevan is the only exception, with a utility access rate of over 75% for power and water. Limited railroad access and a lack of multi-lane hard surface roads limit Limaria to a moderate transportation architecture. The country operates no nuclear power plants and possesses little industrial capacity, as most Limarians work in agriculture or the service industry. Recent reports indicate Limaria may have gained possession of a small number of nuclear weapons.
 
−
 
 
−
=== '''Physical Environment''' ===
 
−
Terrain features across the Caucasus region are similar—dominated by mountains but with deserts and lowlands as well. Specifically, Ariana features a plateau of deserts in the east with mountains prevalent in other areas of the country. Its coast is bordered by the Caspian Sea on the north, the Persian Gulf on the '''''southwest, and the Gulf of Oman on the south'''''. Lowlands are present in Atropia, but the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains are the primary terrain feature throughout the country. Southern Donovia is primarily mountainous, though its access to most of the major outside world means its geographic position assures its strategic importance. The Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains hem in Gorgas to the north and south, respectively, while the Likhi Range divides the country into eastern and western parts. Limaria is 70% mountains, primarily the Lesser Caucasus. Central Limaria consists of a plateau whose elevation gradually decreases as it meets the Aras River Valley. Of note also are the tunnels that exist '''''in these countries''''' to facilitate movement of supplies for the military as well as smuggling by criminal organizations and irregular forces, and underground facilities used to house nuclear training and enrichment programs
 
−
 
 
−
=== '''Time''' ===
 
−
The Caucasus countries, for the most part, do not believe in the sensitivity of time and do not view punctuality or the importance of time as most Western countries do. The people do not look at time  in the short term, but look toward the long term. Time commitments are seen more as an objective to be achieved, if possible, rather than a requirement to be met. Promptness is based on relationships, with people being much more likely to be on time if the person who sets the time commitment is  close to him, such as a friend or family member. The more a country interacts with Western nations, however, the more accepting the country becomes to Western ideas on time.
 
−
 
 
−
== Variable Conditions by OE ==
 
−
{| class="wikitable"
 
−
!
 
−
!'''Ariana'''
 
−
!'''Atropia'''
 
−
!'''Donovia'''
 
−
!'''Gorgas'''
 
−
!'''Limaria'''
 
 
|-
 
|-
−
!'''Political'''
+
|Highway Density (mi/100sq mi)
−
|'''Theocracy'''
+
|5.7
−
- Clerical authority over government structure
+
|2.8
−
 
+
|1.6
−
- Token representative government
+
|4.4
−
 
 
−
-Strong influence of clerical class
 
−
 
 
−
- Wary of “Western Influence”
 
−
 
 
−
- Seeking regional dominance
 
−
 
 
−
- Strong relationship with Limaria
 
−
 
 
−
- Mutually beneficial unofficial relationship with Donovia
 
−
 
 
−
Generally antagonistic relationship with Atropia
 
−
|'''Dictatorship'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Power belongs to a small, elite group – one family
 
−
 
 
−
- Looks to the West for support
 
−
 
 
−
- Sees Ariana, Donovia, and Limaria as threats
 
−
US willing to support
 
−
|'''Authoritarian Republic'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Regionally dominant
 
−
 
 
−
- Figurehead elected President
 
−
 
 
−
- Power rests with small group of elites
 
−
 
 
−
- Five main political parties; only one true opposition party
 
−
 
 
−
- Weakening legitimacy of ruling political party
 
−
 
 
−
- Typically neutral to US power and forces; will protect regional position of power
 
−
 
 
−
- Adversarial toward Atropia
 
−
High levels of crime and corruption
 
−
|'''Emerging Democracy'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Representative republic
 
−
 
 
−
- Values Western principles
 
−
 
 
−
- Looks to distance itself from Donovia
 
−
Seeks NATO and EU membership
 
−
|'''Autocracy'''
 
−
 
 
−
- A small, elite group controls Limarian politics
 
−
 
 
−
- Values alliance with Donovia
 
−
 
 
−
- '''''Loss of territory to Kalaria''''' influences all decisions
 
−
Sees Atropia as a threat
 
 
|-
 
|-
−
!'''Military'''
+
|Airports w/ Paved Runway >8,000 ft.
−
|'''Large conventional force'''
+
|4
−
 
+
|2
−
- Three standing Armies consisting mostly Tier 2 capabilities with four Separate Army Divisions that are considered to be Tier 1
+
|1
−
 
+
|1
−
- Most capable military in the region after Donovia
 
−
 
 
−
- Faces small insurgencies in southeast
 
−
 
 
−
- Capable of a wide range of operations
 
−
Successful nuclear weapons program
 
−
|'''Small army, navy, and air force'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Tier 2 conventional forces
 
−
 
 
−
- Limited offensive capabilities
 
−
 
 
−
- Tensions continue with Limaria over Lower Janga region
 
−
 
 
−
- Defense of hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure paramount
 
−
Two main and several small insurgent groups
 
−
|'''Large conventional force'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Three standing armies with mainly Tier 1 capabilities
 
−
 
 
−
- Most capable military in region
 
−
 
 
−
- Capable of a wide range of operations
 
−
 
 
−
- Successful nuclear weapons program
 
−
 
 
−
- Anti-satellite capabilities
 
−
 
 
−
- Strong INFOWAR capabilities
 
−
 
 
−
- Potential ally of Ariana
 
−
Relations with Limaria
 
−
|'''Smallest military in region'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Tier 2 conventional forces
 
−
 
 
−
- Defensive capabilities with limited offensive capabilities
 
−
 
 
−
- Tensions continue with Zabzimek and South Ostremek (breakaway Gorgan republics)
 
−
Donovian-sponsored paramilitaries are current threat, along with the Donovian military
 
−
|'''Small military with army and air forces only'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Tier 2 conventional forces
 
−
 
 
−
- Tensions continue with Atropia over the Lower Janga region
 
−
 
 
−
- Focused on Atropian military and support for allied Lower Janga military forces
 
−
 
 
−
- Terrorist groups present
 
−
Reports indicate possession of 2-5 nuclear weapons; government denies
 
 
|-
 
|-
−
!'''Economic'''
+
|Deep Water Ports/Berths
−
|'''Economy based on petroleum industry'''
+
|1/19
−
 
+
|4/19
−
- Owns large oil and natural gas reserves
+
|1/4
−
 
+
|<nowiki>-</nowiki>
−
- International sanctions depress economy
 
−
 
 
−
- Relies on Limaria for international trade
 
−
Large agricultural sector
 
−
|'''Hydrocarbon extraction dependent economy'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Owns large oil and natural gas reserves
 
−
Political patronage depresses economic growth
 
−
|'''Dominant energy sector'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Owns large oil and natural gas reserves
 
−
 
 
−
- Large hydrocarbon- related service sector
 
−
 
 
−
- Major international military equipment exporter
 
−
Current economy resultant from an internal economic collapse of 1991
 
−
|'''Primarily service economy'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Large agricultural sector
 
−
 
 
−
- Dependent on trans- national trade routes and pipelines
 
−
Growth limited due to attempt to cut ties with Donovia
 
−
|'''Service and agricultural based economy'''
 
−
- International trade window for Ariana
 
 
|-
 
|-
−
!'''Social'''
+
|Electricity Production/Consumption (MW)
−
|'''Persian Shia Muslim Culture'''
+
|2300
−
 
+
|1700
−
- 51% Persian
+
|130
−
 
+
|60
−
- 24% Atropian
+
|}
−
 
+
''See also: [[Amari Infrastructure]], [[Kujenga Infrastructure]], [[Nyumba Infrastructure|Nyumba Infrastructure,]] [[Ziwa Infrastructure]]''
−
- 77% literacy rate
+
[[File:DATE_Africa_terrain_regions_map.PNG|thumb|Terrain Regions within DATE Africa]]
−
 
 
−
- 1 million IDPs, 70% there over 20 years
 
−
68% of population is urban
 
−
|'''Shia Muslim Culture'''
 
−
 
 
−
- 89% Shia Muslim
 
−
 
 
−
- 91% Atropian
 
−
 
 
−
- 99% literacy rate
 
−
 
 
−
- 1/2 million IDPs
 
−
52% of population is urban
 
−
|'''Arab Sunni Hanafi Culture'''
 
−
 
 
−
- 70% Arabic
 
−
 
 
−
- 98% literacy rate
 
−
67% of population is urban
 
−
|'''Christian Culture'''
 
−
 
 
−
- 84% Gorgan
 
−
 
 
−
- 100% literacy rate
 
−
 
 
−
- 1/4 million IDPs
 
−
53% of population is urban
 
−
|'''Christian Culture'''
 
−
 
 
−
- 98% Limarian
 
−
 
 
−
- 99% literacy rate
 
−
 
 
−
- 300,000 IDPs
 
−
64% of population is urban
 
−
|-
 
−
!'''Information'''
 
−
|'''Tightly controlled information/media environment'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Good INFOWAR
 
−
capabilities; superior in niche areas
 
−
|'''Free but monitored information/media environment'''
 
−
- Growing INFOWAR capabilites; focus on Limaria and Ariana
 
−
|'''Controlled information/media environment'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Tier 1 INFOWAR
 
  
−
capabilities
+
===Physical Environment===
 +
Though making up less than a fifth of Africa, the DATE Africa region includes most of the geographic and climatological features present on the continent. The central features are the Eastern and Western Rift Valleys that run from Kujenga in the south all the way to northwest  Nyumba in the north. They are home to the African Great Lakes, which are the origins for both the Congo and Nile Rivers. Their peaks also make up the highest elevations in Africa. Eastward from the Rift, descending savanna and desert meet the Indian Ocean along an expansive coastline containing the natural deep water ports of Dar Es Salaam in Kujenga, Mombasa, Kenya, and to lesser extents Lamu and Kismaayo in Nyumba. 
  
−
- Most capable in region
+
Lake Victoria is the world's largest tropical freshwater lake and sustains an ever-growing population. Despite the relative water wealth contained in the Great Lakes, much of the region suffers from water stress or water scarcity. Man-made crop irrigation is minimal and the major perennial rivers flowing to the Indian Ocean are prone to severe flooding during the rainy seasons. 
−
Industry standard in some areas
 
−
|'''Most free information/media environment in region'''
 
  
−
- Growing and integrated INFOWAR capabilities, mostly focused on Donovia
+
{| class="wikitable" style="width:50%;"
−
INFOWAR based on NATO standards
+
|+Regional Physical Environment Comparison
−
|'''Fairly free information/media environment – soft censorship'''
+
! &nbsp; !!Amari!! Kujenga !! Nyumba!! Ziwa
−
- Looks to Donovia for support of INFOWAR capability
+
|- valign="top"
 +
|General
 +
Characteristics
 +
||
 +
* Lies on the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria.
 +
*Terrain varies from high mountains and green plateaus to desert lowlands and coastal plains.
 +
*Climates range from tropical to semiarid to sub-alpine.
 +
*Multiple natural hazards exist, resulting from Amari’s geology, weather, native wildlife, and human activity.
 +
||
 +
* Borders the Indian Ocean.
 +
* Encompasses Lake Victoria, Lake Malawi, Lake Tanganika.
 +
* Terrain varies from a significant  rift valley in the central region, high mountains and arid desert lowlands, as well as coastal plains.
 +
* Climates range from tropical to semiarid in the east; warm desert in the west; and humid near the coast.
 +
||
 +
*Borders the Indian Ocean.
 +
*Encompasses Lake Turkana and Lake Logipi.
 +
*Terrain varies from significant rift valley, high mountains and arid desert lowlands, and coastal plains.
 +
*Climates are tropical to semiaridin the east,  warm desert in the west, and arid and humid near the coast.
 +
||
 +
*Completely landlocked.
 +
*Encompasses a portion of Lake Victoria, Lake Natron, and Lake Eya.
 +
*Terrain varies from a significant rift valley and lakes in East with arid desert lowlands and open savanna over a majority of the country.
 +
*Climates range from semiarid in the west and warm desert, arid with increased humidity near Lake Victoria.
 
|-
 
|-
−
!'''Infrastructure'''
+
|Land Area (sq. mi)
−
|'''Relatively modern infrastructure'''
+
|176,619
−
 
+
|364,374
−
- Has the resources to maintain and improve infrastructure but priority is on nuclear and oil/natural gas programs
+
|161,998
−
 
+
|34,216
−
- International sanctions prevent substantial improvements
 
−
Possesses both nuclear power and nuclear weapons
 
−
|'''Unable to maintain infrastructure'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Focus is on oil/natural gas programs
 
−
 
 
−
- Road system incapable of handling military traffic
 
−
 
 
−
- Rural areas lack modern water, electricity, and sewage system
 
−
Baku International Sea Port on the Caspian Sea is key terrain
 
−
|'''Modern infrastructure'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Western standards in terms of railroads and ports
 
−
 
 
−
- Energy infrastructure is top priority
 
−
Possesses both nuclear power and nuclear weapons
 
−
|'''Unable to maintain infrastructure'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Lacks raw materials for its factories
 
−
 
 
−
- Pipelines top priority
 
−
Port of Poti on the Black Sea is key terrain for the region
 
−
|'''Unable to maintain infrastructure'''
 
−
 
 
−
- Atropia’s recent blockade forced reduction of Limarian industrial output
 
−
 
 
−
- Relies on food imports
 
−
Lacks modern running water, electricity, and sewage system for much of the population
 
 
|-
 
|-
−
!'''Physical Environment'''
+
|Inland Water Area (sq. mi)
−
|'''Located in key position on Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz'''
+
|19,956
−
 
+
|26,437
−
- Faces Caspian Sea
+
|3,350
−
 
+
|8,900
−
- Borders Atropia and Limaria
+
|}
−
Rugged mountainous terrain
+
<gallery>
−
|'''Vital transportation corridor between east and west'''
+
File:Fishing Nile.jpg|Albert Nile, Amari
−
 
+
File:2015 05 17 Nairobi National Park RESIZED 0001.jpg|National Park, Amari
−
-Access to Caspian Sea
+
File:Nyumba desert.jpg|Nyumban Desert
−
- Varied terrain
+
File:75M4OB2 F0VO29IFA.jpg|Tana River, Nyumba
−
|'''Greater Caucasus Mountains separate country from southern neighbors'''
+
</gallery>
−
 
 
−
- Access to Black and Caspian Seas
 
−
Varied terrain
 
−
|'''Controls much of Caucasus Mountains and routes through them'''
 
  
−
- Access to Black Sea
+
===Time===
−
Largely mountainous terrain
+
All DATE Africa countries use the Gregorian calendar. However, within that daily routine great importance is paid to the rising and setting of the sun. As is common in equatorial Africa, none of the regional countries observe Daylight Savings Time (DST). 
−
|'''Landlocked'''
 
  
−
- Contains Lake Sevan, the largest lake in the region
+
Whilst Western approaches to time are ''o’clock'', or by the clock; regional attitudes towards time are the opposite. In many rural areas some of the elder population might not even have access to a clock or watch.  However, their apparent lack of concern for clock time should not be mistaken for an inability to accomplish key tasks.  The local populations will commit energy to their tasks with great industry, on their timetable, to achieve their own goals.
−
Mountainous terrain
 
−
|-
 
−
!'''Time'''
 
−
|'''Value planning over deadlines'''
 
  
−
- Uses the Solar, Lunar, and Gregorian (Western) calendars
+
Across the whole region there is a much more flexible approach to time.  ‘Africa time’ is very much a thing.  In short, Africa time means things will happen when they happen; there is no point worrying about what might be.  For example; you cannot control the rain, if it rains and crops grow, so be it.  Conversely, if it doesn’t rain they will not grow.  You cannot plan to harvest crops which depend on rain because you cannot control the rain.
  
−
- Harvest cycle is May to August
+
Once the differing approach to time is understood, business with the Amari should be straightforward.  Attempting to rush them, or impose a Western approach to time will not be of benefit to either US forces or the host nation.  This is the case in the cities as well as the countryside.
−
4-year election cycle, 6 for president, 8 for Forum of Proficiency; no term limit
 
−
|'''Punctuality not important'''
 
  
−
- Uses Gregorian calendar
+
'''[https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/grad/solcalc/timezone.html Time Zone Observed]''' - UTC +3 (East Africa Time - EAT)  <u>DST NOT observed.</u> 
  
−
- Harvest cycle is April to October, depending on climatic zone
+
==Significant Conditions in the OE==
−
2-year election cycle for legislature, four consecutive-term limit; 6-year presidential cycle, no term limit
 
−
|'''Expect punctuality from Westerners but may not reciprocate'''
 
  
−
- Uses Gregorian calendar
+
===Peacekeeping Forces===
 +
{{Main article|Peacekeeping Forces}}
 +
*'''International Peacekeeping Forces'''.
 +
Recent examples of peacekeeping forces with and international mandate include the forces of the [[UNMIDA|
 +
UN mission in DATE Africa]] and the [[EUTMDA|European Training Mission in DATE Africa]].
  
−
- Harvest cycle is year round
+
*''' Regional Peacekeeping Forces'''.
−
6-year election cycle for president, two consecutive-term limit; 4-year cycle for parliament
+
Recent examples of regional peacekeeping forces include the forces of the [[Regional Standby Force]] and the Regional Monitoring Group's [[Regional Economic Community Security Force]].
−
|'''No urgency to complete tasks'''
 
  
−
- Uses Gregorian calendar
+
===Private Security Forces===
 +
{{Main article|Private Security Companies}}
 +
*'''Corporate Private Security Forces'''.
 +
Wealthy individuals and businesses may contract the services of corporate security forces.  These forces are highly disciplined, organized and trained - recruiting mostly from former elite military and paramilitary forces. They are often used for high-end site and VIP security. They are capable of conducting small-unit, high-risk strikes with state-of-the-art equipment and vehicles. They have a significant intelligence and planning capability. While highly effective and fiercely loyal to their employer, they may have the propensity of over-aggression and risk extra-judicial actions.  They may contract local security companies (see below) for mundane activities. Examples: [[Jaguar Integral Defence Services International|Jaguar Integral Defence Services International (JIDSI)]].
  
−
- Harvest cycle is April to October
+
*'''Private Security Companies'''.
−
4-year election cycle for all offices; three- term limit
+
Rampant crime and inadequate policing, particularly in the urban areas has led to the rise of numerous private security companies.  These companies provide security services for businesses and individuals ranging from static guards to armed response teams. Guarded facilities will likely have barbed wire and monitored cameras.  The guards themselves are variously uniformed, from simple reflective vests and caps to military-style garb. They will either be unarmed (batons, irritants) or have a variety of small arms. 
−
|'''Attempt to be punctual for Westerners'''
 
  
−
- Uses Gregorian calendar
+
The quality and cost of the services may indicate the professionalism of responses and adherence to company rules of engagement. These guards are often well-regarded in the community and may have excellent situational awareness of local activities and dynamics, as well as those of the poorer areas from which they are often recruited. 
  
−
- Harvest cycle is year round
+
Note: Non-commercial "neighborhood watches" may exist, but are less likely to be armed or provocative.
−
5-year election cycle for all offices; no term limit
 
−
|}
 
  
−
== Strategic Positions ==
+
''See also: [[Chapter 5: Noncombatants#Private Security Contractors|TC 7-100 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5, Noncombatants - Private Security Contractors]]''
  
−
=== '''Actors''' ===
+
===Non-Governmental Organizations===
−
The US gives increased geopolitical attention to the countries of the Caucasus region (Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas, and Limaria) because of their strategic location that connects Europe to Asia, their hydrocarbon resources, and their key position along this main route for the westward export of Caspian Sea energy resources. Ethno-political conflict that has plagued the Caucasus region for thousands of years led to the death of thousands and material destruction, contributing significantly to political instability, economic hardship, and increased organized crime. Failure to resolve these long-term conflicts continues to keep the region from creating a durable peace and efficient, accountable national governments. Many regional issues will require inter-state  cooperation for any significant progress to occur. Other issues besides basic security include natural resource development, water protection, conservation and management, trade and transit, disease prevention, and drug trafficking. Many issues cannot simply be solved on a national basis—no matter how committed a government remains to reform and overall economic development.
 
  
−
=== '''Security Strategies''' ===
+
A wide range of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) operate within the OE. Many are focused on education, medical, and economic development.  Some organizations center their activities on humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and supporting camp operations. These groups have typically been vulnerable to attack and corruption by various threat actors in the region. UN and Coalition elements, as well as privately-contracted security have been used by these groups to ensure uninterrupted movement and operation.
−
Each country in the region has different threat perceptions formed by its ethno-political situation  and religious fervor. Limaria perceives threats from Atropia and looks to Donovia for security. Atropia perceives threats from Ariana, Limaria, and Donovia and looks to the West for support. Gorgas, which mainly sees threats from Donovia and its internal Donovian population, looks to the West for protection. Ariana sees “Western influence” as the threat to its culture and bases all decisions on that belief. Donovia is adversarial towards Atropia and continues to inject itself into Gorgas’ internal affairs. The Caucasus region countries all seek relationships with outside governments that often prove contradictory. Cooperation continues to deteriorate since the elimination of major Donovian influence impacted the region’s standard of living. This inability to cooperate with neighbors has stymied efforts to tackle regional issues such as drug trafficking. Restrictive tariffs, quantitative controls, and closed crossing points disrupt trade and transit for bothgoods and people within the Caucasus. While the countries all recognize the importance of regional cooperation on key issues, prospects for cooperation remain dim as ethno-political tensions lead to acute regional conflict.
 
  
−
=== '''Potential Conflict Flashpoints''' ===
+
''See also: [[Chapter 5: Noncombatants#Nongovernmental Organizations|TC 7-100 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5, Noncombatants - Nongovernmental Organizations]]''
−
All major players within and bordering the Caucasus region maintain multiple significant strategic interests in conflict with those of their neighbors. Divided by religious and ethnic hatreds hundreds of years old, the Caucasus represents one of the major spots of “frozen conflict” in the world—a critical one that sits astride a major global source for oil and natural gas. The Caucasus countries of Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas, and Limaria find themselves interconnected by ties of conflict unlikely to abate in the near future.
 
  
−
In the Caspian Sea, Ariana and Atropia maintain claims to offshore oil and gas fields that conflict with each other. Atropia also has a chilly relationship with Limaria over the Lower Janga region. Atropia attempts to sustain cordial relations with Donovia, though the country finds itself dependent on Gorgan pipelines to export oil and gas. Limaria generally remains isolated from its Atropian and Kalarian neighbors, but remains integrated with Donovia and pursues deeper ties with Ariana. Donovia and Ariana attempt to assert their traditional power in the region, while the other independent states seek to preserve their own political identities and economic viability.
+
===Hybrid Irregular Armed Groups===
 +
{{Main article|DATE Africa Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions}}
  
−
Potential conflict flashpoints include:
+
The variety of armed groups operating within the OE is indicative of its complex and dynamic political, economic, ethnic, and religious issues. Their structures are as diverse as their ideological drivers. Most are not pure insurgencies, guerrilla groups, or militias, but rather hybrids of all of these. The key differentiators of these groups is their relative mix of forces and the ''primary'' driver of their actions.  
−
* Atropian blockade of goods and electricity to Limaria: Limaria remains dependent on Gorgas (despite a limited embargo) and Ariana—an international pariah—for access to much of its imports and power.
 
  
−
* Lower Janga (current ceasefire): Localized violence routinely disrupts the ceasefire agreement.
+
''' Violent Extremist Organizations'''.  There are a number of international or transnational Higher Affiliated Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) presently operating within the OE.  Many of these groups have indigenous origins, but have since affiliated with external groups for support and identity. Others may have their origins outside of the OE and gained a foothold on the continent.  These hybrid organizations have the capability to organize and execute high-impact attacks against public targets and may be able to mass to conduct semi-conventional operations across the OE.
  
−
* South Ostremek (current ceasefire): The ceasefire simply stabilized the conflict lines, as the Donovians want to politically pry Gorgas away from EU or NATO membership, or even close cooperation with the Western world. Gorgas definitely seeks a return to its pre-war territorial boundaries.
+
Major known groups in the OE include [[Islamic Front in the Heart Africa|Islamic Front in the Heart Africa (AFITHA)]] and [[Hizbul al-Harakat]].  The volatility of security situations across the OE allow rapid growth and morphing of extremist groups as they position for power and influence. Groups will change their tactics and affiliations to adapt to evolving country and regional dynamics.
  
−
* Zabzimek (current ceasefire): Like South Ostremek, Gorgas prefers a return to the pre- war status quo and boundaries, while Donovia wants to further isolate Gorgas from its Atropian and Western allies.
+
'''Insurgencies'''.  Whether motivated by political, religious, or other ideologies, these groups will promote an agenda of subversion and violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. The composition of these in the OE is almost always a hybrid of insurgent elements and guerrilla forces, depending on the locale, goals, and levels of support.  They may act as the militant arm of a legitimate political organization.  These groups will undermine and fight against the government and any forces invited by or supporting it.  They are likely to target government security forces and even civilians to demonstrate force and create instability. They will conduct small operations, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombings, car bombs, and larger military-style operations. Examples: [[Amarian People’s Union]], [[Free Tanga Youth Movement]].
  
−
* Archeological sites and religious shrines in Ariana: Ariana controls significant Shia religious sites where many Muslims conduct pilgrimages for religious purposes.
+
'''Separatist Groups'''. These groups consist mostly of former (losing) soldiers that fought in a previous revolution or coup.  Rather than fighting to overthrow the current regime, their focus is to secure a territory and gain officially recognition. These groups will likely have widespread support in the controlled area and view government or external forces as the enemy.  They may provide security for commercial or NGO movement for a fee or to curry favor.  Separatists will be very protective of their designated borders and may react disproportionately to perceived incursions.  Example: [[Pemba Island Native Army]].  
  
−
* Transnational pipeline operations: The export of crude oil and natural gas to the world remains a significant challenge for Ariana and Atropia. Oil producers possess several pipeline projects that diversify their export options, but pipelines remain vulnerable to interdiction.
+
'''Ethnic or Religious Rebel Groups'''. Numerous conflicts that are highlight ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences have led to the development of ethnicity-focused armed groups. Some groups have developed in self-defense against such groups, then gone onto be violent themselves. Extreme passions of these groups have led to often brazen atrocities, causing massive waves of [[Internally Displaced Persons in DATE-Africa|IDPs]]. Multiple UN interventions may have temporarily quelled the violence, but long-held grievances give life to renewed violence. These groups may conduct raids, extrajudicial killings, targeted killings of civilians, and summary executions. There have been reports of rebels luring villagers to their town center for execution, often throwing bodies into the village water source to spoil it.  These groups may attempt to seize strategic routes to assert control and raise funds. Examples: [[Army of Justice and Purity]] (AJP) and [[Union of Peace for the Ziwa]].
  
−
* Caspian Sea oil and natural gas reserves: The demarcation of Caspian Sea deposits remains a source of contention. Oil and gas fields are the lifeblood of the countries that possess them, and their exact demarcation leads to contentious arguments over the boundaries.
+
'''Local Armed Militias'''. These groups usually have a local focus and may be independent or supported by a local strongman. Their forces are mostly comprised of former soldiers or paramilitary who may have fought for the state, but now serve their own interests. They generally carry small arms, but may have additional capabilities, depending on the goals and support. Moderate factions of these groups may conduct demonstrations, vandalism to force political concessions, while more radical factions conduct small attacks, riots, sabotage to enforce a particular ideology.  In rural areas, they may be heavily armed and appear almost like a guerrilla force.  In urban centers, they may resemble a gang or an insurgent group.  Examples: [[Mara-Suswa Rebel Army|Mara-Suswa Rebel Army (MSRA)]], [[Kujengan Bush Militias]].
  
−
* Arianian nuclear program: The Arianian government’s desire to maintain a robust weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program causes strife with nearly all its neighbors, as the relative power of a WMD-armed Ariana complicates the delicate balance of power that currently exists in the region.
+
''See also [[Chapter 2: Insurgents|TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 2: Insurgents]]'' and [[Chapter 3: Guerrillas|Chapter 3: Guerrillas]]
−
The Caucasus remains an area with dynamic and continuous conflict. Any conflict, especially one that threatens oil and gas production or export, will likely involve outside powers, including the US. The Caucasus also is in a relatively inaccessible spot for US forces due to the geographic realities of airspace and sea lines of communications.
 
  
−
== Threat Actor Chart ==
+
===Criminal Organizations and Activities===
−
{| class="wikitable"
+
{{Main article|DATE Africa - Criminal Activity}}
−
|-
+
The often unstable economic and security situations across the continent have allowed criminal activity and corruption to flourish. Elsewhere in the world, corrupting and co-opting of government officials by criminal enterprises is usually to gain operating freedom.  In the OE, such activities are competitive enablers, intended to gain access to internal and external markets. How these large-scale domestic criminal enterprises and international criminal manifest within the OE are characteristic of each country's circumstances and history.
−
! scope="col" |Threat Actor
 
−
! scope="col" |Organization Type
 
−
! scope="col" |OE
 
−
! scope="col" |Activities
 
−
! scope="col" |Targets
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |Salasyl
 
−
|Insurgent
 
−
|Southeast Atropia with nation-wide capabilities
 
−
|Possible ties to transnational criminal and terrorist actors. Has engaged the Atropian regime in a lowlevel insurgency for the past 20 years. Promotes violent populace opposition to state taxation policies, unreliable public services, substandard medical preventive services, inaccessible state education programs for working class citizens, and a judicial system that illegally favors the ruling political party. Salasyl and South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) insurgents often clash violently over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.
 
−
|Atropian government facilities and leaders
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |South Atropian People's Army (SAPA)
 
−
|Insurgent
 
−
|Focuses on eight provinces in the south with cultural ties to Ariana
 
−
|Primary goal is to create a separate country composed of southern Atropia and Ariana's northwestern provinces. Receives most of its training, equipment, and supplies from Ariana. SAPA and Salasyl insurgents often clash violently over ideology, limited resources, and similar recruiting pools.
 
−
|Atropian government facilities and leaders
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB)
 
−
|Insurgent
 
−
|Northern Vetlia and Erdabil Provinces
 
−
|Donovia supports the BFB, creating political tension between Donovia and Atropia.
 
−
|Atropian government facilities and leaders
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL)
 
−
|Insurgent
 
−
|Southern Erdabil and Western Sirvaki Provinces
 
−
|Small insurgent group with limited regional activities.
 
−
|Atropian government facilities and leaders
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |Bocyowicz Crime Family
 
−
|Criminal
 
−
|Ungoverned Territories
 
−
|Acquires political power in poorly-governed regions, eventually gaining control of geographic space. These political actions are intended to provide security and freedom of movement for the criminal organization's  activities. As a result, the third-generation criminal organization and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority.
 
−
|Atropian police and security forces
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |Atropian Organized Crime (AOC)
 
−
|Criminal
 
−
|Baku
 
−
|The growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and even human trafficking conducted outside of established channels only began recently. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Lower Janga and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.
 
−
|Police and security forces
 
−
|-
 
−
! scope="row" |Al Iksir Cartel
 
−
|Criminal
 
−
|Northern Atropia and Southern Donovia
 
−
|The growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling, and even human trafficking conducted outside of established channels only began recently. Many of those involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of displaced Atropians from Lower Janga and persons who fled Donovia. Atropia serves as a transit point for narcotics travelling to Donovia and Western countries.
 
−
|Police and security forces
 
−
|}
 
  
−
== Events ==
+
Criminal enterprises may have a pronounced impact on military operations in the REGION OE.  Dominant criminal elements may view external military forces as a threat to their territorial control, while less-powerful organizations may look to exploit shifts in security and rules of engagement to gain access to markets or power.
−
{{Main article|Caucasus: Events}}
 
  
−
What follows are tables of 77 fictional events set in the year 2016 in various areas throughout the countries of Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas, and Limaria, in the Caucasus region. These events demonstrate possible ways the conditions of the OE described in Section 2 might play out on the ground. Each event is tied to the mission essential task list (METL) to clearly show the tactical-level connection between the event, its related activities, and possible OE variable conditions.
+
The main categories of organized criminal enterprises within the OE include:
 +
*Drug Trafficking
 +
*Human Trafficking & Forced labor
 +
*Commodity Theft and Smuggling
 +
*Illicit mining
 +
*Oil theft, refining, and smuggling
 +
*Protection Economies
 +
*Criminal Gangs
  
−
Analysts derived these events from realistic yet fictional potential activities that could easily take place in any of the countries in the Caucasus region. Many of the events could apply to more than one country within the region. Additionally, the events collectively have effects for all variables in  the OE: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time.
+
''See also [[Chapter 4: Criminals|TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 4: Criminals]]''
  
−
Each event is listed at the top of the table, with three to four potential related activities, and their likely OE variable conditions, following. The bottom of each table lists the linked METL tasks. The chart was designed to be clear, yet thorough. Events were analyzed to ensure that the details of each variable in Section 2 supported the possibility of the event, and that each event required a tactical intervention, making it useful to units in training.
+
[[Category:DATE]]
 +
[[Category:Africa]]
 +
<references />

Latest revision as of 21:52, 23 February 2021

DATE Africa Overview map

The purpose of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Africa is to provide the US Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of four composite operational environments (OEs) in the Africa region. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events but does not provide a complete scenario. DATE Africa offers discussions of OE conditions through the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) and partner nations that participate in DATE-compliant Army or joint training exercises.

Over 795,000 square miles comprise DATE Africa, a varied and complex region which ranges from Lake Victoria in the west to the Indian Sea on its eastern coast. The region includes the fictional countries of Amari, Kujenga, Ziwa, and Nyumba.[1] The region has a long history of instability and conflict; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors have increasing strategic interests in the region. DATE Africa thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.

(See also Using the DATE and TC 7-101 Exercise Design).

Key Points

  • The countries in the region have experienced dramatic changes in governing regimes over the last few decades.
  • Political, economic, and environmental changes have created societal pressures that spawn conflict between nations, political factions, international players, and potential threat actors.
  • The complex tapestry of ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious loyalties make diplomatic and military operations in the region difficult.
  • US forces may be required to conduct operations in the region in a wide range of roles and will likely operate in a combined effort with other forces.

Discussion of the OEs within the DATE Africa Operational Environment

Republic of Amari

Main article: Amari

Amari, with its capital at Kisumu, is a functioning and relatively stable democracy, receiving significant support from the US and other western countries. A new constitution, implemented seven years ago, attempted to create a framework for better governance, with good results. Ethnic and tribal tensions continuously play out in multi-party politics, which has led to a history of electoral violence and distrust of the government. The last election was uniquely free of the violence of past elections. Other concerns include border security, instability spillover from neighboring countries, regional competition for resources, and terrorism.

Amari gained independence from a western European colonial power fifty years ago; a time when colonial powers were divesting themselves of their African colonies. The government consists of an executive branch with a strong president, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary with an associated hierarchy of courts. Amari is making significant progress in areas of good governance but still struggles with institutional corruption. The new constitution has attempted to create a framework for better governance with good results. Other concerns include border security, instability spillover from neighboring countries, regional competition for resources, and terrorism.

The Amari National Defense Force (ANDF) is the state military of Amari. Its composition, disposition, and doctrine are the result of years of relative peace. Internal security and the constant struggle against border incursions continue to shape its structure and roles. The ANDF consists of the Amari Army, Air Force, and Navy. Amari paramilitary forces include the Border Guard Corps (BGC) and Special Reserve Force (SRF). The ANDF is a well-integrated and professional force with good command and control and high readiness. It has a limited force projection capability and a mix of static and mobile forces. Amari is an active contributor to both regional and international peacekeeping forces and has hosted such forces within its borders.

Republic of Ziwa

Main article: Ziwa
Ziwa is a small landlocked nation located on the southern end of Lake Victoria. Despite a troubled past, Ziwa is making progress toward greater transparency and good governance. Its development path stems from political turmoil in the last few decades and a growing economy—largely based on technical advancements and extensive mineral resources. Ziwa seeks to become a key player on the continent, but has experienced internal dissent and has been affected by regional disputes. Ziwa’s history since gaining independence is one of coups, disputed elections, regional and ethnic violence, and general instability. While Ziwa has expressed an intent to improve its governance, a lack of deep-rooted democratic and civil society institutions makes it one of the most vulnerable and unstable countries in the region.

The Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) is the state military of the Republic of Ziwa. Its structure and focus has adapted over the last decade alongside the country’s economic development. The ZPDF consists of the Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC), Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC), and the National Guard. Ziwa’s military relations with its neighbors—Amari to the north and Kujenga to the south—are generally stable, despite sporadic low-level incidents along the border. Border control challenges contributed to the forward deployment of dedicated maneuver elements and leveraging of former rebels to ensure the appearance of security.

Multiple threats exploit Ziwa’s dependence on natural resources and external power generation and transmission. Brutal militants in the northeast mountain area (“The Watasi Gang”) and pockets of ethnic rebels throughout the country continue to plague stability and keep the military at a continually high operational tempo. Although both Kujenga and Amari have active security agreements with Ziwa, rumors persist of their covert support to the Ziwa rebels.

Republic of Kujenga

Main article: Kujenga

Kujenga gained semi-independence fifty-six years ago under a post-colonial United Nations mandated trusteeship. Three years later, Kujenga gained full independence, establishing a constitution built on a single political party system.

Working under the UN mandate, the outgoing colonial power lent support to the group of elites who had made up the bureaucracy under colonial rule. These elites united under the political party People of Change (POC). They have since controlled the government through successive elections, except for a brief experiment with multi-party rule seven years ago that ended five years later with the subsequent election. After independence, Kujenga established diplomatic relations with the United States. Relations between the two countries have been strained at various times because of Kujenga’s tight-knit oligarchic political structure and repressive tendencies. Ongoing tensions and violence between the Kujengan government and the Tanga region brought especial US condemnation. The Kujengan government is focused on addressing rampant corruption and government inaction, but the country has also experienced a shrinking of democratic space.

The Kujenga Armed Service (KAS) is the state military of the Republic of Kujenga. It emerged from a somewhat turbulent past and a range of internal security challenges. Kujenga’s military relations with its neighbors are relatively stable, although border security issues, particularly in the Tanga region, are increasing the risk of regional conflict. The KAS consists of the Kujengan Army, Kujengan National Air Force (KNAF), Kujengan National Navy (KNAV), and Security Corps. Kujenga’s primary internal security concerns include Tangan separatists, violent bush militias in the central mountains, and the brutal "Army of Justice and Purity" guerrillas in the Kasama region. External threats include border incursions by presumed Amari paramilitaries and cross-border smuggling.

Democratic Republic of Nyumba

Main article: Nyumba
Nyumba is a troubled nation and has had little in the form of democracy since its inception. It has been primarily ruled by authoritarian governments and wracked with internal turmoil and paranoia about perceived external threats. It is suspicious of regional government alliances with western countries and, particularly, what the Nyumba government leaders see as international meddling in its sovereign domestic and regional interests.

The government is authoritarian in all aspects. Beginning fifty-nine years ago, a military coup overthrew the newly elected civilian government, lasting only six years before an Islamist government took power. While the government is based on its interpretation of Sharia law, tribal traditions and influences permeate the government as well. Economic, religious, ethnic, and tribal interests complicate Nyumban politics and have led to decades of civil war and other internal conflicts. These conflicts have threatened border countries with refugees and provided a safe haven for terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and other disruptors. These deep-seated challenges show no signs of dissipating.

The Nyumban Armed Forces (NAF) is the state military of Nyumba and is key to the country’s stability. It has experienced significant challenges from various threat actors in Nyumba, distrust within its ranks, and from politicians. Civilian distrust is particularly high, leading to widespread tribalism and the rise of armed militias. Its composition and deployments are driven by political desires to maintain control of key forces and the de facto ceding of territory to tribes or armed groups. The NAF consists of the Nyumban National Army (NNA), the Nyumban Armed Forces Air Corps, and the Nyumban Navy. The Nyumban National Security Service controls a paramilitary group, the Rapid Security Forces (RSF) which is usually deployed in support of border and anti-insurgency operations. The NAF has inherited a varied structure and culture due to several regime changes and a colonial legacy. The lawlessness of the territory and general instability has heightened both political and military leaders’ wariness of the forces.

Strategic Positioning

This OE is one of the most politically dynamic regions in the world. Almost nowhere else have geopolitical forces and regional ambitions combined to produce such volatile results. State developments ranging from gradual reforms to often violent regime change have occurred throughout the region's history. Although the region may not have been the primary focus of global geopolitical contests, it has often been a factor in the larger geopolitical landscape. This volatility is not likely to change in the coming years as greater multipolarity continues to increase throughout the region.

Coinciding with increased international interest, the region's states grew stronger over the past several years, exerting their sovereignty in ways that challenge the post-Cold War development and humanitarian models. International players increased pressure to gain a foothold on the continent. As the countries in the OE forge new international relationships, they find a range of willing partners with a diverse set of motives. Non-state threat actors also find fertile ground for extremist messages. Uneven economic growth and the injection of international anti-terror military aid empower some states while channeling resources to specific interest groups in power, specifically to the executive and security sector. However, this will not guarantee stability or equitable human development. Rather, the region may see more money pouring into countries, but with greater partisan international interests and increased conflict.

Strengthening centers of power may prevent non-violent political change from emerging. Ambitious leaders on the periphery are likely to resort to violence to unseat ruling regimes that themselves came to power as products of deeply embedded ethnic conflicts, cross-border regional power projection, and divisive domestic inequalities. The OE is often viewed as a 'political marketplace,' the challenges of which could begin to lead the region down a violent path. The region has a history of weathering changes in international attention, while also managing local political conflicts and economic problems. National leader legitimacy deficits co-exist within an international context that often undermines the development of local solutions. Even as regional cooperation is increasing stability and the level of cross border interference has declined, the future is anything but certain. The ever-present international, regional, and national challenges continue to strain the ability and capacity of national and regional institutions to regulate and manage nonviolent change.

Regional Views of the US

The countries of the OE voice mixed views of American soft and military power. There is little consensus about U.S.-style democracy and there are many in the populations who oppose the spread of American ideas and customs in Africa and around the world. At the same time, many in the region still believe the U.S. respects the personal freedoms of its people and they aspire to similar freedoms. While the U.S. and other nations are involved in widely-popular peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, the presence of outside forces has been a rallying cry for disenfranchised groups. The general pull away from U.S. intervention in the region has been aided by aggressive inroads from other external countries, such as Olvana, that promise to supply an alternative to previously undisputed economic and military power.

Regional PMESII-PT Overview

Political

The governments in DATE Africa are vulnerable to widespread corruption, entrenched political leaders who repeatedly amend constitutions to extend their rule, and the historical absence of a democratic political culture. They are apt to place legal restrictions on civil society. A history of coups, civil conflicts, and political stalemates between opposing factions suggest a potential for democratic backsliding across the region. Weak and failed states contain ungoverned spaces that provide operational bases for numerous irregular threats.

Regional Political Comparison
  Amari Ziwa Kujenga Nyumba
Political
  • Level of Freedom: 2 on a 7 point scale.
  • Relatively free and functioning democracy.
  • Constitution approved  7-years ago.
  • Bicameral legislature (Senate and National Assembly for 5-year unlimited terms.)
  • President and Deputy President elected on the same ballot by popular vote for 5-years and limited to 2 terms.
  • Next national elections in 4-years.
  • Legal system blends common law, Sharia law, and customary law.
  • A history of election violence until significant improvements in elections 6-years and 1-year ago.
  • Challenges include public and private sector corruption, weak border enforcement, refugees, terrorism, fragile political parties, and internal ethnic tensions.
  • Level of Freedom: 5 on 7 point scale.
  • Open anocracy - government functions on a continuum closer to a democracy than an autocracy, with improving democratic infrastructure.
  • Constitution approved 57-year ago.
  • Bicameral legislature (Senate and House of Representatives for 4-year unlimited terms).
  • President and Vice President elected on the same ballot by popular vote for 4-year terms and limited to 2 terms.
  • Next national elections in 2-years.
  • Judicial system is subject to corruption and inappropriate influence, but is making slow and incremental progress.
  • Recent elections, judged by past standards, are significant improvements in transparency, openness, and credibility.
  • In spite of a history of military rule and lacking democratic traditions, pressure from civil society groups, journalists, social media, and other organizations are slowly bringing about greater transparency.
  • Level of Freedom: 6 on 7 point scale.
  • Closed anocracy - limited opposition activity allowed that does not threaten one-party rule.
  • Constitution approved 53-years ago.
  • Unicameral legislature controlled by the People of Change (POC) political party with 5-year unlimited terms.
  • Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister elected on the same ticket by a simple majority of the legislature.
  • Next national elections in 3-years.
  • Legal system is a combination of common law, Sharia law, and customary law, but with limited independence and pervasive corruption.
  • Regular harassment, arrests, and intimidation of opposition parties by the ruling party and members of state institutions insure ruling party success in elections.
  • The POC has passed legislation used to arrest, detain, and threaten opposition leaders in the name of national security.
  • Level of Freedom: 7 on 7 point scale.
  • Authoritarian failed state.
  • Beginning fifty-nine years ago, a military coup overthrew the newly elected civilian government, lasting only six years before an Islamist government took power.
  • Unicarmeral legislature controlled by National People's Party (NPP) with 6-year unlimited terms.
  • President and 2 Vice Presidents elected by popular vote for 6-year and unlimited number of terms.
  • Next national elections in 3-years.
  • Legal system is outwardly based on holdover colonial law and Sharia, however, the government is able to manipulate the judicial system to comply with its will.
  • Elections are defined by corruption, intimidation, and other extra-legal activities that insure the election of candidates carefully chosen by the ruling party.
  • The ruling party dominates the political system and uses intimidation, arbitrary arrests, and onerous regulations to prevent other political parties and civil society activists from operating freely.

Military

The countries represented in DATE: Africa are a cross-section and composite of states and state forces. State forces have evolved from a diverse set of conditions including colonial histories to a succession of regime changes and revolutions. They are generally pragmatic in both structure and equipment - the result of constrained budgets and constantly changing threat conditions. The forces of the more modernized countries, such as Amari and Ziwa, are generally more integrated, better equipped, and more professional. At-risk countries, such as Kujenga and Nyumba demonstrate tribal or ethnic segregation, degraded readiness, and a structuring for regime survival. Participation in regional or international peacekeeping forces and exercises is often as much to train and equip their own forces as to develop interoperability and cooperation. A variety of threat groups and endemic criminal activity throughout the region contend to destabilize governments or build power in difficult-to-govern areas.

Regional Military Comparison
  Amari Ziwa Kujenga Nyumba
Military
  • Amari Defense Force (ANDF) includes, Amarian Army, Amarian Air Force, and Amarian Navy.
  • The National Command Authority (NCA) of Amari exercises overall control, planning, and execution of the national security. The Amari Chief of Military Defence Staff is the senior military position, with the Chiefs of the Military Defense Staff functioning at the top of the military hierarchy and decision-making process.
  • Army     12th Mechanised Brigade 14th Mechanised Brigade 18th Mechanised Brigade 5th Armour Regiment 102nd Infantry Regiment ("Amari Mounted Rifles") Fires Regiment Reconnaissance and Intelligence Formation (RIF) Capital Defence Force and Strategic Reserve
  • Paramilitary Forces Border Guard Corps (BGC) Special Reserve Force (SRF) Defense Force Reserves (DFR)
  • Air Force Air Combat Group (ACG)     Fighter/Intercept SQDN     Ground Attack SQDN     Attack Helicopter SQDN     Intelligence and Surveillance SQDN Air Transport Group (ATG)     Medium Air Transport SQDNs     2x Light Air Transport SQDNs     Medium Helicopter Transport SQDNs     3x Light Helicopter Transport SQDNs
  • Navy Coastal Defence Group (CDG) Inland Maritime Security Group (IMSG)
  • Contributes to regional and international peacekeeping missions, to include deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
  • Multi-ethnic and desegregated units.
  • Major threats include cross-border incursions and criminal smuggling.
  • Ziwa People's Defense Force (ZPDF) includes Ziwa Ground Forces Command,  Ziwa Air Corps, and the Ziwa National Guard.
  • Military branches of the Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) receive their authority via the Minister of Security and Defense, who exercises overall control of planning, control, and execution of all instruments of national power and strategy, under the direction of the President.
  • Army 7th Mechanized Brigade 1st Motorized Regiment 2nd Motorized Regiment  26th Artillery Regiment  27th Rocket Regiment  22nd Air Defense Regiment  1st Information Warfare Battalion  356th Engineer Battalion  51st Antitank Battalion
  • Paramilitary Forces Ziwa People's National Guard
  • Ziwa Air Corp (ZAC)  Attack Aviation SQDN (FW)  Helicopter SQDN (RW)  Intelligence (UAV) SQDN
  • No Navy
  • Relies heavily on peacekeeping rotations to solidify and expand individual and small unit capabilities. 
  • The military fills the ranks of both its regular forces and the National Guard through an all-volunteer recruiting program. Reductions in regular force recruiting and retention levels were expected due to Ziwa’s economic growth, but personnel levels from Ziwa’s ethnic minorities and former rebels remain strong.
  • Major threats include internal militants, internal and cross-border ethnic rebels, criminal smuggling, and human and arms trafficking.
  • Kujenga Armed Service (KAS) includes the Kujengan Army, Kujengan National Air Force, Kujengan National Navy, and Security Corps.
  • The Kujengan National Defense Council (KNDC) exercises overall control, planning, and execution of the national security. The KNDC includes the Defense Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, armed service chiefs, and the Chief of the Intelligence Division. The Prime Minister may appoint Special Advisors to the KNDC as needed. Each armed service chief is the senior officer of their respective services.
  • Army 1st Division (Western Region) 2nd Division (Upper Region) 5th Division (Central Region) 16th Division (Lower Region)
  • Paramilitary Forces Kujengan Security Corps (KSEC) Special Reaction Division (SRD)
  • Air Force Air Combat Group     Fighter/Intercept SQDN     Ground Attack SQDN     Intelligence and Surveillance SQDN     3x Attack Helicopter SQDNs Air Transport Group     2x Medium Air Transport SQDNs     Light Air Transport SQDNs     3x Light Helicopter Transport SQDNs
  • Navy Coastal Naval District Lake Tanganyika Naval District Lake Malawi Naval District
  • Contributes to regional and  international missions.
  • Units are officially integrated, but unit-level segregation remains commonplace. Most units are manned by local people from the geographic area where their unit operates, though their hand-picked commanders are likely from elsewhere.
  • Major threats include separatists, bush militias, guerillas, border incursions, and cross-border smuggling.
  • Nyumban Armed Forces (NAF) includes Nyumban National Army, Nyumban Armed Forces- Air Corp, and Nyumban Navy.
  • The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the planning and execution of national power and strategy, with the President exercising significant control over the military. Department chiefs are appointed directly by the President and almost exclusively affiliated and/or aligned with his tribe.
  • Army "Presidential" Division "Marsabit" Division 50th Parachute Division 1st Guards Tank Brigade 21st Light Brigade 15th Motorized Battalion (SEP) 20th Motorized Battalion (SEP)
  • Paramilitary Forces Rapid Security Forces (RSF)
  • Air Force 2x SQDN Multi-Role FW 1x SQDN Utility/Transport FW 1x SQDN Utility RW
  • Navy Inland Maritime Security Group Coastal Defence Group
  • Contributes to regional and international peacekeeping missions.
  • There is little tribal integration at the unit-level. Many of the tactical commanders will reflect the majority tribal or ethnic affiliation of their forces, but the higher leadership will be trusted members of the president’s tribe.
  • Major threats include insurgents, rebels, criminals, and instability driven by an authoritarian government.

Economic

The economic conditions in the four countries cover a wide spectrum. Ranging from modern economic systems to reliance on traditional cash-only systems. In all of the countries the underlying structure of family and tribe motivate most economic transactions and policies.

Regional Economics Comparison
  Amari Ziwa Kujenga Nyumba
Economic
  • Nominal GDP: $85.12 billion (Agriculture 301.%, Industry 19.7%, Services 50.2%).
  • Real GDP Growth Rate: 9.8% (5 year average 19.4%)
  • Labor Force: 38.3 million (Agriculture 60.1%, Industry 10.4%, Services 29.5%).
  • Unemployment: 34.5%
  • Poverty: 45.4% (% of population below the international poverty line)
  • Net Foreign Direct Investment: $6.22 billion (No outbound FDI)
  • Budget: $14.21 billion revenue,   $38.25 billion expenditures.
  • Public Dept. 40.4% of GDP.
  • Infaltion: 6.5% (5-year average 15.5%).
  • Despite government corruption, Amari has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and a gradually improving economic growth rate.
  • Nominal GDP: $14.52 billion  (Agriculture 2.5%, Industry 30.3%, Services 67.2% ).
  • Real GDP Growth Rate: 0.5%  (5 year average 6.9%).
  • Labor Force:   6.4 million  (Agriculture 5.2%, Industry 24.3%, Services 70.5%).
  • Unemployment: 7.4%
  • Poverty: 15.0% (% of population living below the international poverty line).
  • Net Foreign Direct Investment: $1.23 billion (No outbound FDI).
  • Budget: $4.73 billion revenue,         $4.28 billion expenditures.
  • Public Dept: 50.4% of GDP.
  • Inflation: 6.0% (5 year average 5.3%).
  • Although some private enterprise is allowed to function in accordance with open market dynamics, the government maintains an active role in managing the economy.
  • Nominal GDP: $36.11 billion (Agriculture 20.1%, Industry 20.2%, Services 59.7% ).
  • Real GDP Growth Rate: 7.6% (5 year average 5.2%).
  • Labor Force: 18.8 million (Agriculture 70.0%, Industry 9.7%, Services 20.3%).
  • Unemployment: 15.8%
  • Poverty: 70.1% (% of population living below the international poverty line).
  • Net Foreign Direct Investment: $1.62 billion (No outbound FDI).
  • Budget: $5.49 billion revenue,      $10.85 billion expenditures.
  • Public Dept: 119.8% of GDP.
  • Inflation: 15.1%  (5 year average 8.7%).
  • Despite efforts to grow a viable middle class by diversifying the economy, most Kujengans—70 percent—still live on less than one dollar per day, while a small group of oligarchs retain Kujenga's economic power.
  • Nominal GDP: $2.92 billion   (Agriculture 31.4%, Industry 63.4%, Services 5.2%).
  • Real GDP Growth Rate: -6.3% 5 year average 0.6% ).
  • Labor Force:     5.3 million   (Agriculture 65.4%, Industry 25.0%, Services 9.6%).
  • Unemployment: 13.0%
  • Poverty: 79.6% (% of population living below the international poverty line).
  • Net Foreign Direct Investment: $173.59 million (No outbound FDI).
  • Budget: $419.63 million revenue, $441.89 million expenditures.
  • Public Dept: 18.4% of GDP
  • Inflation:2.5%  (5 year average 3.3%).
  • By most modern standards, Nyumba is a very weak or failed state economically, with a small group of powerful individuals controlling the financial, trade, banking, and commodity sectors within the country.

Social

In Sub-Saharan Africa, UN population growth forecasts exceed 2.0% per annum through 2035, with the majority of the population under age 25 through the year 2050. Sub-Saharan Africa’s global share of 15-24 year olds will increase from 14.3% to 23.3% over the forecast period. Under these circumstances, mega-cities will continue to grow rapidly, poverty will persist, and governments will struggle to provide basic services. Insurgent and terrorist groups will seek to exploit these conditions: competing with the state to provide social services; employing violence to intimidate political opposition; using terror attacks to provoke external actors into de-legitimizing military interventions; and aggressively recruiting among the region’s youth.

Regional Social Factors Comparison
  Amari Ziwa Kujenga Nyumba
Social
  • Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 42% 15-59 yr. 53% > 60 yr. 5%
  • Median Age: 19.5
  • Pop. Growth Rate: 1.81%
  • Birth Rate (per 1,000): 25.1
  • Death Rate (per 1,000): 6.8
  • Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 38.3
  • Life Expectancy: 6
  • Literacy Rate: Male 81% Female 74%
  • Urban Population: 25.6%
  • Religion: Christianity 80% Islam 5% Traditional/ Indigenous 4% Other 2%
  • Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 45% 15-59 yr. 49% > 60 yr. 6%
  • Median Age: 20
  • Pop. Growth Rate: 3.2%
  • Birth Rate (per 1,000): 42.9
  • Death Rate (per 1,000): 10.2
  • Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 57.6
  • Life Expectancy: 65
  • Literacy Rate: Male 85% Female 72%
  • Urban Population: 16.8%
  • Religion: Christianity 40% Islam 35% Traditional/ Indigenous 15% Other 0%
  • Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 45% 15-59 yr. 50% > 60 yr. 5%
  • Median Age: 27
  • Pop. Growth Rate: 2.8%
  • Birth Rate (per 1,000): 35
  • Death Rate (per 1,000): 7.6
  • Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 41.2
  • Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 41.2
  • Life Expectancy: 62.2
  • Literacy Rate: Male 83% Female 71%
  • Urban Population: 33%
  • Religion: Christianity 27% Islam 60% Traditional/ Indigenous 10% Other 3%
  • Age Distribution (%) < 15 yr. 44% 15-59 yr. 52% > 60 yr. 4%
  • Median Age: 18
  • Pop. Growth Rate: 2%
  • Birth Rate (per 1,000): 39
  • Birth Rate (per 1,000): 39
  • Infant Mortality (per 1,000): 96.6
  • Life Expectancy: 62.4
  • Literacy Rate: Male 82% Female 68%
  • Urban Population: 40.5%
  • Religion: Christianity 3% Islam 90% Traditional/ Indigenous 7% Other 0%

Information

The OE countries all recognize the importance and influence of information media and its control. Approaches range from low technical capabilities with tight government controls to rapidly modernizing technical capabilities with ineffective attempts by the government to control the public's perceptions. New means of information sharing using modern technology are rapidly adopted by the population unless the government intervenes in an attempt to control information flow. Countries jump directly from limited land-line telephone systems to ubiquitous cell phone use. Distances and improvements in technology, software, and infrastructure allow African countries to implement new information systems at a very rapid pace. In several instances, African countries are on the cutting edge of adopting new information technology to enhance the public's standard of living. Other instances see the leadership of a country attempting to control access to information systems to remain in power and to exploit it for their own benefit.

Regional Information Environment Comparison
  Amari Ziwa Kujenga Nyumba
Information
  • Good diverse, open media
  • High INFOWAR capability
  • Diverse INT capabilities
  • Decent technology
  • Govt. control/owned
  • Strong growth of ICT Sector
  • INFOWAR mixed
  • Mixed INT
  • Adopting modern technology
  • Rapidly growing cell phone capability
  • Ltd. media (radio, WOM) Govt./Private mix
  • Attempt at Govt. control - marginal effect
  • Ltd. INFOWAR
  • Ltd. INT (HUMINT, OSINT)
  • Entry-level cell phone
  • Non-technical (WOM, radio)
  • Govt. media & control
  • INFOWAR niche purchases
  • Ltd. INT (HUMINT)
  • Paid/foreign-supplied IMINT
  • SATCOM phones only (elite)

Infrastructure

Main article: DATE Africa Regional Infrastructure
Regional infrastructure architecture diagram

African infrastructure is expensive. Long distances, low population densities, uneven management, and intraregional competition contribute to these costs. African infrastructure projects emphasize expensive rehabilitation over basic maintenance. The World Bank estimates that about 30 percent of Africa’s infrastructure requires rehabilitation – even more in rural and conflict-prone areas.

Despite the cost, both domestic and international players are keen to expand Africa’s infrastructure. States control most infrastructure systems, but public-private partnerships (PPP) are increasingly more common. The World Bank and international development finance institutions provide most of the financing, followed by domestic government financing. Olvana is the largest financier and constructor of African infrastructure.

The typical project involves a consortium of non-African state development agencies, international government organizations, private financiers, and construction companies. Following the financing announcement, spending or progress is hard to trace until the project is complete. A large portion of the announced projects are either scaled back or never completed. In some cases, competing projects do not have the demand to justify the large investments.

Developed infrastructure correlates with population density. Amari’s main cities: Nairobi, Kampala and Mombasa, are key nodes of the 800-mile Northern Victoria Corridor, a road, rail, and pipeline network. Kujenga follows Amari in both population and infrastructure development, with the competing Dar Es Salaam - Kigoma, DARGOMA, Corridor linking the Indian Ocean port of Dar Es Salaam with Lake Tanganyika and Ziwa’s capital, Mwanza, on the southern shore of Lake Victoria. A major north-south transportation artery runs through Moyale in Nyumba, crossing into Amari just south of Isiolo, through Nairobi to Mbeya, Kujenga in the south. Nyumba, Amari, and Kujenga all compete to be the Indian Ocean gateway of choice to landlocked countries.

Lastly, proposed infrastructure projects are increasingly gathering strong opposition through both standard and social media, quickly gathering international support. The more disruptive to the environment, the more opposition they garner. Examples include port expansion and coal power plant construction in Lamu, Nyumba, and transportation corridors bisecting wildlife ranges in all four countries. While opposition campaigns often start on social media sites and increasingly evolve to on-site demonstrations.

Regional Infrastructure Comparison
  Amari Kujenga Nyumba Ziwa
Infrastructure Summary/Condition Have-use-fix Have-use-don’t fix Either have but degraded or

never-had

Have-use-don’t fix
Highway Density (mi/100sq mi) 5.7 2.8 1.6 4.4
Airports w/ Paved Runway >8,000 ft. 4 2 1 1
Deep Water Ports/Berths 1/19 4/19 1/4 -
Electricity Production/Consumption (MW) 2300 1700 130 60

See also: Amari Infrastructure, Kujenga Infrastructure, Nyumba Infrastructure, Ziwa Infrastructure

Terrain Regions within DATE Africa

Physical Environment

Though making up less than a fifth of Africa, the DATE Africa region includes most of the geographic and climatological features present on the continent. The central features are the Eastern and Western Rift Valleys that run from Kujenga in the south all the way to northwest Nyumba in the north. They are home to the African Great Lakes, which are the origins for both the Congo and Nile Rivers. Their peaks also make up the highest elevations in Africa. Eastward from the Rift, descending savanna and desert meet the Indian Ocean along an expansive coastline containing the natural deep water ports of Dar Es Salaam in Kujenga, Mombasa, Kenya, and to lesser extents Lamu and Kismaayo in Nyumba.

Lake Victoria is the world's largest tropical freshwater lake and sustains an ever-growing population. Despite the relative water wealth contained in the Great Lakes, much of the region suffers from water stress or water scarcity. Man-made crop irrigation is minimal and the major perennial rivers flowing to the Indian Ocean are prone to severe flooding during the rainy seasons.

Regional Physical Environment Comparison
  Amari Kujenga Nyumba Ziwa
General

Characteristics

  •  Lies on the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria.
  • Terrain varies from high mountains and green plateaus to desert lowlands and coastal plains.
  • Climates range from tropical to semiarid to sub-alpine.
  • Multiple natural hazards exist, resulting from Amari’s geology, weather, native wildlife, and human activity.
  • Borders the Indian Ocean.
  • Encompasses Lake Victoria, Lake Malawi, Lake Tanganika.
  • Terrain varies from a significant  rift valley in the central region, high mountains and arid desert lowlands, as well as coastal plains.
  • Climates range from tropical to semiarid in the east; warm desert in the west; and humid near the coast.
  • Borders the Indian Ocean.
  • Encompasses Lake Turkana and Lake Logipi.
  • Terrain varies from significant rift valley, high mountains and arid desert lowlands, and coastal plains.
  • Climates are tropical to semiaridin the east, warm desert in the west, and arid and humid near the coast.
  • Completely landlocked.
  • Encompasses a portion of Lake Victoria, Lake Natron, and Lake Eya.
  • Terrain varies from a significant rift valley and lakes in East with arid desert lowlands and open savanna over a majority of the country.
  • Climates range from semiarid in the west and warm desert, arid with increased humidity near Lake Victoria.
Land Area (sq. mi) 176,619 364,374 161,998 34,216
Inland Water Area (sq. mi) 19,956 26,437 3,350 8,900

  • Albert Nile, Amari

  • National Park, Amari

  • Nyumban Desert

  • Tana River, Nyumba

Time

All DATE Africa countries use the Gregorian calendar. However, within that daily routine great importance is paid to the rising and setting of the sun. As is common in equatorial Africa, none of the regional countries observe Daylight Savings Time (DST).

Whilst Western approaches to time are o’clock, or by the clock; regional attitudes towards time are the opposite. In many rural areas some of the elder population might not even have access to a clock or watch. However, their apparent lack of concern for clock time should not be mistaken for an inability to accomplish key tasks. The local populations will commit energy to their tasks with great industry, on their timetable, to achieve their own goals.

Across the whole region there is a much more flexible approach to time. ‘Africa time’ is very much a thing. In short, Africa time means things will happen when they happen; there is no point worrying about what might be. For example; you cannot control the rain, if it rains and crops grow, so be it. Conversely, if it doesn’t rain they will not grow. You cannot plan to harvest crops which depend on rain because you cannot control the rain.

Once the differing approach to time is understood, business with the Amari should be straightforward. Attempting to rush them, or impose a Western approach to time will not be of benefit to either US forces or the host nation. This is the case in the cities as well as the countryside.

Time Zone Observed - UTC +3 (East Africa Time - EAT) DST NOT observed.

Significant Conditions in the OE

Peacekeeping Forces

Main article: Peacekeeping Forces
  • International Peacekeeping Forces.

Recent examples of peacekeeping forces with and international mandate include the forces of the UN mission in DATE Africa and the European Training Mission in DATE Africa.

  • Regional Peacekeeping Forces.

Recent examples of regional peacekeeping forces include the forces of the Regional Standby Force and the Regional Monitoring Group's Regional Economic Community Security Force.

Private Security Forces

Main article: Private Security Companies
  • Corporate Private Security Forces.

Wealthy individuals and businesses may contract the services of corporate security forces. These forces are highly disciplined, organized and trained - recruiting mostly from former elite military and paramilitary forces. They are often used for high-end site and VIP security. They are capable of conducting small-unit, high-risk strikes with state-of-the-art equipment and vehicles. They have a significant intelligence and planning capability. While highly effective and fiercely loyal to their employer, they may have the propensity of over-aggression and risk extra-judicial actions. They may contract local security companies (see below) for mundane activities. Examples: Jaguar Integral Defence Services International (JIDSI).

  • Private Security Companies.

Rampant crime and inadequate policing, particularly in the urban areas has led to the rise of numerous private security companies. These companies provide security services for businesses and individuals ranging from static guards to armed response teams. Guarded facilities will likely have barbed wire and monitored cameras. The guards themselves are variously uniformed, from simple reflective vests and caps to military-style garb. They will either be unarmed (batons, irritants) or have a variety of small arms.

The quality and cost of the services may indicate the professionalism of responses and adherence to company rules of engagement. These guards are often well-regarded in the community and may have excellent situational awareness of local activities and dynamics, as well as those of the poorer areas from which they are often recruited.

Note: Non-commercial "neighborhood watches" may exist, but are less likely to be armed or provocative.

See also: TC 7-100 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5, Noncombatants - Private Security Contractors

Non-Governmental Organizations

A wide range of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) operate within the OE. Many are focused on education, medical, and economic development. Some organizations center their activities on humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and supporting camp operations. These groups have typically been vulnerable to attack and corruption by various threat actors in the region. UN and Coalition elements, as well as privately-contracted security have been used by these groups to ensure uninterrupted movement and operation.

See also: TC 7-100 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5, Noncombatants - Nongovernmental Organizations

Hybrid Irregular Armed Groups

Main article: DATE Africa Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions

The variety of armed groups operating within the OE is indicative of its complex and dynamic political, economic, ethnic, and religious issues. Their structures are as diverse as their ideological drivers. Most are not pure insurgencies, guerrilla groups, or militias, but rather hybrids of all of these. The key differentiators of these groups is their relative mix of forces and the primary driver of their actions.

Violent Extremist Organizations. There are a number of international or transnational Higher Affiliated Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) presently operating within the OE. Many of these groups have indigenous origins, but have since affiliated with external groups for support and identity. Others may have their origins outside of the OE and gained a foothold on the continent. These hybrid organizations have the capability to organize and execute high-impact attacks against public targets and may be able to mass to conduct semi-conventional operations across the OE.

Major known groups in the OE include Islamic Front in the Heart Africa (AFITHA) and Hizbul al-Harakat. The volatility of security situations across the OE allow rapid growth and morphing of extremist groups as they position for power and influence. Groups will change their tactics and affiliations to adapt to evolving country and regional dynamics.

Insurgencies. Whether motivated by political, religious, or other ideologies, these groups will promote an agenda of subversion and violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. The composition of these in the OE is almost always a hybrid of insurgent elements and guerrilla forces, depending on the locale, goals, and levels of support. They may act as the militant arm of a legitimate political organization. These groups will undermine and fight against the government and any forces invited by or supporting it. They are likely to target government security forces and even civilians to demonstrate force and create instability. They will conduct small operations, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombings, car bombs, and larger military-style operations. Examples: Amarian People’s Union, Free Tanga Youth Movement.

Separatist Groups. These groups consist mostly of former (losing) soldiers that fought in a previous revolution or coup. Rather than fighting to overthrow the current regime, their focus is to secure a territory and gain officially recognition. These groups will likely have widespread support in the controlled area and view government or external forces as the enemy. They may provide security for commercial or NGO movement for a fee or to curry favor. Separatists will be very protective of their designated borders and may react disproportionately to perceived incursions. Example: Pemba Island Native Army.

Ethnic or Religious Rebel Groups. Numerous conflicts that are highlight ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences have led to the development of ethnicity-focused armed groups. Some groups have developed in self-defense against such groups, then gone onto be violent themselves. Extreme passions of these groups have led to often brazen atrocities, causing massive waves of IDPs. Multiple UN interventions may have temporarily quelled the violence, but long-held grievances give life to renewed violence. These groups may conduct raids, extrajudicial killings, targeted killings of civilians, and summary executions. There have been reports of rebels luring villagers to their town center for execution, often throwing bodies into the village water source to spoil it. These groups may attempt to seize strategic routes to assert control and raise funds. Examples: Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) and Union of Peace for the Ziwa.

Local Armed Militias. These groups usually have a local focus and may be independent or supported by a local strongman. Their forces are mostly comprised of former soldiers or paramilitary who may have fought for the state, but now serve their own interests. They generally carry small arms, but may have additional capabilities, depending on the goals and support. Moderate factions of these groups may conduct demonstrations, vandalism to force political concessions, while more radical factions conduct small attacks, riots, sabotage to enforce a particular ideology. In rural areas, they may be heavily armed and appear almost like a guerrilla force. In urban centers, they may resemble a gang or an insurgent group. Examples: Mara-Suswa Rebel Army (MSRA), Kujengan Bush Militias.

See also TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 2: Insurgents and Chapter 3: Guerrillas

Criminal Organizations and Activities

Main article: DATE Africa - Criminal Activity

The often unstable economic and security situations across the continent have allowed criminal activity and corruption to flourish. Elsewhere in the world, corrupting and co-opting of government officials by criminal enterprises is usually to gain operating freedom. In the OE, such activities are competitive enablers, intended to gain access to internal and external markets. How these large-scale domestic criminal enterprises and international criminal manifest within the OE are characteristic of each country's circumstances and history.

Criminal enterprises may have a pronounced impact on military operations in the REGION OE. Dominant criminal elements may view external military forces as a threat to their territorial control, while less-powerful organizations may look to exploit shifts in security and rules of engagement to gain access to markets or power.

The main categories of organized criminal enterprises within the OE include:

  • Drug Trafficking
  • Human Trafficking & Forced labor
  • Commodity Theft and Smuggling
  • Illicit mining
  • Oil theft, refining, and smuggling
  • Protection Economies
  • Criminal Gangs

See also TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 4: Criminals

  1. ↑ The DATE countries listed below are fictionalized territories at the national and first-order administrative levels (i.e. province or county depending on the country). Lower order boundaries such as city wards and municipalities, and physical features such as mountains, rivers, and deserts, have retained their actual names. In many cases literature and media sources will use more than one name for a feature, and may spell them in different ways. As practicable, DATE will follow the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency's guidance contained in the Geonet Names Server (GNS), "the official repository of standard spellings of all foreign geographic names sanctioned by the United States Board on Geographic Names (US BGN)". However, the reader should be cautioned that reference texts and maps may use these other variants. These common variants are also listed in the GNS.
Retrieved from "http://odin.ttysg.us/mediawiki/index.php?title=Africa&oldid=44869"