Difference between revisions of "Donya Syndicate"

Revision as of 19:30, 31 January 2018

DATE Africa > Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions > Donya Syndicate ←You are here

The Donya Syndicate is the largest and most powerful cocaine trafficking organization in the region. Its primary operating base is in and around the Port of Dar es Salaam, although it operates processing and distribution nodes throughout Kujenga. Donya is the most stable and sophisticated of the groups to emerge from the drug turmoil of the 1990s – both within Africa and among central and South American suppliers.

Structure and Activities

The structure of the syndicate helps assure its internal stability by keeping groups of workers functioning as independent cells, with each cell knowing very little about the others. These smaller groups of workers are responsible for very specific aspects of the organization. By segregating cells, chances of mutiny or leaked information to law enforcement are minimized.

The Syndicate resorts to extreme violence when they perceive actual or nascent threats to their operational territory or authority. As violence increases, citizen groups and even some community-based militias resist the groups’ power. Along with staging attacks on Syndicate leadership homes, businesses and affiliates, these citizen groups have begun discreetly informing the Kujengan police with evidence and hideout locations.

Syndicate forces will generally employ small arms, although security elements at main receiving and shipping points may include heavier weapons. Processing facilities may employ improvised explosives and traps.

Trafficking

Product is generally received from central and South American producers via ports in southern Africa, then smuggled northward into Kujenga along the Mbeya corridor. It is then either smuggled overland, or processed through small coastal ports enroute to European distributors. A portion of the product may be smuggled out of the country by commercial air. There is little domestic distribution.

Significant corruption at ports and border crossings facilitate product movement. The group’s business and political links exacerbate corruption and local awareness of or involvement in illegal operations. Local paramilitary elements may be directly involved in smuggling or providing transportation security. The cartel may also hire or coerce local private security to enhance the Syndicate’s already robust security for large product movements. Security forces may be quick to employ violence against perceived threats to the operation.

Exploitation of Government Corruption

The Kujengan government has had few enforcement successes against the Donya, partially due to the group’s leadership being deeply intertwined with legitimate businesses throughout Kujenga. Syndicate-related investments in legitimate businesses are present in almost every sector of the economy.

Members of the Donya Syndicate are likely involved in other criminal activities (protection, racketeering, prostitution, commodity smuggling), provided these do not infringe on the primary product or risk unacceptable scrutiny.

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 [[File:Cocaine-bust.jpg|300px|right|Cocaine Seized]]
-The Donya Syndicate is the largest and most powerful cocaine trafficking organization in the region. Its primary operating base is in and around the Port of Dar es Salaam, although it operates processing and distribution nodes throughout [[Kujenga]].  Donya is the most stable and sophisticated of the groups to emerge from the drug turmoil of the 1990s – both within Africa and among central and South American suppliers.
+The Donya Syndicate is the largest and most powerful cocaine trafficking organization in the region. Its primary operating base is in and around the Port of Dar es Salaam, although it operates processing and distribution nodes throughout Kujenga.  Donya is the most stable and sophisticated of the groups to emerge from the drug turmoil of the 1990s – both within Africa and among central and South American suppliers.
-The Kujengan government has had few enforcement successes against the Donya, partially due to the group’s leadership being deeply intertwined with businesses throughout Kujenga. Syndicate-related investments in legitimate businesses are present in almost every sector.
+==Structure and Activities==
+The structure of the syndicate helps assure its internal stability by keeping groups of workers functioning as independent cells, with each cell knowing very little about the others. These smaller groups of workers are responsible for very specific aspects of the organization. By segregating cells, chances of mutiny or leaked information to law enforcement are minimized.
-==Structure==
+The Syndicate resorts to extreme violence when they perceive actual or nascent threats to their operational territory or authority. As violence increases, citizen groups and even some community-based militias resist the groups’ power.  Along with staging attacks on Syndicate leadership homes, businesses and affiliates, these citizen groups have begun discreetly informing the Kujengan police with evidence and hideout locations.
-The structure of the syndicate has helped assure its internal stability by keeping groups of workers functioning as independent cells reporting back to the leaders, with each group knowing very little about other employees. These smaller groups of workers were responsible for very specific aspects of the organization. By limiting communication between workers, chances of mutiny and leaked information to law enforcement minimized.
-The group has resorted to extreme violence when they perceive actual or nascent threats to their operational territory or authority. As violence increased, citizen groups and even some community-based militias have resisted the groups’ power.  Along with staging attacks on leadership homes, businesses and cronies, these citizen groups began discreetly informing the Kujengan police with evidence and hideouts.
+Syndicate forces will generally employ small arms, although security elements at main receiving and shipping points may include heavier weapons.  Processing facilities may employ improvised explosives and traps.
-Forces will generally be small arms, although security elements for transport and at the main receiving and shipping points may include heavier weapons.  Processing facilities may have improvised explosives and traps.
+==Trafficking==
+Product is generally received from central and South American producers via ports in southern Africa, then smuggled northward into Kujenga along the Mbeya corridor. It is then either smuggled overland, or processed through small coastal ports enroute to European distributors.  A portion of the product may be smuggled out of the country by commercial air.  There is little domestic distribution.
-==Trafficking==
+Significant corruption at ports and border crossings facilitate product movement. The group’s business and political links exacerbate corruption and local awareness of or involvement in illegal operations.  Local paramilitary elements may be directly involved in smuggling or providing transportation security.  The cartel may also hire or coerce local private security to enhance the Syndicate’s already robust security for large product movements.  Security forces may be quick to employ violence against perceived threats to the operation.
-Product is generally received from central and South American producers via ports in southern Africa, then smuggled northward into Kujenga along the Mbeya corridor. It is then either smuggled overland or processed through small coastal ports enroute to European distributors.  A portion of the product may be smuggled out of the country by commercial air.  There is little domestic distribution.
 ==Exploitation of Government Corruption==
-Significant corruption at ports and border crossings facilitate movement. The group’s business and political links increase the likelihood of corruption and local awareness and/or involvement.  Local paramilitary elements may be directly involved in smuggling or providing transportation security.  The cartel may also utilize local hire private security to enhance the already robust security for large product movement.  The companies and forces typically used may be quick to violence against perceived threats to the operation.
+The Kujengan government has had few enforcement successes against the Donya, partially due to the group’s leadership being deeply intertwined with legitimate businesses throughout Kujenga. Syndicate-related investments in legitimate businesses are present in almost every sector of the economy.
-Members of the Donya Syndicate are likely involved in other criminal activities (protection, racketeering, prostitution, commodity smuggling), provided these do not infringe on the primary product or risk unacceptable scrutiny.
+Members of the Donya Syndicate are likely involved in other criminal activities (protection, racketeering, prostitution, commodity smuggling), provided these do not infringe on the primary product or risk unacceptable scrutiny.