Military: Ziwa

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The Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) is the state military of the Republic of Ziwa. Its structure and focus has adapted over the last decade alongside the country’s economic development. The ZPDF consists of the Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC), Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC), and the National Guard. Ziwa’s military relations with its neighbors – Amari to the north and Kujenga to the south - is generally stable, despite sporadic low-level incidents along the border. The scope of border control operations has contributed to the forward deployment of dedicated maneuver elements and leveraging of former rebels to ensure the appearance of security.

Multiple threats exist to exploit Ziwa’s dependency on natural resources and external power generation and transmission. Brutal militants in the northeast mountain area (“The Watasi Gang”) and pockets of ethnic rebels throughout the country continue to plague stability and keep the military at continually high operational tempo. Although both Kujenga and Amari have active security agreements with Ziwa, rumors persist of covert support to the rebels by both countries. Another key role of the ZPDF is support to reducing criminal smuggling and trafficking of arms and humans through the country’s borders. The ZGFC and National Guard both have resources dedicated to this task. Defense spending and percentage of GDP included over the last five years averaged 1% of GDP. (Figures from CIA World Factbook.)

Amari Views on Neighbor States’ Security Conditions

Ziwa	Kujenga	Nyumba
Partners in combating criminal and countering extremists along shared border and on Lake Victoria. Generally not considered a threat, but viewed as a buffer between Amari and Kujengan instability.	Kujenga unwilling/unable to control cross-border and lake criminal activity Militia/gang violence & incursions along southern border and northeastern mountains Poaching and violence spillage a big problem (esp. tourism) Conduit of criminal activity into Ziwan territories	Little direct interaction Driver of lawlessness and refugees

Ziwa National Command Authority

National Command Authority

Military branches of the Ziwa People’s Defense Force (ZPDF) receive their authority via a civilian control and structure. The Ziwan Ministry of Security and Defense (MoSD) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the national security strategy. 

National Strategic Goals

Ziwa’s defense policy has evolved from the previous regime’s emphasis on the need to defend itself against any external aggression.  Over the last two decades it has also recognized that the threat to a country’s stability and economic progress can be internal. The mission of a nation’s security and defense forces are to ensure security by effectively implementing the nation’s policies on internal and external security.  Its experience in suppressing rebellion within its borders led to internal defense policies that have been criticized for complying with only the letter of international agreements.  Ziwa believes its economic progress, political power, and regional prestige are imperiled without a modern military power to secure them. The forces are designed and structured with these objectives in mind:

• Maintain internal stability and prevent internal security issue from destabilizing political and economic gains
• Support regional cooperation and develop stable international military relations
• Ensure and support beneficial use of Ziwan land and lake resources
• Enforce territorial integrity and maintain border security
• Defeat armed militants that threaten internal security and inhibit free trade and tourism.

Security and defense policy dictates that the forces should be held in operational readiness and their organization, equipment and procedures for exercising command and control should be tailored towards meeting the role and missions of the forces in peacetime, national emergency or crisis and in war.

Ziwa’s military forces must be used to influence perceived potential threats across the borders or otherwise. Modernizing and updating of the forces to cater for contingencies is essential and an ongoing program across all services.

Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC)

The Ziwa Ground Forces Command (ZGFC) is responsible for all ground combat and security patrol operations. Generally regarded as a competent ground force when conducting operations, military units in garrison have sometimes reflected their government’s level of corruption. There are approximately 33,600 ground forces on active duty, including the National Guard. No formal reserve capability exists. Forces are generally arrayed in rotation along Ziwa’s borders with non-deployed forces remaining in garrison bases.

Doctrine and Tactics

Ziwan military doctrine in similar to that of its neighbor, Kujenga, in that forces are deployed to stabilize and respond to security incidents.  Heavier maneuver forces and/or air support may then be deployed to augment in-contact forces and provide decisive engagement as needed.  While Ziwa has a fairly capable array of ground assets, commanders prefer to leverage their robust indirect fire capabilities – particularly in sparsely-populated areas. 

Ziwan ground forces have modernized to a point, but their command doctrine retains legacy elements from prior to the force restructuring of the last two decades.

Composition

Amari Army Force Structure

Maneuver battalions are Ziwa’s basic combat unit, with most being able to operate semi-independently.  The ZGFC routinely adjusts its task organization based on mission requirements or perceived changes to threat conditions. The motorized regiments are rotated to designated security missions, with heavy forces and artillery allocated per mission requirements. The remainder of the forces are generally maintained at installations near Usagara and Geita.

Primary Formations:

• 7^th Mechanized Brigade
• 1^st Motorized Regiment
• 2^nd Motorized Regiment
• 26^th Artillery Regiment
• 27^th Rocket Regiment
• 22^nd Air Defense Regiment
• 1^st Information Warfare Battalion
• 356^th Engineer Battalion
• 51^st Antitank Battalionn

Paramilitary Forces

Ziwa People’s National Guard (ZPNG).  The National Guard is the state paramilitary security force of Ziwa.  They are responsible for maintaining order and security along the Ziwan border with Kujenga and on Lake Victoria.  They are generally regarded as capable of conducting area security and stability operations.  The motorized units of the National Guard are arrayed across the Ziwa-Kujenga border, while the Marine Battalion has responsibility on the lake.

A large portion of the National Guard’s approximately 3800 personnel is comprised of former rebel fighters from the border regions.  Intended as a good will gesture, this strategy has been met with mixed results. Their knowledge of the terrain and local dynamics has been a significant benefit, but lingering grudges can create conflict.

The National Guard’s equipment is older than that of the primary ground forces – likely Tier 3, even 4.  Differing levels of discipline within the ranks of the National Guard lead to a wide range of readiness.  Where some units have been meticulous and even improved the vehicles to a Tier 2 condition, others have allowed them to fall into disrepair and resigned to mostly pedestrian operations.

Many of the command positions and most of the signal unit are staffed by regulars from the ZGFC.  The command and control systems are generally most sophisticated and kept in better repair to enable management across distances.  They are likely Tier 2.

The National Guard’s Marine Battalion (MARBAT) is the only element in the ZPDF with a maritime capability. Its mission is to maintain safety and security on Lake Victoria and support lake port security operations.  It has little offensive capability, but conducts regular patrols and courtesy inspection on the lake.  Like the other National Guard units, it is staffed largely by former rebels, but is generally more professional and has a more positive reputation.  

See also [[TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 15, Special Purpose Forces and Commandos]].

Training and Readiness

The military fills the ranks of both its regular forces and the National Guard through an all-volunteer recruiting program. Reductions in regular force recruiting and retention levels were expected due to Ziwa’s economic growth, but personnel levels from Ziwa’s ethnic minorities and former rebels remain strong. Recruits receive basic military skills training at the Ziwa National Training Center near Usagara, with advanced skill training delivered either as additional training at the center or as on-the-job training (OJT).  Ziwa relies heavily on peacekeeping rotations to solidify and expand individual and small unit capabilities. 

Overall readiness and unit-level capabilities are generally better in the regular forces than National Guard units. The ranks of former rebels soldiers often receive waivers for training and may subsequently revert to their previous, often aggressive, small unit techniques if not intentionally enculturated into the wider force.  Reporting has placed the regular force readiness at approximately 70-80%. Readiness in the National Guard varies, but is assumed to be slightly less than the regular force.  National Guard units in the outlying areas, and those dominated by former rebels, have a history of modifying or cannibalizing their issued equipment based on their perceived local requirements. 

Weapons and Equipment

The weapons and equipment of the ZPDF are mostly Tier 2 capabilities, with niche Tier 1 in much of its communications elements.  The National Guard is distinctly less capable, with most of its equipment being Tier 3 and even some Tier 4 systems, although units may modify equipment to make it more capable.  Equipment is generally purchased or acquired through trade agreements from Donovia or Olvana, with only a few categories from other producers.  

The 61^st Tank Battalion functions as a special presidential guard and has a significant allocation of Tier 1 equipment acquired through high-visibility military sales with Olvana. Although more capable than the bulk of the ZGDF, these are largely for regional prestige and not likely to be used except for capital defense.

Functional Capabilities

Command and Control

Army Command Structure

Ziwa’s history of confronting rebellion within its borders has created a culture in which defense-related policies and even brigade or regiment-level command directives are managed by the Ministry of Defense Headquarters at Mwanza. Despite the sometimes cumbersome information flow, military commanders retain a fair amount of autonomy within their assigned missions. Cynicism and distrust remains high throughout the Ziwa People’s National Guard (ZPNG), but frequent command and staff rotations have reduced simmering resentment.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control)

Maneuver

The ZPDF maneuver forces maintain a relatively active rotational deployment schedule.  Battalions assume active security, support, and refit roles throughout the year.  They generally rotate within their parent regiments, augmented with additional armor, artillery, and other assets task organized as needed. As security requirements allow, ZPDF maneuver elements will be used as part of Ziwa’s peacekeeping or humanitarian contribution. Maneuver element are most often used to present an overwhelming deterrent to quell nascent crises or to contain problem situations until indirect fire assets can be utilized. (See below: “[[#Fire Support|Fire Support]]”)

Air Defense

The battalions of Ziwa’s 22^nd Air Defense Regiment have a similar rotation scheme as the maneuver forces, with a primary mission of key facility protection in the capital and lake districts. Up to a battalion-sized force may be used to protect indirect fire assets – particularly long range MRL and artillery supporting maneuver forces in the active security role.

Ziwa has invested significant resources in integrating its air defense systems. This effort ranges from purchase of new systems to retrofitting older ones.  Many maneuver elements have been augmented with physical and electronic air defense deception assets to further enhance survivability of these systems.

All maneuver battalions’ organic air defense capabilities are generally limited to MANPADS.  Units frequently train to receive and send queuing communications to enhance responsiveness and accuracy of non-networked systems.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 11, Air Defense)

INFOWAR

Ziwa’s military information warfare capabilities are closely linked to government capabilities. Both government and military prefers to control and direct the majority of INFOWAR assets at the national level.  Military officials have stated publicly that they do not perceive a significant threat from their neighbors, but rely on their capabilities to maintain situational awareness. 

Intelligence and INFOWAR-related capabilities supporting ZPDF forces will likely focus on maintaining situational awareness of opposing key military leaders, while retaining the capability to disrupt communications and interfere with threat decision-making capacity. Both tactical and space-based assets will impact threat GPS-reliant navigation and munitions.  Ziwa has not publicly acknowledged an offensive cyber capability, but has pursued technological enablers that could be used across the full spectrum of operations.

Ziwa has invested in significant improvements in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  Although much of the public information portrays the UAV advancements as related to the government’s unmanned safety and public health service programs, Ministry of Defense testing of advanced individual and swarm UAVs has been leaked to online sources.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 7, Information Warfare ) and [[Ziwa:Information]]

RISTA

The ZPDF reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) doctrine centers on the ground forces of the National Guard deployed across the border regions. This generally consists of presence patrols, surveillance, and coordination with intelligence personnel for development of human intelligence (HUMINT).  Its ground reconnaissance is supported by advanced intelligence and INFOWAR capabilities allocated and managed by the Ziwan National Intelligence Bureau (NIB).  This arrangement integrated Ziwan RISTA with its INFOWAR capabilities and doctrine.

The Ziwan Air Corp (ZAC) maintain most of the electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, which consist of integrated radar warning and RF countermeasures. Similarly, the 22^nd Air Defense Regiment of the ZGFC is allocated systems to support early warning and target detection.  The ZAC maintains a close relationship with the NIB to facilitate integration of the rapidly developing Ziwan space-based imagery capability.  This capability has been criticized for alleged surveillance on Ziwan citizens, rather than on potential threats.

Ziwa is rapidly and aggressively adopting open source information research and analysis to improve intelligence capabilities.  This has been a joint development project between the Ministry of Defense and prominent Ziwan universities.

Human intelligence continues to provide the majority of external data collection and a balanced share of internal intelligence.

Ziwa has no established MASINT systems but recent purchase of aerostat-based systems for border and regional surveillance. 

See also [[TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 7, Information Warfare]] and [[Ziwa:Information]]

Fire Support

Ziwa views its artillery and rocket forces as key to its ability to maintain order and security within its borders. Rather than directly assigning indirect fire (IDF) assets to its motorized battalions, Ziwa prefers to maintain their IDF inventory at installations closer to the capital.  It may temporarily attach assets to maneuver units as security requirements dictate. When deploying forward in support of maneuver forces, IDF systems will be supported by air defense assets.

Multiple rocket launcher systems are less likely to deploy with maneuver units as their ranges and garrisons allow support across much of the Ziwan territory.  Exceptions in the past include operations to put down rebellion in the northeastern mountainous region.  

Similar to its air defense upgrades, Ziwa has invested heavily in technical capabilities that increase the accuracy, lethality, and integration of the entire spectrum of fire support systems. Ziwa has not pursued a modern missile program.  Rumors of upgrading and refitting of legacy pre-regime systems have been reported, but are likely unfounded. 

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 9, Indirect Fire Support)

Protection

The ZPDF takes substantial effort to protect its critical assets and capabilities. The presumed capabilities of their neighbors, combined with the Ziwan preference for centralizing many of its critical intelligence and military assets has required a full range of physical and electronic protection measures.

Critical information and intelligence capabilities are protected in hardened facilities near the capital, while military assets rely on physical, electronic, and cyber protection.  ZPDF combat units incorporate camouflage, force concealment, and use of decoys into their training.    Elements of the ZPDF’s engineer battalion may be task organized to support specific requirements.  When not specifically tasked, the engineer capabilities support maneuver units’ mobility and protection requirements.

Landmines from previous conflicts in the region have been used in improvised devices by rebels within Ziwan borders.  ZPDF and National Guard soldiers train regularly on explosive hazard awareness. At least a quarter of the soldiers have participated in humanitarian demining operations in the region and worldwide.

(See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support)

Logistics

Ziwa centrally manages military materiel through its Defense Logistics Bureau (DLB), headquartered in Mwanza.  Foreign supplies and equipment arrive for processing via air or rail.  Meticulous record-keeping and modern automated systems allow the DLC to push standard supplies to military units with little interference. Commanders request variance through their staff to the DLC.  Temporary remote depots may be established if commanders request it or secure resupply is at risk of compromise.

CBRNE

Ziwa does not have a confirmed offensive chemical warfare capability, nor is it part of their warfighting doctrine. All personnel receive a basic chemical first aid training.  Emergency responders in all cities have more advanced capabilities for mass casualty care.

Ziwa Air Corps (ZAC)

YOU STOPPED HERE!!! The Amari Air Force (AAF) is capable of supporting ground combat and defensive air operations. Its roles include air-to-air, ground attack, and transportation. It has also been used to support peacekeeping deployments in all of these roles. It is well-integrated into ground force operations and it well suited for defensive operations and support to limited force projection.

Air Force Size and Structure

Amari Air Force Disposition

The Amari Air Force fields an estimated 50-60 fixed wing aircraft and 30-40 helicopters. The Amari air force operates primarily from bases in Kampala and Nakuru, but also maintains smaller bases collocated at the civilian airfields in Gulu, Arusha, and Mombasa. The Air Force also maintains a presence at Kisumu International Airport. The Minister of Defence may authorize air force use of any Amari civilian airfield, as military requirements demand.

Air Force Doctrine and Tactics

The Amari air force stations most of its aircraft and support assets at the two main bases, preferring to push capabilities as requirements dictate. It routinely flies supply and training missions throughout the country to enhance readiness. This also increase its ground support responsiveness and agility. If crisis situations arise, they may push a response and support package to a more forward airfield.

Air Force Weapons and Equipment

The Amari air force operates equipment and weapons based on technology from 10 to 20 years ago to create a Tier 2 capability rate. Some of the aircraft have been fitted with niche Tier 1 equipment that provide advanced capabilities, such as surveillance and targeting. The Amari air force can conduct 24-hour operations in all weather and over all terrain. The Amari aircraft inventory includes equipment from USA, Canada, and Spain/Indonesia.

Amari Air Force Composition

Air Combat Group:

• Fighter/Intercept SQDN
• Ground Attack SQDN
• Attack Helicopter SQDN
• Intelligence and Surveillance SQDN

Air Transport Group

• Medium Air Transport SQDNs
• 2x Light Air Transport SQDNs
• Medium Helicopter Transport SQDNs
• 3x Light Helicopter Transport SQDNs

Air Force Training and Readiness

Due to its small size and large operational budget as compared to the other services, the Amari air force maintains a high level of training and a 80% operational readiness rate. Amari pilots receive significant annual flight hours and have earned a solid international reputation on both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Most pilots are trained to provide close air support, aided by linked ground location tracking systems. In addition to the traditional roles of the Amari air force, they consistently train on dynamic mission re-tasking.

Amari Naval Forces

The Amari Navy (AN) has military responsibility for the Amari maritime security along its eastern coastline and on Lake Victoria. Amari's maritime force is large compared to its neighbors, yet still retains a high level of agility and capability. Amari maritime operations have evolved to be very similar to others in the region, focusing on coastal and inland defense with moderate force projection capabilities. Their doctrine centers on defense with a heavy emphasis on securing the coastal areas and protecting commercial traffic and resource shipping from smugglers and pirates.

The Amari policy of aggressive confrontation of smugglers and pirates has largely been applauded, but several incidents involving misidentification have led to tragedy and international protest. This has led to ongoing tensions in the waters between the mainland and Pemba Island and the Pemba Islanders.

Amari naval missions include:

• Patrolling and defense of coastal areas
• Lake and inland waterway security
• Support to peacekeeping
• Combating maritime crime, smuggling, and piracy
• Supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
• Combating threats to the environment
• Maritime and aerial surveillance
• Search and rescue
• Assisting the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries
• Protecting offshore resources

Navy Size and Structure

Amari Naval Disposition

The Amari naval headquarters is collocated with its Coastal Defence Group in Mombasa. The Amari Navy divides maritime security responsibilities into two commands:

Coastal Defence Group. The Amari Coastal Defence Group has responsibility for maritime operations along the coast, Pemba Island, and territorial waters. It maintains bases near Mombasa and Malindi, with several smaller stations, with a detachment on Pemba Island (Pemba Naval Station).

Inland Maritime Security Group. The Amari Inland Maritime Security Group has responsibility for maritime security operations of Amari waters on Lake Victoria and Lake Albert. It also maintains small detachments on Lake Natron and Lake Kyoga for mostly environmental protection. It is headquartered near Entebbe.

Navy Weapons and Equipment

The AN fields largely tier 2 equipment and weapons with limited Tier 1 niche capabilities financed largely through regional security agreements and sale of natural resources.

Amari naval equipment focuses on defensive operations, especially the defense of off-shore resources and infrastructure. Amari will continue to purchase equipment such as minesweepers, increase Special Operations capabilities, and improve amphibious assault capabilities. The AN can operate in all sea conditions and can successfully conduct 24-hour operations.

The AN possesses 30-35 surface craft and reportedly 2 submarines. It operates a variety of surface combatants, patrol boats, minesweepers, and amphibious elements. The AN also fields a small naval special operations forces (SOF).

Elements of the 102nd Infantry Regiment or the Reconnaissance and Intelligence Formation may be attached to support naval requirements as needed

Amari Navy Composition

Amari Naval Inventory:

• 4x Frigates
• 2x Corvettes
• 6x Patrol/Strike/OPV/IPV
• 6x Coastal/River defense
• 9x River/Lake Defense
• 2x Minesweepers
• 4x Amphibious assault
• 2x Submarines

Navy Training and Readiness

While the AN went through a significant downsizing over the last decade, the reinvigorated emphasis on countering piracy and other maritime crime has increased its operational readiness to approximately 80%. It has a well-trained and motivated force, due mostly to a comprehensive training and professional development program, supported with international trainers.