DATE Pacific Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions

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Significant Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions

Significant Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions in the OE, 2025

Group Name	Type	Country	Description
Yellow Sashes	Insurgency	Olvana	The Yellow Sashes are primarily Hindu who detest the Olvana communist government’s repression of religion. The Yellow Sashes are often traditionalists who wish to return the country back to the way it was 150 years ago. The Yellow Sashes want a return to the previous form of government before communism, which was a hereditary monarchy.
Olvana Jemaah Islamiyah	Insurgency	Olvana	The OJI is a Muslim insurgent group that operates primarily in Western Olvana with many of its leaders training in the Middle East. As the OJI becomes stronger, the group continues to push further to the east. The mainline OJI is usually content to slowly convert people to Islam by providing services to the poor rural people that the central Olvana government seems to forget. There are OJI cells that do not feel the conversion process is occurring fast enough, however, and are trying to convert the rural villages by force.
Olvana Christian Party	Insurgency	Olvana	The OCP is not a political party, but a group of Christian missionaries whose mission is to make the lives of rural Olvanians better while converting them. The Olvana central government is not extreme in its denunciation of religion and will generally allow various religions to practice as long as those practicing their faith seek to use it as a means to overturn the current political structure. The OCP is on the cusp of going from a group tolerated by the Olvana government in the northwestern part of the country to one that the communists will seek to destroy.
Tantoco Cartel	Criminal	Multiple	The Tantoco Cartel was founded in the Republic of Torbia, it also operates in the largest cities of Olvana. The Tantoco Cartel is involved in almost every type of criminal activity imaginable: drug and weapons smuggling, extortion, motor vehicle theft, illegal gambling, money laundering, counterfeiting, and murder-for-hire The Olvana government is serious about bribery as some senior government leaders have been forced to resign or imprisoned when caught taking bribes.
South Torbian Communist Army	Insurgency	South Torbia	The South Torbian Communist Army (TCA) is probably less than 1,000 actual fighters, but they may have many more supporters throughout the country. Their expressed intent is to establish a communist country based on the Marxist model, the same goal as stated by the South Torbian Communist Party (TCP). The TCP claims that their group has no connection to the TCA, but there are probably some members that belong to both organizations.
Islamic Torbian Army	Insurgency	South Torbia	The Islamic Torbian Army (ITA) began on Mindoro as a movement to convert the country into an Islamic Republic. The ITA has expanded to many parts of South Torbia, especially those that contain a large number of Muslims. Since the ITA normally attacks non-Muslims, most other Muslims remain neutral or provide tacit support to the ITA.
Osongco Syndicate	Criminal	South Torbia	The Osongco Syndicate is a large-scale criminal network that is based on the island of Mindoro in Bongabong led by Zikri Osongco. Osongco may sometimes work with the Tantoco Cartel, but it is not part of the latter. Tantoco leaves Osongco alone as long as he confines his activities to Mindoro. The Osongco Syndicate is primarily involved in stolen goods and smuggling, but will not hesitate to delve into other areas on the island that can make the organization money such as extortion or even bank robbery, especially those that do not practice the Muslim faith. Some Muslims see Osongco as a modern-day Robin Hood who takes from the rich and gives to the poor.
Gabal Forever)	Insurgency	Gabal	"Gabal Forever" is a very small group (less than 100) of boisterous people who do not like the way the government and business leaders are catering to foreigners in attempt to chase the tourist dollar. Many of these are 85%-95% ethnically native to the local islands and trace their ancestry back beyond written history through the oral history tradition of their ancestors. These people are upset about the change in their island’s life and would like it to return to what it was 200 years ago before Westerners arrived.
Kumpulan	Criminal	Gabal	Kumpulan is the major criminal organization in Gabal. Its leader owns a local import/export business with warehouses in several cities and towns in Gabal, from which it can hide illegal goods among legitimate imports. It is highly likely that the group has agents scattered throughout the National Police as well as any local governmental officials.

Miscellaneous Conditions

Criminal enterprises may have a pronounced impact on military operations in the OE. Dominant criminal elements may view external military forces as a threat to their territorial control, while less-powerful organizations may look to exploit shifts in security and rules of engagement to gain access to markets or power.

See also TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 4: Criminals

Drug Trafficking

Heroin and cocaine are the main drugs for trafficking through the OE. These drugs generally enter the OE via established lines of communication to/from Europe and Africa, are processed and packaged, then smuggled out of the OE to European and other lucrative markets. Heroin and cocaine have little domestic distribution. There are numerous smaller groups that specialize in other drugs, such as cannabis, methaqualone, and khat. These groups often operate growth or production facilities in proximity to an urban area or transit hub in areas with ineffective law enforcement. While these groups also export a substantial amount of their drugs to foreign markets, a large proportion is intended for domestic distribution.

All of these groups are highly territorial and have a history of being quick to violence. In addition to their primary drug, they will also be involved in ancillary criminal activities, such as protection, racketeering, prostitution, and commodity smuggling. Groups often operate with local political, community, or military awareness and possibly involvement. Operations are usually enabled by corrupt border or customs enforcement officials. Security at production and shipment facilities is paramount. In addition to their robust security forces, larger drug organizations may hire legitimate private security companies or partner with other irregular forces to secure their operations. Rural operations may have a guerrilla or militia-style forces to protect the organization's interests.

Human Trafficking

The practice of the theft, smuggling, and trafficking in persons has been an ongoing problem to the OE. International organizations and NGOs have fought to reduce the problem, but the power and money in the practice make it a lucrative trade for a variety of criminal and irregular actors in the OE.

The sex trade is one of the key drivers of human trafficking in the OE. The victims are usually between 8 and 15-years of age. Some will be transported out of the OE to be sold as sex-slaves, while others are made to work within the OE in the sex-tourism industry. They are often acquired by kidnapping from outlying farms or small towns and may be members of vulnerable communities, such as the homeless, refugees, drug users, or urban trans-sexuals. They may also be stolen during interdicted migration or tourist movement.

Piracy

Thousands of miles of coastline, limited ground infrastructure, and unstable economies contribute to rampant piracy in the OE. Pirates operate small vessels that may appears as any of the numerous small commercial or private vessels operating along the coasts. Primary targets are simple theft of commodities and kidnapping for profit. While governments attempt to stop the piracy and kidnappings, the limited number of military watercraft and higher competing requirements makes it almost impossible to stop all of them.

Smuggling

The unstable and complex economic and political environment, combined with numerous maritime lanes throughout the OE contributes to the illicit movement of finished goods and bulk commodities. Observable activities are often at/near port facilities and production locations. Bulk goods are often illicitly moved through large ports with assistance from corrupt officials to avoid customs fees. Corrupt officials may allow or facilitate these activities with falsified inspections and other documents.

Criminal Gangs

Street crime is common in most places of the world, but the power, organization, and integration with other irregular elements is of special importance to Forces operating in the OE. Large numbers of displaced or marginalized young men, combined with volatile economic conditions and inconsistent law enforcement have led to these dangerous groupings. Many members join for self-protection or to have a sense of purpose, but many see it as one of the few avenues to financial security and status.

Criminal gangs in the OE are generally observable as small groups or gatherings of more than 100 and are most often localized to their stated territories. They will be armed with a mix of small arms, improvised blades and incendiaries. They may also quickly employ improvised obstacles such as burning tires, debris, and cars. Their somewhat limited armed capabilities are greatly enhanced with ubiquitous mobile communications and in-depth knowledge of their territories. They have high situational awareness of forces and activities in and around their areas of control. Their sophisticated use of social media to conduct precision attacks and avoid detection.

Gangs may be hired or motivated to assist other irregular groups. Insurgent groups have reportedly contracted gangs to infiltrate peaceful demonstrations to agitate and destabilize the crowd. Guerrilla groups and militias regularly use these gangs to conduct low-level strikes and kidnapping for forces labor.

In the region's larger cities such as Manila, street gangs are common and operate with only superficial interference from police. They mainly focus on armed robbery and extortion. The street gangs are usually confined to a defined neighborhood whose petty crime does not encroach on the territories and markets controlled by the various organized crime groups, such as the Tantoco Cartel.

See also: TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 4: Criminals-Gangs

Armed Civilian Non-combatants

Large groups of civilians may assemble for planned or spontaneous demonstrations or protest. The factors influencing a crowd's agitation and potential violent actions are diverse and complex. There will usually be one or more motivating incidents leading to the gathering that is likely organized via social media. These assemblies are generally only loosely organized, but can rapidly coalesce and escalate tensions. Otherwise peaceful demonstrations may be driven to act as a mob or even pushed into riot. Large groups of civilians may be hired or leveraged by criminals or insurgents to create distractions, dynamic obstacles, or INFOWAR opportunities. While gun laws in the region vary significantly, private ownership of firearms is common. Open carry is prohibited in most areas, but laws are oftennot strictly enforced in many rural areas.

See also: TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5: Noncombatants

Private Security Organizations

Private security contractors (PSCs) are commercial business enterprises that provide security and related services on a contractual basis. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter intrusions or theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. They may also be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat. PSCs can act as an adjunct to other security measures and provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for a state’s military, paramilitary, and police forces. They may also be employed by private individuals and businesses (including transnational corporations). PSCs may be legitimate, well-respected corporations providing contract advisors and employees as part of a military nation-building program funded by a foreign government. A PSC that provides services on a contract basis outside its country of origin also falls into the category of a transnational corporation. Other PSCs may be domestic firms that supply contract guard forces. In its simplest form, a PSC might be a local citizen organization that performs actions on a short-term contractual basis.

There are a number of small security firms that provide personal protection to South Torbian businessmen. Some countries, such as the RoT, require these companies register in order to operate within their borders. Corporate forms that provide nearly military levels of capabilities are a growing condition in all operational environments. These highly organized and capable entities, such as Jaguar Integral Defence Services International, Blue Storm, White Star, and Orange Dragon often operate outside of traditional jurisdictions.

See Also TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces>Chapter 5: Noncombatants>Private Security Contractors