Military: North Torbia

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The DPRT is one of the most militarized countries in the world, with more than half a million active duty military personnel and over two million reservists. The DPRT’s military spending is around 20% of its GDP, and about one-quarter of all adults serve in some military capacity. The Torbian People’s Supreme High Command is comprised on the Torbian People's Army (TPA), the Tobian People's Air Force (TPAF), and the Torbian People's Navy (TPN).

Military Forces

Despite being an island nation, ground forces comprises the largest portion of the TPA, at approximately 80% of all military personnel. The TPA is responsible for all ground units, the Special Purpose Forces (SPF), and low-level air defense. About 70% of all ground forces are located in the southern half of the country. Most TPA artillery is located in hardened positions in the mountains close to the RoT border, in order to maximize its weapons systems’ ranges. This places the Republic of Torbia (RoT) capital city, Manila, within the range of the heaviest TPA artillery pieces and missiles.

The DPRT army’s basic unit is truck-mounted infantry.  There are also a number of mechanized and armor brigades. The TPA also fields a number of missile brigades, and its engineers continuously practice water crossings and facilitation of amphibious landings.

The Torbian People’s Air Force (TPAF) of 100,000 personnel. The TPAF’s primary mission to defend its homeland from the air, with secondary missions to provide tactical air support to the army and navy, transportation, logistical support, and SPF insertion/extraction.

The Torbian People’s Navy (TPN) is primarily a brown water force, consisting of approximately 75,000 seamen, with little capacity to operate more than 80 km off the DPRT coastline. The TPN fields no aviation units, as those are operated by the TPAF. The TPN focuses on supporting amphibious assaults, insertion and extraction of SPF, and submarine warfare. The TPN will use their submarines to prevent the reinforcement of the RoT by outside powers, and to interdict any sea lines of communication.

Military Strategy

National Command Authority

DPRT National Command Authority

DPRT’s National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power to plan and carry out the country’s national security strategy. The NCA includes the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Information, Finance and Economic Affairs, Interior, and Defense, along with other members selected by the Secretary-General, who chairs the NCA.

The Secretary-General appoints the Minister of National Security, who exercises responsibility for the NCA’s Strategic Integration Department (SID). The SID serves as the overarching agency responsible to integrate all the instruments of national power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the plans and actions of all DPRT’s ministries, but particularly those associated with the instruments of national power.

See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 1, Strategic and Operational Framework.

DPRT Supreme High Command and Military Force Structure. Regional commands are in diagrams below.

Strategic Operational Framework

The DPRT exercises command and control (C2) of the Armed Forces via the Supreme High Command (SHC). The SHC includes the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but separately. The MOD assumes the responsibility for policy, acquisitions, and financing the Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the service components, while its functional directorates assume responsibility for key aspects of defense planning. In wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters. Planning and execution are centralized, with each lower level of command less likely to take initiative for fear of repercussions of failure.

The DPRT currently configures its military in an administrative force structure (AFS) that manages its military forces in peacetime. This AFS contains the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, the various militaries group their forces into divisions and brigades for administrative purposes. In some cases, the militaries may group their forces administratively under operational strategic commands (OSC) designated as military regions. If the SHC elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of the AFS to each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. Typically, these administrative groupings differ from the country’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the AFS consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level. (See FM 7-100.4 Opposing Force Organization Guide: Chapter 3, Task Organizing.)

Except for the 96th Airborne Infantry Division, all units that report directly to the DPRT Supreme High Command are stationed in the capital city of Baguio.

National Strategic Goals

The DPRT strategic goals are influenced by a history involving repeated seizure and rule of their islands by outside forces. The three primary goals of the DPRT: maintaining the maintaining total control of the country under the Worker’s Party of Torbia (WPT) and Secretary-General Song Chong-Su, the unification of North and South Torbia under Song’s control, and the prevention of outside interference into DPRT’s internal affairs by other countries. Examples of specific strategic goals include:

• Maintenance of the Song family in complete control of the country
• Defense of DPRT’s sovereignty against outsiders
• The unification of the two Torbias under Song’s control
• Maintenance of its status as a nuclear power despite any outside objections

Implementing National Security Goals

DPRT strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or preparation for war. Once war begins, strategic operations continue during regional, transition, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.

In pursuit of its national security strategy, the DPRT prepares to conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. The four types of operations include:

• Strategic operations use all instruments of power in peace and war to achieve DPRT’s national security strategy goals through attacks against any enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. For North Torbia, it is the threat of using nuclear weapons if the country is attacked by any world power.
• Regional operations include conventional, force-on-force military operations against overmatched opponents, such as regional adversaries and internal threats. For North Torbia, it is using its oversized army to unify Torbia under DPRT control
• Transition operations bridge the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contain some elements of both. The country continues to pursue its regional goals while dealing with developing outside intervention that has the potential to overmatch its military. For North Torbia, it is the threat of using a nuclear weapon mounted on a missile that could reach any regional country that decides to interfere with DPRT military action.
• Adaptive operations preserve the country’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that overmatch the country’s military. For North Torbia, it is the policy that bypassed small units and civilians will turn to irregular tactics to harass and defeat any country that decides to invade the DPRT.

National Security Strategy

Although the DPRT refers to them as “operations,” each of these courses of action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each type of operation aggregates the effects of tactical, operational, and strategic actions in conjunction with instruments of national power to achieve each country’s strategic goals. The types of operations employed at a given time will depend on the types of threats, opportunities, and other conditions present.

The DPRT’s strategy is to unify Torbia under DPRT control and defend North Torbia from external enemies. If possible, the DPRT will attempt to achieve its ends without armed conflict. North Torbia will not limit strategic operations to military means and will not begin with armed conflict. They may achieve the desired goal through pressure applied by nonmilitary instruments of power, perhaps by merely threatening to use superior military power or nuclear weapons against the opponent. These actions fall under the general framework of “strategic operations” and is a significant indicator that other countries will need to analyze for what the DPRT may intend to do in the future.

The DPRT government resorts to armed conflict to achieve its desired end state when nonmilitary means prove insufficient or not expedient. Strategic operations, however, continue even if a particular regional threat or opportunity causes the DPRT to undertake “regional operations” that may include military means against South Torbia. Prior to the initiation of hostilities—and throughout the course of armed conflict with its regional opponent—the DPRT government continues to conduct strategic operations to preclude intervention by outside players, other regional neighbors, or an extra-regional power that could overmatch its forces. The main method for the DPRT to preclude outside interference is through its submarine fleet, air defense weapons, and the threat of using nuclear weapons. Such operations, however, always include branches and sequels to deal with the possibility of intervention by an extra-regional power providing the DPRT with the capability for their subordinate leaders to understand their missions.

Military Forces Overview

Military Strategy

DPRT military strategy revolves around the overarching desire to reunite the RoT territory under Secretary-General Song’s control, while preventing regional or extra-regional powers from intervening if war were to break out between the two Torbias. The TPA will fight a conventional war with its ground forces, while using its SPF and civilian spies hidden among the RoT population to conduct irregular warfare aimed at command and control (C2) nodes, logistic units, and key weapon systems.

Army Overview

DPRT ground forces field approximately half a million soldiers, most of them career professionals. The military is regarded in the DPRT as a great career compared to the private sector, so competition to remain on active duty is intense among commissioned and non-commissioned officers.  While soldiers are well trained and disciplined, the readiness of their equipment is often lacking. Due to the large number of soldiers in the prime of their life serving in the military, the government often directs them to work outside of the military: in the agricultural industry during rice planting and harvesting seasons, in lumber milling operations, and in the mining industry. This non-military work affects the training readiness of the army, meaning that the army is most prepared for combat at the end of its dry training cycle that coincides with the mobilization training of the reserve forces.   

Army Size and Structure

The division serves as TPA’s basic combined arms unit, although it is common for the Supreme Command to task organize its strategic forces throughout the country. The TPA designs its maneuver divisions and brigades to serve as the basis to form a division tactical groups (DTG) or brigade tactical groups (BTG) as needed.

See also TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 2, Command and Control.

The TPA's ground forces are divided into three regional commands (Western, Northern, and Southern). The Supreme High Command's strategic forces are generally garrisoned throughout the country with the units of attachment, but maintain a robust force around Baguio.

North Torbia ground forces dispositions.

Southern Army:

DPRT's Southern Army is designated as the primary offensive force to accomplish the goal of reunifying the Torbias. It maintains consistent patrols and observation posts throughout the border region. The Southern Army's divisions are deployed with little task-organization, but have conducted drills organized as smaller Brigade Tactical Groups. Second echelon elements, some fires elements, and other vulnerable systems are protected in hardened positions. Locations tucked into the mountains leverage extensive underground hardened facilities. Some strategic elements are near-permanently attached to the Southern Army, while others remain dedicated to regime defense.

• 30th Infantry Division: Kasibu
• 31st Infantry Division: Tuba
• 32nd Infantry Division: Santa Fe
• 33rd Infantry Division:  Kasibu (Fwd Deployed to SE border area)
• Supreme Command permanent garrisons (direct support) near Luzon, Santiago, Cauayan
• Supreme Command permanent garrisons (strategic forces) near Baguio, San Fernando

Northern Army:

The Northern Army appears to have multiple roles - provide follow-on forces to a reunification attack, and conduct anti-landing on the northern and northeastern coasts. Inland, second echelon elements, some fires elements, and other vulnerable systems are protected in hardened positions. Locations tucked into the mountains leverage extensive underground hardened facilities.

• 20th Infantry Division: Aparri
• 21st Infantry Division: Tuguegarao
• 22nd Infantry Division: Gonzaga
• Supreme Command permanent garrisons (direct support) near Tuguegarao

Western Army:

The Western Army's primary focus is anti-landing along the western coast. While it actively patrols the coastline, at least half of its ground forces and almost all of its organic fires assets are in hardened mountain positions. Under crisis situations, the President may order forces to support strategic elements near the capitol.

• 10th Infantry Division: Batac
• 11th Infantry Division: Candon
• Supreme Command permanent garrisons (direct support) near Vigan City

• DPRT Garrison Force Structures
• 

  Supreme Cmd

• 

  Southern Army

• 

  Northern Army

• 

  Western Army

Army Doctrine and Tactics

TPA ground forces doctrine and tactics are heavily influenced by the People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO) and the Republic of Donovia. Due to the historical relationship of the DPRT to PRO and Donovia, the TPA sent many of its officers and senior NCOs abroad for training.

Five doctrinal principles guided the creation of the DPRT’s strategy and tactics:

• Lessons learned from wars the country’s wars;
• The overall national objective of reunifying Torbia under DPRT control;
• The idea of self-reliance by the DPRT government;
• Reliance on surprise, a quick and decisive war, and the use of mixed force tactics;
• A unique set of their offensive and defensive tactics.

Military Strategy

Surprise Attack:

The TPA attempts to attack its enemy in unexpected ways. The characteristics of a surprise attack could include the use of inclement weather, night operations, or rugged terrain; a detailed deception plan; skilled infiltration units to include SPF units; parachute or air assault operations; the massing of fires; the quick concentration of forces at the decisive point and time; or the unexpected employment of mechanized or armor forces.

Quick Decisive War:

Even though the DPRT can mobilize millions of civilians for war, the DPRT lacks the resources to fight a protracted war. Therefore, any war must be quick and decisive. Based on recent experience, the DPRT realizes that many democratic countries take time to react. If the war is concluded before any Western powers can fully mobilize, the new status quo may be allowed to be retained.

Mixed Force Tactics:

Offensively, the TPA plans a two-prong war using both conventional and unconventional means. The DPRT is willing to launch a pre-emptive strike, and is willing to risk its country’s annihilation in order to defeat its enemies. The first prong consists of a massive conventional assault—supported by substantial fires and chemical attacks—on selected forward positions. Additionally, ballistic missile strikes—including some with chemical warheads—target air bases, ports, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) nodes. The second prong is an attack by the TPA SPF throughout their enemy’s rear area, in conjunction with DPRT agents already in place. The SPF will attempt to reach their objectives by a number of means including helicopters, hovercraft, light planes, parachutes, small boats, submarines, or a small number of infiltration tunnels through the volcanic rock. The TPA or DPRT agents will not hesitate to attack civilian targets or hide among civilians, making it difficult for other militaries to neutralize them. The DPRT will not hesitate to use hostages—or even their own citizens— as human shields if it will help them achieve their objectives.

Operational/Tactical Doctrine:

TPA doctrine is based upon five fundamental principles of war: surprise attack, mass and dispersion, maneuverability, slyness, and operational security.

Surprise Attack:

Already discussed above; but this principle applies to all echelons of the TPA.

Mass and Dispersion:

The TPA seeks to concentrate its combat power at the decisive point and time while weighting the main effort. The TPA believes its forces only need a 2:1 force ratio advantage at the decisive point for successful offensive operations. The main effort seeks to operate on a narrow front, while supporting attacks disperse over a wider front to deceive their enemy about where the main attack will occur.

Maneuverability:

The TPA seeks to quickly win any war. To accomplish this, combat units seek to use the terrain to their advantage. The TPA employs trucks enhance the mobility of its infantry. The TPA conducts night moves and uses minor roads and rugged terrain to surprise their enemies. SPF or other forces may conduct raids to seize key transportation nodes.

Slyness:

While the TPA says it trains its troops to use initiative and be aggressive without hesitation, fear of failure sometimes prevents lower level leaders from actually executing any plan other than the one given to them by their higher commander. The DPRT is not a signatory country to a number of treaties on land warfare, and will not feel restricted by any international conventions. If a TPA leader thinks some tactic will work, they will do it.

Operational Security:

The TPA keeps a close hold on all plans while distributing false information to confuse its enemies. Operational security activities include reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, deception, counterintelligence operations, and conducting operations in inclement weather or darkness. Most of the TPA’s night vision equipment is tier 3.

Other Techniques

Besides the military strategy and tactics listed above, the TPA also employs two other techniques during both offensive and defensive operations:

Adequate Logistics:

TPA logistical system may be inadequate to support sustained operations. TPA doctrine calls for each commander to ensure that there are sufficient supplies to successfully complete their missions. Due to potential supply shortages, most TPA commanders plan to use captured supplies—military and civilian—to complete their assigned missions. TPA weapons systems such as mortars and artillery are often of a slightly larger caliber than those of their enemy, allowing the TPA to use captured military stores while denying their enemies the same option.

Annihilation:

TPA offensive doctrine calls for the complete destruction of enemy formations by continued pursuit, staying close to the enemy to reduce the influence of the enemy’s superior artillery and close air support. Continual contact prevents the enemy from withdrawing to regroup for a future attack. The taking of terrain is secondary to the enemy’s destruction.

Army Training and Readiness

TPA ground forces rely mostly on long-term conscription to field the majority of its army. Each year, about 200,000 males reach military age, and all those deemed physically fit must serve 10 years in the military. About the same number of female DPRT females reach military age each year, and all must serve three years in the military if they meet the medical standards.  Those selected to attend college can defer their military commitment—collegians serve after graduation, often as officers. Upon leaving the military at the end of the commitment, all able-bodied personnel must continue to serve in the reserves until age 55. Since the navy and the air force receive their pick of those who score highest in aptitude for military service, ground force units receive lower quality recruits unless the new soldier requests service in the ground forces. After a short basic training period, new draftees report to their first unit for on-the-job training in a field chosen through their aptitude test. Many mid-grade and senior officers and NCOs receive training in Olvana or Donovia, or by Olvanese and Donovian instructors in the DPRT. Due to the large number of soldiers that enter the military each year, it is estimated the operational readiness rate for the TPA is around 90%.

All TPA soldiers are taught to perform the duties of those holding the next rank above them. A regular day in the TPA lasts from 0500 hours to 2200, with at least ten of those hours scheduled for training, education, or political indoctrination. This instruction does not include time for meals, where soldiers typically receive less than 1.75 pounds of food per day, depending on military specialty. There have been recent reports of soldiers selling uniforms, fuel, weapons, and ammunition on the black market, in order to obtain additional food. No provision exists for time off on weekends; leave is a rarity, and corporal punishment used regularly even for minor infractions. Soldiers, when not training, often perform other duties such as planting or harvesting crops, cutting lumber, or assisting in mining operations. The TPA selects commissioned officers based on demonstrated loyalty to the Worker’s Party of Torbia (WPT), while noncommissioned officers (NCO) must show superior physical and combat abilities. The TPA produces a physically tough soldier with individual discipline that is firmly grounded in the political party line.

The TPA maintains a large SPF corps for a country its size, and often trains with the SPF from Olvana or Donovia. Individual combat skills and political indoctrination are the building blocks of all SPF training. The TPA selects its best soldiers for SPF units, usually after five years of service in regular units. The soldiers assigned to the SPF display an inordinate amount of esprit de corps and feel a sense of pride in belonging to an elite TPA unit.  SPF soldiers call themselves “supermen” [translated from Torbian]. These soldiers receive additional training on demolitions, infiltration, intelligence gathering, martial arts, mountaineering skills, night combat, and swimming. SPF endure more intensive physical training and additional political indoctrination to inure them from the temptation to defect, as some of them will be expected to operate deep behind enemy lines. If required for credentials by their unit, the SPF soldiers will go through airborne or amphibious training. SPF soldiers practice food deprivation.  SPF practice swimming/floating all day with only a single handful of rice. Soldiers who successfully complete SPF training are either promoted to NCO rank, or receive commissions as junior officers. These personnel will likely serve in an operational SPF units for the rest of their military careers. The end result of this rigorous training regimen is a TPA SPF soldier who, on scant rations, can travel faster and cover more ground with a heavy combat load than counterparts in most other armies.  SPF soldiers are mentally conditioned to accept orders without question, and will most likely fight to the death if cornered. The SPF constitutes the bulk of the TPA forces fighting the second front in their enemies’ rear area.

Army Equipment and Weapons

Major North Torbian naval bases. The DPRT navy will use any port necessary to support the operations.

The TPA ground forces operate primarily tier 2 equipment, though there is some tier 3 equipment on active duty. The TPA rarely discards any of its old equipment, transferring equipment not needed for the active duty units to the reserves; equipment gradually cascades down to the lowest level of units based on readiness. Any excess equipment not needed for the reserves is placed in storage, in case of a national emergency. Due to the large variety of equipment causing maintenance issues and the need for a large variety of replacement parts, the TPA equipment readiness rate is only 80%. Recently, Olvana and Donovia provided the DPRT with some more modern systems, so the DPRT army does possess niche tier 1 capabilities. The TPA operates in all terrain types and successfully conducts 24-hour operations. (For further information see the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), Vol. 1, Chapter 1, OPFOR Tier Tables.)

Naval Forces Overview

The TPN fields a naval infantry regiment, submarines, and surface ships. The TPN operates no aviation, as all rotary and fixed-wing aircraft belong to the TPAF. The TPN uses submarines to interdict the sea lines of communication, secure coastal areas using mines and patrols, assist in amphibious assaults, and insert and extract SPF personnel.

Navy Size and Structure

The TPN operates primarily in three naval groups: one that protects the west coast, a second that protects the east coast, and the third that trains to operate (in case of war) in the strategic straights to the east of the RoT that belong to RoT or Belesia. At 75,000 sailors, the TPN is large enough force that personnel can rotate between sea and shore duty assignments. Many sailors operate in support of the TPA’s SPF. There have been discussions in the DPRT government to increase the size of the naval infantry force, submarine fleet, and amphibious ships. This would allow the modernization of the most strategic TPN assets.While units have a home port, mission requirements may have the ships operating from other ports.

• Headquarters: San Fernando
• 1st Naval Infantry Regiment: San Fernando
• 2nd Missile Attack Boat Squadron: Batac
• 3rd Missile Attack Boat Squadron: Maconacon
• 4th Missile Attack Boat Squadron: Gonzaga
• 5th Patrol Torpedo Boat Squadron: Baler
• 6th Patrol Torpedo Boat Squadron: Dicalayo
• 7th Patrol Torpedo Boat Squadron: Vigan
• 8th Straits Defense Squadron: Dicalayo
• 9th Western Coast Defense Squadron: Laoag
• 10th Eastern Coast Defense Squadron: Maconacon
• 11th Amphibious Support Squadron: San Fernando
• 12th Frigate Squadron: Banlon
• 13th Submarine Squadron: Candon
• 14th SubmarineSquadron: Casiguran
• 15th Submarine Chaser Squadron: Gonzaga
• 16th Minesweeper Squadron: Baler
• 17th Minesweeper Squadron: San Fernando

Torbian People's Navy Force Structure. Units without a location listed are co-located with its parent headquarters. The Torbian People's Navy may move ships from its home port to other ports for specific missions.

Navy Doctrine and Tactics

The TPN protects the DPRT’s coastal borders and patrols the rivers for illegal activities. The security of the DPRT’s territorial waters in the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea remains a paramount mission for the TPN. Secondary missions include search and rescue (SAR) and port security operations.

Typical TPN missions might include:

• Defensive patrolling of coastal areas
• Minelaying in their own territorial waters during times of war
• Anti-smuggling operations
• Amphibious operations
• SPF infiltration/exfiltration
• Submarine interdiction of sea lines of communication

Navy Training and Readiness

The TPN conducts most of its individual ship training in the Philippine Sea to avoid issues with Olvana. Olvana and the TPN sometimes conduct joint naval patrols and training in the South China Sea. The TPN has been known to conduct exchange programs with the Olvanese and Donovian navy. DPRT citizens can choose to perform their military service with the navy, but with the same obligations of time and reserve service. The number of personnel assessed each year into the navy depends on the TPN’s requirements, based on the number of sailor retirements and departures after mandatory service obligations are completed. After a short basic training period, new recruits are assigned to ships, and learn most of their necessary skills through on-the-job training. Due to the lack of training of new sailors before their arrival at their first post, the operational readiness rate hovers around 80%.

Navy Equipment and Weapons

Location of major North Torbia airports or runways. The DPRT aviation assets will use any runway necessary to complete missions.

The TPN operates primarily tier 2 and 3 equipment, though there may be small numbers of tier 1 equipment. There are discussions to upgrade the TPN’s equipment, especially in the areas of submarines, amphibious craft, and small boats for SPF insertion/extraction. Funding is the most common stumbling block for newer equipment, as the TPN takes a back seat to the ground forces in the budget process. The TPN can operate in all waters in and around the country can conduct both day and night operations. Units habitually work with the same SPF, the Marine Infantry Regiment, or amphibious units during training. Due to the age of equipment and the number of new sailors each year, the equipment readiness rate does not usually exceed 85%.

Air Force Overview

The TPAF’s primary mission is to defend North Torbian airspace, with secondary missions to provide tactical air support to the TPA ground and naval forces, transportation, logistical support, and SPF insection/extraction. The TPAF force operates primarily tier 2 and 3 equipment and planes. TPAF pilots possess a respectable reputation for their flying skills despite the lesser number of hours of flying skills despite the lesser number of hours of flying compared to many Western air forces.

Torbian People's Air Force Structure. Units without a listed location are co-located with their higher headquarters.The Torbian People's Air Force will base planes out of an airbase or civilian airfield based on mission requirements.

Air Force Size and Structure

The TPAF is approximately 100,000 personnel, with approximately fifty percent of the aviation assets located within 100 km of their shared border with RoT. Air defense is provided by TPA ground force units. While KPAF units have home bases, mission requirements will force them to operate out of other bases. During combat, any operational runway will be used by the TPAF to conduct missions. Home base locations are as follows:

• Headquarters: Tuguegarao
• 1st Ground Attack Regiment (Independent): San Fernando
• 2nd Recon Aviation Regiment (Independent): Baguio
• 3rd Mixed Aviation Regiment: San Luis
• 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment: Baguio
• 6th Transportation Aviation Regiment: Baguio
• 7th Transportation Aviation Regiment: Tuguegarao
• 8th Attack Helicopter Regiment: San Fernando
• 9th SPF Aviation Squadron: Baguio
• 10th Heliborne Jamming Squadron: Laong
• 10th Fighter Aviation Division: Laong
• 11th Fighter/Bomber Division: Cauayan
• 12th Bomber Aviation Division: Laong
• 13th Bomber Aviation Division: Tuguegarao
• 17th Mixed Aviation Regiment: Baguio

Air Force Doctrine and Tactics

The TPAF pilots receive much of their training from Olvanese and Donovian airmen, either in the DPRT or through exchange programs to the other countries. Due to the close working relationship with Olvana and Donovia, the TPAF air force doctrine and tactics reflects this partnership.

Air Force Training and Readiness

Each year, newly drafted personnel take a battery of tests to determine their aptitude for specific jobs found in the ground, naval, and air force elements of the TPA. The TPA assigns those scoring highest in mechanical skills to the TPAF. Draftees’ time commitment is still ten years, with reserve service until age 55. The number assigned to the TPAF each year depends on their needs.   Despite the high turnover of airmen each year, it is estimated that the TPAF maintains a fairly well-trained air force with around an 87% operational readiness rate.

Air Force Equipment and Weapons

The TPAF primarily operates tier 2 equipment, with some tier 3 and tier 1 in niche areas. There is always discussion about upgrading the air force, but partisan bickering in the government usually leads to the army taking the most of the budget. The TPAF has only a limited night operations capability, though recent emphasis on night operations improved the TPAF’s efficiency in that area. Due to the older equipment in the inventory, the equipment operational readiness rate in the TPAF usually never exceeds 91%.

Government Paramilitary Forces

The DPRT Ministry of the Interior (MOI) controls ten brigades, whose purpose is to prevent the overthrow of the Song regime. The MOI’s forces use military-style light weapons and light wheeled vehicles. The MOI can also use these forces for riot control, and in wartime, would be used for rear-area security missions.

Paramilitary Brigades

The MOI controls five brigades of the most loyal soldiers, whose sole purpose is to protect the Song regime. The MOI selects these soldiers from the army based on training and loyalty. The chain of command for this organization runs from the Secretary-General, to the MOI, to the State Security Directorate, who normally exerts operational control of the paramilitary brigades. The nickname for these soldiers is “The Black Tigers.”

MOI Special Purpose Forces (SPF) Brigades

The MOI controls five SPF brigades through the same chain of command as the paramilitary brigades. Selected from the TPA’s SPF units, these SPF personnel are the best of the best. During peacetime, they train hard and likely conduct missions into the RoT for reconnaissance purposes in case of future war. Most of these SPF personnel speak a second language, and some of the units contain female personnel. In wartime, these units conduct strategic missions as part of the “second front” dressed in RoT uniforms, or those of RoT’s allies.

Reserves and Militia

Regular Reserves

The DPRT maintains a robust reserve force of over six million personnel.  When soldiers leave active duty after their mandatory obligation, they then serve in some sort of reserve status until reaching the age of 55. Army veterans are assigned to a First Reserve Unit from their departure from active duty (around age 28) for ten years. First reserve units meet for four weeks of training once per year at the end of the active duty’s dry training period. Veterans 40 to 50 years of age, participate in the Second Reserve Units, and participate in one week of training once each year at the end of the first reserve units’ four-week training period. The TPA is at its highest readiness state for the entire year at the end of this annual reserve training period. A 50 years of age, veterans are placed are placed in the third reserve, just a name on list that is available for reactivation during a national crisis. TPN and TPAF veterans go through the same reserve process, except their annual training period for first and second reserve units is two weeks each year. Due to the job skills they learned in the service, the technical expertise gained in the TPN and TPAF makes them an essential part of the civilian sector.

Torbian Youth Group (TYG)

The TYG is a school program for students 14 years of age until graduation from school and their entry into the regular army. The TYG conducts 450 hours of classroom training and seven days of military training each semester. The TYG seeks to identify potential anti-government militants or counter-revolutionaries, and can be called upon to defend the country at a time of war. It is estimated that there are over 1.6 million TYG members. By the time a DPRT joins the military after their high school graduation, they already possess basic military skills, such as marching and marksmanship. This allows for the truncated basic training programs used by all three branches of the TPA.

Militia Command

The Supreme High Command fields nine motorized infantry brigades that compose the 6th Militia Command. Using wheeled armored personnel carriers, the militia brigade serves several purposes. The brigades can be dispatched outside the capital city to quell riots, leaving the MOI’s forces to protect Baguio. If necessary, the militia can support the MOI’s SPF or paramilitary brigades in their missions.

Non-State Paramilitary Forces

Insurgent/Guerrilla Forces

Due to the oppressive nature of the Song regime, there are no known insurgent groups operating in the DPRT. There are individuals in the RoT that would like to reunite the two countries under a democratic style of government, but cannot make any headway in the country. Due to the HUMINT provided by children spying on their parents and citizens reporting one another for minor offenses against the Song regime, any potential insurgents are quickly rounded up. Anyone who discusses regime change in DPRT is either executed after a show trial or placed in a concentration camp as a political prisoner.

Yusingco Enterprises is heavily involved in smuggling goods that the DPRT citizens cannot buy from their government ran stores.

Criminal Organizations

Most crime in the DPRT is driven by poverty and the difficulty of survival under an oppressive regime. The most common crime is selling goods on the black market—including food grown on small family plots intended for personal use. The government’s collective farming system distributes the produces from the larger farms. As long as the families with the small plots of land do not draw attention to their criminal activity, local governmental officials usually leave them alone.

Violent crime is almost non-existent because the Song regime commonly executes offenders charged with murder, rape, or armed robbery. Drug use is uncommon: its cost means that few DPRT citizens can pay for it. The people’s main vice is cigarettes, often found through the black market.

There is one significant organized criminal group: Yusingo Enterprises. They operate in the vicinity of San Fernando City. Their primary activity is smuggling goods such as cigarettes, alcohol, electronics, and medical supplies in from RoT to sell on the black market. Yusingo Enterprises will also sell drugs if they can find buyers. The local San Fernando City police usually ignore Yusingo activities because the mayor receives a cut of their profits.

Private Security Organizations

Due to a no civilian gun ownership policy, there are no private security organizations in the DPRT. The only people allowed to have guns are the police and the military. Teachers tell their students to turn in the names of anyone who may have a gun to them for safety reasons, as the teachers do not want the children to be killed by an accidental discharge. This includes their family members, as children receive an award each time one of their tips leads to the seizure of an illicit firearm and the arrest of the gun owner.

Foreign Military Presence

There are no foreign military units in the DPRT. Foreign military advisors train the TPA, TPN, and TPAF. Most of these advisors come from Olvana or Donovia, but other countries have also been known to conduct training in the DPRT.

Nonmilitary Armed Combatants

It is unlikely that any nonmilitary armed combatants would be found in the DPRT due to gun ownership’s illegality. Any guns will be found in the hands of the military, the police, or other government officials. If someone has a gun, they work for the government.              

Military Functions

Joint Capabilities

The TPA can conduct joint operations, as the ground, naval, and air forces all come under the TPA’s command. There is rivalry between the ground, air, and sea services that sometimes reduces effectiveness during joint operations. Those TPN and TPAF units that work with ground units or SPF elements normally do so on a regular basis, creating good working relationships between the units. Despite the TPA controlling all units, there is still competition between the ground, naval, and air force units for funding; ground units usually win out over the TPN and TPAF. This sometimes creates friction between the higher ranking officers of the three services.

Command and Control

TPA ground units are the DPRT’s primary military force. The TPN and TPAF support the TPA ground forces, primarily through defense of the homeland and the deployment of SPF in the enemy’s rear area. The TPA use the old Donovian C2 structure: a highly structured chain of command with higher units dictating the actions of subordinate units. While the TPA publicly states that it trains its soldiers to operate at the next higher command level, many commanders may hesitate to show the initiative desired for fear of doing the wrong thing and subsequently being punished.

Maneuver

The TPA uses Donovian tactics along mobile corridors during offensive operations. Armored and mechanized forces will likely place two-thirds of a force forward, in the first echelon, and a little less than one-third in its second attack echelon. TPA SPF will likely maneuver to rear areas by helicopter, plane, or via a tunnel. The TPA seeks to confuse their opponent by concentrating a force in front of them, while the SPF opens the “second front” in their enemy’s rear areas by attacking combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Enemies of the DPRT must watch their flanks and for foot attacks from unexpected directions.

On the offense, the TPA will attack even if they only maintain a 2:1 force advantage. They will attempt to break through the initial defensive line with its infantry forces, then pass an armor or mechanized force through the gap in the lines to attack the CS/CSS elements in the rear areas. If possible, the TPA does not want to get involved with a combat arms on combat arms battle. The TPA wants its combat arms units to destroy its enemies’ combat support and combat service support units.

On the defense, the TPA is mostly concerned with the enemy’s armored forces. Thus, they concentrate on the destruction of tanks using armor kill zones and a maneuver defense, as found in TC 7-100.2. A TPA division in defense will put approximately 1/3 of its units along the front lines and 5/9 in the second echelon. The remaining 1/9 of the division will serve as an anti-tank mobile reserve, or as the division’s counterattack force.

Air Defense

The TPA fields a large number of air defense systems, including an air defense command within each OSC, and the Capital Defense Air Defense Command at the SHC level. These commands each feature a variety of long-range, medium-range, and short-range air defense artillery weapons. The Capital Defense Air Defense Command also operates an electronic warfare brigade.

The DPRT considers every soldier with a man-portable air defense system to be an air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively low cost and are widely proliferated. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy aircraft operating at low altitude near DPRT units. Ground units also employ them to set ambushes for enemy helicopters, especially those on routine logistics missions. (For more information, see TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 11, Air Defense.)

INFOWAR

The DPRT will likely use all seven Information Warfare (INFOWAR) capabilities—electronic warfare (EW), computer attack, information attack, deception, physical destruction, protection and security measures, and perception management—as best they can. Some systems are in permanent locations while others are mobile. The DPRT has practiced EW with several previous attacks against RoT GPS, hacking of RoT websites, and the attempts to steal digital currency from RoT entities. The TPA places great emphasis on camouflage, a major component of deception operations. The DPRT directs their social media campaign at RoT citizens— not their own—as the common North Torbian cannot access the Internet. The DPRT attempts to manage the perception of its own people through the control of the information environment. The TPA will likely use old school techniques such as leaflets and other propaganda methods to attempt to turn South Torbians into supporting the DPRT. Periodically, the DPRT drops leaflets from balloons over RoT that try to convince the South Torbian people that President’s government is illegitimate and that Song should be ruling all of Torbia.

RISTA

The TPA emphasizes reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. The DPRT uses spies and SPF units in its enemies’ rear areas to conduct its RISTA activities. The TPA can deploy UAVs to obtain additional information on its enemies. Despite no declared war between the two countries, DPRT UAVs have crashed landed in the RoT. Several times in the last decade, the crashed UAVs contained photographs of military installations taken illegally. Whenever the RoT government finds a mysterious UAV in their country and charges the DPRT with spying, the DPRT government always denies ownership. Most DPRT UAVS are tier 2 or 3, but the TPA is in the process of upgrading its UAV fleet to drones that carry cameras that can provide real-time data back to the controller. The chart shows the RISTA capabilities for all units in the DATE-Pacific region including those assets belonging to the DPRT.

Fire Support

The TPA doctrine is similar to Donovian doctrine with heavy emphasis on artillery, missiles, and multiple rocket launchers combined on a single target. If aviation assets are available and not involved in homeland defense on the insertion of SPF elements, the TPAF will provide close air support to the TPA ground forces.

Protection

Due to its belief that its forces cannot achieve air superiority against most of its enemies, TPA doctrine expounds maximum use of active and passive camouflage, concealment, and deception in order to prevent the enemy from locating TPA units and important static positions. The more ordnance that its enemies use against decoys, the less ammunition will hit actual TPA units, positions, buildings, and weapons. (See TC 7-100.2: Opposing Force Tactics, Chapter 12, Engineer Support and Chapter 7, Information Warfare.)

Logistics

While TPA doctrine states that adequate logistics is important, it is unlikely that the DPRT can sustain any significant long-term military operation. The DPRT maintains only a two- to three-month stockpile of food, POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), and replacement parts. It is likely that the DPRT maintains one million tons of rice in storage for potential military operations, and only under the severest conditions will release some of its food stores to help the North Torbians avoid starvation. In any case, the capture of enemy food, equipment, and ammunition will become a high priority for the TPA in order to continue its military operations for any sustained period of time. The DPRT may store up to 10 million barrels of fuel in storage for wartime use, but there are reports of soldiers trading fuel on the black market for fuel to avoid starvation. There are 150 arms factories in the DPRT and 100 other nonmilitary factories that have a dedicated wartime materiel production mission. Any supplies from these factories will go to the military before civilians. Within the last decade, the DPRT purchased 4,000 trucks from Olvana. While the trucks are used in all units, many of them were specifically purchased to improve the logistical capabilities of the ground forces.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

The DPRT possesses chemical as well as nuclear weapons, and may possess biological weapons. The DPRT has not renounced the first use of any of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is expected that the TPA will use chemical weapons during their artillery bombardments. The DPRT will most likely use non-persistent agents against objectives where their soldiers may need to pass through. In areas where the DPRT does not intend to occupy, expect heavy doses of persistent VX nerve agents.

The DPRT has fewer than ten nuclear weapons, but their missile technology prevents them launching against any target over 2000 km away. If Secretary-General Song perceives that his regime is about to collapse—or that an extra-regional power is contemplating regime change—he may order the use nuclear weapons on the belief that it is better to destroy the DPRT than have it exist without him in power.

There are indications that DPRT scientists have been conducting biological research with military applications. A DPRT soldier who recently defected was found to have been vaccinated against anthrax.

Research and Development Goals

The DPRT is working on its missile capabilities and has recently launched an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the range to reach the far western edge of the United States. This puts all countries within DATE-Pacific in range, as well as US possessions in the Pacific Ocean and the state of Hawaii. The issue is miniaturization of the nuclear warhead–current missiles lack the throw weight to lift extant warhead technology. It is expected that the DPRT will achieve this breakthrough within the next five years.

Special Considerations

The DPRT is a military dictatorship ran by a despot. Almost all DPRT served or are serving in the military, and even if they leave active military service, all veterans must continue to serve in the reserves until age 55. The DPRT youth begin receiving basic military training when they are 14 years old. If necessary, Song will use every person in his country to defend his regime. Do not expect massive surrenders, as the people have been indoctrinated to fight to the death.

To prevent their people from leaving the country, the DPRT strictly controls the mutual border with the RoT. Those who attempt to illegally cross into the RoT are imprisoned, along with three generations of their family. This fear of what may happen to their family prevents many DPRT citizens from fighting back against the regime. Large numbers of DPRT soldiers patrol the border to prevent defections. The DPRT government says it is to prevent smugglers and other criminals from coming from south of the border, but in reality it is to prevent people fleeing the Song regime.

Summary

The DPRT maintains a large military with the goal to eventually unify all of Torbia under the control of the DPRT leader, Secretary-General Song Chong-Su. The TPA trains hard, but is faced with issues revolving around outdated equipment and its maintenance. The individual TPA soldier is tough, but may be limited by his equipment and a fear of not following orders exactly as given. While the TPA says they want their soldiers to take initiative, this is often not achieved in practice. Do not underestimate the TPA, the TPN, or the TPAF. Due to their numbers alone, all three branches of the military maintain the capability to inflict significant casualties on any opponent.