Africa
The purpose of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) - Africa is to provide the US Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of four operational environments (OEs) in the African region; specifically the fictional countries of Amari, Kujenga, Ziwa, and Nyumba. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events but does not provide a complete scenario. DATE-Africa offers discussions of OE conditions through the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) and partner nations that participate in DATE-compliant Army or joint training exercises.
Contents
- 1 What is DATE?
- 2 The Changing Character of Warfare
- 3 Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
- 4 How to Use the DATE
- 5 Divergent Aspects of DATE from real-world OEs.
- 6 Providing Feedback
DATE World, with its four regions (Africa, Caucasus, Europe, and Pacific), is constructed using real-world conditions to challenge unit training objectives. The OEs present in the regions are composites based on data and analysis of global OEs to provide foundational OEs that can be adapted to fit the training requirements of any training event across multiple domains.
The conditions described through PMESII-PT variables offer insight into each fictitious country’s dynamic, and multidimensional environment. The conditions described for each country create a local and strategic narratives based upon global conditions which enables the interweaving across the DATE World regions.
The force structures provided for each actor (both state and non-state) provides a baseline for developing a scenario specific Order of Battle for exercise implementation. The force structures provided through ODIN are not task-organized and can be adjusted as necessary to meet training and exercise objectives (e.g., an exercise may require ADA to be pushed to lower echelons. ADA resident in Olvana DIV FS can be task organized down to BN, etc.).
DATE World foundational content is intended to provide scenario and exercise designers with the basis for their OE and OE Assessment products described in TC 7-101, Exercise Design. The DATE Knowledge Base is also intended to enable home-station training (HTS), and provide contextualizing OE information for training participants.
DATE World consists of 20 unique OEs spread across four interconnected regions: Caucasus, Africa, Europe, and Pacific.
What is DATE?
The intent of DATE World is to provide enough detail for scenario designers to rapidly build a plausible scenario while enabling a wide-range of variations that allow for flexibility. For example, the OE conditions provided within DATE describe the basic state of a country's economy, political system, and infrastructure that can be scaled in ways that cause changes that lead to conflict or the need for intervention. At the designer's discretion, any DATE country could be allied or belligerent with any of the other DATE countries. However, per AR 350-2, however, scenario developers are explicitly restricted from using real-world countries as belligerents in DATE scenarios. DATE World consists of the following key components and characteristics:
- Composite OEs representative of real-world conditions.
- All OE conditions and actor characteristics and capabilities are realistic; countries are given fictitious names for AR 350-2 (Opposing Force Program) compliance.
- Each DATE World region provides a range of geographical features and conditions with embedded realistic actors capable of fulfilling the full range of potential threat capabilities up to and including near-peer and pacing threats.
- DATE World provides the conditions required to effectively train for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).
- DATE World provides the conditions needed to realistically and effectively challenge ANY Army task.
- DATE World provides the foundation for a variety of realistic challenges to collective tasks.
- DATE World provides complex OEs with and includes actors that can serve as adversaries that can be employed to challenge any unit’s training objective.
- DATE World is Dynamic – regularly updated to incorporate new conditions, and any updated military organizations, systems, and capabilities.
- DATE World is Scalable – scale to level of complexity based on training objectives.
The Changing Character of Warfare
Each DATE OE incorporates conditions derived from TP 525-92 “The Changing Character of Warfare.” This document is the TRADOC G-2’s view of the current and near-term strategic environment. The goal is to highlight the most significant global conditions and related military implications.
TRADOC G-2 uses TP 525-92 to frame all OE work across the Army. Because only when the conditions of the OE are captured, understood, and factored into Army decision-making, can realistic training occur, the correct mix of systems and capabilities be determined, and the proper approaches to leader development and education be identified and implemented across the Army. Thus, each DATE conditional framework is designed to optimize desired learning or training objectives within the Army Learning Model use for training, education, and leader development in both the operational and institutional domains.
- Potential for adversary overmatch - Overmatch is the application of adversary capabilities or unique techniques with the intent to prevent or mitigate U.S. forces tactics or equipment.
- Increased momentum of human interaction and events - Meeting the challenge of increased momentum will require the Army to integrate capabilities in time, space, and purpose to adapt quickly to momentum shifts.
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) - Solving future WMD challenges require ground forces that have the ability to endure for the considerable amounts of time in inhospitable conditions.
- Demographics and operations among populations in complex terrain - With continuing worldwide urbanization; populations in dense urban terrain will be a pervasive condition for future Army operations.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
The DATE World framework reflects the five main characteristics of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) conducted in multiple environments (arctic, sub-arctic, jungle, mountains, littoral and urban environments that include mega-cities) across tropic, temperate, dry and continental climate zones that are likely to impact land force operations in the future.
- Conditions within DATE are competition based, however they are intended to lay the foundation for scenarios based in competition, crisis, conflict, and change.
- DATE World was originally designed for training focused on the Land Domain, however it is constantly being updated to integrate conditions needed to represent and replicate all domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) in the training OE.
- Increased integration of the cyber and space domains - As part of MDO, the cyber and space domains increasingly impact land force operations.
How to Use the DATE
DATE World is a tool for the training community to use across training events ranging from rotations at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to individual home station training (HST) events. It is the baseline document for all the conditions and characteristics of the Operational Environment (OE) in the selected region. Exercise planners should use this document for all exercise and scenario design requirements.
DATE was developed and designed to enable flexibility and creativity in its application. Not all conditions present in DATE World need to be represented during each training event. Specific training requirements should drive the scenario development and conditions replicated. If additional description or detail is needed for a given condition, each exercise planner can add that condition into the narrative. The intent is for DATE World to provide a stable baseline of conditions—including group naming conventions and associated conditions—while allowing for any additional narrative to be added as required by the training tasks. Fundamentally changing the basic nature of an operational variable in an OE will increase inconsistencies across the other variables and diminish the integrity of the DATE World OE as a whole.
DATE World provides representations of real world conditions – Scenario Developers and trainers then replicate those conditions in training.
Examples of Consistent and Inconsistent Alterations to DATE content:
| Consistent - Adding helpful detail to an operational variable in an OE | Inconsistent - Fundamentally changing the basic nature of an operational variable in an OE |
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See also TC 7-101 Exercise Design.
Divergent Aspects of DATE from real-world OEs.
The dual and competing purposes of the DATE are to 1) provide a complex set of realistic training situations that a unit could face and 2) standardize a multipurpose exercise operational environment to reduce the "backstory learning curve" for exercise participants and the opposing forces (OPFOR). TC 7-101 discusses the issues the command and training community should consider before deciding on the use of DATE or a more MRX-oriented training event.
Time
While describing OE variables requires some historical narrative, the DATE Knowledge Base has intentionally reduced the timelines seen in earlier DATE products. More detailed historical discussions may be helpful for particular OE assessments or "roads to war," however placing them in the overall body of DATE material would reduce the DATEs flexibility by fixing relationships between certain countries. Historical discussions are only used to provide a plausible rationale for why a condition may or may not exist.
Two different categories of dates exist in this document. The first are “fixed” dates, which are those that have a specific day/month/year. An example is the Council of Guardians Revolution in Ariana, which took place in early 1979. Fixed dates do not change with the passage of time. The second category is "sliding" dates, which are described as having occurred a certain number of years ago. An example is the Four Traitors incident in Donovia, which happened 20 years ago. Sliding dates change with the passage of time: an exercise held in 2014 would place the Four Traitors incident in 1994, while one held in 2023 will place the Four Traitors incident in 2003. With few exceptions, all post-1989 dates are sliding dates. The timelines provided in the Time variable of each OE are broken out by fixed and sliding dates for convenience, but some overlap of the two may occur.
Geography
The fictitious OEs of the DATE exist in four different, yet interconnected geographic regions. It may be frustrating that some territory adjacent to the DATE OEs is "grayed out" and only vaguely described in the narratives. This does not mean that these countries cannot be played in DATE scenarios. On the contrary, both the terrain and actors can be played as long as they countries are played as themselves, and as members of a coalition with the US, not as belligerents or members of the belligerent’s coalition.
DATE developers broadened their geographic considerations to better reflect the differing conditions seen around the world. In addition, the intent is that an exercise designer can use as much or as little of each DATE framework as they require. For example, an exercise using DATE Africa as a base can have elements from across the DATE World, such as Olvana exerting economic influence by investing in the development of a nation’s infrastructure, or, alternatively, they might just utilize the relationship between two DATE Africa OEs such as Amari and Kujenga.
International Relations
The only nations in play for designers are our own forces (US and exercise partners) and DATE countries; the exceptions are the real-world European countries in DATE Europe, which can only be utilized as 'friendly forces', not hostile to the US or exercise partners. The United Nations and its various entities are also in play, however, the exercise participants and the DATE countries are the only acceptable force providers. Designers are free to describe relations between nations in the different DATE OEs. For example, a scenario may require Olvana, from DATE Pacific, to a military mission to Amari, in DATE Africa. The DATE OE content sets characteristics of each nation, and the framework within which they interact, but their scenario-specific interactions can be dialed up or dialed down as needed. Some nations may seem inherently linked, such as South Torbia’s economic support Gabal in DATE, however this is simply a starting point, and scenario designers should feel comfortable creating a road to war that sees that economic relationship cease to exist. OE Combatant Commands (COCOMs): No COCOM is defined for any of the OEs in the DATE. Instead, the exercise designer determines which COCOM each country will fall under for that exercise. This allows a COCOM to either “own” the entire region or be required to engage in inter-COCOM coordination due to other COCOM(s) having responsibility for one or more of the countries used in the exercise.
Providing Feedback
Please send an email to [[1]] if you would like to provide feedback or submit an RFI.
Continuous review and revision by DATE Stakeholders and users is essential for the DATE Knowledge Base to serve the exercise design community.
The wiki-media nature of the DATE Knowledge Base enables an easy, trackable, revision of all aspects on ODIN.
Example Errors That May Be Encountered
- internal contradiction or inconsistency between variables (e.g. a tier 1 military with a tier 5 GDP)
- factual error (usually related to the physical variable)
- aggregated conditions described do not exist in the target OE (e.g. overemphasis on one dimension within a variable skews the real story of the variable across the OE)
Example Omissions That May Be Encountered
- significant conditions in the OE not described in the DATE
- additional support required across variables to establish a plausible condition
User Driven Additions
The maintenance and development of DATE is a collaborative effort between content developers, analysts, scenario designers, and the ultimate users. If you believe that the DATE World would benefit from one of your ideas (big or small) please reach out to us. Your idea could drive future development and impact the direction of DATE World as the U.S. Army’s training OE.
Recommendations can be focused on time (history) or space (geography) within the DATE and should include rationale. Recommendations can also be focused on adding more depth to the different PMESII-PT variables used to describe the environment (e.g. providing further detail to the human domain, or specific infrastructure advances).
When providing suggestions, please try to address the following subjects:
- Explain what training tasks cannot be fully developed in an exercise without the added detail.
- Explain the conditions that you would like to incorporate, and how you believe they will help address the training tasks you mentioned.
- Try to provide real-world examples that either inform or are related to your suggestion.
Please review "Providing DATE Feedback"
(See also Using the DATE and TC 7-101 Exercise Design).
Key Points
- The countries in the region have experienced dramatic changes in governing regimes over the last few decades.
- Political, economic, and environmental changes have created societal pressures that spawn conflict between nations, political factions, international players, and potential threat actors.
- The complex tapestry of ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious loyalties make diplomatic and military operations in the region difficult.
- US forces may be required to conduct operations in the region in a wide range of roles and will likely operate in a combined effort with other forces.
Countries in the DATE Africa Operational Environment
Republic of Amari
Amari, with its capital at Kisumu, is a functioning and relatively stable democracy, receiving significant support from the US and other western countries. A new constitution, implemented seven years ago, has attempted to create a framework for better governance with good results. Ethnic and tribal tensions play out in multi-party politics, which has led to a history of electoral violence and distrust of the government. The last election, was uniquely free of the violence of past elections. Other concerns include border security, instability spillover from neighboring countries, regional competition for resources, and terrorism.
Republic of Ziwa
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Republic of Kujenga
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Democratic Republic of Nyumba
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Strategic Positioning
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Regional Views of the US
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Regional PMESII-PT Overview
Political
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| Amari | Ziwa | Kujenga | Nyumba | |
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Military
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Economic
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| Amari | Ziwa | Kujenga | Nyumba | |
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Social
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| Amari | Ziwa | Kujenga | Nyumba | |
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Information
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| Amari | Ziwa | Kujenga | Nyumba | |
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Infrastructure
Despite the cost, both domestic and international players are keen to expand Africa’s infrastructure. For the most part, states control infrastructure systems but with a trend towards public-private partnerships (PPP). Development finance institutions provide the bulk of the financing, followed by domestic government financing. China is the single largest international financier and constructor of African infrastructure on a standalone basis, involved in 14% of the major infrastructure projects undertaken in 2015.
The typical African infrastructure project usually involves a consortium of non-African state development agencies, international government organizations, private financiers, and construction companies. Following the financing announcement, the subsequent spending or progress is hard to trace until the project is finally complete. In some cases, grand projects compete to the point where they lose their utility.
Developed infrastructure correlates with population density. Amari’s Nairobi, Kampala and Mombasa are the main cities and key nodes of the 800-mile Northern Transport Corridor, a road, rail, and pipeline network. Kujenga follows Amari in both population and infrastructure development, with the competing Central Corridor linking the Indian Ocean port of Dar Es Salaam with Lake Tanganyika and Ziwa’s capital, Mwanza on the southern shore of Lake Victoria. The major north-south transportation artery runs through Moyale in Nyumba, crossing into Amari just south of Isiolo, through Nairobi on to Mbeya, Kujenga in the south. Regional rivalries focus on providing Indian Ocean access to landlocked countries at the expense of strengthening this north-south trans-Africa route. Adding to this competition is the Lamu Port Express (LAPEX) Corridor, a planned southeast-northwest road/rail/pipeline corridor mainly within Nyumba connecting north central Africa with the Indian Ocean port of Lamu. Isiolo would serve as a transportation and refining hub.
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See also: Amari Infrastructure, Ziwa Infrastructure, Kujenga Infrastructure, Nyumba Infrastructure
Physical Environment
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Time
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Significant Conditions in the OE
Peacekeeping Forces
- International Peacekeeping Forces.
TO-DO: Description goes here Recent examples of peacekeeping forces with and international mandate include the forces of the UN mission in DATE Africa and the European Training Mission in DATE Africa.
- Regional Peacekeeping Forces.
TO-DO: Description goes here Recent examples of regional peacekeeping forces include the forces of the Regional Standby Force and the Regional Monitoring Group's Regional Economic Community Security Force.
See Also: TBD
Private Security Forces
- Corporate Private Security Forces.
Wealthy individuals and businesses may contract the services of corporate security forces. These forces are highly disciplined, organized and trained - recruiting mostly from former elite military and paramilitary forces. They are often used for high-end site and VIP security. They are capable of conducting small-unit, high-risk strikes with state-of-the-art equipment and vehicles. They have a significant intelligence and planning capability. While highly effective and fiercely loyal to their employer, they may have the propensity of over-aggression and risk extra-judicial actions. They may contract local security companies (see below) for mundane activities. Examples: Jaguar Integral Defence Services International (JIDSI).
- Private Security Companies.
Rampant crime and inadequate policing, particularly in the urban areas has led to the rise of numerous private security companies. These companies provide security services for businesses and individuals ranging from static guards to armed response teams. Guarded facilities will likely have barbed wire and monitored cameras. The guards themselves are variously uniformed, from simple reflective vests and caps to military-style garb. They will either be unarmed (batons, irritants) or have a variety of small arms. The quality and cost of the services may indicate the professionalism of responses and adherence to company rules of engagement. These guards are often well-regarded in the community and may have excellent situational awareness of local activities and dynamics, as well as those of the poorer areas from which they are often recruited. Note: Non-commercial "neighborhood watches" may exist, but are less likely to be armed or provocative.
See also: TC 7-100 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5, Noncombatants - Private Security Contractors
Non-Governmental Organizations
- TODO: list general types, roles; include camps
See also: TC 7-100 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 5, Noncombatants - Nongovernmental Organizations
Hybrid Irregular Armed Groups
The variety of armed groups operating within the OE is indicative of its complex and dynamic political, economic, ethnic, and religious issues. Their structures are as diverse as their ideological drivers. Most are not pure insurgencies, guerrilla groups, or militias, but rather hybrids of all of these. The key differentiators of these groups is their relative mix of forces and the primary driver of their actions.
Violent Extremist Organizations. There are a number of international or transnational Higher Affiliated Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) presently operating within the OE. Many of these groups have indigenous origins, but have since affiliated with external groups for support and identity. Others may have their origins outside of the OE and gained a foothold on the continent. These hybrid organizations have the capability to organize and execute high-impact attacks against public targets and may be able to mass to conduct semi-conventional operations across the OE.
Major known groups in the OE include Islamic Front in the Heart Africa (AFITHA), Hizbul al-Harakat, and the Army of Justice and Purity(AJP). The volatility of security situations across the OE allow rapid growth and morphing of extremist groups as they position for power and influence. Groups will change their tactics and affiliations to adapt to evolving country and regional dynamics.
Insurgencies. Whether motivated by political, religious, or other ideologies, these groups will promote an agenda of subversion and violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. The composition of these in the OE is almost always a hybrid of insurgent elements and guerrilla forces, depending on the locale, goals, and levels of support. They may act as the militant arm of a legitimate political organization. These groups will undermine and fight against the government and any forces invited by or supporting it. They are likely to target government security forces and even civilians to demonstrate force and create instability. They will conduct small operations, such as kidnapping, assassination, bombings, car bombs, and larger military-style operations. Examples: Amarian People’s Union, Free Tanga Youth Movement.
Separatist Groups. These groups consist mostly of former (losing) soldiers that fought in a previous revolution or coup. Rather than fighting to overthrow the current regime, their focus is to secure a territory and gain officially recognition. These groups will likely have widespread support in the controlled area and view government or external forces as the enemy. They may provide security for commercial or NGO movement for a fee or to curry favor. Separatists will be very protective of their designated borders and may react disproportionately to perceived incursions. Examples: Pemba Island Native Army, Other Separatist Group.
Ethnic or Religious Rebel Groups. Numerous conflicts that are highlight ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences have led to the development of ethnicity-focused armed groups. Some groups have developed in self-defense against such groups, then gone onto be violent themselves. Extreme passions of these groups have led to often brazen atrocities, causing massive waves of IDPs. Multiple UN interventions may have temporarily quelled the violence, but long-held grievances give life to renewed violence. These groups may conduct raids, extrajudicial killings, targeted killings of civilians, and summary executions. There have been reports of rebels luring villagers to their town center for execution, often throwing bodies into the village water source to spoil it. These groups may attempt to seize strategic routes to assert control and raise funds. Example: Army of Justice and Purity (AJP).
Local Armed Militias. These groups usually have a local focus and may be independent or supported by a local strongman. Their forces are mostly comprised of former soldiers or paramilitary who may have fought for the state, but now serve their own interests. They generally carry small arms, but may have additional capabilities, depending on the goals and support. Moderate factions of these groups may conduct demonstrations, vandalism to force political concessions, while more radical factions conduct small attacks, riots, sabotage to enforce a particular ideology. In rural areas, they may be heavily armed and appear almost like a guerrilla force. In urban centers, they may resemble a gang or an insurgent group. Examples: Mara-Suswa Rebel Army (MSRA), Kujengan Bush Militias.
| Group Name | Type | Country | Description |
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| Amarian People’s Union (APU) | Insurgency | Amari |  |
| Army of Justice and Purity (AJP) | Guerrilla | Kujenga |  |
| Civil Militias | Militia | Nyumba | Nyumban civil militia groups operate and thrive in conditions of state disintegration in areas with little or no state control. Many of the roving gangs will be younger, but groups of older men and possibly women may arm themselves to respond to threats. Civil militia groups are often organized along very narrow political lines, religious intolerance, and ethnic exclusion. The emergence of civil militia-controlled areas has created problems for border enforcement and the lucrative mining and tourism sectors. |
| Donya Syndicate | Criminal | Kujenga | The Donya Syndicate is the largest and most powerful cocaine trafficking organization in the region. Its primary operating base is in and around the Port of Dar es Salaam, although it operates processing and distribution nodes throughout Kujenga. Donya is the most stable and sophisticated of the groups to emerge from the drug turmoil of the 1990s – both within Africa and among central and South American suppliers. |
| Free Tanga Youth Movement (FTYM) | Insurgency | Kujenga |  |
| Hizbul al-Harakat | Violent Extremist | Nyumba |  |
| Hodari Cartel | Criminal | Amari | The Hodari Cartel is the largest and most powerful heroin trafficking organization in the region. Its primary operating base is in and around the Port of Mombasa, although it operates processing and distribution nodes throughout Amari. Limited, tense cooperation among other regional drug trafficking organizations may exist to minimize public or political backlash. |
| Islamic Front in the Heart Africa (AFITHA) | Violent Extremist | -Multiple |  |
| Kujengan Bush Militias | Militia | Kujenga | The Udzungwa mountain range of central [Kujenga] is home to a number of violent gangs and militias. The most prominent are the Waaminifu Boys and the Antivurugu Militia. These groups often align themselves with an ethnic group or religious ideology, but their actions often betray this alignment. Bush militia groups are consistently involved in vicious territorial fights with little regard for the safety of local Kujengans. Constant fighting makes travel through the area dangerous–particularly at night. Bush militia groups and affiliated gangs routinely engage in banditry, raids, poaching, kidnapping, and drug trafficking and smuggling to sustain themselves. |
| Mara-Suswa Rebel Army (MSRA) | Militia | Amari |  |
| Pemba Island Native Army (PINA) | Insurgency | Amari |  |
| Tajammu Militias | Militia | Nyumba | The Tajammu is a violent militia comprised of Nyumban Arab tribes and disaffected camel herding tribes of the Nyumban northern region. They are currently in conflict with Nyumban civil militias in central Nyumba and Hizbul al-Harakat elements in the Nyumban western region. They have been one of the main drivers of violence throughout the region. |
| Union of Peace for the Ziwa (UPZ) | Insurgency | Ziwa | Large pockets of these former regime loyalists and disaffected persons have developed into regions in which Ziwan government forces are consistently harassed and even attacked. UPZ forces have been blamed for and/or taken credit for attacks on tourists and government anti-poaching patrols in the Serengeti and northwestern regions. The most brutal violence occurred in the south, in which UPZ forces claimed responsibility for atrocities against mining operations with ties to the government. |
| Watasi Gang | Militia | Ziwa | The Watasi Gang is an extremely violent militia group operating in Ziwa's mountainous northeastern region. They have also been known to operate across the border in Amari as part of the Mara-Suswa Rebel Army. Watasi Gang members also routinely engage in banditry, raids, poaching, kidnapping, and drug trafficking or smuggling. |
See also TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 2: Insurgents and Chapter 3: Guerrillas
Criminal Organizations and Activities
The often unstable economic and security situations across the continent have allowed criminal activity and corruption to flourish. Elsewhere in the world, corrupting and co-opting of government officials by criminal enterprises is usually to gain operating freedom. In the OE, such activities are competitive enablers, intended to gain access to internal and external markets. How these large-scale domestic criminal enterprises and international criminal manifest within the OE are characteristic of each country's circumstances and history.
Criminal enterprises may have a pronounced impact on military operations in the REGION OE. Dominant criminal elements may view external military forces as a threat to their territorial control, while less-powerful organizations may look to exploit shifts in security and rules of engagement to gain access to markets or power.
The main categories of organized criminal enterprises within the OE include:
- Drug Trafficking
- Human Trafficking & Forced labor
- Commodity Theft and Smuggling
- Illicit mining
- Oil theft, refining, and smuggling
- Protection Economies
- Criminal Gangs
See also TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces, Chapter 4: Criminals
Potential conflict flashpoints
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| DATE Africa Quick Links . | |
|---|---|
| Amari | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
| Kujenga | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
| Nyumba | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
| Ziwa | Political • Military • Economic • Social • Information • Infrastructure • Physical Environment • Time |
| Other | Non-State Threat Actors and Conditions • Criminal Activity • DATE Map References • Using The DATE |